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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the growth and development 
of Manchester airport and the implications of municipal ownership. 
The main theme is the nature of municipal ownerships structures and 
their interaction with other institutional structures andagencies 
in the immediate locale and at national level,which have influenced 
development processes and exercised control with the UK civil air 
transport industry as a Whole, in terms of development policy and 
regulation. 
-- - The implications of municipal a.vnership structures 
within this wider context are viewed fran the general perspective of 
the process of growth and developrent and fran the specific standpoint 
of their implications for the evolution of procedures for and conduct 
of industrial relations at Manchester Airport. In essence the study of 
industrial relations fonns a microcosm in which the potential problems 
introduced by the co-existence of municipal ownership structures 
alongside other ownership fonns wi thin the civil air transport industI:y 
are explored. 
It is arguai that the pattem of growth and developrent at 
Manchester Airport has differed. fran that experiencai at other airports 
situatai in the provinces. Despite the potential constraints upon 
airport developrent em:mating fran municipal ownership, it has 
consti tutai a posi ti ve factor in praroting the growth and developrEIlt 
of airport facilities in Manchester. In essence, municipal enterprise 
has proven to be an appropriate vehicle for maximising gains in an 
industry subject to rapid technological change and growth. Municipal 
ownership supporting the injection of local kna.vlaige, drive, 
ini tiati ve and enthusiasm has prarotai the establishrrEnt of a local 
agenda for developrent, in the absence of positive growth praroting 
forces deriving fran agencies and institutions operating within the 
civil air transport industry as a whole and on the periphery of airport 
operation. It is further arguai that the municipal ownership regilre 
offered the flexibility of approach and adaptability of internal 
organisational structures essential to the changing requi.renEnts of 
airport developnent. As far as industrial relations is concemai, it 
is argued that the application of principles governing the conduct of 
xiii 
industrial relations within the local GoverrmEnt SeJ:vice to airport 
workers, has given co-existence, had a partially negative effect on 
industrial relations with the relatively large group of specialist 
manual workers. Whilst procedures were generally adapted to 
acconm::xiate the special needs of a rmmicipal airport undergoing a 
process of grCMth. and developtEIlt not experienced by its counterparts, 
at the end of the day, the constraints of local authority procedures 
and practices culminated in the rejection of a national negotiating 
machinery which was inherently inflexible. 
1 
An airport fonns an essential part of a nodem. transport systen 
because it is the physical site at which a nodal transfer is made fran 
the air node to surface nodes. Rather than providing goods, an airport 
is concerned. with the provision of a systan of services on demand fran 
a set of plant and fixed. assets which can vary in size, quality and 
nmnber. Clearly the main function of an airport is to facilitate the 
ITOVE!lEn.t of passengers and freight by air. 
An airport constitutes the point of interaction of three major 
canponents canprising the air transport system, viz, the airport itself 
(including the airways control system), the airline and the users. 
Basically for the air transport system to function efficiently, it is 
important for each of these three canponents to reach a position of 
balance with each other. Failure will result in sub-optinal conditions 
which may be manifested. in a variety of ways including deficit 
operations by the airport or by the various airlines using it; 
unsatisfactory 'WOrking conditions for both airline and airport 
employees; inadequate passenger accamndation; insufficient air 
services; unsafe operations; high operational costs to users; 
inadequate support facilities for airlines; long delays; inadequate 
access facilities; and, not least, sluggish passenger demand levels. 
Each condition can lead to a reduction in scale of operations as 
traffic is attracted. elsewhere or, in the absence of substitutes, to 
declining levels of demand within the air transport system. (1) 
In addition to the three major canponents which constitute the 
direct demand and supply elerents of the air transport system, the 
surrounding ccmnunity and its neighbourhood organisations may be 
regarded. as a fourth elem::m.t acting upon and fonning part of the 
institutional framework of an airport. An airport is in constant 
contact with its surrounding envi.ronrrent at l1EIlY levels depending upon 
size and function. As airports differ in type and in scale, so they 
similarly vm:y in their interrelationship with gavernm:mtal and quasi-
gavernm:mtal bodies, and fit within different matrices of allied. and 
associated. organisations at central and local goverrment levels. Small 
2 
airports may have little influence over the developYEl1t of the air 
transport network outside the local area, and in their operation, 
encounter little interaction with the national and international 
institutional structures which govern the developrent of the civil air 
transport industry. ( 2 ) Objectives and goals may be set by an airport 
authority but the achievarent of such goals will be highly dependent 
upon the perceptions of institutions involvai in the control of the 
civil air transport industry and other influential agencies operating 
within the institutional franework. 
Differences in type and scale affect not only interaction with 
external agencies but also internal operation. Ai.rp:)rts providing 
simple passenger tenninals for low voluma operations may provide 
little nore than a tenninal facility, and the internal operation of 
such airports may be no nore canplex than a railway station or 
interurban bus station. '!he natium or large scale airport is, however, 
much nore canplex in operation, and organisational structures need to 
be capable of administering a wide variety of activities dealing with 
the servicing and maintenance of aircraft, airline operations including 
air craN, cabin attendants, ground crew, tenninal and office staff, 
aviation support facilities - including air traffic control and 
IIEtoorology, and goverrmental functions such as custans, imnigration 
and health. With increasing size, operations may be diversified. beyond 
.i.nm:rliate traffic needs, supporting a variety of ancillary businesses 
providing al ternati ve sources of inccma necessary for the financial 
stability of the airport, such as retail concessions. As the scale of 
activity increases, aviation revenues assuma a decreasing importance 
and, in nost countries, airports maintain econanic viability by 
developing a broadly based. revenue capability. In general, the 
organisational structure of the operating authority needs to change in 
oIDer to reflect this naN emphasis on carmarcial revenues. '!hus 
organisational structures will be evolutionary in nature and will, in 
part, depend on previously existing arrangenents and on the ability to 
handle pressures as the scale of operation increases. ( 3 ) 
Ai.rp:)rts may be regaroed. as being similar to other businesses in 
that they require continuous and expensive maintenance, careful control 
of finances, and a planning capability to ensure that the operation can 
respond to changes in demand, technology and working practices. ( 4 ) 
However, there are a nmnber of features of airport operation which 
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dist.inguish it fran other enterprises and fran the classical notion of 
the finn operat.ing under free narket con.di tions . 
Firstly, airports are not footloose .in the classical sense as 
location constra.ints arise fran the need to be .in relative close 
proximity to the narket served. Airp:>rt developrent requires an 
allocation of land far greater than \'\lOUld be necesscuy to support 
alnost any other s.ingle land use function . Currently Manchester 
Airp:>rt occupies Sate 1,400 acres of land. In itself this .invest:mant 
of land can represent a significant opportunity cost. A site must be 
suited to accamodate the forecast size and purpose of the airport and 
can only be abandoned at a heavy price. (5) Therefore, site selection 
is rrore cIUcial than .in many other industries and the early abandOI'lIlSlt 
of the Barton site in Manchester adequately dem:>nstrates the 
difficulties .involved. The acquisition of land for initial developrent 
and to cater for expansion may be costly, but such .invest::nent decisions 
are relatively inf:ra;ruent and the effects of past decisions are long-
lived, as can be seen fran the consideration of the developrent of 
airport facilities .in Manchester which fonns part of Chapter Tv.u. 
Any major public use airport, whether of national or .international 
importance, represents a large scale developrent of multiple runways, 
taxiways and aprons, multiple passenger and cargo tenni.nals, large 
navigational control centres , extensive coverage of fire, ambulance and 
related safety services, .internal security systans, multi-storey car 
parks, and road and feeder route systans. (6) Unlike other ente:rprises 
it is generally difficult to start small and re.invest profits to 
expand. In addition to initial developrent costs the operation and 
ma.intenance of a major .international airport cover.ing a 24 hour period 
during which emergencies can be rout.inely anticipated requires 
substantial capital outlay and cont.inu.ing .invest.nent to keep facilities 
up to date. (7) 
Another factor differentiating airports fran other ente:rprises is 
the need to rrobilise capital first and canplete an airport project 
before benefits can aCCIUe. This provision of heavy capital 
expenditure ahead of demand neans that an airport authority may not 
only face an unranunerati ve period dur.ing constIUction of a facility, 
but also for long periods while traffic builds up. Airp:>rt developrent 
plans are essentially long tenn because of the tine scale of obtaining 
the necesscuy approvals. A decision to establish or extend an airport 
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has always entailed lengthy discussions with one Goverrment depart:nent 
or another on the justification for and siting of the proposal. It 
requires planning pennission which may concern nore than one authority 
because of the extent of the "safeguanting areas" in which the 
developrent of buildings could affect the safe operation of the 
airport. It requires negotiation for the acquisition of land-
possibly by carpulsory purchase order (as was the case in nany 
instances at Manchester) and easemants for approach lighting. Rather 
than the gradual expansion of runways and buildings there are nany 
decisions to be made on " lumps" of inves1::rrEnt representing all or 
nothing propositions, such as the decisions taken by the Manchester 
Corporation in the 1950s to extend the main runway and provide a new 
tenninal building to cope with the jet aircraft of the 1960s. At the 
minimum level of service and for the small airport this "lumpiness" of 
capital inves1::rrEnt is accentuated by the fact that a runway is needed 
as a minimum requiremant. Initially a short runway may be constructed 
with no taxiway, suitable for only light p:ropeller aircraft. As darand 
increases so the use of the runway expands until the question arises as 
to whether to strengthen and lengthen the runway. It is unlikely that 
the short runway will be fully utilised before it becares desirable 
because of the attraction to airlines of cost reductions arising fran 
the use of larger aircraft, to build the longer jet runway. Up to 
capacity then the expansion path involves marginal costs which are 
always below average costs and this is an ~rtant elemant in the 
argmnent for subsidising small airports. ( 8) Gi veIl this lumpiness of 
inves1::rrEnt and long gestation period involved, airport developrent can 
only be viewed fran a long-run perspective; this in itself fonns a 
prinary justification for adopting an historical approach. 
InvestnEnt decisions are canplicated by the interdependence of 
runway and passenger terminal systems. The threshold of a passenger 
tenninal building may be reached in advance of runway congestion or, 
al temati vel y, inves1::rrEnt in runway capacity to cope with large jet 
aircraft may be negated if sufficient passenger terminal facilities are 
not provided to cope with the increased throughput of traffic at any 
one tine. The anount of capital exr-endi ture on tenninal facilities 
depends not only on the potential annual throughput of traffic but on 
traffic expected in the busiest periods of the busiest days. Air 
travel is concentrated at certain hours of the day on particular days 
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of the week in the smrrrer season. Facilities cannot be easily adjusted. 
to these different demand conditions and indivisibilities characterise 
the supply of airport services and related facilities. (9 ) 
Individual investnen.t decisions nay have an unintentional - but 
nevertheless significant - impact upon airports in neighbouring 
regions. Traffic catchmant areas overlap local boundaries so that the 
action of one airport authority may affect another in a variety of 
ways. For example, if one of a nmnber of airports with the potential 
to serve a caulon catchmant area generating the sarna level of denand 
differentiates itself fran its neighbours by operating upon supply-side 
factors, such as providing the necessary facilities to cater for the 
aircraft which airlines wish to operate on particular inter-regional 
routes, then that airport has the potential to attract the lion's share 
of traffic wi thin that region. The extension of Manchester Airport's 
catchnent area in the post-war years is a factor highlighted. in Chapter 
Two. The inte:rdependence of investnen.t decisions, coupled with the high 
proportion of capital costs invol verl in developrent rreans that 
canpetition nay not prevail as many would-be operators nay not be able 
to finance developrent without aid. So even where potential denand 
exists, if an airport is not large enough or facilities are not 
provided sufficiently ahead of demand, nonopoly or SarE fonn of 
oligopoly of air transport services is likely to E!ll3rge as the result 
of the attraction of traffic elsewhere. Interdependence nay also have 
a negative impact on the airport authority which decides to invest for 
expansion as the prine econanic unit of the civil air transport 
industry, the air route , involves both a point of origin and a point of 
destination. If one airport on a route invests in facilities to cater 
for a particular aircraft type and volurre of throughput whilst the 
other airport fails to invest to the sarna degree because of different 
perceptions or goals, then potential traffic on the route can be lost-
so affecting adversely both airports. 
Given the nature of investnen.t decisions airports operate in a 
highly pJli tical envirol1IIB1t. They are often regarded as facilities 
requiring public investnen.t and, as such, frequently fonn part of a 
national airports systan designed and financed to produce the maximmn 
benefit. Attempts at national airport planning and policy rega:rding 
the financing of airport facilities are considered in Chapter Five and 
it is clear that airports in rarote areas may be regarded as providing 
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an essential public service and thus the profit noti ve na.y not 
necessarily be pararrount. National constraints detennine the nature of 
current and future traffic handled in tenns of pararreters such as 
volume, aircraft types, international/domestic traffic split, the 
number of airlines served and potential growth rates. Although such 
constraints are a detennin.ing factor in airport developrETlt, they can 
clash with other conditions in the operating environrrEnt. In one sense 
civil aviation is concerned with supplying a transport service, 
satisfying a derived. denand which arises fran the need to match the 
production of goods and services with points of consumption, but 
spatially this acti vi ty is not constrained by national boundaries. 
Since air transport services operate within an international setting, 
the achievemant of a spatial optimum may require fun.c:iarrental co-
ordination at the international level. This study therefore considers 
the nature of the international regulatory frarta\Urk as part of Chapter 
Six. 
Perhaps the IIOst significant distinguishing feature of an airport is 
the relatively high incidence of externalities which arise fran 
operation. Although the construction and expansion of a large 
international airport and of access links to the rretropoli tan area may 
immediately benefit air travellers, business interests and the 
industrial activities of a region, such developrent also leaves an 
imprint on the fonn, structure and pattern of growth of the urban areas 
served. Airports may generate social disarren.ities and physical 
envirol1IlE11tal impacts which affect the "neighbours" in the vicinity of 
the site. Public safety and noise regulations related to aircraft 
operations may have a direct impact on the kind of land uses pennitted 
in the area irrmacliately surrounding the site. The operation of safety 
and noise zones can IIEa1l the prohibition of building within a certain 
distance of nmways, and control in land use such as the curtai1nent of 
residential developrent within areas of high annoyance falling within 
the airport's noise shadow. Thus airports have a particularly strong 
relationship with their surrounding locality - a characteristic which 
is investigated in Chapter Four. 
Airports also provide several ingredients that encourage urban 
growth. Airport services are labour-intensive and fonn an ilnportant 
source of anploymant. Airport authorities thansel ves may be large 
anployers and this direct employnent extends to on-site anploynent in 
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services .inm:rliately related to airport and aircraft operators. '!he 
operation of an airport introduces a large number of basic jobs wi thin 
a region. An influx of workers and their dependent families nay 
increase population. '!he nost important region-wide impact of 
BIploynent directly related to airport services nay be the paynent of 
higher than average wages influencing ali'loyee expenditure patterns. 
So the outcana of this ali'loynent is likely to be a considerable and 
lasting increase in regional incare. 
Employees of industries relaterl to airport services generally follow 
the short journey to work tradition and settle in relative proximity to 
the workplace, and the spending of their incare induces a multiplier 
effect which ripples through the labour rrarket with primary ali'loymant 
giving rise to jobs in seconclal:y and main! Y service industries like 
retailing. A similar impact on other sectors derives fran the 
increased. demand for housing near the airport causing a surge in town 
building and an associaterl increase in public services like water and 
sewage. '!his secondary and service ali'loynent is, therefore, not 
related to the airport site but is associated with the airport 
BIploynent base. Employees who fill service jobs, together with their 
dependent families, will bring about a further increase in population. 
Apart fran these incare effects fran ali'loynent, spending by passengers 
and friends at an airport will further contribute to the econany of the 
airport region. Many will earn their incare outside and in a way 
analogous to the foreign. tourist spending will contribute to the 
region's exports further assisting an increase in ineates. 
As traffic flows to airports are often higher than those converging 
on any other single activity centre outside the central business 
district, airports must be served. by a "superior" roadway system. '!he 
vicinity of an airport nay be an attractive location for businesses 
such as trading canpanies and banks frequently in contact with other 
countries, and for manufacturers of high value products dispatcherl by 
air and for distribution centres of nore than regional importance. 
However, in addition to these secondary activities which are directly 
linked. to the existence of an airport, the well developed road nebourk 
which exists to serve the airport will, in itself, attract industries 
and tertiary services. These nay include transport orientated 
industries wi. th national or international markets; regional rrarket 
industries serving the netropoli tan area; research and new product 
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industries; and hotels, offices, catering finns, car hire outlets and 
warehouses. Other secondary effects flow fran the opening up of the 
region to provide access to the airport, for example, the products of 
original inhabitants may be transported. rrore cheaply and. rrore distant 
markets will beoame accessible. 
In short, airport developrent invariably requires major invest.mant 
in infrastnlcture and public utility and the surrounding area beoames a 
natural focus for developrent. In the long-run in the absence of 
strict control airport sub-regions can beoame dense urbanised zones. 
Historically, in the UK many airports were located on inexpensive flat 
land near the urban periphery for technical reasons. ~t of 
infrastnlcture serving the airport ripened developrent potential of 
these corridors. As cities began pushing out into less populated. 
hinterlands in the 1950s and 1960s the infrastnlcture designed. to serve 
the airport provided a ready link to the relatively undeveloped areas 
beyond. The ensuing developrent may have had little to do with the 
presence of the airport itself, but was stimulated or accelerated. by 
the airport's need. for an extensive road transport system. Thus 
inadvertantly airports played a role in opening up new corridors for 
development just when many large cities were witnessing major 
population redistributions. 
The indirect effects or externalities of airport operation are 
clearly highly significant. However, they are nore difficult to 
IIEasure or even to identify than direct effects. Any assessnent of 
externalities will inevitably be coloured by perceptions and goals in a 
wider context. The urbanisation effects of airport developoant may be 
regamed as positive or negative depending upon the general goals of 
national and regional plarming institutions. Where the policy is to 
st.imul.ate the growth of a hitherto unde:rdeveloped area an airport can 
serve as a powerful tool towards this end. If the goal is to slow down 
further expansion of an already highly urbanised region or to preserve 
an area as a valuable agricultural open space or recreational resource, 
the constnlction of a major airport or expansion of an existing one 
might Dill counter to that goal. (10) In the local arena the anenity 
groups which conceDl thE!IlSel ves with the disamani ties of airport 
operation are nore than likely to find thE!IlSel ves in a directly 
opposing camp to local Chambers of Camerce and other ad-hoc airport 
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" booster" groups which may develop to represent a miscellany of 
interests which are activated by such opposition. .As this thesis is 
not generally concerned with the externalities of airport operation no 
attempt at measUI'E!IB1t was made. HaNever, in examining the role of 
local and national agencies in decision making processes, the local 
camruni ty cannot be discounted. '!herefore, Chapter Four centres on the 
influence exercised by representative groups in the ilma:li.ate locality. 
Given the possibility that airports may act as grcMth points, 
govenments may exercise control in such a way as to prarote an airport 
as an instrurrEnt for redistributing prosperity be~ one region and 
another. IDeal authorities might similarly welcxma the material 
prosperity pranised by an airport. Possibly regional plarmers and 
politicians may find it easier than their national counterparts to 
envisage the effects of a proposed airport, to decide whether or not to 
accept the proposal and to identify any m:xlifications to it and this 
superior knowledge may add weight to the goals set at this level. This 
is an essential there of this thesis which investigates the grcMth and 
developrent of an airport which has fran its begirmings been owned and 
managed by a local authority. 
Fran the foregoing, it is suggested that airports differ fran the 
classical finn in a number of significant ways. These differences 
which relate to the nature of the market in which they operate; the 
canplexity of the institutional franework which influences their 
activities; the evolving internal organisational structure which 
develops with increasing scale; the peculiar nature of and constraints 
upon invest.m:mt decisions; and the scale of externalities which flow 
fran airport operation fonn a key justification for examining the 
process of developrent at Manchester Airport in detail. 
Whilst airports differ fran the classical finn equally there are fEM 
parallels to be drawn between civil air transport and other transport 
industries. The concept of social overhead capital and its 
distinguishing characteristics fonns a useful basis for carp:rrison. 
The transport developrents in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain 
encanpassing Turnpike roads, canals and railways represented capital 
fonnation in an area basic to a number of econanic activities. '!hese 
transport systems were expensive to provide in carp:rrison with 
manufacturing industry and were essentially non-importable. Large 
annunts of capital outlay representing I1Dre than the individual could 
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be expected to accumulate were involved so ownership and control was 
ini tiall y vested in trusts for Turnpike roads; these were superceded by 
the introduction of private non-participatory shareholders in the canal 
network; and finally this process culminated in a national market for 
railway shares in the mid-nineteenth century. Projects took a 
considerable time to construct with a long gestation period before any 
retUDl on capital could be expected and a high capital-output ratio 
reflected the technical indi visibili ties involved in developIEIlt. 
Several econanic historians have highlighted the significance of these 
developnents as a source of external econanies; these generated a 
retUDl on investmant which flowed. indirectly to the camnmity as a 
whole. The need to provide facilities ahead of darand has also been 
identified as another distinguishing feature of social overhead 
capital. 
Broadly speaking an airport displays the characteristics which 
differentiate social overhead capital fran other types of capital 
formation such as high capital-output ratios, technical 
indvisibilities, long gestation and external econanies. With reference 
to the source of capital funds for major airport developrents in the 
twentieth century the nonn has involved substantial in jections of 
public investmant and has confornai nore to the concept of social 
overhead capital than the transport developrents of earlier centuries 
which were funded by private capital of one fonn or another. However, 
a fundanEntal point of difference bebram civil air transport and other 
transport networks is the incidence of variable patterns of ownership 
reflecting the respective stages of developrent and the differing 
functions involved. 
Throughout the stages of the developrent of the civil air transport 
industry private airfields have existed alongside municipal and state 
awned airfields. Similarly the airlines which the airports have served 
over tine have also taken on mixed fonns of CMIlership. The 
institutional franework for the developrent of the railway network in 
Britain contrasts sharply with this arrangarent. Ownership and control 
may have changed significantly through time with the nerging of the 
small railway canpanies into the major trunk line canpanies which ~ 
succeeded by the wholesale nationalisation of the network as a single 
entity after the Second w:>rld War, but the node of control and 
ownership of different parts of the network has not differerl so far 
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through space. 
As far as the railway network of the nineteenth and. twentieth 
century is concerned. the railway station - which might be regarded. at 
the distribution and. collection point on the surface net\\Urk equivalent 
to the airport on the air route net\\Urk - the rolling stock, railway 
tracks and other capital stock were under one single unit of ownership 
and control. Decisions as to the planning of routes and the 
developrent of the railway net\\Urk including the establishIrent of 
terminal points, have tended. to be made by the sane people in carm:m 
ownership of the system. By way of contrast, the ownership and control 
of civil air transport is vested. in t\\U distinctly separate and 
fundamantally different econanic units, the airport and the airline. 
This separation of the two branches of the civil air transport industry 
can engender wasteful canpetition between individual airports who may 
try to influence the camercial decisions of the airlines. An analogy 
may be drawn with the Turnpike roads of the eighteenth century which 
were intended. to be self financing by users paying tolls i profits 
depended. upon hOW' Imlch the road was used. and it could be assum:rl that 
if roads were well maintained. then their use would increase. 
Similarly, a well maintained. airport which is constantly adjusting to 
the changing need.s of the airlines may maxllnise returns at the expense 
of other airports. However, the analogy begins to break down when it 
is considered that the true point of canparison is the air route itself 
rather than the airports at the point of departure or destination. The 
key question then concerns the ownership and control of the air route 
network which is rather canplex. The system of international air 
routes has developerl under the control of bilateral agrearen.ts between 
nation states. Licences to operate the route may be granted to 
airlines but this by no IIEanS confers CMIlership of that route. 
Primarily then the fundamantal econanic unit of the air route is owned. 
by neither a single nor a canbination of airlines or airports. 
The segregation of ownership of the different canponents of the 
civil air transport system detracts fran the traditional notion of 
transport systems as items of social overhead capital. As suggested., 
the econanic characteristics of airports generally confonn to the 
acceptErl definition of social overhead capital but the internEdiary, 
the airline, does not fit so easily into this definition. It is 
possible for an airline to function with the minimum capital investmant 
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in say one aeroplane, so the level of capital investmant ra;ruired to 
carmance operations is not necessarily high, and. there is the 
possibility of reinvesting profits to increase the scale of activity. 
Technical indi visibilities are not a problem and. the retuIn on 
investment can be alrrost inm:rliate . Clearly, capital can be imported 
fran other countries and. even the ownership of such capital nay be 
vested in overseas canpanies. Unlike the airport, the airline is also 
relatively footloose in its choice of location since it is rrore or less 
free to select and. subsequently change the operating base fran one 
airport to another. 
Civil aviation and the airports which serve the airlines also differ 
fran other previously developerl fonns of transport in tenns of the 
econanic role perfoDIEd. Like other transport systems , civil aviation 
can contribute significantly to econanic developtent extending the 
geographical area of the narket, lowering production costs, improving 
ccmmmications and diffusing technological innovation . Essentially, if 
the railways helped to build nations then the airlines helped to build 
an inteD1ational market. Transport by aircraft in the twentieth 
century has drastically cut journey tines like the railways of 
nineteenth centw:y Britain - but over much longer distances. This 
process of change has been evolutioruuy. Like the coaching services of 
the eighteenth century, the market for aviation in the inter-war years 
lay with the businessnan and the rich. However, in the post-war 
pericxi, the era of mxienl air transport developerl and narkets becane 
nore diversified and extended. Clearly, the nass passenger transport 
market discovered by the nineteenth centw:y railways bears SatE 
similarity here. However, it could be argued that the social ilrp:ict of 
air travel is of greater magnitude in its extension of tourist and 
family travel cutting across regional, national and international 
cultural and social differences. 
As the transport revolution of the railway network was based on the 
application of steam power to internal transport, the extension of 
civil air transport into ne.v markets has similarly owerl much to 
technological advancarent - although the significant feature of civil 
air transport has been the rapidity of technical developrents in 
aircraft which has ra;ruired the sane pace of change at the airports 
which serve them. (11) '!he history of aviation in the ~tem 
countries since 1913 has been one of alrrost uninterrupted technological 
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advance spurred on by two major conflicts. The era of m:xiern air 
transport after the Second World War was largely basa::i upon the rapid 
gains made in aircraft p:roducti vity which were significantly extenda::i 
by the developtent of the jet airline in the late 1950s. As suggesta::i, 
the facilities required on an airport are primarily detenni.na::i by the 
characteristics of the aircraft, and aircraft have constantly been 
outgrowing airports. The grass nmways which were adequate for the 
transport aircraft of the 1930s have had to be replaced by hard nmways 
to neet the nore exacting requi.l:arEnts of the present day air fleets. 
The length of runways required has been increasing, and approach paths 
needa::i for safe landings have becarE nore critical fran the point of 
view of the freedan fran man-made and natural obstructions. The 
rapidity of technological change and its ilnpact on denand for airport 
facilities has been a major contributory factor in the "lumpiness" of 
investmant decisions. The rate at which aircraft have been developed 
has also made it nore difficult to make sound carnercial judgrrents on 
the econanics of potential new projects at airports. The econanic life 
of an aircraft may be about seven to ten years on average, but delays 
in their developrer1t mean that aircraft tend to be superceda::i earlier. 
In contrast, by nonnal carnercial standards the econanic life of a 
building is about 50 to 60 years. (12) 
In canparison with the developrent of other fonns of. transport, the 
institutional franework which has govema::i the developrent of civil air 
transport has differed fran the accepta::i nOlIn. The role of the airport 
as a tenninal point on the system is neither canparable to the railway 
station in tenns of its integration with other parts of the system, nor 
carp:rrable to the sea port in tenns of the market structure which 
prevails and. the relationship with other fonns of transport. In effect 
the system that ererges is nore the outcare of the interaction of 
nmrerous institutions which are seaningly independent of each other but 
are, in practice, interdependent because of the effects of decisions on 
the other ccmponents of the system. On the face of it each institution 
may set its agenda independently of other forces but, in reality, 
interoependence effects the achievarent of whatever goals are set. 
A survey of the literature regarding transport systens in general 
and. civil aviation in particular reveals that econanic historians have 
overwhelmingly concerna::i themselves with the developrents of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, seeking to explain the interaction 
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between the process of industrialisation and the developrent of the 
maans to carry greater quantities of goods and people over longer 
distances, at greater speed and at reduced cost. The impetus for 
change, the process of change and the consequences of change have all 
been debated at length. 
As far as the civil air transport industry is concern.ed, the 
secondary literature is limited, with arphasis being placed nore on 
airline rather than airport operation - which is probably reflective 
of the notion that airlines are the primary agents of change in 
exercising camercial judgenent as to whether to fly a route or not. 
Notable titles here include the work of Alan Stratford, (1973); Stephen 
Wheatcroft, (1956 and 1964); and David Cobbett (1965). 
Unlike the tenni.nal points on transport systans that have predatErl 
civil air transport, airports have not been viewed as prine rrovers in 
restructuring the econanic base of an extendErl camnmity despite the 
high incidence of externalities. Inevitably there are difficulties in 
derarcating the extent of the camnmity involved in an industry which 
serves roth darestic and international markets at the sane tine, and 
this in turn detracts fran any neani.ngful neasurE!IB1t of the 
contribution of airport developrent to econanic change. In addressing 
the econanic role of other transport systens, attention has focussed on 
the benefits which accrued to the camnmity as a whole. Social costs 
have tended to be regarded as relatively small and far outweighed by 
the long nm benefits of econanic growth. In contrast, airports which 
have developed in a new era of consciousness concerning the envi..rorment 
have been subjected to a close scrutiny which has alrrost exclusively 
centred upon the ilnpact of airport operation on the surrounding 
environIrent; cost-benefit analysis has been the order of the day with a 
considerable emphasis upon costs. As a result, the limited literature 
has been influenced by the thinking and philosophy of geographers and 
spatial planners such as Kenneth Sealy, and Richard de Neufville. A 
notable exception to this general rule has been the work of the 
Transport Studies Group of the Polytechnic of Central IDndon which has 
been involved in the study of the econanics and finance of airports for 
sare 20 years. 
Given that rmmicipal authorities have been involved in airport 
operation fran the very early stages of developrrant of the industry in 
the 1920s, one might expect to find sare references in the public 
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sector econanics literature. fIor..,.1ever, :researchers inte:r::esterl in the 
nature of nnmicipalisation have concentraterl their efforts on the great 
enterprises of gas and electricity which fomed. such a fundarrental part 
of a Victorian philosophy - one that encarp3.sserl social goals which 
have not necessarily underpinnerl the developrent of airports as 
nnmicipal undertakings. The absence of the "public utility" philosophy 
and the fact that the provision of airport facilities has never been a 
mandatory function of local authorities probably accounts for this. 
Within 50 years Manchester Airport has grown fran a snall scale 
scherlulerl air service airport in the 1930s to an international gateway 
airport. The airport has remainerl under local authority control 
throughout the period of developrent. Charting the historical 
developra1t of the airport enables us to examine the nature of 
different institutional fonns involved and the way in which they 
interact to achieve set goals. It is possible to observe the 
:relationship between size, business policy, internal organisation and 
external influence. A number of key issues can be add:r::esserl including 
the impact of nnmicipal ownership structures on the setting and 
achievatent of goals and on capital and labour structures; the 
evolution of internal organisational structures with increasing scale 
and the inplications of interaction with other canponents of the civil 
air transport industry and central goverrment. However, to date the 
secondary literature has been largely confinerl to books and pamphlets 
published. by or on behalf of those engagerl in publicity and marketing 
of the facility. These works am generally highly subjective and 
geared towards a public which is oveI:Whelmingly canpriserl of "aviation 
enthusiasts" interesterl in a very general way, in the developrent of 
"their airport". The thrust of the remainder of the literature tends 
to centre around the :results of :research ccmnissionerl by the airport 
owner for particular purposes and so is limiterl in scope, such as 
various traffic fo:r::ecasting and aircraft noise studies. 
Given the nachinery of regulation and control which has pe:r:vaderl the 
developreI1t of the industry there is a relative abundance of publisherl 
official sources, including GoveD1IIEl1t White Papers and the reports of 
regulatory b:xties. In addition, the nnmicipal ownership of Manchester 
Airport in itself has generaterl a wide variety of unpublisherl sources. 
In any nnmicipal enterprise the anphasis is on public accountability; 
therefore, size of the undertaking is largely irrelevant and data of 
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the sane quality and ~leteness is generate:i whether dea 1 j ng with 
snaIl services such as bathhouses or services like Erlucation which 
tends to account for a major share of IDeal Govemnent expenditure. 
Public accountability also involves exhaustive decision making 
processes and, as a result, an official record is create:i at each level 
of the reporting channels in the hierarchy fran local line managerent, 
to local authority officers, elected nenbers in ccmnittee and finally 
elected nanbers in full Council. 
Whilst Council minutes present major policy decisions, details as to 
why certain decisions were made, what options were considered and the 
consequences of past decisions are providErl in the official record of 
the spending ccmnittee, that is the Airport Carmittee/Airport Authority 
on the one hand, and the Treasury Ccmnittee or Finance Ccmnittee and 
other service carmi ttees such as Establishnent, Policy and Resources, 
etc, on the other. The reports of IDeal Authority Officers and Airport 
ManagE!ll311t supplarent ccmnittee minutes, collectively providing an 
account of the developrent of the life of the airport and its 
acti vi ties. Where the usefulness of this data is lind. tErl by surrnary 
and over-siIrplification, access to the records of the Manchester 
Airport Archive offers the possibility of enhancing the quality of 
information by reference to working files of the airport 
administration. This Archive has been the basic resource of the 
research and access to it has enablErl ne to draw together all the 
available sources of infonnation in the public danain relating to the 
Airport's developrent. WOrking files are supplarente:i by reports 
fo:r:wardErl by the major institutions and agencies involved in the 
process of growth and developnent at the national and local level. In 
addition, the Archive possesses a full range of briefs, proceedings and 
reports of public inquiries and an extensive collection of newspaper 
cuttings, all of which have providErl an invaluable basis for the 
research. In effect, access to the Manchester Airport Archive has been 
fundamantal to this thesis which is basErl lcn:gely on prinary data and 
the availability of public and private sources together has offered 
insights not available elsewhere. 
The central focus of this thesis is municipal enteIprise in the 
context of the institutional fraIlB\1Ork of the long-run growth and 
developoont of Manchester Airport. The main thE!le is the nature of the 
municipal ownership structures and their interaction with other 
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institutional structures and agencies in the .imrediate locale and at 
national level. The implications of nnmicipal ownership structures 
within the wider context are viewed. fran the general perspective of 
growth and developnant, and fran the specific standpoint of their 
implications for the evolution of procedures for and the conduct of, 
industrial relations. This latter arphasis fonns a microcosm in which 
the potential problans introduced by the co-existence of nnmicipal 
ownership structures alongside others within the civil air transport 
industry are explo:r:ed. 
The thesis is structured into three main parts to support the focus 
on the interaction of institutions at the local and national levels, 
with Part III fanning the study of the institutional fra:rrework and the 
specific case of industrial relations. Chapter Two charts the process 
of growth and developIBlt at Manchester Airport fran its beginnings 
down to the late 1970s and canparison with other airports is included 
in order to highlight points of uniquenesss and generality. Chapters 
Three and Four study the relationship between. the airport and its 
.imrediate locality fran the perspective of those "endogenous" factors 
arising fran nnmicipal ownership, and the "exogenous" influences 
i.mpinging upon the developIBlt process. Chapters Five and Six address 
the nature and i.mplications of national policy regarding airport 
developrent and the structure of the airline industry for Manchester 
Airport. Part III is divided into two chapters, the first providing 
the context for a consideration of the conduct of industrial relations 
at Manchester Airport; this examines the separate and distinctive 
evolution of industrial relations in IDcal. Goverrment and the 
concurrent developrent of procedures for the civil air transport 
industry as a whole. Chapter Eight considers the way in which the c0-
existence of these procedures has affected the course of industrial 
relations. Generally research has covered the period up to the late 
1970s, projecting into the early 1980s only when necessary for 
canpleteness. Essentially, 1978 has been regarded as a convenient 
break-point as the award of category "A" International Gateway Airport 
status is viewed as the culmination of a process of growth and 
developnant originating in the early twentieth century. 
It is argued that the pattern of growth and developrent at 
Manchester Airport differs considerably fran the experience of other 
airports in the provinces . Despite SalE obvious potential constraints, 
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I try to show that municipal CMIlership, and. what might be loosely 
terned municipal "pride" has been a positive factor in prcm:>ting the 
growth and developrent of Manchester Airport. Indeed, I suggest that 
municipal enterprise has proven to be an appropriate nodus operandi for 
achieving gains in an industry subject to rapid technological change 
and spurts of growth. In the absence of posi ti ve growth-praroting 
policies in the national arena and the difficulties of a purely 
privately-led approach, municipal ownership supported the injection of 
local knowledge , drive, ini tiati ve and. enthusiasm, and. thereby praroted 
the establishnent of a local agenda for developrent. Whilst the 
benefits accruing to the City of Manchester were initially gainErl at 
the cost of other carmunities in the inm::rl.iate locale, in the long-run 
the perception of cost was tarpered by sare awareness of the positive 
externalities of airport operation. with respect to industrial 
relations, the application of the broad principles governing the 
conduct in the IDeal Gove.rrment Service has been a source of 
instability in relation to the relatively large group of manual \YOrkers 
who identified thanselves nore clearly with workers at larger airports 
operating under different ownership structures. HaNeVer, in the long-
run procedures have been adapted to accarm:xiate the special neErls of a 
municipal airport undergoing growth and. developrent at a pace not 
experienced by its counterparts. 
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UN; '!'Em( CIJAKiE: AIRPCRr FACTT.I'I'IES, 'IRAFFIC AND FINAl£IAL ~ 
2.1 INJ:RO:Xc.rI~ 
This thesis is broadly concerned with the growth and developrent of 
Manchester's airports. The central there is the nature of nnmicipal 
enterprise, thus emphasis is placed upon the institutional frarrework 
deriving fran municipal ownership and interaction with national 
agencies involved in the control and regulation of the civil air 
transport industry. Obviously the study of the institutional franework 
within which growth and developrent has taken place cannot proceed 
without ini tiall y deriving Sc::m3 neasure of the extent of change placing 
experience at Manchester within the wider context of the UK civil air 
transport industry as a whole. As the institutional frarrework itself 
is likely to affect the operation of free narket forces in a variety of 
ways, it is useful to distinguish and consider separately the 
endogenous factors which constitute the underlying conditions 
detennining the potential for growth. 
The aim of this Chapter is to provide an overview of the evolution 
of Manchester Airport which constitutes the general frarravork for 
consideration of the role of institutions at the local and national 
levels. The basic objective is to examine the relative position of 
Manchester Airport through tine, within the UK civil air transport 
industry . Primarily, emphasis is placed on supply-side factors, the 
rrost significant being changes in aircraft technology as they affect 
the requirements for airport facilities. Whilst appreciating that 
demand is influenced by other forces such as incare levels , it is 
suggested that technological change has been a major detenninant of 
growth in, for example, bringing civil air transport within the reach 
of l(){N8r incare groups. 
Operating in an international envi.ronmant the civil air transport 
industry is influenced by changes in the international econcmy such as 
fluctuations in W'Orld trade and world output. The developrent of the 
industry in one country will be affected by balance of paynents and 
exchange conditions. A balance of paynents deficit, for example, may 
lead to trade restrictions and foreign exchange controls both limiting 
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the danand for international air travel. The darestic market for civil 
air transport is also affected by international econanic conditions 
wheI:e contraction on an international scale may limit the extent of 
trans-shipnant wi thin the darestic econcmy, although natural econanic 
conditions aI."e probably the single nost important detenninant of denand. 
in this branch of the industry. It is suggested. that such denmld 
considerations would be I:elevant to an industry-wide appraisal of civil 
air transport, however, the major thrust of this thesis is 
consideration of the I:elati ve position of one particular airp:>rt within 
an overall transport system. Similarly, only limiterl I:eference is made 
to local danand conditions because of the difficulty of defining local 
market boundaries as catchnen.t aI."eaS aI."e extended.. 
'!his chapter charts the extent and patten1. of growth at Manchester 
Airport in tenns of particular inputs and outputs making canparison 
with other UK airp:>rts located. in the regions and the UK airp:>rt 
network in general wheI."e necessary. '!his is supplE!IB1tErl by 
consideration of the growth patten1. arerging within the UK civil air 
transport industry as a whole. 
The chapter is di vidErl into thI."ee main sections, addressing firstly 
the developnant of airp:>rt facilities in Manchester and secondly the 
growth of air services and traffic. particularly in this second 
section canparisons aI."e made with airp:>rts which \\1eI'e of canparable 
size to Manchester in the early years of developrent, and the pattern 
of growth is I:elated. to roth the UK nen..urk as a whole and the regional 
network of airp:>rts. By adopting this approach, it is possible to 
dete:rmine hCM experience at Manchester Airport differed fran the nonn 
and to provide an insight into why this should be the case. The third 
section deals with financial perfonnance as an adjunct to considering 
supply-side factors. Responses to changes in requirEm:mts will 
inevitably influence financial perfonnance and in this sense sare 
canparison with other airp:>rts may prove to highlight the diversity of 
experience. However, gi veIl the nature and organisation of airp:>rt 
operation only broad conclusions can be drawn fran financial data. 
Thus emphasis is placed. upon the :results of various surveys which have 
sought to address the internal economies of airports whilst 
highlighting the difficulties of canparison. 
It is argued. that the pattern of growth and developrent at 
Manchester has differed funcianentall y fran its provincial counterparts. 
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The advantages deriving fran a natural extensive catchman.t area ~ 
realised at an early stage of developrent of the UK civil air transport 
industry. As a result of the provision of airport facilities to cope 
with the largest aircraft of the day diversification was similarly 
achieved at an early stage. The diversification in turn provided the 
fraIlEWOrk for financial stability. 
2.2 .1\1RRRr FACTI. I 'l'llS 
The establishrrEnt of the first aeroclrare in Manchester was 
associated with the City's involvatent in aircraft production 
i.rrmadiatel y preceding and during the First w:>rld War. A V Roe had 
forned a canpany manufacturing aeroplanes on 1 January 1910 and, with 
the outbreak of war four years later, was di:rected by the War Office to 
concentrate efforts on increasing the manufacture of the "Avro 504", a 
pre-war design which was to prove its worth, principally as a training 
machine. Construction work was based in Manchester in the baSE!lEl1t of 
Brownfields Millon Great Ancoats Street which was adapted for use as a 
wurkshop. The design and testing of aircraft took place at Brooklands 
in Surrey. As the production of "504"s increased, at the Miles 
Platting factory additional premises were established in a large 
extension to the Newton Heath wurks of Mather and Platt. Many aircraft 
"Were tONai through the streets of Manchester on their CMl1 wheels to be 
loaded for rail transport, but a small nmnber of rrachines were also 
tested at Traffond Park fran 1913. (1) 
'!he success of the "Avro 504" at the School of Special Flying, 
coupled with a shortage of operational aircraft, led to its increasing 
use in the flying services. With expansion of the services, smaller 
canpanies becanE involved in war-ti.ne aircraft manufacture including 
the Central Aviation Canpany Limited at Traffond Park and Crossley Bros 
Limited resed at Gorton. In the early ITOnths of 1917, the GoveI:nIIent 
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decided. to build three National Aircraft Factories and a newly forna:i 
canpany, Crossley Motors Limited, was appointed to run one of then. 
Work ccmtal.ced. on the No 2 National Aircraft Factory at Heaton Chapel 
in October 1917 which specialised. in the production of DH9 aircraft in 
the following year. (2) 
The aircraft pouring out of constructors' premises in Manchester 
required examination and equipping for operational purposes prior to 
delivery to units at hema and overseas, therefore, the War Depart.mant 
advised. the Manchester City Council of a proposal to build an Air 
Acceptance Park at Didsbury. In close proximity to the proposed. site 
was a railway station known as "Alexandra Park" and this became the 
name of the new aerocirc:ne which was used. for the ferrying of aircraft 
fran May 1918. Figure 2.1, The siting of aerodrares around the City of 
Manchester, illustrates the close proximity of Alexandra Park to the 
city centre. The military authorities took possession of the site 
without purchase, under special war-tine legislation. The War 
Departmant supervised. the erection of buildings, including hangars 
designed. to house any aircraft up to the size of the Handley-Page 0/400 
twin engined. bcmber which had a wing sp:m of 100 feet. The City 
Engineer undertook to improve road access to the area and to lay down 
all aerocirc:ne roads. A V Roe and carpmy Limite:i occupied. a hangar at 
the No 15 (Manchester) Aircraft Acceptance Park, although the major 
user of Alexandra Park was the No 2 National Aircraft Factory which had 
produced. approxinately 400 "DH9"s by the Annistice on 11 NovEmber 1918. 
(3) 
Plans for additional work at Alexandra Park were cancelle:i by the 
Air Ministry follCMing the curtailnEnt of aircraft production. 
However, by the end. of the War a number of large hangars ~ in use 
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and the field had proven suitable to accamod.ate the largest aircraft 
of the day, generatOO by both Service flying and. manufacturers' test 
flying. Following the deletion of the aerodrare fran the list of 
Service airfields in June 1920, the hangars were usOO to billet 
soldiers of the Territorial AImy. ( 4 ) The Manchester Guardian of 5 
August 1920 reoondOO: 
" not long since hundrerls of WRAPs and. IrEChanics, pilots and. 
observers were about the place and. aeroplanes carrE and. went 
continually. Now the great doors are never open." 
By November, grazing rights had been let and pilots were warnOO that 
they might expect to find cattle and. sheep on the aerodrare. 
Nevertheless, the Manchester Corporation entered into negotiations with 
the landowner, IDnd Egerton of Tatton, and. the Goven1rrEnt authorities 
for the purchase of the whole site, including buildings, as a civil 
aercxirare. Negotiations continuOO over four years during which time it 
becane increasingly evident that the possibility of acquiring the site 
and buildings at a reasonable cost was rem:>te. The ultimate collapse 
of negotiations was presagOO when IDnd Egerton announced his 
unwillingness to sell the area to the City for flying purposes, 
subsequent to the expiry of the Goven1rrEnt lease, so Manchester's first 
aercxirare was closOO in 1924 despite the efforts of the Manchester 
Corporation to acquire the site for civil purposes. ( 5 ) 
With the benefit of hindsight, it was perhaps fortuitous that the 
ae:r:odrare should close as in reality its future use would have been 
limi too by the Corporation's plans for road developrent. One of the 
schenes projectOO under the provision of \'\lOrks for the relief of 
unemploynen.t in 1919 had been the construction of an extension to 
Princess Road - a major thoroughfare fran the City - across the site of 
the aercxirare. Had the aerodrare ranainOO in existence on canpletion 
of this project, it \'\lOuld have been limitOO in size to only 110 acres, 
insufficient to deal with nost of the airliners of the next decade. 
The building developoant which took place around the area in the 1920s 
and 1930s \'\lOuld also have interfered with developoant of the site and. 
been detr.inental to neteorological conditions. ( 6 ) 
Although the Manchester Corporation had failOO to establish a civil 
airport for the City in the 1920s, it is clear that little advantage 
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had been lost as a network of UK aerod:rares had not been finnly 
established by this ti.ma. The closure of Alexandra Park left four 
Govenment armed aerod:rares in the country at Croydon, Lynple, Castle 
B.rcmvich and. Renfrew. In England and Scotland there were 43 landing 
grounds of which 26 were for RAF use and 17 were civil installations. 
( 7 ) The Manchester Corporation eventually purchased the Alexandra Park 
site as an exhibition and show ground whilst the City Engineer was 
charged with the task of seeking alternative sites for an aerod:rare. 
Initially, golf courses at Didsbury and. Blackley were considered and 
during the decade Fairfield Coonon, Buxton, Northenden, Macclesfield, 
Knutsfom, Bramhall, Willnslow and Alderley Frlge were all to be recorded 
as having actual or proposed landing grounds. (8) Suggestions that 
sites on the northern side of the City were being considered led to 
SalE concern on the part of aviators who were familiar with its 
environs, 
"the murky atm:>sphere . . . is often so dense as to constitute a 
real danger of an approaching 'plane being badly out of its 
bearings. " 
Support for the Alexandra Park site continued. £1,250,000 had been 
spent on the aerod:rare during war-tine and although the hangars had 
been subsequently dE!rDlished, " the wonderful surface and the adequate 
area" remained. In contrast to other sites, the " plain! Y visible 
railway line fran the south" running adjacent to the aerod:rare pIUVided 
an unmistakable landmark. ( 9) Ha.vever, such support was futile as the 
ultimate sale of the site to the Corporation had been conditional upon 
it not being used as an aerod:rare in the future. ( 10) 
Given the difficulties of site selection, the Corporation sought the 
advice of John F Isemi.ng, a local aviator. By September 1928, he had 
inspected three sites and. the one must favoured was an area of 115 
acres situated on the Wythenshawe Estate on the south side of 
Northenden, six miles fran the city centre. Fumished with the results 
of these site inspections, estimates of the cost of a projected 
aerocirare at Manchester were canpiled and two schemes were considered. 
The first scheme was based on the require:ren.ts for a well equipped 
aerocirare capable of operating a service of at least two aircraft per 
day, both ways, between Manchester and Croydon, with scme allowance for 
expansion in local traffic. The projected cost involverl in this schere 
was estinated as follows: 
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Capital cost of aeroclrare: 
Capital cost of ancillary services: 
'Ibtal Capital Cost: 
Annual expenditure - aeroclrare: 
Annual expenditure - ancillary services: 








Source: Report of the Acting Town Clerk, Proposed Airport for 
Manchester Town Hall, Manchester, 10 September 1928 (MA PIC 
Archive) 
Annual revenue arising out of the adoption of the schare was 
estimated at only £1,968. The second schare was nore elaborate in the 
way of hangar accamodation and allowed for expansion in the operating 
service to between ten and twelve machines a day, using the BOst m::x::lern 
aircraft whilst allowing for a possible increase in the size of future 
aircraft. In this case, the capital cost of aeroclrare p:rovision alone 
was estimated at £44, 770. ( 11 ) These figures confi.rned that aerc::rlrare 
provision involved heavy capital expenditure and suggested that the 
Corporation would face an unrenunerative period in the initial stages. 
Nevertheless, a special sub-carmi ttee of the City Council was appointed 
in September 1928 to formulate concrete proposals. (12) 
The special sub-commi ttee inspected various sites north of 
Manchester in the Victoria Avenue district and at Chat Moss, to the 
west of Eccles in the rural district of Barton. Ul timatel y, the sub-
ccmnittee selected an area on the Chat Moss Estate, owned by the 
Cleansing Ccmnittee, situated six miles by road fran the city and in 
close proximity to the Trafforo Park industrial estate. (13) The land 
at Chat Moss had been acquired in 1893 for the disposal of nightsoil, 
but with the discontinuance of the use of pail closets and the 
subsequent conversion and substitution of the water carriage systan, 
the necessity for the disposal of nightsoil had dilninished. ( 14 ) The 
fact that the land was in the ownership of the Corporation was 
advantageous in eliminating the need for heavy expenditure in land 
acquisition and. the need for Ministry of Health approval, but to SarE 
degree, these advantages were offset by the extent of work requ.irai to 
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nake the site sui table for an aeroc.iJ:are. ( 15 ) 
At the ti.ne, aeroc.iJ:ares required the provision of a length of runway 
in all directions of not less than 600 yards and the clearance of all 
approaches - eliminating high chimneys, tall trees, church spires, etc. 
Any obstruction could lessen the effective length of a runway to the 
extent of ten tines its height. Another requi.rarent was that the 
aeroc.iJ:are should have a gocxi, hard level surface with an average 
gradient of not nore than one in fifty. 'Ib satisfy these conditions at 
Chat Moss, the work required included the raroval of fences within the 
aerodra're perimater, the re:roval of railway tracks and fann tracks, the 
filling in of depressions and the levelling of anbanknelts. ( 16 ) 
By January 1929, the Corporation had pnxiuced two detailed estimates 
of the cost involved in the provision of an aeroc.iJ:are at Chat Moss. One 
provided for the canplete preparation of the landing ground, including 
the laying of concrete runways and the erection of hangars, whilst the 
other provided for only partial developIETlt of facilities. Experts 
advised the .AerociraTe Special Carmittee that the latter arrangemmt 
would suffice for any initial air service so a sum of £30,000 was set 
aside for partial preparation and canpensation due to famers for 
vacant possession of the aeroc.iJ:are site. Mindful of the financial 
risks involved in aeroc.iJ:are provision, further developrE11t of the site 
was postponed until such ti.ne as the aeroc.iJ:are showed a return. ( 17 ) 
The Cleansing Departnent expressed its willingness to co-operate in the 
siting of an aerodra're and sare 124 acres of land at Barton Moss ~ 
leased to the Corporation's .AerociraTe Carmittee at a rental of £450 per 
year for twenty one years. The Cleansing Carmittee negotiated the 
tenns for canpensation to two tenant famers, one of whan was quitting 
his total holding of 257 acres and the other who was relinquishing 19 
acres of his holding. ( 18) The greater part of the work involved in 
the erection of buildings, the construction of roads and the levelling 
and surfacing of the landing area at Chat Moss was carried out by 
Corporation labour under the direction of the City Engineer. The 
Cleansing ccmni.ttee had a special role to play in the construction of 
the aerodr<::lre naking use of the light railway which existed in the 
area, to supply 300 tons of clinkers per week, 300 tons of dust every 
fortnight and an unspecified quantity of ash box refuse for 
consolidation of the runway. (19) 
The eagerness of the Manchester Corporation to becare involved in 
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the provision of air services for the City is deronstrated by the fact 
that whilst awaiting canpletion of the Barton site a temporary site was 
inp:roved at Wythensha~ at a cost of £150 16s 3d involving site 
preparation and levelling, and alterations to a barn which was to serve 
as a tenninal and hangar. In the sane financial year, 1928/9, the 
Airport Carmittee recorded an incane of lOs by way of rent of the 
temporary aeroc:lrc.ne. In its fist and last year of operation, 1929/30, 
the ineate derived fran landing fees was £12 19s 3d. (20) 
.As shCMIl in Figure 2.1, this temporary site was to the south of the 
city whilst the perrranent Barton ae:rodrare which was opened on 1 
January 1930, lay to the ~st. .As suggested, the major consideration 
in site selection had been the avoidance of heavy capital expenditure 
in land acquisition but, within four years, the ae:rodrare was found to 
be inadequate for operational and technical reasons. On a visit to the 
aerodrome, representatives of Railway Air Services expressed 
"disappoint::IIent" at the small landing area which they reganied as 
insufficient for the regular operation of the DH 86 type of aircraft. 
(21) Extension to the ae:rodrare ~d have been difficult and costly 
as the ground conditions becane progressively \\Urse deteriorating to 
bogland. ( 22) Nevertheless, three different methods of extending the 
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landing area \\1ere considered, although in all cases the total area of 
the landing ground could be extended to only 133 acres. '!he first 
method involved the entire re(oval of peat with ploughing and sowing 
with seed in the southam area. The estinated total cost of this 
schEm3 was £281,485. '!he second. schare involved trinming off the 
surface and levelling the ground, driving \\UOd piles and finishing with 
four inch :reinforced. concrete in the northam area; rem:wal of snaIl 
pockets of peat and ploughing and sowing with seed in the south.ern. 
area. This method of extension was estinated to involve a. much snaller 
cost of £114,874. The third. schare considered was the sane as the 
first, but rather than ren:we the peat entirely fran the southam area, 
only a layer of a depth of two feet would be replaced with dry 
material. This was the least costly schare, estinated at £104,887. 
All three costings :related to grounc:iwork on! y on the landing area and 
the provision of fcx;r runs was estinated to cost an additional £110,293 
to £329,645. Notwithstanding such improvE!IEIlts, the general outline of 
the landing ground would still have been irregular; the Barton Power 
Station and the railway ~d have been a hindrance to future 
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extensions of the aeroclrare, the approach to Barton f:rcm Manchester was 
not ideal and surface transport in the Eccles area itself was also 
difficult. ( 23 ) 
Given that the Barton Airport offered little prospect of future 
developrent, the Manchester Corporation sought an altemati ve site in 
o:rder to establish a p:rcminent position in civil aviation. Other 
aeroclrares had been established in the north west region by the mid 
1930s, but as far as the needs of the city were concerned, each had its 
drawbacks. For example, the AV Roe AeJ:odrare at Woodfo:rd was 13 miles 
f:rcm the city by road and could not offer satisfactory access. There 
was the possibility that Liverpool (Spake) Airport, which was seven 
miles fran the city of Liverpool, could have seI:Ved. the region as a 
whole and KIM, the Royal Dutch Airline, had, in earlier years, 
supported the notion of a joint airport for Manchester and Liverpool on 
the grounds that: 
"for such an industrial area with Manchester as a centre, and with 
the great port of Liverpool, the creation of a joint large nodern 
Airport \\Uuld be easy and could be made to pay." ( 24 ) 
However, even in these early days of developrent , Liverpool Airport 
had already reached the maximum diJrensions obtainable on the existing 
site. Hooton, a private airport on the other side of the Mersey, 
similarly seem:rl to offer little in the way of future developrent as it 
was not canprrable in size to what could be obtained at Spake. ( 25 ) So 
on the basis of existing facilities there was same justification for 
another airport in the North West region capable of dealing with 
foreseeable developments. 
In March 1934, the City Surveyor considered lands suitable for the 
siting of an additional aeroclrare in the Manchester area. Initial 
investigations revealed that the choice of sites in close proximity to 
Manchester and fulfilling the required conditions was very limited. If 
a prospective airport was to supply the needs of both intercity and 
town camnmications within the British Isles and continental traffic it 
was imperative that the facility be placed close to the major centres 
of population. An area of land in the parish of Mobberley was found to 
be fairly suitable as to contour and texture, but was limited in size 
and lacked direct camnmication with Manchester. ( 26 ) A site near 
Warrington, canprising same 831 acres, was large enough to cater for 
future developrent, but the presence of open ditches, water holes and 
30 
ponds requira:i cul verting . In addition, the site was little higher 
than the existing site at Chat Moss and the soil canposition was 
unsatisfactory. (27) In July 1934, the Waterworks Ccmnittee reported 
the availability of a site canprising 560 acres situated at Bowlee, 
Middleton which might offer advantages as an airport , especially close 
proximity to the city. (28) 
However, on this occasion in order to ensure that every possible 
avenue of enquiry was exhausted, the Corporation contracted the 
services of Messrs lbnnan, Muntz and Dawbarn, Aeronautical Consultants, 
based at Heston Airport to advise upon al ternati ve sites. '!he 
consultants, in tum, approached a Manchester based finn of Chartered 
SUrveyors, Meller, Speakm:m and Hall, to inspect and. report on the 
environs of Manchester for a distance of up to 15 miles fran the city 
centre. '!he inspection of land a:rmmd the north of Manchester :revealed 
that the general characteristics of the land, especially proximity to 
the Pennine Chain, would prejudice this choice. '!he general direction 
of the range is fran north to south about 15 miles fran Manchester, a 
large proportion of land on the south side is well raroved fran the 
hills, however, they converge on the north side. A large area of land 
on the north east and easter sides of Manchester, although sui table as 
regards distance fran the city was out of the question as it actually 
lay on the foothills of the Pennines. '!his area included land a:rmmd 
Whitworth, lbmen, Milnrow, Oldham, Ashton-under-Lyne and Stalybridge. 
Building developrent on the north side of the city had tended to be 
rather indiscriminate and visibility all around the north and east of 
Manchester was inferior to the south. Despite these general 
characteristics, six particular sites north of Manchester at Heywood, 
Urlffio.urth, Middleton, Victoria Avenue, Culcheth and Audenshaw ~re 
considered. However, all sites tended to be centred in built-up areas 
with tall chinmeys and electric power lines or cables. (29) 
In contrast, the land aroillld the south of Manchester in North 
Cheshire, boasted few towns, villages and factories . Residential 
developrent had progressed with the Corporation's new estates at 
Wythenshawe and building around Hyde, Raniley, Stockport, Hazel Grove, 
Bramhall, Cheadle, Northenden, T.inp:rrley, Sale, Altrincharn and Hale. 
However, beyond this ring the country was quite open. '!he area offered 
relatively level ground, good visibility and. aeroplanes approaching 
fran r.ondon, the South, Ireland, West Scotland and the Continent could 
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avoid the need to fly over Manchester. 'Iiu:ee sites ~ considered at 
Mobberley, l\bodford and Ringway. The najor problem with the Mobberley 
site was very poor road and rail access whilst the site at ibrlford, 
which already accarm:xlatEd an aeroc::lr:arE of about 150 acres, was 
virtually incapable of extension as the land slopes towards the River 
Dean. On the other hand, Ringway was seen to offer a number of 
advantages. Wi thin reasonable distance of the City, the then planned 
Princess Parkway extension fran Altrincham Road at Wythenshawe to the 
City boundary at Ringwayextending southward as a nain arterial road to 
beyond Knutsford offered the future prospect of excellent access to the 
centre of Manchester. At the same tine, the City was planning for 
another main arterial road 60 feet wide leading fran the end of 
Kingsway at East Didsbury through the Wythensh.awe estate at Sharston 
and Brownley Green to Heyhead making contact with the north easterly 
boundary of the Ringway site. The proposed site of 664 acres was found 
to be ranarkabl y even; fields on the site were of a m:rlerate size and 
hedgerows were low. The ground consisting of mainly boulder clay on 
narl or sandstone was also satisfactory. As the area was mainly 
agricultural, there \\ere virtually no high buildings and. only one tall 
chimney which belonged to a local brickworks. As the site was 260 feet 
above sea level or 200 feet above the Barton site, visibility was much 
improved. ( 30 ) 
Nigel Nonnan suggested that on this site II an aeroc::lr:arE better than 
any in this country and. second to none in Europe could be created II • 
(31) The only disadvantage of the site was that it was not in the 
ownership of the Corporation. In fact the land. for canplete 
developrent of the site was in a considerable nmnber of ownerships and. 
lay outside the city boundary. Messrs Nonnan, Muntz and. Dawbarn 
highlighted the necessity - should the City Council approve the schare 
_ to open negotiations with Cheshire County Council, Bucklow Rural 
District Council and the North Cheshire Regional Planning Ccmnittee to 
secure agreement to the construction of the airport and the 
cons~ential diversion when required, of public highways and. proposed 
new roads included in the plarming proposals for the district. (32) 
In assessing the requirarEnts of an aercx:ir<::.m3 on the Ringway site, 
Noman, Muntz and Dawbarn considered areas of land. which could be 
reserved for airport building developrent; areas which it was desirable 
the corporation should control for direct access to arterial roads 
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and/or railways; land suitable for activities ancillary to the airport 
and land which should be kept free fran flying obstructions. The 
initial schema of developrent proposErl a landing area of 187~ acres, 
providing grass runs of 1,200 yards, sufficient to suit all airline 
requireIents except heavily laden long distance aircraft. The 
estinBtErl cost of this initial landing area was £50,890, (although the 
City Engineer later revised this estinate to £64,512). The cost of 
buildings, anCillary works and services was estinatErl at £54,050 and 
the cost of land acquisition including compensation, legal, 
professional and arbitration fees was estinated. to be in the :region of 
£58,633. The Finance Ccmnittee of the City Cotmcil confinra:l that the 
total costs involved in the initial stages of developIE11t would be 
about £179,295. (33) 
Clearly, the investigations undertaken by the Aeronautical 
Consultants camrl.ssionErl by the Corporation had been exhaustive in 
contrast to previous site selection procedures and the Airport 
Ccmnittee was confident that the growth in air traffic between England 
and the Continent was sufficient to justify future expenditures. For 
example, the number of passengers carriErl fran Liverpool to AmsteI:dam 
and beyond in the first two -weeks of July 1934 had exceErlErl the number 
of passengers carriErl in June when the service had been inauguratErl. 
Similarly, regular internal airlines were being operated to a total 
route mileage of 2, 719 and virtually all of these air lines had 
camencErl operation in the pl:eCEding 12 to 18 nonths. (34) 
The decision to proceed with the construction of an airport at 
Ringway was taken by the City Council on 25 July 1934, but this 
decision did not lead to the ultinate demise of Barton Airport. The 
Council decidErl that expenditure at Barton was not abortive, as 
operating in its existing state, it could act as a buffer to Ringway 
for small aircraft not working to regular tinetables and for the 
activities of light aeroplane clubs. Finns interested. in the 
manufacture of aircraft could also be encouraged to locate at Barton. 
(35) 
By September 1935 a contract for levelling, draining and seErling the 
site at Ringway had been awardErl to the En-rrbut-Cas Canpany Limi tErl. 
WOrk camelcErl on 28 Novenber when the lDrd Mayor of Manchester, 
Alderman T S Williams, perforned the ceraoony of cutting the first sod. 
( 36 ) The landing area canplete canprisErl 247 acres and providErl 
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runways of 1,100 yards in three directions and a fog nmway of 1,400 
yards nmning north east to south west. Messrs Nonnan, Muntz and 
Dawbarn were engaga::l to prepare detaila::l plans for the erection of the 
first instalnent of tenninal buildings and for the provision of night 
lighting to allow for the use of the airport in the early nonting hours 
and after dusk. The initial building w:::>rks proposa::l invol ve::i the 
erection of a hangar with annexes containing storeroans and workshops 
for the operating canpanies and a tenninal building containing 
administration offices, Custans offices, a :restaurant, pilots' rcx:m and 
control tower. The contract for this work was awarda::l to Messrs C H 
Godfrey and Son Limita::l of Manchester in October 1937. In the sane 
year, the Fairey Aviation Cc.t'rp:my Limiterl acquired a lease fran the 
Corporation and constructed the first building of their factory 
developteTlt on the west side of the site. The Canpany had taken over 
the forner First v«:>rld War aircraft factory at Heaton Chapel, 
Stockport, to deal with large orders for the "Fairey Battle". 'Ihese 
aircraft had been testa::l at Barton, but the operation transferra::l to 
Ringway when the landing ground was canplete::i. ( 37 ) 
Manchester's second airport, Ringway, as shown in Figure 2.1 opened 
on 25 June 1938. The City's first airport had failed to becarE the 
scha::lula::l service airport envisaged in the 1920s. The Barton 
experience had ad~tel y dem::>nstrated the difficulties invol ve::i in 
site selection and as a :result the Corporation had taken every effort 
to ensure that a second airport would be capable of accamodating 
future requirem:mts. However, wi thin little nore than a year, the 
civil operation at Ringway was interrupta::l by war-tirre conditions which 
were to significantly affect airport operation in the post-war years. 
During the war a revolutionary change had taken place in the design 
and construction of airfields. In contrast to the 1920s by the end of 
the Second v«:>rld War, the UK possessa::l a canpI.'eh.ensi ve system of 
aerodrates equipped with concrete runways of va:rying dim:msions and 
bearing strengths, Scm3 built to cater for fighters and others for 
heavy banbers. 700 airfields existerl, although their siting and 
dispersal had been detennina::l by strategic and mili ta:ry requ.irarEnts 
and few were conveniently locata::l close to towns and cities or suitably 
planned and constructed for civil airports. (38) When the ban on civil 
flying was lifted on 1 Janua:ry 1946, nine aerodrares which had been 
used for civil aviation befo:re the war were inmadiatel y opened and by 
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the end of 1947 the nmnber of aeroclrares available for civil flying had 
grown to 133. (39) 
During war-tine, air transport facilities in Manchester had been 
improved. Similar to the experience at Croydon, Heston and Li verp:xJl 
which had been the main international airports in 1939, the grass 
landing ground had proven unsuitable for continued use in all weathers 
and the very heavy traffic generated by war-tine operations. rrhe 
Ministry of Aircraft Production had therefore constructed, with the 
consent of the Corporation - hard runways of six inch reinforced 
concrete carpeted with pervious bituminous asphalt in three of the four 
directions of landing. ( 40) 'Ihese runways were 150 feet wide and 
3,270; 3,300 and 4,200 feet long with ~ and a half miles of per.ineter 
track. 'Ihe only hard surface existing before the War had been the 
apron where passengers boarded and alighted. Further buildings had 
been erected for the Ministry of Aircraft Production and, in total, the 
Ministry improvemants at Ringway during the War had anounted to a 
investmant of about £700,000 ( 41 ) Figure 2.2 illustrates the extent 
to which the Airport had been developed fran the original tenninal 
building to cater for war-tine requ.irarents. 
Other airports similarly benefited fran the intrusion of war-tine 
conditions. Prestwick had been developed not only as an airport for 
traffic plying the Atlantic, but also as a facility to cope with the 
stream of military aircraft fran Canada and. the USA. It had been well 
equipped with navigational aids and a main runway 6,600 feet long. 
After the cessation of hostilities, Prestwick becane a port of call for 
BOAC's air services to Canada and the United States and in 1947, the 
Ministry decided to strengthen the main runway as an interim IIEasure 
against the arrival of the heavier types of trans-Atlantic airliners 
which were expected. Similar extensions and. adaptations of existing 
buildings and the erection of new buildings were canpleterl at 
Black:pool, Isle of Man (Ronaldsway), Wick, Edinburgh (Tumhouse), 
Glasgow (Renfrew), Carlisle (Crosby) and Inverness (Dalcross). Within 
two years of the end of the war, the embryonic Heathrow Airport was 
transfonre:i into the lDndon Airport with facilities for handling all 
the long distance trunk operations of British, DClninion and. foreign 
airlines. ( 42) 
As early as 1944, the Manchester Corporation had considered the 
likely future role of its airport after the cessation of hostilities. 
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The City Surveyor and Messrs Nornan and Dawbam concluda:::l that as far 
as aerodrarEs catering for aircraft with a range of 3, 000 to 4, 000 
miles were concerned they 
" must be the responsibility of Central Goverrment . . . an airport 
of this scale of importance is a National require!rent in the sane 
way as a great seaport ... no local authority or private owner can 
be expected to finance the construction and maintenance of an 
airport of this type . .. Ringway should not and cannot be a Transoce:an airport . . . but should and can be a "major airport" . . 
. cater.rng for transcontinental traffic, linking services with the 
great European cities." (43) 
'Ib achieve this state of affairs, a number of al ternati ve schares 
for future developnant were considered involving either three or four 
runways with te:cninal buildings, an enbarkation area, are-fuelling 
area for aircraft, an area for "layoff" where servicing and 
maintenance repairs could be carria:::l out including hangars, a rotor 
park for helicopters and hard taxi strips to reach the runway. Such 
plans however, were very tentative and enphasis was placa:::l upon the 
need to base proposals on infonna.tion available after the war regarding 
the latest imp:rovemants in aircraft design. ( 44 ) 
With the benefit of hindsight, this clearly was a prudent decision 
as the effects of changes in aircraft design in the post war years on 
airport requiremants were far reaching. Initially because of the war-
tine decision to concentrate on the production of fighters and. banbers, 
British civil aircraft production had fallen behind the USA. Sare 
piston engined aircraft were produca:::l innEdiatel y after the war but 
they were make-shift designs derived fran military types. The 
characteristics of these aircraft reflected priorities set by aircraft 
designers during the war who had sought to obtain higher speeds 
particularly increasa:::l stalling and. landing speeds. Increasa:::l speeds 
had the effect of increasing the lengths of runway requ.irerl. to land. and. 
the new generation of aircraft in use after the war also requ.irerl. 
surfaced runways with clear approaches above a very shallow angle. (45) 
In 1951 the main runway at Ringway Airport was extended by 1,700 
feet to 5,900 feet by the Ministry to allow adequate take off runs for 
larger aircraft. This gave Ringway the status of a class "C" aercxirc:nE 
according to International Standards laid dCMIl by the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation ( lCAD) . ( 46 ) HONeVer, technological 
change in aircraft design continued at a pace in the post-war years as 
the British and US aircraft manufacturing industries sought to achieve 
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the canpetiti ve ooge. Prior to the cessation of hostilities, the 
British Goverrmen.t had set up a carmittee under IDm Brabazon to 
prepare plans for the post-war developIETlt of civil aircraft and the 
ccmni.ttee had recamEndoo a "leap frog" policy for British aircraft 
developrent, urging that post-war designs should incorporate turbine 
engines. The two nost inportant aircraft in this phase were the 
"Viscount" where turbine engines were usoo to drive propellers, and the 
"Caret", which was a pure jet design. By 1958, the US had the "Boeing 
707" ready for service which was nore technically acivancei, offered. 
superior range characteristics and could provide non-stop regular 
operations across the North Atlantic. Four years later, the new "Crnet 
4" was in service with OOAC. Subsequent developrent was very rapid and 
by 1963, the long range jet aircraft in use includoo the "Ccmat 4", 
"Boeing 707", "Boeing 720", "DC-8" and "Convair 880/990". The 
application of these aircraft on short haul routes was less rapid than 
on long haul. Many experts felt that the "turbo-props" had cost 
advantages on these shorter routes where the advantage of speed offered. 
by the jets was less inportant. The Vickers "Vanguard" and Lockheed 
"Electra" were products of this belief. Nevertheless, the introduction 
of the French "Caravelle", introciucei to regular service by Air France 
in May 1959 and its camercial success on relatively short routes gave 
rise to a new generation of canpetiti ve jet aircraft, all designoo for 
rraiium and short haul services. Such aircraft includoo the de 
Havilland "Trident", "Boeing 727", BAC "1-11", and DJuglas "DC-9". 
Whilst aeroplane imp.roverents had been made in the past, none had been 
so radical as that introciucei by the jet age. Pre-existing aircraft 
types could not co-exist with the new and thus major airlines began to 
replace whole fleets. ( 47) As the pace of change in aircraft design 
increasoo, so this was reflectoo in rapid runway iroprovemant at 
Manchester Airport in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A significant 
feature of this developrent was the continual nodification of plans 
which reflectoo the fact that aircraft design was in a constant state 
of flux creating difficulty in forecasting future reg:u.il:enents. 
In the early 1950s, it had been suggestoo by the Airport Special 
Carmittee, that if the airport was to be developed to international 
standards, the main runway would have to be lengthenoo to at least 
7 ,000 feet. ( 48 ) The existing length of 5,900 feet maant that trans-
Atlantic aircraft like the Stratocruiser, Caret rv, DC-7C, DC-8 and 
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Super Constellation had to land at Prestwick or Shannon before crossing 
the ocean or altematively suffer a reduced payload. Subsequently, the 
Ministl:y of Transport and Civil Aviation advised that, in order to meet 
the needs of aircraft likely to be in use in the foreseeable future, a 
balanced field length of 8,100 feet would be required with 7,000 feet 
of paved surface being supplemented by 900 feet of prepared stoIMCiY at 
the north easterly end and 200 feet of stOJ;Ma.y at the south westerly 
end of the nmway to provide energency provision to enable aircraft 
experiencing engine trouble during take-off to land again in safety. 
(49) 
'!he Airport Carmittee of the Corporation initially proposed that the 
1,100 feet of paved nmway should be at the south westerly end on lands 
fOnning part of the airport. '!he total schE!le involved the carpllsory 
purchase of land for the provision of stOJ;Ma.YS at both ends of the 
paved nmway as extended, and for the diversion of the A538 Altrincham 
to WilmslCM Road, which \\UUld otheI:Wise have been only 80 yards away 
fran the end of the proposed extension. '!he Ccmni.ttee recarmended that 
the initial work should involve the runway extension and the 
construction of new taxi-tracks within the airport boundary, with the 
existing nmway and taxi-tracks being strengthened at the SanE tine. 
'!he Ministl:y of Transport and Civil Aviation agreed innB::liatel y to the 
strengthening of the runway which was canpleted by 1956 at a cost of 
£87 , 334. Within a year, the Corporation had acquired sufficient land 
to allow for the construction of the 200 feet of stoIMCiY at the south 
westerly end of the main runway extension. Approximately 26 acres of 
land still needed to be canpulsorily purchased for the provision of the 
900 foot stoIMCiyand 200 foot clearwayat the north easterly end. '!his 
was a matter of urgency as without this land work on the runway 
extension could not proceed. Whilst the proposed additional length of 
nmway \VOuld allow aircraft to take-off the full length in a north 
easterly direction and land the full length in a south westerly 
direction, the road diversion was required to allow the extended runway 
to beccma fully operational and to allow the re:nainder of construction 
w::>rk to be canpleted. (50) 
As the Corporation sought to rapidly execute plans for the runway 
ilTIprovemant, m:xiifications were needed in the light of changing 
requil:erents. In October 1956, the Airport Ccmni.ttee had been infonnad 
that mAC were seeking consent fran the Ministry of Transport and Civil 
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Aviation to purchase "Boeing 707" aircraft capable of carrying 144 
passengers, for use on their trans-Atlantic services by the early 
1960s. It was expected that these and OC-8s would practically 
rronopolise the North Atlantic traffic. The original plan to divert the 
A538 allowed for future extension of the runway to a maxi.rmmt of 8, 700 
feet but precluded extension beyond this. To cope with the new 
aircraft and to ensure that the existence of the road would not present 
a barrier to future runway extension, the Airport Ccmnittee 
contanplated an al temative schema for diversion through a tunnel 
beneath the runway. When this schema was placed before the Ministry, a 
canpranise was proposed to allow the present runway extension to 
proceed. This tanporary schema to operate for two years , involved the 
closure of the road at a point where the new' taxi-way was net. Traffic 
was diverted onto the taxi-way, crossing the run-up area. and rejoining 
the A538 at the end of the extended runway. (51 ) 
By 23 April, 1958 the main runway extension had lJecarE operational 
and "Boeing 707" aircraft were operating through RIDgway. Havever, it 
was found that the strengthening of the runway carried out in 1956 was 
unsatisfactory. The strengthening had involved an asphalt overlay 
which showed poor friction characteristics in wet ~ther. To overcare 
the problem, shallow grooves were cut in the asphalt surface by 
Constructex Limited. of Byfleet, Surrey, the only finn in the country 
which had the equiprent to do so. In addition, it was found that the 
main runway held water in wet ~ther requiring a 500 foot paved 
extension of the runway. This was provided in 1961 by overslabbing the 
first 500 foot of stopNay at the north east end in concrete. ( 52 ) 
The 1960s represented. a decade involving the execution of a major 
runway extension prograrme designed to facilitate long-haul jet 
operations, allowing maximum weight takEK>ff on trans-Atlantic stages 
wi thout the need to refuel at Prestwick or Shannon airports. 
Extensions included 400 feet at the north easterly end of the main 
runway, 1965; 1,100 feet to the south west extending over the 
Altrincham to Wilmslow Road which was diverted in a tunnel and a 
further 200 feet at the north easterly end canpleted in 1969. (53) 
With the introduction of "Boeing 747"s to long-haul operations in the 
1970s, further runway .inp.rovaIents were necessitated. To cope with 
these large jets the runway was widened fran its existing 150 feet by 
the addition of 25 foot hard shoulders and it was improve1 and extended 
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to an overall length of 3,048 netres to allCM long-haul services to 
operate to Australia and the Far Fast without weight penalty. rrhe 800 
foot extension was canpleted in 1982 following strengthening and re-
profiling. Civil engineering ~rks involved. the diversion of the River 
Bollin and the filling of the valley to a depth of 82 feet. In orner 
to maximise the benefits of the extension, a new link taxi-way was 
constructed linking the runway with tenninal facilities (54). 
Whilst extensive operational improvenents were nade to airport 
facilities in the 1970s and 1980s, undoubtedly, fran the planning point 
of view, the IIOSt difficult period had been the two decades following 
the end of the Second World War which had involved. considerable 
uncertainty :r:eganli.ng the operational requiremants of the new jet 
aircraft which 'We.I."e introduced. The operation of these new aircraft 
created the need not only for longer nmways but also nore extensive 
tenninal facilities. For example, the payload of the "OC-8" and 
"Boeing 707" jets was a.l.nost twice that of the piston-engined aircraft 
which they replaced. (55) Also, the influence of war tima experience 
on civil flying was apparent in the increased dem:md for air travel 
which maant that by 1949, the pre war tenninal building had already 
becare inadequate. Whilst long tenn plans for tenninal developnant 
~re being drawn up, as a tanporary neasure the Eastern Annexe of the 
Volunteer Reserve hangar erected in war tima was adapted for passenger 
handling. (56) It can be seen fran Figure 2.2 that this hangar (number 
6) and the linked RAP building, identified as Arrival and Departure 
Station, 'We.I."e conveniently sited close to the main runway, for this 
purpose. 
As early as March 1953, consideration was being given to the 
erection of a new tenninal building and control ~, a new apron 
associated with this building and a new fire station. The existing 
tenninal apron of 153,000 square feet had been constructed by the 
Coxporation for the Air MinistJ:y in war t.i.ne and had been extended when 
passenger handling facilities were transfer.cai to the Eastern Annexe of 
the Volunteer Reserve hangar in April 1949. Initial plans were drawn 
up for the construction of an apron of 850,000 square feet. However, 
the uncertainty of traffic requirarEnts once again neant that short 
tenn nEasures had to be taken whilst planning for the future. A 
technical study carried out in 1954 suggested that given the expected 
frequency of services and the type of aircraft to be used over the next 
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two years, there was a need to extend the apron to provide an extra 
200,000 square feet as a natter of urgency. To canplete the schare by 
July 1954, the Airport Ccmnittee recarmanded that the City Surveyor 
carry out the ~rk using direct labour. (57) 
The City Archi teet prepared a number of prelimi.na1:y schares for the 
erection of a new tenninal building. The choice of sites for a new 
building was severely restricted by the need to minimise the darolition 
of existing buildings, whilst ensuring that the landing area was not 
encIOached upon to such an extent as to constitute a fixed obstruction. 
The tenninal building could, therefore, only be provided on a 
triangular site lying west of the existing passenger handling 
facilities. '!his involved the darolition or raroval of the initial 
buildings and control tower, erected in 1938, three hangars, the 
existing fire station, the Airport Dep:rrtm:mt' s ~rkshop, office and 
store, the Airport Director's house, the refreshrrEnt hut in the public 
enclosure, various fann buildings, the electricity sub-station and 28 
other small buildings and structures. In addition, the project 
involved the diversion of services such as overhead telephone cables 
and underground GPO lines, overhead power lines, underground 
electricity cables, the water supply, etc, and the diversion of Yew 
Tree Lane. (58) 
The najor concern of airport officials was the need to cater for the 
level of transit passengers which could be generated in the future and 
which was largely dependent upon the najor policy decisions of airline 
operators and the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. Therefore, 
building design incorporated provision for extension in the event of 
air traffic increasing beyond the forecasts predicted for the next ten 
years. It was decided that the requi..rem:mts at Manchester Airport 
could best be satisfied by a solution in which aircraft stands ~re 
located on either side of two piers, one for international and the 
other for darestic traffic projecting into the apron fran the tenninal 
building. Passenger flow and baggage flow ~ carpletely separated, 
with the two novemants taking place on two separate floors; sightseers 
and passengers were similarly separated and an unrestricted view of the 
apron fran all passenger waiting roans and restaurants on the airfield 
side was provided. A camon concourse for passengers and friends with 
concessions and all other a:nEI1i ties was included in the developrent. 
(59) 
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This schare, subnitted to the Ministry in Decanber 1954, was 
estimated to involve a capital expenditure of £2,772,310 - a sum which 
the Ministry felt to be illljustified in view of the anounts proposed to 
be spent on Ministry airports at Glasgow, Prestwick and Edinburgh. An 
alternative schare was proposed involving a separate control tower near 
the intersection of the runways on the airfield and separate buildings 
for the handling of freight. Hc:Jwever, the City Council was of the 
opinion that no substantial reduction in cost would accrue fran the 
adoption of this schare which failed to fulfil all of the essential 
principles outlined above. Nevertheless, the City Architect and 
Airport Director were pranpted to ascertain the absolute minimum 
requi.rem::nts for a tenninal building without prejudicing future 
expansion. The original schare was nodified to provide 183,126 square 
feet of floor area as opposed to 239,209 square feet, reducing the 
total estimated costs to £2,159,716. (60) 
Further cost reductions were proposed by the elimination of ramped 
roadways for the arrival and departure of passengers at the first floor 
level and the provision of escalators fran and to the ground floor 
entrance and exit, reducing the cost of the schare to £1,987,000. (61) 
However, before the aIlEIlded schare could be developed, further 
modifications were necessitated by the introduction of a new 
requi.rem:mt that the control tower should affoni a view of taxi-ways as 
well as runways. Thus the height of the control taNer needed to be 
increased fran 80 feet to 130 feet. Another requirerent that the Radar 
Rcx:m be adjacent to the control roan maant that the taNer had to be 
enlarged as well as heightened. It was decided by the Airport 
Ccmnittee that although in excess of iImatiate requirerents, the 
central core should be surrounded by office accamn:iation as it seared 
impractical and illleconanical to anit this interna:liate area when 
constructing the tower. ( 62) 
Plans for the tenninal apron also requiIed m:x:lification in the light 
of uIrlated traffic forecasts. As suggested in 1953 a tenninal apron of 
850,000 square feet had been proposed. The technical study carried out 
in 1954 which investigated traffic projections to 1963, had suggested 
the need for 20 aircraft standings. H~, as the tenninal building 
project developed, it was found that the original proposal of 850,000 
square feet would be too small to accamn:iate 20 stands, 10 around the 
intemational pier and 10 around the dcmastic pier of the tenninal 
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building, so est.;.......".tes T.Y>. ......... canp';led f ~L~ vv=L"c:; • or an apron of 146,000 square 
yards. These apron nodifications, coupled with the new requ.irarents of 
the Ministry, had the effect of increasing the capital cost of the 
tenninal scheme to £2,157,345 an increase in costs of 7% since July 
1955. (63) 
By October 1957, \\Urk had camenced on the foundations for the new 
tenni.nal building, but as construction progressed, proposals ~ 
constantly nodified further. The Minist.l:y of Transport and Civil 
Aviation found that rrore space was required for the Teleccmnunications 
Fquipnant Roan and Technical Store, and as these needed to be provided 
next to each other, at ground. floor level, it maant that they could no 
longer be accamodated within the control ~ and dooestic wing of 
the tenninal building as planned. The Airport Carmittee, therefore, 
proposed an extension wing fran the control tower, tw:J storeys high, 
which could be extended to eight storeys in the future, increasing 
costs by £28,350. ( 64) Consequent upon a review of expected traffic 
carried out in 1957, the proposals for the tenninal apron \\ere m:x:tified 
to provide 185,000 square yards providing five parking spaces on the 
~stem side of the international pier, capable of handling jet 
aircraft and a total of 26 standings in all. (65) B¥ 1959 the plans 
for the tenni.nal building involved a floor area of 240,000 square feet 
excluding piers. Whereas in 1954 the Ministry had required 9,610 
square feet of accamodation, in the interim, their needs had increased 
to 15,830 square feet. (66) 
Despite having to cope with constantly changing ~ts, 
developnant work was in hand on the superstructure of Phase I of the 
tenni.nal building, consisting of the control tower and dooestic flights 
wing, by Decanber 1959. The superstructure of Phase II was the subject 
of a separate contract providing the provision of a traffic and baggage 
wing, concourse, Custans and restaurant wing, flight piers, etc. B¥ 
April 1960, the structural steel\";,Urk for Phase I was sufficiently 
advanced for the City Architect to tender for the ccmpletion of Phase 
II. R Costain and Sons (LiveIpOOl) Limited, the main contractors for 
both phases of the tenni.nal building, undertook to canplete by March 
1962, but unforeseen ciretmlStances maant that Phase I could not be 
canpleted to schedule. By November 1960, the estimated total cost of 
the schE!rE, excluding apron or roads, paved areas or original car park, 
had risen to £2,510,216. (67) Finally after nine years of planning, 
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updating and nodification, the new tenninal building at Manchester 
Airport opened on 22 October 1962 and becarre operational on 3 Decanber 
1962. (68) 
As planned, a tenninal building capable of extension had been 
constructed and before the end of the decade, interim arrangE!lEIlts vera 
being nade to handle "Boeing 74 7s II which were to operate on future long 
haul routes, the inteInational ap:ron was widena:i by 40 feet and the 
Custans Baggage Hall and baggage handling area were nodifia:i to 
facilitate the unloading of "Boeing 747" type containers. (69) In 
1969, George Harvey, ex-Airport Director, now consultant to the 
Airport, caI¥?iled a report outlining the requi..raIEnts for passenger 
tenninal developren.t up to 1982, given that the "Boeing 747"S which 
OOAC intenda:i to use on their trans-Atlantic service fnxn 1973 were 50% 
larger in size, nore than twice the weight and had double the capacity 
of the largest civil aircraft in use at the tine. (70) The proposed 
developren.t plan involved three stages. Firstly the extension at the 
first and second floor levels by 30 feet of the southern frontage of 
the existing tenninal building. The other three phases of the schE!IE 
included an additional inter-continental pier to acculllOOate 1,600 
passengers in lounges, with stands capable of taking four aircraft of 
the "Boeing 747" type and one of the "Boeing 707" type at one tine, or 
seven of the smaller "Boeing 707"s. A IlDVing travellator and air 
bridges were to link the pier directly with the aircraft. (71 ) 
The next stage of developIEIlt involved the construction of a car 
park block of 13 levels, p:roviding 2,500 car parking spaces, adjacent 
to the tenninal building. The car park block was to include a new 
booking hall, imnigration hall and offices, an international baggage 
claim and custans hall with offices adjacent and an international 
arrivals hall. Finally, the existing Custans Hall was to be converted 
into an extension of the concourse, also enIcn:ging the existing 
international and transit lounge. Engineering ~rks related to this 
tenninal developIEIlt included site investigation, nain sewer diversion, 
the construction of circulation roads and elevated road structures and 
the construction of an apron and taxiway associated with the new long 
haul pier. ( 72) The tentative estimate of the capital cost involved in 
this schema, basa:i on superficial area or cubic content of the 
structure and making general provision only for ~lexity of design, 
nethods of construction, the use of specific naterials or plant, the 
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quality of finish and the additional cost of carrying the fundanental 
re-developIent whilst the airport was in full 24 hour operation was 
£5,091,000. (73) The entire project, including the new international 
pier and new booking hall with 34 check-in desks and an ultimate 
capacity of 48, was canpleted early in 1974, the tenninal extension 
offiCially opening in March of that year. (74) Fran the initial 
planning stage, within five years the capacity of buildings had been 
doubled to five million passengers per annum. ( 75) Figures 2. 3a and b 
depicting the changing layout of the airport illustrate the way in 
which the tenninal building, canpleted in 1962, was extended. 
In effect, the tenninal building designed in the early 1950s had 
seen the airport through the decades of rapidly changing aircraft 
design which had dananded adjUS1lTent to cope with larger numbers of 
passengers passing through the airport at any one tine. The SanE 
generally applies to the runway extension prograrrne planned in the 
1950s and executed in the following decade. In essence, the planning 
and provision of facilities ahead of demand neant that further 
consideration of future developrent requirements did not beccma 
necessary until the early 1980s and even then developIEIlt proposals 
catering for aircraft and passengers generally involved. only the 
extension of existing facilities. 
Finally, in catering for the requirements of freight traffic, 
adaptation of existing facilities tended to be the key note of 
developrent. In the early 1950s office and storage accamodation for 
freight had been provided in the western annexe of hangar number six 
with a floor area of 12,600 square feet. When planning the new 
tenninal building, in 1957 the Airport Carmittee had envisaged 
accamodation for freight handling being provided on the ground floor 
of the building. However, by 1959, the need for additional 
accamodation had beccma pressing. It was, therefore, deciderl that 
hangar number seven should be utilised because, although road access 
was not wholly satisfactory, it was ilmediately available for 
conversion to cope with the increase in freight traffic and it was in 
close proxiloi ty to Building Eight (shown as 1\dmi.ni.strati ve Block in 
Figure 2.2) where Custans facilities were houserl along with the offices 
of sare freight agents. The schEm3 for adapting hangar number seven 
for use as a freight warehouse, bonded transit accamodation and 
offices in 1959 initially involved. the structural alteration of an area 
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of 46,044 square feet. (76) However, airline operators, freight agents 
and Custans and Excise increased their original requireuents wi thin the 
year necessitating preparation of a revised schare to cater for 64,472 
square feet, an increase of 40%. (77) The canpleted. freight depot was 
finally brought into use in the early part of 1962. Throughout the 
1960s, growth in freight traffic continued to be accoom::dated by 
structural adaptations to existing hangars. In 1970, the introduction 
of a "Ccmron Inp:>rt Bond" where imports ~ recei veri into a catm:Jn 
transit shed area and dealt with by a single handler, British European 
Airways, rather than 40 different freight agents, assisted. the 
rationalisation of the process of Custans clearance. By 1971, with 
expected growth into the 1980s, consideration was being given to the 
long tenn planning of a dedicated. facility. (78) A phased developtent 
of facilities was recarmanded with the airport administration planning 
and acquiring land to cope with throughput expected in 1985. 
A site was provisionally allocated to the north west of the 
passenger tenninal offering gcxx:l access to the future M56 and 
conveniently placed. for existing aircraft taxi-ways. The majority of 
land for developrent was already in Corporation ownership, and the 
schema proposed, involving separate airside and lands ide facilities, 
offered. other advantages. The scope for any change in airline and 
freight agents was maximised by this arrangarent and the schare could 
nore readily accept changes in the pattern of cargo handling, such as 
the increased use of unit load devices. Faced with a subsequent 
downtUD1 in air cargo traffic, planning continued, but on the lines of 
a much reduced. developrent to give a telJni.nal capacity of about 175,000 
to 200,000 tons per annum by 1985 rather than the 400,000 tons 
originally envisaged. In the rreantine, warehouse accoom::dation 
provided in hangars was ilnproved by the addition of 20,000 square feet. 
(79) 
Having anbarked upon plans to allow Manchester to take advantage of 
the buoyancy in the British civil air transport industry which occurred 
in the post-war years, the initial adaptation of war tine facilities 
was followerl by an investrrent progranne which by 1962 equipped the 
Airport to service the largest aircraft of the day. Manchester was the 
first European airport to incorporate two piers, the daIEStic pier 
being 720 feet long with a capability of handling nine aircraft and the 
international pier being 960 feet long with facilities for 11 aircraft. 
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The runway extension prograrrrre had. canplaren.ted these developtEnts. 
The provision of facilities ahead of darand contributed to the 
attraction of Manchester Airport especially for international air 
services. By the late 1970s, airports like Binningham ~ already 
suffering congestion in tenminal areas despite a relatively low level 
of passenger throughput. (80) Similarly, at Iea:fs/Bradforci the range 
of aircraft which could use the airport was seriously constrained by 
limited runway length. NOt on! y was the establishrren.t of long haul 
services curtailed but short haul charter and scheduled operators may 
have similarly been forced. to use Manchester because of this 
limitation. (81) To a great degree, Liverpool Airport likern.se reaped 
the harvest of a 7,500 foot nmway by the 1970s and a tenninal building 
which had been constructed in 1939. (82) Figures 2.4 a - c depict the 
layouts of these canpeting airports by the early 1980s, adequately 
deronstrating the contrast with facilities at Manchester Airport by 
this tine. 
2.3 'lRAFFIC 
(a) The period up to 1939 
The first ever powered, sustained and controlled aeroplane flight 
was made by Orville wright in Decanber 1903, but prior to the First 
V\brld War transport by air was viewed with great public scepticism. 
When the Manchester Gua1:dian considered the potential of air transport, 
it was pronounced on 11 September 1908 that it could not envisage "to 
what practical use a flying machine that is heavier than air can be 
put." The war years dE!IOnstrated the possibilities of the use of air 
transport in arna:i conflict, and this experience altered many of the 
negative views which had been held in preceding years. Referring to 
the Manchester Gua1:dian again, a fundanEntally different view was 
expressed on 13 Decanber 1918 when the editors advocated that 
Manchester should becane the main centre for flying outside lDndon. 
Civil flying was pennitted fran 1 May 1919 and the transportation of 
passengers and freight across national borders began in that year with 
the establishm:mt of the first carIIErCial air service between IDndon 
and Paris. (83) Pleasure flights ~ offered to the British public 
soon after the war, with professional pilots flying war-tine aircraft 
which could be operated fran small fields temporarily licensed by the 
Air Ministry . Generally , civil air transport at this tine took the 
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fonn of private flying and flight by newly established flying clubs. 
(84) In Manchester, the "Avro Transport canpany" was forna:i and this 
was followed by the setting up of joy riding centres at Alexandra Park 
in the surmer of 1919. On 6 May 1919, Blackpool Council were granted 
authority for a Manchester - Southport - Blackpool air service which 
was inaugurated on 26 May. '!his was the first sustained scheduled 
dooestic air service but it was short lived, operating for only 18 
~ · Whilst such exper.inen.ts in the developtent of internal air 
services took place, two Manchester man, John Alcock and Arthur 
Whitten-Brown, presaged the inter-continental routes of later years, 
flying a "Vickers Vi.n¥" nearly 2, 000 miles across the Atlantic in Jillle 
1919, carpleting the first ever direct trans-Atlantic flight. Sate 
four nonths later, a rail strike prallpted a Goverrment organised air 
mail service between IDndon and the major cities in the provinces. 
Mail was flown between Manchester and IDndon and distributed by the 
"Manchester Circuit". (85 ) 
The first significant attempt to operate international air services 
on a camercial scale fran Manchester was recorded in 1922 and involved 
a canpany called "Daimler Ai1:way Limited", a subsidicuy of "Daimler 
Hire Limited", which had been allocated a maximum subsidy of £55, 000 a 
year to operate a service between Manchester and IDndon and on to 
Amsterdam, H.a:mburg and Berlin. The Manchester to IDndon service was 
opened on 23 October 1922 and it was expected to can:y nine passengers 
fran Manchester at a fare of £2 3s Od. The scheduled tine for the 
flight to Amsterdam was four hours. On 30 April the first aircraft to 
make a through journey fran Manchester to Berlin left Alexandra Park. 
However, within the year, the service had to be withdrawn and proposals 
for a service to Zurich were also shelved in the light of limited 
support . Subsequently, experinental flights to establish an air mail 
service between. Plyrrouth, Birmingham, Manchester and Belfast were made 
in 1923, but despite the efforts of the "De Havilland Conpany", and its 
pilots, Alan Cobham and Hubert Broad, it did not progress beyond the 
experilrental stage. (86 ) 
The major problem retarding developrent in these early years was the 
technical perfonnance of British aeroplanes and in this respect, the 
developrent of the British aircraft manufacturing industry during the 
war was a negative influence. On short-haul intemal routes, air 
services ~ uncanpetitive with the relatively efficient rail and. road 
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network over land. The Handley-Page hi-planes of the tirre cru.isErl at a 
speed of 70 to 80 miles per hour, but with a 40 mile per hour head 
wind, the ground speed dropped to 30 to 40 miles per hour, slower than 
the express trains of the day. The limi tErl range of aircraft 
necessitating re-fuelling stops, further lengthenErl air journeys. In 
1925, a suitable aeroplane had been p:roducecl in the UK, capable of 
seating two people with a 75 horse power engine. These light aircraft 
~ being marketErl in quantity for civil use but their application was 
generally limitErl to air-taxi work, the main contractors of which were 
newspaper proprietors and press agencies. With the large nmnbers of 
surplus war-tine aircraft available, little encouragarent was given to 
the production of a machine a~iate for wider oammercial 
application. The lack of suitable econanic purpose built passenger 
aeroplanes was canpounded by the lack of radio aids particularly in 
adverse weather conditions. (87) 
In contrast to the British experience, the 1920s was a decade of 
great strides in civil air transport in Europe. In 1920 only 6,000 
miles of :route had been flown, but by 1926, this had increasErl three 
fold. Statistics suggest that to a limitErl degree, the British civil 
air transport industry sharErl in this growth. In 1925, 20,721 
passengers ~ flown between Britain and the Continent, increasing to 
25,524 in 1926 and 28, 764 in 1927. The value of freight transported by 
air in the sane period was as shown in Table 2.1. 
By 1927, the British "Imperial Ai:r:wa.ys" canbine was operating 
bebNeen. lDndon and Paris, Basle, Zurich, Ostenci, Brussels and Cologne. 
( 88) However, in the sane year, sema 25 million miles were flown on 
organisErl air routes worldwide. Gernany and the USA accountErl for 12 
million miles, whilst the UK could claim only 1.5 million miles. (89 ) 
Addressing both internal and international traffic, the relatively 
inferior position of the UK civil air transport industry is ada}Uately 
daronstrated in Table 2.2. 
The USA constitutes a special case in that long distances without 
international ccmplications ~ being exploitErl, but also in Europe 
flight within and across national boundaries was being extendErl. 
France was developing principal :routes through Central Europe to 
Constantinople; th:rough Southenl Europe to Syria and the Far East; 
th:rough Spain and West Africa to South Anerica; th:rough Spain to the 
Sahara and fran the Congo to Madagascar. France also ran many European 
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services, for example Paris to Berlin and to lDndon. Gennany could 
boast extensive European services branching into Russia in the North 
and downwards to South AIrerica. (90) 
As suggested, the British civil air transport industry continued to 
lack support, and this is further daronstrated by experience with air 
nail, where it was found that considerable distances had to be involved 
before air transport was regamed as a viable proposition. Journey 
tine was a significant factor in the retardation of developrBlt. For 
example, despite the regularity of and lCM rates applying to the lDndon 
- Paris service, the anount of air mail carried on the route remained 
small. Conversely, services fran Egypt to Iraq and later, to India, 
carried a high proportion of letter mail as they offered a saving of 
sare five to eight days on the alternative maans of carriage. As for 
ineaning Anerican Mails, an Air Mails Ccmnittee (Crmld 2038) had 
reported that apart fran interruptions due to weather conditions, the 
tine of arrival of mails at the European port was so irregular that the 
employmant of air transport was found to offer no advantage in the case 
of 50% of the arrivals. (91) 
'!he disparity reganiing the developrBlt of internal air routes is 
striking and in accounting for this a report on "'!he Progress of 
British Civil Aviation", published in 1927, envisaged that air services 
"'\NOuld not be of any great magnitude in the foreseeable future" gi veIl 
the "efficient rail carmunication" servicing Britain. For Irish 
traffic, it was suggested that any demand for air services would be 
adequately net by "sea 'planes", as it was uneconanic to use three-
engined aeroplanes which would be necessary to make the sea crossing 
without fear of breakdown or forced landing. (92) 
In assessing the early experience of air transport in Manchester, it 
is suggested that in tenns of potential demand for air services, the 
City was in a nore advantageous position than many other pnNincial 
centres in the country, given its role as a camercial and business 
centre. In the retuI:ns for the Provincial Bank Clearing Houses, 
Manchester registered returns of £681,307,000 in 1928, followed by 
Liverpool with £426,735,000; the returns of the city of Binoingham 
anounted to £137,295,000. '!he relatively prosperous North West 
contrasted with the poorer North Fast and South West centres of 
Newcastle, Bradford and Bristol recording £75,834,000, £68,609,000 and 
£62,638,000 respectively. '!he Custans Port of Manchester extended fran 
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a point alnost ilrrIatiately East of the City of Liverpool and rankEd 
third. in the country in tenns of the value of imports and exports 
handlEd in 1928. ( 93) '!he area around Oldham, Bury, Bal ton and 
Rochdale rep:resentEd a centre of "spinning" whilst leigh, Atherton and 
Tyldesley constitutEd an area where the coal and chanica! industries 
predcminated. Dem::>graphic change in these areas was important in 
assessing the potential market for air services in the 1920s. In the 
decade 1901 to 1911, Britain had experiencErl a natural increase in 
population and in South East Lancashire population had expandEd because 
of a continuing process of industrial growth and the accarpmying 
concentration of labour. In the decade 1911 to 1921, the rate of 
natural increase for the country as a hole had declinEd as a result of 
declining birth rates and war deaths. In this period the rate of out-
migration in South East Lancashire was greater than that for the 
country as a whole because of the contraction of the textiles and 
clothing industries. In the slump of 1920-21, with the effects of 
severe unanploynent, the rate of out-migration recordEd in the area was 
2.2%. However, in the years 1921 - 1931, the trend was sooewhat 
reversed. Although the rate of natural population increase for South 
East Lancashire was below the national figure, the rate of out-
migration had declined to 0.2% as canpared with a national average of 
1.5%. (94) 
Although econanic instability followed by partial recovery, the coal 
strike and the Great Slump of 1930-31 had resultEd in declining exports 
for the area, Manchester still rerainEd a large centre of population. 
Within a 25 mile radius of the centre of Manchester, the population was 
4.3 million, contrasting with 1.0 million around Bristol and 698,000 
around Hull. (95 ) H~, despite being situaterl in one of the nost 
densely populated areas of the country, the City confronterl the dilemra 
of attracting the business to justify the existence of airport 
facilities. Experience at the tanporary aenxirare at Wythensha\E did 
not augur well for the future. In the first three m:mths of operation, 
97 aircraft arrivals and departures were recordEd can:ying only 108 
passengers, of which eight were classified as having origins or 
destinations abroad. In July, 84 aircraft rrovem:mts carriEd only 48 
passengers. By October, following the surrmar peak, throughput had 
declined to 51 aircraft m:::warents can:ying 21 passengers. ( 96 ) By 26 
October 1929, Northern Air Lines Limiterl which had been operating air-
51 
taxi services fran Wythenshawe were considering the transfer of their 
operation to the newly proposed aeroc:lrare at Liverpool. John leaning, 
the co-director of the Canpany asserted that "the carmarcial flying 
needs of Manchester could be supplied by one small Moth." ( 97 ) 
As previously suggested, the tenporru:y aeroc:lrare at Wythenshawe 
continued to operate until the Barton Airport opened in January 1930. 
By May of the sarre year, arrangarents were being made for a direct 
connection by air between sare of the principal towns in Britain and 21 
destinations on the Continent via Croydon. Inperial AiI:ways Limited 
proposed to run a service thrice weekly as an experinen.t for three 
nonths, between Liverpool, Manchester, Binningham, Croydon and Paris or 
Cologne, using 16 seater Handley-Page Rolls Royce airliners. The three 
City Councils involved. on this side of the Channel agreed to provide 
grants-in-aid of £1,000 each to Imperial AiJ::ways. 'l\\u other airlines, 
KI.M, the Royal Dutch Airline and Sabena, the Belgian airline, were to 
be involved in providing connections between Croydon and various towns 
and cities on the Continent. (98) The service was operated fran 16 
June 1930 to 20 September 1930. During this period, 543 paying 
passengers were carried along with 1,197 pounds of freight; 205 
passengers and 962 pounds of freight passed through the Manchester 
stage. The bulk of freight, 687 pounds, was for transport between 
Manchester and lDndon. ( 99) Gross revenue for the lDndon - Binningham 
- Manchester - Liverpool leg was £1,056; £1,027 being taken in 
passenger fares; £12 in excess ba.ggage and £17 in freight receipts. 
(100) Although throughput exceeded anything that had gone before, the 
object of the service, that is, a rapid connection between the 
Provinces and the Continent was not achieved. Continental traffic was 
only about 5% of the total and all of this traffic was to and fran 
Paris. In the transportation of freight, little advantage had accrued 
to shippers ~rting because the service operated on alternate days 
only. Clearance through Custans pI:OCedures at Croydon, prior to trans-
shipnant inland, rreant that there was no irrm3diate connection for goods 
~rted to the Provinces. (101) 
The general depression in trade would have affected the danand for 
air travel like any other class of transport, but in their analysis, 
Imperial .Ai1:ways concluded that frequency of service had been the ma jar 
factor in limiting traffic. The canpany maintained that no service 
beb\een highly populated areas would succeed in attracting the 
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anticipated. traffic if it \\ere operated less than once a day in each 
direction. It was suggested. that had the service been operated daily, 
traffic would have nore than doubled. The corollary of this was the 
need. for l~r capacity aircraft to n:rluce running costs; the load 
factor on the route suggested that the use of 12 to 18 seater aircraft 
would not be justified for sema tine to ccma. (102) Whereas in 1927, 
14 seater aircraft had been used on the IDndon - Paris route only, in 
subsequent years experinEntation using these aircraft on other routes 
increaSingly suggested the need for a fast, efficient, carm:rrcial 
madium sized aircraft offering better perfonnance and accamodation and 
the possibility of a nore frequent service. ( 103 ) Whilst the Barton 
Airport in its first year of operation recorded a total of 2,056 
aircraft nnvemants, excluding "joy flights", (Northern. Air Lines 
accounting for 746; "Air Taxis" 221 and Imperial Ail:ways 156), the bulk 
of aircraft novem:mts continued to be occasional visitors and private 
flying by resident aircraft. (104) By October 1933, there was still no 
evidence of any airline operating regularly fran the aerodrarE and as 
suggested in the previous section, it became increaSingly clear that 
the lack of adequate facilities at Manchester's airport was becaning a 
pressing problem as new aircraft designs evolved. The dilemna for 
airport authorities was adequately sUIlllEd up by the Superintendant of 
the Board of "Railway Air Services", (a canpany fomed by the four 
mainline railway canpanies of the ti:rre and "Imperial Ail:ways" , 
registered in March 1934 with the declared objective of operating 
regular and reliable internal air services). In the three nonths, 
August to October 1934, the Canpany had made 193 landings at Barton 
Airport, carrying a total of 320 passengers and 3,083 pounds of freight 
and mail. In accounting for the lack of progress the inadequacy of 
existing facilities to cope with a new breed of fast camercial 
aircraft caning into increasing use was highlighted.. As nore airline 
operators opted. for high speed aircraft , flying which had been regarded 
as a sport a few years earlier, became a nore regular fonn of 
conveyance for the businessman and thus airport authorities were faced 
with increasing demand for all-weather operations and the problem of 
catering for new aircraft design at the sane ti:rre. (105) 
As suggested in the previous section, the response of the City of 
Manchester to the challenge before it was to seek altemati ve airport 
facilities. Given the potential for growth in the late 1930s, it may 
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be arguEd that this had been a prudent decision. In the second half of 
the decade, the Bri tish civil air transport industry undeI:Went a 
process of "catching up" in the intemational market. In 1933, the 
industry had carriEd 79,070 passengers as carp:rrEd with 123,036 in 
Ge:r:many. Howewer, a pattexn of g:rowth was finn! y establishErl in the 
following years with passenger throughput increasing to 200,000 in 1935 
(canparable to Ge:r:many's 209,875) and 244,400 in 1937. By 1937 the 
route mileage flown by UK air transport canpanies also canpared 
favourably with Gennany (26,679 route miles as canpared with Genrany's 
25,968); the aircraft miles flown by Genrany and Britain in the sama 
year were also nore or less the sama, at about ten million miles each. 
(106) 
In the five years, 1933 to 1937, the anount of goods carriErl by air had 
increasEd fran 741 tons to 2,353 tons, an increase of 218%. In tenus 
of the weight of letter mail despatchEd by air to Europe, an inp:>rtant 
developre11t had been the application of the "all-up" principle already 
establishEd on inland services, whereby First Class mail (letters and 
post cards) could be despatchErl by air at the ordinary rate of 
international postage without surcharge. As a result, in 1936 alone 
the weight of letter mail despatchErl by air to Europe increasErl by 
179%. (107) 
By 1936, Imperial Ail:ways had openEd new branch lines to West Africa 
and Hong Kong, so by this tine, the Empire routes serverl includErl 
lDndon to Brisbane, Penang - Saigon - 'lburane - Hong Kong, IDndon to 
Johannesburg and Khartoum to West Africa. '!he European routes flown by 
Imperial AiI:ways were fran IDndon to Paris; Paris - Marseilles - Rcma-
Brindisi; Basle and Zurich; Brussels and Cologne; and Cologne-
Halle/Isipzig - Prague - Vienna - Budapest. ( 108) DeveloprEIlts had 
also taken place in the internal market with route mileage increasing 
markErlly in 1935 to 5,810 miles as canpared with 3,265 route miles 
operating in 1934. Aircraft mileage on internal routes had increasErl 
by 95% and the nmnber of passengers handlErl had increasEd fran 72,441 
to 121,559. Freight and mail tonnage carriErl on internal routes had 
rrore than doublEd in the sarre period. (109) To sare extent, despite 
its limitations, the Barton Airport sharErl in this early growth of 
internal air services, as boDle out by the traffic statistics detailErl 
in Table 2.3. 
By 1937, Black:pool and West Coast Air Services Limited operated a 
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service between Manchester , Liverpool, Blackpool and the Isle of Man, 
twice daily on weekdays, until the canpany was taken over by Isle of 
Man Air Services Limited on 27 Septanber 1937. Railway Air SeI:vices 
Limited operated a number of services between leeds, Manchester and the 
Isle of Man via Liverpool or Blackpool in the StmnEr nonths; the routes 
flown by the Manx Ai1:way Section of Railway Air Services being taken 
over by Isle of Man Air Services on 27 September. '!he routes flown by 
Isle of Man Air Services included Manchester - Liverpool - Blackpool-
Isle of Man - Belfast - Glasgow once on Sundays; Manchester- Liverpool 
- Blackpool - Isle of Man twice daily on weekdays; Manchester-
Liverpool once daily on weekdays and Liverpool - Isle of Man - Belfast 
once daily on weekdays • ~rth Fastem Ail:ways Limita:i operata:i a 
Grilnsby - Hull - Doncaster - Manchester route twice daily on weekdays, 
later extended to Liverpool and operated once daily on weekdays and a 
Doncaster - Manchester service also operated once daily on weekdays. 
(110) Although growth was experienced it is inpJrtant to note that 
many of these routes ~ under-utilised reflecting the fact that the 
nost successful dcmastic routes on a national scale continued to be 
those drawing their traffic fran one or nore nainland aercx:irares 
crossing stretches of water and showing the nost narked advantages in 
convenience and speed over ships . Generally, it was still the case 
that air services when canpeting with gocx:i rail services were slower 
than the fastest trains on stages of less than 100 miles. (111) Major 
airlines, such as British Airways Limited, tended to concentrate their 
efforts on the developnant of routes involving a sea crossing such as 
lDndon to Ryde and on to c~s; Liverpool to Blackpool extending to the 
Isle of Man and Liverpool to Belfast and Glasgow. (112) 
The fact that air transport was relatively inferior to surface 
transport over land was reflected in the status of airports operating 
outside IDndon in 1936, with coastal airports accounting for the lion's 
share of air traffic. Port.snDuth was the largest, handling 25,385 
passengers in that year, followed by Southarrpton with 24,606. '!hese 
two airports alone accounted for 44% of the passenger traffic generata:i 
outside lDndon . Liverpool was the next largest airport, handling 
16,038 passengers. An inpJrtant developnant in the 1930s had been the 
institution of regular air services fran England to the Charmel 
Islands. Jersey Airways ~ operating a Southampton - Jersey service 
and a Plym::ruth to Jersey service. Port.snDuth, Southsea and Isle of 
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Wight Aviation Limited were operating between Southanpton, Ryde and 
Cowes with a Portsnnuth to Ryde service every 20 minutes. (113) 
In 1936, the largest tonnage of freight and mail handlOO outside 
lDndon was recordOO at Liverpool with 73.7 tons of freight and 213 tons 
of nail, representing 35% and 55% respectively of the total tonnage 
outside lDndon. In tenns of mail throughput , Liverpool was gaining 
advantage fran the establishIrent of inland mail services operating fran 
lDndon to Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast. (114) In 1937, Southampton 
becama an important distribution point for freight and mail outside 
lDndon, handling 370 tons of freight and 517 tons of mail or 57% of the 
freight traffic and 45% of the traffic in mail, generatOO outside the 
Capital airports of Croydon, Gatwick and Heston. '!he Isle of Man also 
handled srne 9% of freight fn:m the regions and 13% of mail throughput, 
whilst Liverpool's throughput had declinOO relatively to 11% and 22% 
respectively. It should be noted, however, that this situation did not 
reflect an absolute decline in the status of Liverpool, but an absolute 
increase in the overall throughput of freight and mail handlOO outside 
the Capital. In contrast, the Barton Airport at Manchester had little 
part to play in this expansion, handling only approximately 21 tons of 
freight and nail in 1936 and 16 tons in 1937. Whilst airp:>rts in the 
provinces situated on the coast experienced grcMt.h generatOO by routes 
involving a sea crossing, the only European route operating out of a 
provincial airport in 1937 was the Royal Dutch Airlines' Liverpool-
Doncaster - Amsterdam service. In general, as continental routes fran 
the provinces W9re limi too, lDndon accounted for the lion's share of 
traffic, handling 49% of passengers, 45% of mail and 78% of freight 
passing through the UK airp:>rts in 1937. (115 ) 
The daninance of lDndon in the civil air transport network, couplOO 
with the relative success of overseas routes, offered little irmediate 
prospect of the early establishrrEnt of schOOulOO air services fran the 
newly opened Manchester airp:>rt at Ringway. But in the long tenn the 
area which Ringway Airport was expected to serve continuOO to be 
relatively prosperous - suggesting a ready narket as and when technical 
developrents in aircraft design made air transport nore econanical and 
convenient. The depression in trade experienced in the 1930s, couplOO 
with the decline of prices, profits and interest rates, was manifested 
in a reduction in Bank Clearing House returns fran nore than £681 
million in 1928 to £566 million in 1937. ~,Manchester was still 
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relatively more prosperous than other regions. £566 million 
represented nearly 30% of the national total outside IDndon and 
excea::iai the aggregate of the next three nost .inp:>rtant centres of 
Liverpool, Binningham and. Newc:astle-upon-Tyne. (116) 
Wi thin the South East Lancashire area, there were SarE indications 
of rising prosperity. The tonnage of freight processed through the 
Manchester Ship canal had increased fran 5,389,000 in 1933 to 7,053,000 
in 1937 . The Port of Manchester was still the centre of the 
manufacturing for Lancashire's cotton goods and in 1937, one million 
bales of raw cotton were inportErl through the Manchester Ship Canal. 
The Manchester Royal Exchange was the centre of the marketing and 
export of cotton manufactures and. in 1937, yarn and cotton exports were 
still the IIDst inportant calUcdi.ty group in the country. Manchester 
was also the headquarters of the Co-operative rrovemmt with a turnover 
of £100 million in 1938. At the sane tine, new industries were clearly 
assuming an increasing .inp:>rtance in the econany. Of the 2,600 rranbers 
of the Manchester Chamber of Ccmrerce, only half were involved in the 
cotton trade, the other half canprising finns engaged in engineering, 
(an activity in which Manchester could claim to be the largest centre 
in the country) and chemical manufacture, the export of which fran the 
Greater Manchester area exceerlai that of any other area of the country. 
( 117 ) In 1929, the textile industry had been the largest single 
atq)loyer with a total workforce of 116,501 rraking up 20.1% of the 
insured population. By the end of the 1930s, the numbers anployerl in 
textiles had declinErl to 91,198 representing a drop of 22%. In the 
sarre period, the distributive trades had advancErl fran 88,998 workers 
to 107,447 an increase of 21% becaning the single largest group. 
Clothing trades and miscellaneous services also showed large increases 
in atq)loynent of 29.5% and 53. 5% respectively. These novem:mts 
representai the adaptation of the area to changes in the national 
econany, following the decline of the textile export industry, 
(accelerated by the slurrp and the policy of deliberate concentration 
designai to reduce capacity and. output), and the subsequent recovery of 
prices and rise in the standard of living. With the new prosperity, 
the engineering and clothing trades expandai along with distribution 
and professional and other services. Between 1929 and. 1939, the 
nmnbers atq)loyed in cannarce, banking and insurance had doublErl. So 
the local econany had changed fran one daninaterl by textiles to one 
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where engineering, textiles, clothing, distribution and miscellaneous 
services ~ all significant E!tployers of labour. ( 118) 
As the structure of the econaqy diversified, so the nature of trade 
altererl in a nanner which could be potentially beneficial to air 
transport. In 1937, the export trade was dcminated by rranufactured and 
semi-manufacturerl goods, representing SCIrE 84% of the total value of 
exports handled.. This export trade represented a potential market for 
the Ringway Airport, requiring a rapid transport service to deal with 
the nore diversified products which were contained in large and small 
parcels rather than in ship-loads. Sarrples of clothing incorporating 
new designs had to be forwarded to a European market quickly and air 
transport could potentially satisfy the need. for quick delivery of 
spare parts for nechanical, electrical and textile machinery. Small 
instrurrEnts, chemicals and drugs, rope and twine, ];Xlper, rubber 
rranufactures, glassware and pottery might also be transporterl by air in 
considerable volurre. Air transport could also cater for the "personal 
services" required. in marketing such products as the volurre of exports 
realised. depended upon a quick appraisal of market requiJ::arents and a 
constant servicing of consurrer areas by sales and technical staff. 
(119) 
'!he Ringway Airport at Manchester opened. on 25 July 1938. In the 
short pericxi of operation prior to the outbreak of the Second World War 
(July 1938 to August 1939) the Airport handled. 7,087 aircraft 
IlDVE!l'ETlts, carrying 7,625 ];Xlssengers and 163,168 pounds of freight. 
Airline routes established during this limited pericxi included. services 
to Croydon, the Isle of Man, Glasgow, Bristol and Amsterdam. Operating 
canpanies included. Railway Air Services using DH 86bs and Rapides. Isle 
of Man Air Services, Southampton Air Services and the Royal Dutch 
Airline, KIM using OC2s and Electras. (120) '!he establishment of a 
service to Amsterdam by KIM represented scmathing of an early 
breakthrough into the continental market. A writer in the Liyerpool 
Echo on 1 June 1939 contrasted. the experience at Liverpool Airport with 
that at Ringway highlighting the fact that: 
"'!he one operating line which did not enjoy any holiday support .. 
. [over the Whitsun break] . . . was KrM with its Amsterdam route 
connecting with other Continental cities, but KrM found ample 
canpensation in the fact that Manchester provided 13 ];XlSsengers on 
the Friday." 
(b) The Early Post-War Years, 1946-1961 
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In the years iIrmrliately following the end of v«>rld war II, 9Xp:)rts 
fran the Manchester area continued to be daninated by manufactures with 
chanicals, iron and steel machinery, textiles and. paper accounting for 
62.6% of total exports of 2,004,897 tons. Primarily, the area still 
owa:i its p:rosperi ty largely to success .in making and. selling textile 
goods, engineering products and clothing, with a high degree of 
specialisation and concentration of labour .in these industries. '!he 
percentage of the total insured population engaged in these industries 
was about twice that of Britain as a whole, accounting for about half 
of the working population when added to carmarcial and other services. 
(121) 
In addition, the City of Manchester had beccm3 a press centre 
canparable to IDndon and was developing as a centre for scientific and 
industrial research, notable for i ts activities in the field of IIEdical 
research. Close business links were being established between the 
industrial units of the North West and West Riding and those of the USA 
and Canada. Much of the industrial developtent on the Traffo:rd Park 
Industrial Estate, for exanple, involved Amarican and Canadian 
interests eager to take advantage of the Western gateway to England and 
Europe. The fact that many canpanies were basing their offices .in 
Manchester neant that increasingly directorate and managerial staffs 
~re centring in Manchester and residing in North Cheshire, creating 
wealthy residential areas around ~on, Hale, Hale Barns, Knutsford, 
Prestbury, Wilms low , Alderley Edge, Cheadle and Handforth. The bulk of 
industIy centred on Manchester, with the whole of trans-Atlantic trade 
of the area passing through the ports of Manchester and Liverpool. 
Manchester was the nearest seaport for the cotton textile, silk and 
clothing industries of South East Lancashire, the woollen towns of West 
Yorkshire and the IlEtalltn:gical centres of Sheffield and Chesterfield. 
(122) 
Clearly then, it may be argued. that given its geographical position, 
Ringway Airport's natural catclmen.t area was extensive and therefore 
the a..irfxJrt was likely to assuma a major :role in the civil air 
transport industry as sCX)n as air travel aver land becane a viable 
al ternati ve to other neans of transport. In many respects, the Second 
WJrld War had been a great "forcing house" for aviation as benefits 
accrued fran the technical advances that had been made priIIarily to 
secure military objectives. (123) Great progress had been made in the 
59 
design of airfranes and engines, although for the efficient prosecution 
of war, the UK aircraft manufacturing industry had concentrated on the 
production of fighters and banbers to the virtual exclusion of 
transp:>rt aircraft. All-weather flying had been extended as a result 
of developtent in radio and radar during war-tine. Great numbers of 
rren had served in the flying services, providing a natural resource of 
recruitm::mt for civil aviation after the war. Flying had ceased to be 
sCllEthing outside the nonnal experience of "the man in the street" as 
tens of thousands of rren and waren had flown or been flown, and many 
nore were familiar with the idea of flight as a consequence of having 
\\Urked in aircraft factories and in the works of precision instrurrent 
makers. As suggested in the previous section, many aeroc:irates had been 
imp:roved to cater for war-tine ~ts. ( 124 ) 
'!he scale of the British effort in civil aviation fz:an 1 August 
1946, when war-tinE restrictions on the flight of civil aircraft ~ 
:revoked, may be gauged by the fact that wi thin seven nonths, not only 
were civil air services resurra:i be~ the United Kingdan and the nine 
European capitals of Paris, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Brussels, 
Amsterdam, Rare, Athens and Helsinki, and be~ the UK and New York, 
but also the first regular British service to South Anerica was 
inaugurated. In 1947, UK airlines carried a total of 586,500 
passengers and 5,051 tons of freight on scheduled services as carp:rred 
with 222,200 passengers and 2,527 tons of freight in 1938. In the same 
perioo, the mnnber of passengers carried on internal routes had 
increased by two and a half tines the 1938 figure of 147,700 and the 
number of people using air services to cross national boundaries had 
increased nore than three tinEs. ( 125 ) The rapid resmnption of 
activity and the large dem:md for services which the experience of the 
war years had engendered were, in part, reflected at Manchester. In 
the 14 nonths, October 1946 to November 1947, Ringway Airport handled 
33,022 passengers and 253,321 pounds of freight as carp:rred with 7,625 
passengers and 163,168 pounds of freight in the 14 rronths to August 
1939. Although in absolute tenns growth was registered, the scale of 
operation at Manchester rem:rined quite small in canparison to other 
regional airports in 1947. For example, Speke Airport at Liverpool 
handled a total of 66,058 passengers, Ronaldsway, the Isle of Man 
airport, recorded 51,653 passengers and Nutts Comer in Belfast, 
55,535. ( 126) However, the Sl.lll'llEr t.inetable offered fran Ringway 
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Airport in 1948, as detailed in Table 2.4, suggests a significant 
improvemant upon the regular air seJ:Vices which had been offered in the 
p:re-war years, an inp.rovarent which was in great part due to the 
operations of foreign rather than UK airlines. 
In addition to these passenger services all-cargo services operatErl 
fran Manchester to Dublin to Liverpool and to lDndon once a week. 
Whereas, in the pre-war era, the only continental airline operating out 
of Manchester had been KrM, a nmnber of foreign airlines ~ now using 
the airport. KrM and Aer Lingus operated on the Amsterdam and Dublin 
routes, Air France operated to Paris and COBErA, the Belgian airline, 
operated the services between Manchester and Brussels and lDuIdes. All 
other services were operated by British European AiIways. (127) 
During the early 1950s, British civil air transport was still in its 
infancy and the nean rate of growth in tenninal passengers passing 
through UK airports of 18.6% in the period 1951-55 was in rrany respects 
typical of a new industry. (128) Civil air transport was generally 
absorbing traffic where it enjoyed a clear advantage due to the 
consolidation and extension of the changes in aircraft design which had 
been initiated during the Second w:>rld War. Whereas in the years 
inm3diately follCMing the end of hostilities, the industry had been 
dependent upon war service aircraft such as the "Dakotas" or military 
types adapted for civil use like the "York" and "Lancastrian" 
(developed fran the Lancaster Banber) as the years progressed, a new 
generation of aircraft cane increasingly into use. For example, 
British European Airways, Air France, Aer Lingus and Sabena usErl 21 
seater OC-3s fran RIDgway; KIM used OC-3s and Convairs whilst Swissair 
operated OC-3s, Convairs and Skymasters. Many of these aircraft were 
capable of carrying three timas as many passengers as those in use at 
the end of the Second World War. (129 ) 
'Ille total passenger traffic handled at Ringway Airport increased by 
119% between 1949 and 1953, as the result of the greater popularity of 
air travel on existing routes and the introduction of new routes. 
However, as Table 2.5 indicates, increases W9re nore markErl for sene 
routes than others. 
As far as darestic traffic is concern.ed IlUlch of the expansion was 
due to the increased popularity of services to holiday destinations 
such as the Isle of Man and Channel Islands, as new operators 
introduced larger nnre canfortable aircraft whilst at the sane tima 
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increasing the frequency of service. Similar factors applied in the 
expansion by BEA of the IDndon route where passengers carried no:re than 
doubled between 1952 and 1953. This service acted as a feeder for sate 
short-haul journeys to the Continent where a direct service fran 
Ringway was not providOO because of low payload or where a greater 
frequency of service offera:i at the capital nade interlining rrore 
attractive. In addition, the service fOO long haul I:OUtes operated 
fran IDndon. As far as international routes are concernOO, Manchester 
- Dublin was nost popular with the nmnber of passengers increasing by 
59% between 1949 and 1953, following the trend in Irish emigration in 
the imoodiate post-war years. '!he nore inpJrtant continental routes 
xegistened growth rates of 82% to 133%. (130) 
Significantly, as indictOO by Table 2.6, the growth of passenger 
throughput in the early post-war years was greater at Ringway .AiJ:port 
than for the countJ:y as a whole and, therefore, a greater share of the 
civil air transport narket was captured. 
Undoubtedly, this was due in part to the effect of the nore rapid 
developrent by BEA in 1952 and 1953 of intemal air services of which 
the proportion taken by Ringway had a greater impact upon its smaller 
totals than increases in dc:mastic services had upon national averages. 
(131) In addition, the developlIent of the IDndon route in particular, 
swellOO traffic figures as Ringway becane increasingly used as a 
"transit" ail:port. In 1951, 5,963 transit passengers had passed 
through Ringway canpared with 14,818 two years later. (132) 
Similarly, in the narket for air freight, growth and expansion took 
place in the imoodiate post-war years, with the extension of scheduled 
passenger services and the developrent of da:iicated freight services. 
As Table 2. 7 indicates, in 1948 only 524 short tons of freight had been 
handlOO at Manchester .AiJ:port. 
'!he primlly origins and destinations of freight traffic were Dublin, 
Amsterdam, Liverpool, Belfast, IDru:ion, the Isle of Man, Brussels, Paris 
and Zurich, carried by BEA, Air France, KIM, Sabena, Aer Lingus, 
Swissair and various charter canpanies. '!he type of goods handled was 
extensive, including nachinery and nachinery spares, notor car spares, 
shipping spares, agricultural nachinery, tools, radar and electrical 
equipIEIlt, foodstuffs including soft fruits, clothing and "nade up" 
cotton goods, textile designs and sanples, na:lical supplies, mnbrellas, 
biological spec.inens, confectionery, leather goods, boots and shoes, 
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wines and spirits, racing dogs, greyhounds, horses, cattle and various 
other anilnals for zoos and private collections. ( 133 ) 
By 1953, the tonnage handled at Ringway was exceeded only by 
airports at IDndon, Northol t, Lynpne and Southampton and, of these, 
figures for Lynpne and Southampton were swollen by the short cross 
channel transportation of motor cars in the holiday season. 
Manchester's share of the UK freight market increased fran 3.5% in 1948 
to nearly 6% of the total tormage carried by air in 1953. However, 
again the bulk of traffic was destined for a limited number of centres. 
Reflecting trends for the UK as a whole approximately 70-75% of tonnage 
was for export, but over half this freight was carried on the Irish sea 
routes, especially to Dublin. Consi91ments consisted mainly of 
consurrer durables in the nain like radio sets, refrigerators, washing 
rrachines and a range of rranufactured goods of high value and. snaIl bulk 
for which air transport over a short sea haul was prrticularly 
sui table, offering reduced p:lckaging, insurance and handling costs and 
less risk of damage in trans-shiprent. Much of the Irish inp:>rt trade 
consisted of textiles sent for processing in the West Riding of 
Yorkshire and. subsequently re-exported to Dublin, but the tonnage 
remained relatively snaIl as a large part of the exports fran Ireland. 
at the tine consisted of agricultural goods unsuitable for air 
transport. (134) 
Freight carried on the IDndon service consisted mainly of p:irC9ls of 
textiles for overseas destinations, where the princip:ll advantage of 
speed was necessary and could be fully realised. The anount of freight 
carried from Manchester direct to foreign airports was srrall, 
reflecting the UK position in civil air transport where only sam 2-
2.75% of the total value of exports ~ sent by air in 1947-52. In 
essence, further growth depended upon. the extent to which all-freight 
aircraft would be developed with greater payloads and. l~ operating 
cost per ton~le. (135) 
By the end of the 1950s, Manchester Airport had developed a fairly 
extensive network of air services operated by a nmnber of airlines. 
BFA had joined KIM and Aer Lingus on the Amsteroam route; Aer Lingus 
had joined Sabena flying to Brussels; Sabena and BFA operated to Dublin 
in addition to Aer Lingus and. KIM; and. BFA, Aer Lingus and. Swissair 
operated to Zurich. New scheduled services had been introduced to the 
Continent by BFA, flying to Barcelona, to Milan, to Palna and. to Rare. 
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Independent operators becane nore heavily involved in darestic routes, 
for exanple, Cambrian flew routes between Manchester and Bristol and 
Manchester to Cardiff. The IDndon route was developerl with BFA and 
BOAC together operating 41 services per week in the Stm1Ter nonths and 
33 in winter. A new departure was the introduction of "Inclusive Tour" 
services to Dublin and a number of destinations on the Continent, like 
Bas Ie , Beauvais, BeIgen, Dusseldorf, I£>urcies, Luxanbow:g, Nice, Osten.d, 
Perpignan, Pi sa , Saragossa, Stavanger and Valencia. (136) Perhaps the 
nost striking developrent of the 1950s was, however, the introduction 
and expansion of trans-Atlantic services which began to set Ringway 
apart fran aiIports of canparable size at Belfast and Glasgow for 
example, and placed it in the sane league as the larger Prestwick 
Airport in Scotland. 
The first trans-Atlantic service was introduced by Sabena, the 
Belgian airline on 28 October 1953, operating between Brussels, 
Manchester and New York. Over the next three years trans-Atlantic 
services were expanded with OOAC call1erlcing a route between IDncion, 
Manchester, Prestwick and New York and Lufthansa inaugurating new 
services to Montreal and Chicago. In addition to these new scheduled 
services, North An'erican charter traffic was swollen by a large 
increase in emigrant traffic, the introduction of the "air coach 
holiday" and the IrOVE!le11ts of US military forces and families into and 
out of the UK and Europe. (137) 
Between 1957 and 1961, the terminal passengers on trans-atlantic 
flights at Ringway incr:eased fran 11,907 to 26,903 representing an 
increase of 126% with nore passengers travelling eastward than \\1estward 
through Manchester. 'Ibis reflected a general UK trend where the 
proportion of US and canadian nationals was in the ratio of three to 
one because earnings in North An'erica 'Were relatively higher than the 
UK; the population of the US and canada was three and a half tines that 
of the UK and past migration had creata:i family journeys in a \\1esterly 
direction. The International Air Transport Association (rATA) 
camenting on the developIent of North An'erican tourist traffic at the 
tine, confil::'Ira:i that it was alnost wholly of North An'erican origin and 
was estimated to be \\Urth $500 a head to the operators and $900 a head 
to the European countries visita:i. (138) 
Despite the grCMth in trans-Atlantic traffic, existing services 
offered fran Manchester \\1ere capable of accanrodating a larger number 
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of passengers. For example, in 1961, OOAC aircraft calling at 
Manchester had a capaci~ of about 100,000 seats of which 22,000 were 
taken up. The problem in naximising throughput at Manchester was that 
SaTE of the trans-Atlantic traffic arising fran the hema catchrrent area 
was carried through the IDndon "gateway", largely because IDndon 
offered flights to a mnnber of Anerican destinations without the nea:i 
to change at New York and the choice of service at different hours of 
the day was greater. BFA took a count for two weeks in May 1962 of 
outward passengers fran Manchester to IDndon interlining for the United 
States and Canada. '!hese includErl passengers going by Pan Anerican and 
other North Anerican airlines and the number recorded in two weeks was 
83. '!his count and annual figures provided by BEA of passengers 
be~ Manchester and london who interlinErl to destinations outside 
Europe suggestErl that about 6,000 passengers a year to and fran 
Manchester interlined on trans-Atlantic routes. Sana also travelled 
direct by road or train to IDndon. So it was asStmEd that in addition 
to the 27,000 trans-Atlantic passengers travelling through Manchester, 
a further quarter travelled through lDndon, making a total of about 
34,000 passengers a year into or out of the effective home area. (139) 
Another factor affecting passenger totals on trans-Atlantic flights 
at Manchester was the developIeIlt of internal air services fran 
Liverpool, Newcastle and leeds to lDndon Airport. Travellers fran 
these areas could find it nore convenient to interline at IDndon fran 
their local airport for a direct flight than to travel by road or rail 
to Manchester. In the short nID, this tended to restrict Manchester's 
effective catclmen.t area, but in the long nm intemal fea:ier services 
were regarded as essential if Manchester was to became a major trans-
Atlantic airport. Another favourable long tenn possibili~ was the 
effect of Manchester having a greater number of direct links with the 
Continent. It was recognised that such continental links ~d put 
Manchester in a gocxi position to act as a trans-Atlantic teJ:mina1 '!hus 
priori~ was placed upon increasing the frequency of service on trans-
Atlantic routes in order to rrake it nore attractive to interline at 
Manchester rather than lDndon or Prestwick. ( 140) 
'!he tendency for trans-Atlantic traffic to pass through IDndon was 
also reflected in the transit of cargo. As Table 2.8, Freight (Short 
'Ibns) on Trans-Atlantic Routes, 1957 - 1961, indicates, although 
throughput at Manchester was rising, it remained far below that of 
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london and Prestwick. A g:ceater tormage of North Atlantic cargo was 
exported fran Manchester than was .imported,in 1961, for example, 631~ 
short tons was carried westbound and only 174~ short tons were 
eastbound. Whilst at the london Airport a similar tendency emarged, 
the disparity was much less suggesting that sare of the cargo destined 
for the North of England was p:issing through the london Airport. (141) 
In essence, the early post-war years represented a period of 
substantial grCMt.h for the British civil air transport industry as a 
whole and for Manchester's airport. Existing routes were becaning nore 
popular as the fJ:eqUency of service ilrproved and larger aircraft cane 
into use. By the end of the 1950s, a new period of exper.inentation was 
ushered in ~th the inc:reasing introduction of the new generation of 
"turbo prop" aircraft like the Viscount, Pionair and Super 
Constellation. As Manchester inc:reased its share of the UK p:issenger 
and freight narket, a dependence upon the Irish market and holiday 
routes was countered by the developlEl1t of continental and trans-
Atlantic air services which gave Manchester a lead over its provincial 
counterparts but also suggested a new era of stiffer canpetition with 
the london airports. 
(c) The 1960s and 1970s 
Whilst dynamic growth was the keynote of the British civil air 
transport industry during the first two decades after the Second World 
War, the 1960s were marked by a substantial slowing down of growth 
p:ittems, puticularly in the second half of the decade. Growth rates 
declined fran 12.9% during 1961-65 to 8.6% in 1966-70. (142) As 
previously stated, grCMt.h p:itterns of the ilmatiate post war years had 
been characteristic of an infant industry. Civil air transport had 
absorbed traffic where it enjoyed a clear advantage. In later years, 
it could, therefore be expected that growth could begin to slow down as 
air transport began to canpete for the nore marginal traffic. ( 143 ) 
However, it is argued that in contrast to previous decades, the 
application of technological change in aircraft design also had a 
dampening effect on darestic traffic levels in p:rrticular, at a tine 
when this market was suffering fran an intensification of canpetition 
from surface modes. (144) 
On the face of it, one might expect that the introduction of larger 
aircraft would .result in a reduction in air fares in real tenns, based 
upon increased prcxiucti vi ty of the larger aircraft and. the econanies of 
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larger scale operations. 'lhi.s had indeed been the case in previous 
decades and continued to apply in the 1960s, as far as international 
air routes are concerned. The concept of the "Inclusive '!bur" (IT) had 
been established in the 1950s and in the next decade, growth was so 
rapid that by 1968 passenger levels were sare 20 tines greater than 
those which had existed in 1958. 'lhi.s growth was limJely the result of 
the contribution made by technological change to reduced air fares 
arising out of reduced costs and the ability to can:y limJer numbers of 
people. Thus the declining price of air travel abroad brought overseas 
holidays by air within the reach of layer incare groups. (145) In the 
darestic market, however, the introduction of limJer aircraft is viewed 
as having been forcOO by increased canpetition between the independent 
sector of the airline industry and the State Corporations, (a thaIe 
which will be elaborated nore fully in Chapter Six) . 
It is clear that darestic air services in the UK have been 
characterised by a long history of instability resulting fram 
relatively high costs and inadequate returns attributable to short 
average stage lengths, low volurres of traffic on nany routes, the 
difficulties of securing adequate aircraft utilisation and carpetition 
fran surface nodes of transport. (146) However, with increased 
canpeti tion, British European Ail:ways introduced jet aircraft with 
higher operating costs per seat per mile than those of the "Vanguard" 
type. BEA's passenger load factors were forced down fran 68% in 1962-
63 to 63% in 1967. (147) As previously nentioned, the situation was 
exacerbatErl by increased canpetition fran other transport nodes. In 
the mid 1960s, British Rail enbarked upon a railway electrification 
prograrme which was to reduce journey tine. More frequent services 
with greater mgularity were thus offered. Similarly, the changing 
levels of air traffic be~ Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
reflected technological developrel1.ts in sea transport. Between 1961 
and 1969, the total air traffic flowing between the a.vo centres 
increased by about 4.5% per year. However, between 1960 and 1968, 
carryings had been increasing by about 13.5% per annum. Thus the 
retardation in 1968 was swift following the introduction of new ships 
on the Irish sea routes. (148) 
Overall, the "forced" application of new technology and increased 
canpetition fran surface nodes resulted in the consolidation of air 
operations with activity centring on a limited number of high traffic 
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routes at the expense of the leaner routes which were unable to support 
an adequate frequency of semrice and aircraft of an "econanic" 
capacity. Sixteen cross-country darestic UK air semrices involving six 
different air carriers were withdrawn be~ April 1966 and March the 
following year. (149) As airlines increasingly concentrated on well 
established routes, a number of notable anissions appeared in the 
darestic network of air semrices. For exanple, despite the relatively 
high population density and relatively poor rail connections between 
Manchester and Northern England on the one hand. and the South West and 
South Wales on the other, air services could not be maintained on these 
marginal routes which could only becane econanic if operated at maximum 
frequency by snaller m:xiern aircraft. (150) In the late 1960s, there 
was therefore the potential for "thini-level" airlines supporting inter 
city semrices or feeder routes to the main centres of population, if 
operators were prepared to employ 20 seater aircraft. However, few 
operators attempted dcmastic services with aircraft of less than 44 
seat capacity. (151) Inevitably, these changed narket conditions in 
the darestic sector had implications for the growth potential of UK 
airports which had developerl in the past to cater for this traffic. 
However it is also clear that in a general sense, the existence of 
an airport does not necessarily imply that direct air services will be 
provided to accamodate demand. It is possible for a region or country 
to have too many airports in the sense that the range and frequency of 
semrice provided is a factor of the total number of air travellers who 
might potentially use an airport. (152) 
It is significant that by 1969, the number of licensed airports in 
the UK reached about 100 with 45 offering facilities for scheduled air 
transport semrices. ( 153 ) Given the size of the country, many of these 
airports were in relatively close proximity and thus an elemant of 
canpetition between airports arose out of the nea:! to develop the 
intensive air semrices which would generate self-sustaining future 
growth and econanies of scale. However, wi. th the trend towards 
concentration of operations at a snall number of lcn:ger airports, 
reflecting the econanies of airline operation in the 1960s, it was 
likely that few airports outside the capital would aspire to rrajor 
roles. Smaller airports would assume a supporting role, handling 
charter services and sare darestic and short haul international 
"feeder" services to the larger airports. (154) 
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It is argued that the airports nost likely to assurce praninent 
positions were those which provided adequate airport facilities to 
cater for intensified air services. In tum, the potential for 
intensification could only be achieved. by the extension of catchIrent 
areas beyond local boundaries into neighbouring districts. 
Essentially, if an airport's catchnent cll'ea is limited, airlines will 
offer ferN direct services to few destinations. As suggested by earlier 
experience at Manchester, potential passengers may find it equally 
convenient to travel by road or rail to a neighbouring airport where 
direct services are provided, thus the local airport may be 
increasingly relegated to the role of "feeder" airport. ( 155 ) 
Given the stagnation of the dcnestic market (reflected in the fact 
that in each of the five years fran 1965 to 1970, rates of growth in 
darestic tenninal p3.ssengers ~ l~ than those of total UK 
p3.ssengers) the need to develop international routes becane essential. 
Dependence on the darestic market inevitably rreant that national growth 
rates TNOUld not be achieved. As previously suggestErl, the major growth 
area at this tine was the "Inclusive '!bur" market, thus the future 
viability of UK airports becane dependent upon the attraction of a wide 
range of such services. (156) It should be notErl however, that a 
fundanen.tal characteristic of the tourist industry is its volatility. 
Short tenn fluctuations in econcmic conditions have a disproportionate 
effect on holiday p3.ttems and the total volurre of personal travel is 
strongly influenced by ineate factors. '!hese principles are adequately 
dem:mstrated by experience in the IT market during the 1960s when very 
high growth rates were recoroed in the period 1962-66, but trends were 
reversed in the following years. (157) 
Although UK airlines carried over one million holidaynakers on ITs 
to Europe, the Middle East and North Africa in the SUImEr of 1967 and 
foreign airlines contributErl a further quarter of a million p3.Ssengers 
- such figures canparing favourably with the 295,000 departing IT 
charters of 1962 - they nonetheless representErl the lowest percentage 
increase ever recoroed. Whilst up to 1965 holidays abroad increased at 
a faster rate than GOP, this trend was halted in 1966. '!he nonetary 
and trade crises of the latter part of the decade with an adverse 
balance of paymants resulting in currency and travel restrictions were 
also important detennining factors in the slow dCMIl of growth. (158) 
Given the volatility of the IT sector, it becane equally necessary that 
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UK airports should attract a wide range of scheduled air services to 
provide an essential cushion against the effects of short tenn 
fluctuations in the holiday narket to maintain econanic viability and 
growth. (159) Again, in achieving this wider traffic mix, it is argued 
that the provision of facilities was a key detenninant. 
Having considered the factors which detennined changes in the market 
for air services in the 1960s, and their implications for UK airports 
in general, it is necessaxy to consider the growth of Manchester 
Airport wi thin this context. '!his study will primarily be based uPJn 
consideration of passenger traffic levels in different sectors . 
Although freight traffic will also be considered, hem the study will 
be rather nore circumscribed as carriage by air has tended to develop 
as an offshoot to the primary preoccupation of developing passenger air 
transport. (160) In highlighting growth trends, it will be useful to 
address the perfonnance of Manchester Airport in tenns of the UK in 
general, regional airports and airports which were of broadly 
canpa.rable size in the early 1950s. 
It is argued that by the 1960s Manchester Airport had already 
established a sufficiently broad traffic mix which provided the basis 
for self-sustaining growth in the next decade. '!his position was 
consolidated by the developten.t of airport facilities in the 1960s 
which was geared tCMaIds the needs of the larger aircraft operating on 
trans-Atlantic routes. In assessing the significance of this praninent 
market position for future growth consideration will be given to the 
impact of the fuel crisis in the 1970s on traffic levels. It is ru:gued 
that as airport facilities were extended in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
the Airport began to make substantial gains fran the tendency towards 
concentration within the industry which minimised the impact of 
extemal shocks. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates Manchester's shaJ:e of the total UK narket for 
air transport neasured. in tenns of tenninal passenger throughput fran 
1961 to 1980. In 1962, Manchester accounted for approximately 7% of 
the UK market, representing a peak in activity which had been follCMing 
an uprrcrrd trend fran the 1950s. During the 1970s ha.vever, Manchester's 
market share fluctuated between 5.5% and 6.5%. '!he growth of scheduled 
passenger traffic in the early 1960s had largely been due to the 
developrent of daoostic routes. In the second half of the decade, 
ground was increasingly lost to Heat.h.rcM. Although the growth in 
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daoostic traffic declined at the lDndon area airports, the decline was 
not as severe as that experienced. at the regional airports. Table 2.9 
illustrates the decline in darestic passenger throughput at Manchester 
Airport during the second half of the decade when traffic ra:iuced. by an 
average of 4% per annlllTl. The overall decline in rrarket share 
throughout the decade nay have reflected, in part, the higher 
proportion of. daoostic traffic passing through Manchester in contrast 
to Heathrow. ( 161 ) However, fran 1961 to 1969, the IDndon share of 
total UK scheduled passenger traffic increased fran 56% to 64% 
reflecting a nore fundanEntal trend towards concentration of air 
services in the South Fast. (162) Airlines had not achieved the 
traffic levels necesscny to support the developtent of proportionally 
nore of their European services CMay fran IDndon to Manchester. The 
econanic effect of lOW' load factors was heightened by the higher unit 
operating costs of the smaller size aircraft in operation like the HAC 
1-11 and Caravelle, as opposed to the Trident and Boeing 727 which 
operated into london. The underlying problem was one of serving a 
relatively small narket with the large capacity aircraft available, at 
a flight frequency sufficient to constitute an effective air service. 
(163) 
Essentially, it was in the charter market that Manchester was rraking 
substantial gains with terminal passengers increasing at an average 
annual rate of 16% canpared with 15% for the IDndon area airports. 
( 164 ) The gains nade by Manchester in the " Inclusive '!bur" sector were 
to sare degree reflected at nost UK regional airports where the 
diversification of tour progrannes provided the essential counterweight 
to the general trend of concentration of activity at IDndon. The total 
number of passengers carried on charter flights fran airports outside 
the london area increased fran 371,000 in 1961 to 1,374,000 in 1969, a 
large proportion of which were passengers on Inclusive '!burs. However , 
although up to 1969 there was considerable gDJWth in Inclusive Tour 
passengers fran the provincial airports, the rate of gDJWth at the 
london area airports was again faster. The london area share of total 
charter passengers for the UK increased fran 66.3% in 1961 to 76.5% in 
1969, the highest increases being recorded in 1967 when london 
accounted for 68.0% of this narket. In 1971, the trend towaIrls IDndon 
was reversed with IT seat applications fran all the provincial airports 
increasing by 45% on the previous year, the increase for the london 
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area airports being 14.5% (165) 
rrhe major stinnllant to the changing relative ~rtance of the 
provincial airports was that by the 1970s Il'Ore people were able to 
afford package tour holidays than at any tine before (for the reasons 
highlightErl earlier). rrhe darand for tours to the Il'Ost popular areas 
like Spain and. Italy fran the provincial airports was increasing at a 
rate which made the provision of IT services on a significant scale a 
viable econanic proposition. Also, the market for Inclusive 'Iburs 
tends to be highly canpetitive with individual tour operators seeking 
to expand and. improve their tour Pl:OC].l:'aJrlres each year. rrhe provision 
of regional departures thus becama a rna jar p:rarotional factor and a 
stimulus to greater local darand. (166) Independent airline operators 
sought out new market opportunities in charter services and in 
association with the highly canpetiti ve UK travel industry, marketa:i 
low cost holidays abroad to increasing proportions of the UK 
population, providing the basis for an extension in the range of 
intemational destinations offered fran regional airports. ( 167 ) 
Referring to Manchester's position within the regions, Figure 2.6 
illustrates Manchester's share of tenninal air passengers using the 
regional airports, 1961 - 80. By 1964, Manchester accounta:i for 19% of 
the UK market outside IDndon. '!his again represente:i a peak in an 
upward trend fran the 1950s when in the second half of the decade the 
airport handlErl approximately 15% of the tenninal passenger throughput 
registered for all UK regional airports. In subsequent years, a 
cyclical pattern aTerges with Manchester's share of the regional market 
varying between 16% and 21% to 1978. 
In the 1970s, two particular trends warrant further consideration, 
firstly the downward trend in market share fran 1973 to 1974 and the 
rapid recovery in the following year. with the large increases in fuel 
costs in 1973, the travel market in general becama depressa:i. In 1974 
terminal passenger throughput at Manchester Airport declina:i to 
2,231,600 fnam a figure of 2,574,214 necordErl in 1973. This 
representErl the first year since 1946 that the number of passengers 
handlErl were less than the previous year. However, in 1975, passenger 
throughput excee:iErl the 1973 level with the airport handling 2,579,700 
tenninal passengers in that year. At other regional airports like 
Li verp:x:>l and Belfast, the recession deepenErl in subsequent years and 
although others like Binningham Airport registered sene recovery over 
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the following years, the 1973 level of throughput was not exceeded for 
same time. (168) 
Clearly, Manchester Airport had reached a scale of activity whereby 
it would be insulated fran the \\Qrst effects of econanic recession by 
the tendency for airlines to concentrate activity at Manchester in the 
regional market. The increasing scale of activity had owed. Imlch to the 
developrent of the Inclusive rrbur narket at Manchester, a trend which 
had been established in the 1960s. By 1979, the airport was increasing 
its share of this burgeoning regional market. Table 2.10 records the 
year by year gnMth of tenninal passengers on Inclusive '!bur services 
passing through Manchester Airport fran 1964 to 1980. The recession of 
1974 is clearly reflected in the reduction of traffic by 21.9% in 1974, 
but this was fully recovered in 1975. However, fran an examination of 
Table 2.11 it is equally clear that the general recovery in traffic 
levels was not only the product of an expanding holiday market. The 
decline in tenninal passenger throughput on European and trans-Atlantic 
scheduled routes reconied in 1974 was also succeeded by substantial 
gnMth in the following year. 
In seeking to explain the rapid recovery at Manchester in contrast 
to other regional airports, there can be little doubt that this 
phenare:non owed much to the extension of the airport's catchrrent area, 
initially increasing its penetration of the f\brth West region at the 
cost of its nearest canpeti tor , Liverpool (Speke) Airport, and during 
the 1970s increasingly drawing traffic fran regions outside the f\brth 
West . Generally, between the catchrrent areas of Scotland and Tyne-Tees 
to the f\brth, the IDndon airports to the South and South East and 
Bristol and South Wales to the South West lies an area carprising 
lancashire, Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and the Midlands . Potentially, in 
this area dem:md could have been met by a nmnber of regional airports 
all aspiring to sare degree of international status. (169) However, 
Manchester Airport assumed the dcminant position in the provision of 
air services , especially international air services. It could be 
suggested that the central position of the airport alone \\Quld 
sufficiently account for this. The Airport was especially \'\,1811-
positioned to serve the areas of Manchester, Stockport, Crewe, 
Macclesfield and Stoke on Trent, (170) but various studies of the 
origins and destinations of passengers at UK airports confirm the 
manner in which this catchrrent area was extended fran the 1960s, as a 
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result of Manchester Airport successfully canpeting with neighbouring 
airports through the extension of facilities. 
In 1968, a study of airports in the area of North lancashire , 
entitled Airport and Air Service DevelopYEnt in North lancashire, 
confinood the already extensive catclmen.t area which Manchester served, 
especially in relation to scheduled air services. '!he study surveyed 
the industry of the area and its requ.i..rEm:mts for air transport. A 
sample of one in three industrial finns located in the survey area was 
taken fran the CBI Kanpass Industrial Index and. the survey area was 
divided up into five contiguous zones:-
A Preston, Blackpool, Fleetwood, Lytham, lancaster, Morecambe and. 
canuorth. 
B Blackbun1, Accrington and. Rossendale. 
C Burnley, Colne, Nelson, Bacup, Clitheroe and. Great Hal:wood 
o Horwich, Wigan, Southport, Onnskirk, SkelIrersdale, Dal:wen, 
Chorley and Ieyland. 
E Bolton 
'!he percentages of finns using Manchester Airport in the last year for 
the carriage of personnel were as follows:-
Zone A: 50% 
Zone B: 60% 
Zone C: 79.6% 
Zone 0: 49% 
Zone E: 80% 
In the whole of the survey area this translated to a total figure of 
63.5% of finns using the airport for the carriage of personnel. In 
contrast, the corresponding figure for Liverpool's airport at Speke was 
13.0% (171) 
A Depart:mant of Trade and. Industry Survey of Passengers at Airports 
in Scotland and the North West in 1970 suggested that Manchester by 
this tine displayed the catchm:mt area of a :regional airport for all 
traffic whilst its provincial partners like Liverpool and 
Ieerls/Bradford airports provided a local service. (172) '!he :regional 
hinterland for the najor UK airports is depicted in Figure 2.7a. Of 
the international passenger traffic recorded at Manchester, 12% had 
origins/destinations in the Liverpool Urtxm Area; 9% in the 
leeds/Bradford Area; 4% in the West Midlands and. 3% in the Sheffield 
Urban Area. '!he survey identified an interchange of passengers be~ 
catchm:mt areas at all airports surveyed but Manchester nade a net 
gain. '!he highest contribution fran Liverpool was tcMards charter 
traffic (13% of charter traffic at Manchester, originating fran the 
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Liverpool County Borough) whilst the nore important ru:eas for the 
generation of scheduled traffic ~ the Eccles/lrlam area and the 
Alderley Fdge/Cheadle/wilmslow area. rrbe survey of darestic passengers 
highlighted. the general trend. whereby the majority of passengers had 
origins and destinations in the sarna region as the airport, eg 79% of 
all dcmastic passengers at Manchester ~ travelling to and fran the 
North West. HC1I.1eVer, 21% of all darestic passengers ~ drawn fran 
areas outside the North West region including 3% fran Ieeds/Bradfoni 
Urban Area, 3% fran the Sheffield Urban Area and another 4% travelling 
to and fran the West Midlands. Overall, then, Manchester was drawing 
substantial numbers of passengers fran Binningham in the South and 
U3eds/Bradfoni in the North whilst Liverpool was ~ll within the 
catclment area. rrbe gains which Manchester made fran Liverpool far 
outweighed the reverse traffic flow with less than 5% of Liverpool 
Airport's tenninal passengers caning fran the Manchester area. ( 173) 
A subsequent CAA survey of international passengers in 1975 
suggested that Manchester Airport was increasingly assuming the role of 
a "gateway" airport serving a catchrrent area as depicted in Figure 
2 . 7b. By this tine 17 . 5% of Manchester Airport's international 
passengers were being drawn fran the Yorkshire Htmlbe.rside region and 
5.8% fran the Midlands. Fran the perspective of the I.serls/Braciford 
Airport, by 1975 it was catering for less than 20% of its potential 
international market generated in the Yorkshire/Htmlbe.rside region, 29% 
~re using Manchester Airport; 13% travelled via Heathrow with the sarna 
mnnber flying fran Luton Airport; 19% travelled via the East Midlands 
Airport and 9% via Gatwick. Within the North West Region, Manchester 
accoilllted for 73% of the region's international passengers whilst 
Liverpool aCCOilllted for only 13%. (174) 
'lb sare degree, the expansion of Manchester Airport's catchman.t area 
may be attributed to developtelts in surface transport. Figure 2.8 
illustrates the extent of major road developlent ringing Manchester 
Airport in contrast to Liverpool and Binningham. Improved road 
connections to outlying areas had a depressing effect on the dcmastic 
market for air transport by making the surface node relati vel y rrore 
canpetiti ve. H~r, these developtents also eased access to the 
airport widening the potential catchman.t area for international 
passengers. Significant developtelts in the road network surrounding 
Manchester included the construction of noto:cway standard roads in the 
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1960s linking Manchester with Bolton, Wigan, Bury and Rochdale. In the 
1970s, the notorway and classified road canplex ringing Manchester 
improved the surface links be~ the airport and the outlying 
districts. The construction of the M61 to Preston and the joining of 
Burnley with the M62 ~re critical factors detennining the use of the 
airport by the population of the County Borough of North East 
lancashire. ( 175) Ready access fran outlying areas was provided by the 
M6 and M62 trans-Pennine notorway, linking Manchester with Iea:is and 
eventually the North Humber shore. (176) '!hese developrents eased 
surface traffic novaren.t and offered the potential for both Manchester 
and leeds/Bradford Airports to gain. '!he M62 Manchester - Liverpool 
notorway and the MS6 Cheshire rrotorway were similarly significant; the 
MS6 in particular providing a direct link to Manchester Airport fran 
the Wirral, possibly attracting passengers away fran Liverpool Airport. 
Clearly the developnants in surface transport enhanced the potential 
for growth at Manchester Airport. Hc:Jwever, it is argued that 
Binningham Airport at Elnrlon enjoyed similar advantages. '!he airport 
was in close proximity to Binningham and Coventry serving these centres 
of population and industry. The A45(T) effectively connected the 
airport to the M5 and M6 and to the M45 and the MI. Access to the 
airport involved the need to travel through Birmingham but the airport 
nonetheless could potentially gain advantage fran the canpletion of the 
M6 Midland Link notorway replacing the A45(T), thereby raloving the 
necessity to travel through Binningham on all but notorway class roads. 
(177) 
Manchester's neighbouring airport at Liverpool, situated on the 
north bank of the Mersey estuary, six miles south east of Liverpool, St 
Helens and Widnes, suffered to the extent that it could only be reached 
via the M6 passing through Warrington, making access relatively 
difficult. In addition, the Mersey estuary hampered access fran the 
Wirral and the Mersey and Dee estuaries similarly hampered approaches 
from North Wales. (178) 
Whilst such factors may be ilnportant to airport developren.t, it is 
suggested that the developlent of surface nodes of transport are in 
thansel ves a function of the developnant of air services and airports. 
In other \\Urds, the developnant of Manchester Airport will have placed 
increasing demands on the surrounding road network thereby calling 
forth inp:'ovarent. In translating latent danand for air services into 
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effective danand it is arguErl that the provision of airport facilities 
to cater for a wide range of air services to appropciate destinations 
at sufficient frequency is the overriding factor. In assessing the 
significance of this factor in the developtelt of Manchester Airport, 
emphasis will be placErl on the responses to the changing market 
conditions of the 1960s. The divergence of response at different 
airports will be highlightErl by a canparison of airports which were of 
canparable size in the 1950s. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 plot the growth in 
Te:r:minal Air Passengers at selectErl airports 1955 - 1980. Fran an 
examination of these graphs a number of points are ilrm3c.liately 
apparent. In tenns of the l'brth West Region, Manchester Airport has 
daninatErl the scene since 1955; the interdependence of the LiveI:pOOl 
Airport and the Isle of Man Airports is markErl; at Glasgow Airport 
traffic trends have been similar to those experienced at Manchester, 
but after 1970 growth patterns have diverge:i; finally the p:lttern of 
traffic grcMth at Binningham Airport is similar to that of Manchester, 
but on a much srrall scale of operation. 
In accounting for these trends, it is necessaIy to refer back to 
those factors previously highlighted as being significant to the 
structure and perfonnance of the British civil air transport industl:y 
during the period under consideration . Firstly, the extension of 
railway electrification and the developtelt of the rrotoIWaY net\\Urk 
during the period may be expectErl to limit the growth of purely inland 
darestic :routes; although developnants in surface nodes of transport 
would not perhaps have the sane impact on p:lssenger traffic where a sea 
c:rossing is involved, eg Belfast and the Isle of Man. (179) Railway 
electrification was relevant to the provision of air services be~ 
Liverpool, Manchester, london and Glasgow. In April 1966, the railway 
:routes between IDndon and Li veI:pOOl/Manchester were electrified, saving 
about one hour on journey tine. At the sane ti1re, the service offered 
greater regularity and frequency. (180) As a result, the throughput of 
darestic passengers at Manchester Airport was seriously curtailed. 
BEA's Annual Report for 1966/67 showerl the london - Manchester traffic 
falling back 20% in the six SUIIIIEr rronths of 1966 as canpara:i with the 
sarre period in 1965. Given the longer distances involva::i, the 
canparable decline on the london - Glasgow :route was 10%. (181) On the 
Li veqxx:>l - london :route, tenninal passenger throughput declined by 
6.5% in 1966. 
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The diversion of traffic away fran Manchester Ail:port could be 
expected to have been long term and in 1968, the recove.:ry in British 
Rail's passenger traffic continuerl, whilst passengers on the lDndon-
Manchester air service declined from 347,896 in 1967 to 314,940. (182) 
However, wi thin two years, Manchester Ail:port was recon:ling a recovery 
in darestic traffic. The increasing use of jet aircraft fran 
Manchester probably regained sare of the traffic lost in earlier years, 
but the extension of Manchester's role as an interlining airport is 
also a significant factor. Air travellers have a specific reason for 
using air services as opposed to the surface node. For example, a 
Boan:i of Trade Survey carrierl out in 1968 suggested that 48.4% of 
passengers using the air service fran Manchester to lDndon were 
interlining at Heat.hrow. Also, for those passengers interlining, 
business passengers \\ere nore likely to use air services. A Departmant 
of Trade and Industry Sw:vey of 1970 confinIed these trends, 65% of 
passengers were interlining by this tirre and 70% of the passengers 
using the service \\ere travelling for "business/official" purposes. 
(183) 
At Manchester, the lDndon route was still daninant in 1970 
constituting one of the airport's primary routes; carrying rrore than 
90,000 tenninal passengers. ( 184 ) As far as other dcmastic routes are 
concerned, Manchester retained a daninant position in traffic to 
Belfast. On the Glasgow routes traffic throughputs at both Manchester 
and Binningham airports were about equal in 1970. Although both 
airports served all the rna jor dcmastic routes. Manchester Ail:port 
asstnTEd. a carmanding position on other primary routes. '!his was in 
large part the consequence of the higher frequency of services offered 
fran the airport, as illustrated in Table 2.11. Whereas on the lDndon 
route, for example, flights \\ere offered fran Manchester at "sufficient 
frequency" to constitute a viable air service, the opposite was the 
case at Binningham. Even after the cutback in service to one a day 
fran the SllIIlIEr of 1970, the route continued to lose rrore than £20,000 
per annmn. The service was eventually suspended in the fuel crisis of 
1973-4 after which load factors declined and losses gnew to £1,000 per 
day. (185) 
Whilst the London route at Manchester expanded, its relative 
importance changed. In 1961 it had contributed 33.6% of the airport's 
total scheduled passengers, increasing to 41.8% by 1965 but reducing to 
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28 · 0% in 1970. ( 186) '!he Airport sustained an increase in traffic on 
non-darestic scheduled routes, in contrast to the experience of other 
airports. Table 2.12 shCMS, for example, the growth in tenninal 
passengers handled at Manchester between 1963 and 1980 on European and 
Trans-Atlantic scheduled routes. In contrast , Liverpool Airport's prine 
routes, carrying between 75,000 and 100,000 passengers in 1970, 
included wndon and the Isle of Man. SecondaI:y routes, can:ying 20 to 
35,000 tenninal passengers, included Belfast, Glasgow and the Channel 
Islands, whilst the minor routes, can:ying less than 10,000 passengers, 
operated to Bristol, Cardiff and Newcastle. Between 1965 and 1970, the 
traffic on the london - Liverpool route declined fran 140,000 to 
94,000. This was alnost wholly canpensated for by increased traffic on 
the Isle of Man route which becane Liverpool's IIDSt important scheduled 
route in 1970 when 95,000 tenninal passengers were handled as canpared 
with 55,000 in 1965. (187) This did not augur well for future growth 
as the Isle of Man was to increasingly lose appeal as a holiday resort 
as a result of declining air fares on routes abl:Oad and the growth of 
the Inclusive Tour narket. ( 188 ) 
By September 1961, IIDre than 25 international passenger routes 
operated on a regular basis fran Manchester Airport, using Viscounts to 
West Europe and Britannias and Boeing 727s on OOAC's routes to North 
Anerica. '!he IIDst fxequently servOO route was Dublin - Manchester-
Dublin by Aer Lingus with 285 two-way flights in September 1961, using 
Viscounts, OC-3s and Friendships. Five years later, much the sane 
international destinations were serva:i but on prime routes the larger 
Tridents and Caravelles were beginning to replace Viscounts; and Boeing 
707s were beginning to replace Britannias, reflecting the higher levels 
of passenger danand on these routes. Figure 2.11, Manchester Airport, 
International Tenninal Passengers as a percentage of International, 
IXm3stic and Republic of Ireland highlights the growth in total 
international passenger traffic fran 1965, the proportion doubling fran 
aIDut 25% to 50% by 1972. In tenns of scheduled passenger throughput, 
the continental routes increased their share of traffic fran 16% in 
1965 to 23% in 1970, the major scheduled continental routes being 
Amsterdam, Paris, Dusseldorf and Brussels. (189) By 1969, a 
canprehensi ve ne"bvurk of all year international scheduled services was 
YJell established serving a nmnber of destinations including Amsterdam, 
Dublin, Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Cork, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, 
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Madrid, Milan, Montreal, Netl York, Paris, Rare, Rotterdam, Tel Aviv, 
'!bronto, the West Indies and Zurich. (190) New routes continua::l to be 
added to the network operating fran Manchester Airport in the following 
year, eg Chicago, Philadelphia, Malta, Barcelona, Palma, etc, 
:reflecting the tendency to concentrate regional activity at Manchester 
as direct air services intensifia::l. ( 191 ) 
In contrast to the experience at Manchester, in September 1961, only 
one international passenger service operata::l fran Li vel:pOOl Airport, 
Dublin - Li veI:pOOl - Dublin, using "OC-3s" and "Friendships". By 
September 1966, nine international passenger services had been 
established serving, for exanple, Palma, Rimini, Ostend, Amsterdam and 
Cork, but three years later, all of the new' continental services had 
disappeared largely as a :result of the collapse of the airline canpany 
"British Eagle". (192) '!he collapse of "British Eagle" was sarething 
of a factor peculiar to Li vel:pOOl Airport, thereby intrcxiucing a 
distorting effect to "nomal" traffic trends. However, Binningham 
Airport similarly experienca:i difficulties in establishing viable 
international air services. BEA "Viscounts" had operated fran 
Binningham to Barcelona (April 1960 - October 1967), Amsterdam (July 
1960 - October 1961 and again fran April 1966), Milan (April 1961 - 64) 
and Basle (IT flights 1961 - 64). However, aircraft larger than 
Viscounts could not profitably operate out of Binningham and as early 
as 1964 sema departures had to be "doubla::l up" - a second aircraft 
operating ten minutes later. It was only in the period 1968 - 1974 
that Viscounts began to be replaca::l by jet aircraft on the BEA routes, 
eg Viscounts on the Amsterdam route were replaca::l by Super I-lIs in 
April 1973, and those on the Dusseldorf route were replaca::l by 
"Tridents". '!he 1970s saw sare significant breakthroughs with the 
opening of a route to Frankfurt via Brussels by British Midland Airways 
in 1972; by the end of 1973, separate routes could be maintaina::l. By 
the late 1970s, British .Airways had opena::l up new' services to Milan 
(1978) via Manchester, to Copenhagen (April 1979) and to Zurich via 
Brussels. However, in the period 1980-83, these new' routes were 
deleted. ( 193 ) Although Binningham Airport was establishing itself as 
an international airport in the late 1960s, handling the largest number 
of international passengers in the provinces outside Manchester, in 
contrast to Manchester the only stable continental route at the tine 
was the 13illni.ngham - Paris route with seven flights per week. (194) 
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Later experimantal continental routes proved. to be wlnerable to 
canpeti tion fran the larger airport at Manchester. 
Whilst Manchester Airport nade relative gains in both the dates tic 
and international scheduled markets, the greatest growth was recorderl 
in the "Inclusive Tour" sector. Table 2.10 charts the substantial 
growth of this sector fran 1963 to 1980 which was only curtailerl in 
1974. Whilst total tenninal passengers nore than doublerl fran 1963 
(1,117,774) to 1972 (2,350,656), throughput on Inclusive '!burs 
increased nore than ten-fold fran 91,655 in 1963 to 999,814 in 1972. 
By the late 1960s, Manchester Airport serve:i a wide range of IT 
destinations including Alicante, Barcelona, Bas Ie , Bargas, Dubrovnik, 
Gerona, Ibiza, Lisbon, Ljubljana, Luxenborg, Mahon, Malaga, Milan, 
Munich, Ostend, Palna, Pula, Rimini, Split, Tenerife, Tunis, Valencia, 
Vama and Venice. New destinations like Naples, Rare, Tarbes and 
Zurich were introduced in the late 1970s. (195) All the najor UK tour 
operators, including Clarksons, Global, Blue Sky, Sunair, Lyons and 
Wallace Arnold, offered direct flights fran Manchester Airport. Of the 
top 11 Inclusive Tour charter operators only Lunn Poly was the 
exception in not offering direct flights fran Manchester. ( 196 ) '!he 
nost significant growth occurred on the holiday routes to Spain, 
especially Palna. In 1970, traffic on this route was nore than three 
tines that of its nearest rival, the Amsterdam route . Five of the top 
six routes fran Manchester Airport were holiday destinations by 1970, 
as canpared with one in 1961. To sare degree the relatively slower 
growth of the traditional scheduled routes fran Manchester in the 1960s 
was masked by the exceptional growth in holiday traffic. ( 197 ) Table 
2.13 Manchester Airport, Temlinal Passenger Mix, highlights the 
increasing significance which this traffic has assUIlEd in later years. 
In contrast, the developtent of the IT market at Liverpool has been 
erratic. To SarE degree, the .relatively close proximity of the airport 
to Manchester has been an obstacle to the long tenn developlent of IT 
charter traffic which initially treblerl be'b.een 1960 and 1965, but then 
stagnated over the next three years to finally decline absolutely in 
1968/69. (198) Again, the collapse of "British Eagle" was significant 
Alth h til "Euroavia" operated in la ter years. oug, ano er carp:my, 
Inclusive Tours fran Liverpool, expanding their operation to include 
flights to Valencia, Palna and Perpignan in 1964, the canpany withdrew 
to Manchester Airport for the 1965 surrmar season, following the 
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breakdown of negotiations regarding the lease of a hangar to set up an 
engineering base. The loss to Liverpool Airport probably had far 
reaching consequences as "Euravia" was soon to becaIe "Britannia 
Airways", the charter airline of the Thanson holiday group, one of the 
largest tour operators of the day. (199) Throughout the whole of the 
decade fran 1960 - 69, Liverpool Airport's penetration of the Inclusive 
'!bur market ranained minimal in canparison with Manchester; with 90% of 
tenninal passengers being carried on scheduled flights. ( 200) AI though 
the ratio of charter to scheduled passengers increased in later years 
(eg to reach 19% and 81% respectively in 1975), Liverpool's air 
services ranained predaninantly scheduled, reflecting the fact that the 
airport was increasingly becaning regan:ied as a "dcmastic" facility. 
(201) 
At Binningham Airport, the developrent of the IT market has been on 
lines nore similar to that of Manchester, although, in absolute tenus, 
the larger airport has predaninated. In the first half of the 1960s 
over 90% of total passenger throughput was carried on scheduled 
flights, between 1965 and 1970, the scheduled canponent reduced to 75% 
and by 1975 a 50/50 split existed between scheduled/charter traffic, 
oamparable to Manchester's 54/46 split. (202) 
Having considered the significant changes in traffic mix at the 
major UK regional airports in the 1960s, it is clear that a primal:y and 
secondary net:\i\urk evol veri - a structure which was to vary little in the 
subsequent decade. A small nmnber of airports, with Manchester 
predaninating, serviced the bulk of international routes connecting the 
major international "gateways", together with the darestic trunk routes 
characterised by a larger volurre of traffic reflecting the increasing 
use of larger jet aircraft. Other mgional airports serviced a 
secondary net:\i\urk made up of darestic routes and certain related 
services, mainly linking the mgions with the nearest parts of the 
continent. '!his network required the use of smaller aircraft of the 
type decreasingly useful in other sectors. Air services of a rrore 
local character were in evidence employing very small aircraft of 
limited range and capacity. (203) 
By 1970, both Manchester and Binningham Airports were mgarded as 
important domestic airports, although the bulk of traffic was 
international in character. (204) A eM survey of airports in 1975 
highlighted the significance of the ratio of intemational to darestic 
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passenger throughput citing Belfast, Glasgow, IeOOs/Braciford and 
Liverpool airports as having a preIX'nderance of passengers travelling 
on dooestic flights. (205) By 1975, the ratio of international to 
dooestic passengers at selected airports was as shown in Table 2.14. 
It is suggested that the divergence of traffic growth trends be~ 
Manchester and Glasgow fran the late 1960s aves much to this effect. 
'!he dependence of Glasgow Airport on dcmestic traffic is confimed by 
the fact that by 1975, despite a reduction in traffic levels, Glasgow 
rated second only to Heathrow in its d<mestic passenger tlu:oughput. 
Binningham Airport had extended its international role and was thus in 
a position to register alnost continuous growth tlu:oughout the period 
but the scale of operation was quite small. In effect, Manchester was 
consolidating its position as the al ternati ve to the South East 
Airports in providing "gateway" international air services, fed by a 
network of 'Well established and relatively stable dcmestic services. 
Whilst Manchester Airport handled two and a half million passengers in 
1975, the airports of Glasgow and BiDningham handled over one million 
passengers each; a significant contribution to regional air traffic but 
each tending to develop single markets, ie one darestic and the other 
international. (206) 
As suggested earlier, trends wi thin the civil air transport industry 
tend to be determined by passenger dem:md. HaNeVer, brief 
consideration will be given to the developre11t of freight traffic at 
Manchester Airport during the period as in contrast to passenger air 
transport, evidence suggests that the tendency towaI:ds concentration in 
the South East was not so successfully eotmtered as changes in aircraft 
design encouraged the consolidation of loads. 
Although the voluma of UK air trade remains small, ie less than 
0.25% of total trade in 1978, for exaIrq?le, its value is high. A trend 
of increasing growth was established in the 1960s, continuing through 
the 1970s. The value of UK trade carried by air was £526 million or 6% 
of total UK trade in 1960; by 1976, the value of air trade had 
increased to £8,564 million or 15% of total UK trade. (207) Air 
transport had increasingly penetrated the freight trade market in the 
1960s, eg in 1969, the value of imparts carried by air stood at £1,085 
million, 17% higher than the previous year whilst the value of total 
imports grew by only 5%. Similarly, for air exports their total value 
was £979 million in 1969, 18% higher than the previous year whilst the 
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total value of exports increased by a lesser proportion of 14%. Air 
transport was continuously outpacing the recorded increases of freight 
traffic carried on the nore traditional nodes of transport. 
The major camn::lities being carried by air have continuErl to be 
machinery and clothing; over 80% of all air freight has been made up of 
industrial consiglluents having high value and 10ffl weight and volune. 
In 1969, for exanple, one third of all exported madical and 
phamaceutical products and scientific inst.nments were transported by 
air. (208) 
In tenns of the direction of UK trade carried by air, in 1970, 40% 
of UK air exports were destined for Western Europe and. 33% for North 
Anerica, whilst at Manchester Airport the only significant trade 
carried by air was to the EOC and EFTA countries, accounting for 38% 
and 14% respectively, of air exports and 32% and 18% of air inp::>rts. 
( 209 ) On the face of it, this trend may be regarded as the product of 
the nature and direction of North West trade, but it is suggested that 
it derives nore fran other factors mainly the .impact of technological 
change engendering the consolidation of loads for inter-continental 
destinations and a concentration of activity in the IDndon area. 
Figure 2.12 plots the trends in throughput of international and 
dcmastic freight at Manchester Airport and air freight destinErl for or 
originating in the Republic of Ireland. Of striking significance is 
the increasing volume of domestic air freight carriErl to/from 
Manchester Airport to the mid 1960s, followed by a decline in tormage 
and the alnost uninterrupted rise in international freight handlErl from 
1955 to 1970, again followed by a decline. 'lhese trends can largely be 
attributed to the .impact of changes in aircraft design introduced to 
cater for the needs of passengers rather than freight carriage. 
With reference to the darestic market for air freight in the 1960s, 
Manchester Airport had been on the BFA network of Argosy specialised 
cargo flights with schedules to Heathrow (seven per week) and Belfast 
( daily except Satm::days, using Viscounts). (210) These all-cargo 
scheduled flights had been supplerenterl by a substantial freight-
carrying capa.city on pa.ssenger aircraft. However, in 1969, the 
Vanguard aircraft, with a large surplus freight carrying capa.city in 
the belly-hold, were increasingly replaced by SAC 1-11 aircraft 
offering very limiterl spa.ce for freight on air routes to IDndon. In 
the first six nonths of 1970, freight throughput on the BFA Manchester 
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- IDndon route dropped by an average of 50% as increasing anounts of 
freight were transported to and fran the capital by road. ( 211 ) 
In attempting to cater for the shortfall in freight capacity in the 
early 1970s, many of the Vanguard aircraft which had becane obsolete on 
the passenger network were converted to all-cargo aircraft, knCMll as 
"Merchanblen" . Initially, BEA offered ten flights per ~ providing 
80 tonnes of space for Manchester in each direction. However, this 
capacity was not fully utilised and by 1975 increased operating costs 
coupled with the effects of the econanic recession of 1974, led to the 
proposal to withdraw the "Merchantman" aircraft fleet. Other freight 
handlers at Manchester, for example, Servisair, also cited the impact 
of congestion at the IDndon Airport as a contributory factor in the 
increasing tendency to transport freight by road. Whilst the cargo 
tenninals of BEA and OOAC could handle single operations (either export 
or import) types of cargo adequately, if cargo was routed via IDndon by 
air, no guarantees could be given that the transit operation could be 
accanplished in less than 48 hours. In any event, the withdrawal of 
British Ai.I:wa.ys' "Merchant:nan" operation nrust have serverl to increase 
the anount of cargo carried by road after 1975 as freight ~d only be 
carried on the passenger aircraft of the BAC 1-11 type, severely 
limiting capacity to about one tonne per aircraft of hand loaded cargo. 
(212) Although passenger aircraft like the Boeing 757 \\1ere later 
intn:xiuced on the IDndon - Manchester route, it is suggested that by 
this ti.ne the preference for road transport had becane well and truly 
entrenched . 
As far as the throughput of international air ccn:go at Manchester is 
concerned, the impact of teclmological change is again readily 
observable in Figure 2.12. In the 1960s, the largest proportional 
growth was recorded on routes to and fran west Europe; in p:rrticular 
Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Zurich. '!he largest growth on all 
routes served was Frankfurt increasing fran 118,000 kilos in 1961 to 
4,245,000 kilos in 1969. The increase in air freight to west Europe 
and the relative decline in darestic freight over the period was 
reflected in the relative shares of scheduled freight traffic. In 
1961, darestic freight accounted for 50.3% of total scheduled freight; 
Europe 17.2%; Irish Republic 25.5% and intercontinental 7%. By 1969, 
these shares had changed to daTestic 29%; Irish Republic 16.1%; Europe 
40.4% and intercontinental 14.5%. In Septanber 1961, two all-cargo 
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services linked Manchester To Stuttgart and Amsterdam. By 1969, BEA 
were operating 112 flights fran Manchester to West Europe, Sabena 31, 
Lufthansa 51, KIM 19 and Swissair 31. The range of aircraft on these 
services include1 Boeing 727s, OC-4s and OC-9s. The OOAC North 
Atlantic all freight services also provide1 a stinulant to growth in 
the 1960s. In September 1961, 11 flights linke1 IDndon, Manchester and 
Glasgow with North Amarica, using DC7 aircraft, by 1969 53 flights 
operated using Boeing 707s and nore direct flights were provided fran 
Manchester. (213) 
The growth of international freight tonnage peaked in 1971, 
declining substantially throughout the ranainder of the decade. 
Especially in the second half of the decade, airlines had increasingly 
shifted away fran the use of all-freight aircraft to the use of excess 
belly-hold capacity on wide-bodie1 passenger aircraft. As the 
introduction of these aircraft was significantly sl~ at Manchester 
than at london, the tendency to truck cargo between the two centres 
increase1. ( 214 ) 
As the early introduction of wide-bodie1 aircraft on passenger 
routes create1 excess cargo capacity, airlines were increasingly 
encourage1 to use pricing structures to inpnJVe their individual 
utilisation, thus distorting the flow of air cargo through UK airports. 
Given excess capacity, if there is canpetition on nedium/long haul 
routes, airlines will be presse1 to l~ their freight rates. In the 
UK, as much as 85% of air freight in chanelle1 to the airlines through 
freight foIWaI'ders, a substantial proportion of control is vested in 
the hands of a few foI:Warders who can take advantage of the effects of 
tapering cargo rates through consolidation. For very large 
consigrments of 500 kilos, the rate per kilo may be one fifth of that 
for a :mi.nimal consigrment. The large freight foIWcU'ding organisations 
can also negotiate discounts below the publishe1 rate. The benefits 
fran consolidation and discount canbine to enhance the attraction of 
the london group of airports having a wide range of services and 
routes. The rates available nnre than offset the costs of "trucking" 
cargo and the accumulation of traffic at london in few hands further 
strengthens the baJ:gaining position of the freight foxwarders. 
Undoubta::il y, this effect had impacte1 on the throughput of West 
European and North Atlantic air freight at Manchester. Consolidation 
can save for the shipper and fo:rwarder up to 75% of the "nonnal" costs 
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of noving say 100kg across the Atlantic. Any airport charge for 
handling or loading for road transport is insignificant carprred to 
these savings. FI:a:n the airlines' viewpoint, even if a B747 has a full 
belly - load of cargo destined for the North West, the airline can nake 
substantial savings by landing at Heathrow only and trucking cargo to 
Manchester. (215) The effects of consolidation on Manchester's share 
of the total UK air freight market are illustrated in Figure 2.13; 
Manchester's market share a.J..nost doubling fran 3.4% in 1961 to 7.2% in 
1970. Thereafter market share consistently declined to 1980. 
In the 1970s then, Heathrow daninated the long haul market and 
continental Europe, whereas on the routes to and fran the Irish 
Republic, Manchester and LiV9rfXJOl airports together handled as much 
cargo as the lDndon Airport. These routes accounted for 50% of 
LiV9rfXJOl's cargo throughput 20% of Manchester's cargo throughput but 
only 6% of Hea:thra,q's. (216) In 1971, although Manchester's cargo 
throughput rated second to Heathrow in the UK, the other major lDndon 
airport, Gatwick, had begun to narrow the gap, being the only major 
airport to show an increase in throughput over 1970. (217) Similarly, 
with the onset of the econanic crisies in 1974, Gatwick was the only UK 
airport to show significant growth in air cargo throughput. By that 
tine Manchester had been ousted fran its position of second la:rgest 
cargo handling airport in the UK. (218) Clearly then, technological 
change may be seen to have had a stimulating effect on the growth of 
passenger air transport at Manchester, particularly as far as 
international routes are concerned. ~,as far as the growth of 
freight throughput is concerned, it has had a dampening effect. 
2.4 FINAK:IAL ~ 
In considering the financial performance of any finn financial data 
may be used to derive maasures of efficiency such as profits, costs and 
prcxiuctivity; but there are, of course, several inherent difficulties 
in undertaking such an exercise. The financial statem:mt of a business 
should sha,q the anount of profits eamed and available for distribution 
after having maintained. the value of capital. However, canplications 
arise in defining and calculating both profits and capital ("capital" 
here defined as the difference between assets and liabilities and 
"profit" expressed as a rate of retum). For ~le, the objectivity 
of the valuations of assets may be in question and. rronetary values may 
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not convey an accurate impression of the true value of assets which 
varies with market conditions. What is to be put into a capital 
account and what into an incare account is often at the discretion of 
the business, and this may detract fran the usefulness of using 
declared profits or dividend contribution as a guide to real net 
earnings. Usually in balance sheets, assets are valued at historic 
cost with or without an allowance for depreciation. '!he use of 
historic cost is so unrealistic that it can often provide a totally 
false picture of a finn's financial status. If finns do not revalue 
their assets, the historic cost may be divorced fran :reality. Apart 
fran the changes in long teI:m price levels and the value of noney, 
changes in the :real value of assets can occur through deterioration 
with the passage of ti:rre. So the importance of net profits cannot be 
overstated because of the disagrearent about the nature of profit, its 
usefulness as a neasure of perfonnance and the difficulties of relating 
it to capital. (219) Although the profit and loss account is usually 
the major yardstick for judging the efficiency of a finn, in principle, 
the very concept of an annual financial statem:mt is arbitrary and 
annual accounts break up the continuous stream of events and the 
overlapping of business operations. Balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts are primarily finished products, the result of a refining 
process involving adjus1:nen.ts and selective anissions and the process 
of surrmarisation may rob financial statem:mts of Imlch of their value in 
suggesting the way in which results were achieverl. ( 220) 
Canplete reliance on the profit and loss account masks b.\u different 
elem:mts in the neasure of managem:mt' s ability, the first is 
detennined by the objective circumstances facing the organisation and 
the second is detennined by the subjective :reactions and effectiveness 
of managem:mt in relation to these objectively fixed circumstances. As 
airports are essentially subject to public control historically, 
"social" objectives may distort the initial cost and revenue data. 
(221) 
Despite the problans of data, it may be possible to construct a 
long-run time series of a finn's financial results and fran this draw 
SClle general conclusions about the growth of a canpany over ti:rre and 
its profitability. In general, accounts are a nunerical record 
canpiled when or soon after events occurred and they should, therefore, 
reflect the actual operations which go to rrake up an enterprise. A 
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whole range of issues in the developrent of accounting practices, such 
as depreciation policies or their total absence, the acceptable 
relationship between risk capital and loan capital, the IIEthcrl of 
presenting figures and heM this practice has changerl over t.i.ne, nay be 
addresserl. The extent to which reserve funds have been userl, whether 
provision was nade for bad debts, and the proportion of profits 
retainerl for plough back canpared to that distributerl as dividends can 
all be investigaterl fran these dOCUIIE11ts. ( 222) Prinarily, accounting 
data cannot suggest why decisions YJere nade and it cannot be relierl 
upon as a true IIEasure of profitability. In respect of Manchester 
Ai1:port the nature of decisions affecting financial results will be 
influenced by factors deriving not only fran airport operations but 
also from municipal ownership structures which are given full 
consideration in Chapter Three. 
Whilst attanpting to canpare the basic financial perfo:cnance of 
Manchester Ai1:port with other UK airports, it should be noterl that 
although problans of canparability are inherent in nearly all inter-
finn canparisons, particular difficulties are encountered. with airports 
arising out of the nature and organisation of their operation. 
Firstly, two airports with identical air services could have a great 
disparity in expenditure on arployees. Staff on fire protection, air 
traffic control, passenger baggage and freight handling, refuelling 
aircraft, cleaning, catering and equiprent repair and naintenance nay 
or may not be on the airport payroll. (223) At the extrenes, sare 
airport authorities may operate purely as landlords with very little 
participation in nost activities, other airports may provide nearly all 
the services thanselves and the extent of invol VEm3Ilt may not only 
effect arployee costs but all cost and revenue structures. As 
suggesterl, differences in the execution of ramp handling (aircraft 
handling, baggage and freight loading and unloading) and traffic 
handling (passenger and freight handling) may arise. ( 224) For 
example, at Manchester Ai1:port, the poSitioning of steps for the 
anbarkation/disanbarkation of passengers is carrierl out by personnel 
arployerl by the airport, however, the steps thansel ves are providerl by 
the various handling agents who are generally responsible for other 
aspects of passenger handling fran the point of check-in. Similarly, 
with respect to in-flight catering, catering concessionaires are 
responsible for the preparation and packaging of foOO, but the actual 
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loading onto the aircraft is carried out by airport staff using 
catering loaders again supplied by the airport. ( 225 ) 
Further canplications nay be intrcxiuced if an airport authority is 
not charged the full cost of a service p:rovided by a th.ini party. ( 226 ) 
With respect to air traffic control and related neteorological and 
camrunications services, gaverrmen.t depart:nents tend to fulfil this 
role at many UK airports. For the BAA group of airports, the costs 
associated with these activities have not been passed onto individual 
airports. At Binningham and Manchester, the airports have been 
directly charged for these services in recent years.· (227) However, 
carparison through tine and space is further canplicated by the fact 
that up to 1965, Binningham, Liverpool and Manchester airports were not 
charged for this service whereas, for example, Southend retained its 
own control staff involving a cost of £31,000 per annum, plus the 
:renewal and maintenance of a}Uiprent. (228) Any carparison of 
financial perfonrance in the earlier years of airport developrent will 
be distorted by the fact that the Govemmant provision of air 
navigation services for rrany years nade a loss at UK airports other 
than Heathrav and this loss will not be reflected in airport accounts. 
(229) 
'!he other na jar operational area where discrepancies nay occur is in 
police and security. Scma airports nay anploy private finns to fulfil 
security requirarents, whilst other anploy their own security guards. 
At Manchester, the policing function has changed over the years fran 
Ministry provision to the establishnent of a dedicated airport police 
force and finally to the airport fanning a sub-division of the Greater 
Manchester Police Force . Finally, at the local administrative level, 
local gaverrmen.t staff not based at the airport nay be involved in 
running it p:roviding, for example, treasmy, persormel, architectural 
and surveying and engineering support. All costs and. rranpawer involved 
in this support should be recha1:ged to the airport. (230) 
Differences in accounting practices similarly hinder c:arparison. 
With the public ownership of airports, the tendency has been to adopt 
public accounting procedures rather than nonnal camercial practices. 
Often assets are excluded fran depreciation if for example, they have 
been financed ft:an govemmant grants. If the airport is owned by a 
local authority, accounts will not show depreciation payrrents as such, 
instead loan redanption will be charged but only on assets financa:i 
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fran loans and not on assets financed fran governm:mt grant or revenue. 
Different depreciation policies, such as current versus historic cost 
accounting further camplicate the issue. (231) In this sense, it is 
difficult to establish a rate of return on assets enployed. Under a 
historic cost accounting regine the older airport will always shay a 
nore favourable return on assets than the newer one. It may be argued 
that the older the asset the higher will be the maintenance costs so 
that although a lower base denaninator will be involved, this will 
canpensate for the greater cost involved in upkeep. HCM3Ver, this does 
not fully resolve the original problem. (232) An alternative to 
calculating a rate of return on assets is to use a Revex ratio, showing 
revenue as a percentage of expenditure before tax. However, the 
treatm:mt of debt charges remains a problem. Debt charges reflect the 
provision of runways and tenninal buildings (on which the return is 
mainly by way of landing fees) and the provision of hangars, offices 
and factories (to be let at an econanic rent). '!he proportion of 
different mixes and dates of campletion of projects can again nullify 
any carp:rrison of incare as a return against expenditure, as present 
costs will be so much higher. '!he extent of letting of accamodation in 
tenninal buildings to airlines and concessionaires also varies 
significantly between airports. (233) Again, for debt charges, a major 
distorting factor can be changes in interest rates. A small percentage 
increase in interest rates can result in massive changes in capital 
costs and this in itself will bear little relation to the ability of 
airport managE!lEI1ts to improve financial perfonnance. ( 234 ) 
'!he extent of both indirect and direct goverrnrent subsidy may 
distort any carp:rrison of the financial perfonnance of airports. 
Indirect goverrnrent subsidy has already been mantioned, but airports 
may also receive direct grants towards capital projects f:ran both the 
UK Goverrmmt and the EOC Goverrmmt grants towards developuent 
projects have applied at different tines to, for exanple, airports at 
Manchester, Binningham, Tees-side, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow. 
As suggested, these outright gifts are disreganied for accounting 
purposes as no depreciation or interest is charged to cover them. 
'!hose airports which have received Goverrmmt grants will appear to be 
in a nore favourable position than those which have been forced to 
finance developrent by loans and associated costs. (235) For exanple, 
in 1966, Manchester Airport recomed debt charges of £363,000 on a 
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capital expenditure of £5 million, but as nore than £21/4 million had 
been contributed by Goverrment the charges referred only to £23/4 
million. As the burden of debt charges accounts for much of the annual 
losses recorded at airports and may deter capital investnent, it is 
interesting to note that although Manchester headed the list of UK 
airports recording the highest level of debt charges for the year, 
followed by Liverpool ( £126 ,000) and Fast Midlands ( £114,000) , the 
airport also recorded the highest smplus. ( 236 ) 
Differences in design and service standards will also distort any 
canparison of financial perfonrance. Most larger airports have their 
own physical service standards considered desirable to provide an 
acceptable level of passenger service. '!he decision on service will 
affect cost and nanning levels and to a great degree there will often 
be a direct trade off between the two. Of course, in detennining the 
appzopriate level of service, sare factors may be outside the iImB::liate 
control of the airport authority itself, for exanple, the ~sition of 
night closure for envirormental reasons. (237) 
Finally, in addition to these general factors which tend to detract 
fran the validity of any canparison both through tine and space, it 
should be noted that fran tine to tine, various miscellaneous itans may 
also intrcxiuce problems. For exanple, in the financial year 1974/5 
Manchester Airport made a once and for all paynent of £400,000 to the 
Manchester City Council on the transfer of half of the airport's assets 
to the Greater Manchester County Council. ( 238) 
Because of the difficulties of measm:e:n:mt of econanic perfonrance 
outlined above and the characteristics of airport developrent 
highlighted in Chapter One, airport studies in the UK have anphasised 
technical feasibility, suitability of sites and particular facilities 
to neet sare predicted level of dem:md. Econanic feasibility has been 
seen in tenns of cost/benefit analysis which included internal and 
external costs and. benefits. Little attention has been paid to the 
internal econanics of airports. Hcmever, with the nounting concern in 
the 1970s regarding the operational losses being recorded at IlDSt UK 
airports, greater anphasis has been placed upon the issue of airport 
financial results and. the problans of the future financing of regional 
airport developIEllt. (239) Since 1976, the Transport Studies Group of 
the Polytechnic of Central IDncion, headed by Professor Rigas Doganis, 
has been .responsible for much of the bcxiy of research which has 
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developed in :respect of the finance and econanics of airports . 
Initially, the Group concentrated its efforts on consideration of UK 
airports but in :recent years the scope of study has been broadened. to 
include both European airports and airports in the developing world. 
Relying heavily up::m data produced. by the Polytechnic of Central lDndon 
and the limited data available prior to the 1970s, very broad 
conclusions may be drawn reganli.ng the financial perfonnance of UK 
airports in the peirod under consideration. 
In the very early years of developIeTlt, the low level of air traffic 
and the limited pattern of services highlighted. in the pmvious 
section, contributed to nnmicipal airports trading in deficit in the 
1930s (see Table 2.15). The total expenditure in England and Wales up 
to 1940 on providing the 38 operating nnmicipal airports had been 
£3,534,678, on average £93,018 per site ranging f:r:an the nost expensive 
projects at Liverpool of £435,541, Manchester's two airports costing 
£521,402 and the large schate at BiDningham £315,820 to Worcester's 
tiny £14,074. By 1939, a further seven nnmicipalities had purchased. 
land, valued. at £268,886 for unrealised. schates. '!he acquisition of 
land was the major cost involved in providing aerodrares contributing 
towards the inability of aerodrares to :reach a threshold of acti vi ty 
which would generate sufficient revenue f:r:an landing fees and hangar 
rents to cover the m:i..nimum operating level of expenses. ( 240) '!he 
second major cost was in levelling, draining and seeding a grass 
runway. However, the growing use of camercial aircraft led. to the 
decision regarding capital outlay on hard runways and associated. 
taxiways and hard standings. Provision of these facilities involvOO 
large capital expenditures which again increased the likelihood of 
trading deficits. (241) Throughout the 1950s, the capital expenditure 
required for improvenents as well as the cost of operating tenninal and 
technical facilities continued. to escalate, whilst the revenue fran 
landing and other fees continued. to fall short of operating costs. As 
late as 1955, the operating losses, excluding the cost of technical 
services, at Ministry airports was alrrost £400,000. '!he cost of 
technical services was a further £1,273,000 and to this could be adderl 
a further £3 million for administrative costs at the Ministry itself 
and £1~ million for interest and depreciation on the capital invested. 
in aerodrares. ( 242) '!he continued deficits :reflectErl in part the 
indi visibilities in airport investnent highlighted in the previous 
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chapter, and. was also the result of the fact that air transport was 
still very much in its infancy. 
In nore recent years, many airports in the UK have undergone heavy 
invest:nent programs whilst passenger t1u:oughput has not expanda::l to fit 
expectations. In seeking to explain this phenarenon a number of factors 
care to light. Firstly, during the 1960s an unco-ordinata::l system grew 
up where local initiative was the nost important factor detemrl.ning 
airport developtent. As suggesta::l in the previous section, a climate 
of canpetition between airport authorities attarpting to establish 
financially viable and successful airports t1u:ough supply orientata::l 
adjust:nents aterged. 'lb attract new' operators and retain existing 
ones, large scale invest:nent projects ~ pusha::l fol:WaI:d when perhaps 
they were not econanically justifia::l. The provision of "superior" 
facilities becane the daninant fonn of canpetition and creata::l adderl 
pressure against increasing charges to caopensate for increased cost 
associata::l with these supply orientata::l adjustnents. Marentmn stEmlECi 
fran the canpetiti ve climate, airports investa::l to attract the sane 
traffic by capturing and keeping important operators. Airlines 
themselves influenced airport operators to invest heavily in 
facilities. In effect, airlines can make or break an airport which 
generally neerls only one najor operator to survive and they have 
effectively played one airport off against another. The available 
traffic has been split over a wide dispersion of airports and only a 
few' have been able to attract enough traffic to be financially viable. 
( 243 ) The developtent programs of the 1960s were characteriserl by 
runway developrents. In later years, a second developrent program 
invol VErl the larger regional airports gearing up to cater for the wide 
bocli.a::l jets of the late 1970s and early '80s. ( 244 ) 
In a study of 23 UK airports, all handling in excess of 100,000 
passengers per year (except Southampton), carrierl out by the Transp:>rt 
Studies Group in the early 1970s, it was found that by 1969/70 the 
industry returna::l a rep:>rta::l surplus of £3.8 million. However, 
excluding Heathrow Airport, the canbina::l result was a deficit of £1.8 
million. The 18 regional airports studia::l reported a canbina::l deficit 
of nore than £2 million whilst the IDndon airports as a group reporterl 
a surplus of appI:Oximately £6 million (£5.65 million of this 
attributable to Heathrow alone). Manchester reported the nost 
pranising results rep:>rting a surplus of sema £410,000 other surplus 
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airports at the tine included Prestwick, Glasgow, Southend. and Jersey. 
(245) '!he early analysis of the econanic and financial perfonnance of 
UK airports undertaken by Doganis and '!harpson emphasised the 
significance of the traffic threshold and concluded that sm:pluses 
could not be expected in the early stages of developllent generally and 
that a throughput of three million passengers or equivalent per annum, 
was essential if revenues were to cover costs. However, it was also 
noted that Sate airports had managed to achieve surpluses at a lower 
level of throughput. In seeking to explain this finding, a canparati ve 
analysis of the effectiveness of airport managem:mts based upon a 
multiple regression analysis for different breakdowns of revenues and 
costs for the year 1969/70 was carried out. Each regression produced a 
residual elem:mt for each airport observation which represented that 
part of cost or revenue that is not explained by independent variables 
in the nOOel fonnulation. With reference to the residual of cost 
equations it was found that Blackpool and Southend showed a consistent 
"better than average" cost position for all breakdowns followed by 
Binningham and Belfast. Prestwick, Heathrow and Bristol, on the other 
hand, showed a consistently worse than industry average. As far as the 
residual structure of revenue equations is concerned, Fast Midlands, 
Heathrow, Prestwick and Tees-side showed a consistently better than 
average revenue situation, Glasgow and LiverpcxJl consistently adverse. 
For Manchester's airport, it was concluded that its revenue position 
enabled it to show an above average position overall, despite being a 
"mature" airport with high costs, managemant had "consistently shown 
foresight and judgarent regarding its invest:nen.ts and revenue policies 
and the relationship be~ than." (246) 
By 1974/5, the impact of the oil crisis and increasing costs for 
airline operators were apparent. Eight airports which had recomed 
surpluses in 1969/70 were nrluced to only two, ie Heathrow and 
Guernsey, and Guernsey's surplus was largely attributable to the 
writing off of £645,000 worth of debt in 1972. Manchester recorded a 
deficit of £641,000 but it must be bome in mind that the airport had 
only recently completed a major ~amme of t~ building 
extension which would have contributed to increased costs. '!he 
industry as a whole still reporterl a surplus of £202,000 but again, if 
Heathrow is discounted, this becares a reported deficit of £8.34 
million. '!he IDndon area surplus had impIUVai fran £6 million in 
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1969/70 to £7.82 ndllion in 1974/75 but only as a result of expansion 
at Heathrow. In the regions, the deficit deepened fran £2.1 million to 
£7.62 ndllion. (247) 
Taking operating surplus or deficit, ie total revenue minus total 
operating expenditures excluding the costs associated with capital like 
interest paynents and. loan redanptions, in 1974/5 only seven of 22 
airports carried sufficient revenue to cover operating costs. Of the 
regional airports Manchester was way ahead with an operating surplus of 
£1,618,000. The industry as a whole made a large operating surplus of 
£10.76 million, rrost of which was contributed by Heathrow, whilst the 
regional airports as a group failed to generate sufficient revenue to 
cover operating costs. (248) 
Given the many problems reganiing the canparison of airport 
accounts, the Transport Studies Group also pI:CXiuced adjusted results in 
an attarpt to put the canparison of airports on a CCJlllon basis. 
Adjustnents were made for net cost arising out of CAA provision of 
aerodrcma navigation services and an inpIted cost for capital charges 
associated with governnent grants was incorporated assuming airports 
themselves had financed all of their investments through loans. The 
results of this analysis suggested growth in the already substantial 
deficits. On an adjusted basis Manchester recorded a deficit of 
£1,862,000. The regional airports deficit increased fran £7.62 million 
to £13.42 million after adjustment. This was seen to reflect the 
extent of governnents hidden subsidy by way of developrent grants and 
CAA losses. At Manchester, Binningham, Prestwick, Gatwick, Fdinburgh 
and. Belfast, CAA losses on aerodrcma navigation services alone were 
greater than the losses airport authorities reported in all other 
acti vi ties. However, it was also pointed out that in canparing the 
years 1969/70 and. 1974/5 at current values the poor financial 
perfonnance was overstated as in 1974/5 the pound was worth much less 
than in 1969/70 in real tenns. In the interim the RPI had risen 78%. 
Table 2.16 gives the results of deflating adjusted values to 1969/70 
prices. (249) 
The overall results of this analysiS also suggested that the 
principle that, as traffic increases financial perfonnance will inprove 
because of falling unit costs and. increasing unit revenues as output 
expands, may be in question. Table 2.16 suggests a deterioration even 
though traffic has increased. Despite an average 25% increase in the 
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regional airports' traffic, total revenue has declina:i by 4.6% in real 
tenns. Cost results are better for the regional airports as with 25% 
increase in traffic costs increasa:i by only 13.7%. In further 
investigation of the relatively poor revenue perfonnance, it was found 
that the nost significant factor here had been the proportion of 
international passengers handla:i. A 10% increase in the proportion of 
international passengers resulta:i in only a 2.64% increase in costs but 
a 3.14% increase in total revenue. (250) 
A further study of the financial year 1975/76 confi.:rm3d continua:i 
adjusta:i deficits. In both 1974/5 and 1975/6 only one airport other 
than Heathrar.r prcxiuca:i a surplus of an adjusta:i basis. In each of the 
financial years, about a dozen airports were each operating at an 
annual deficit of over £500,000. In explaining the trend of continua:i 
substantial deficits, average unit costs and revenues were examina:i. 
Evidence suggesta:i that between 1969/70 and 1974/75, unit costs for the 
industry had declina:i but had increasa:i in the succeeding year. The 
overall effect on unit costs at a constant value was that in 1975/76 
they were lower than in 1969/70 but only marginally so. Up to 1974/5 a 
slowing down in the rate of investmant in facilities had maant that 
airports were naking better use of existing capacity and. facilities, 
thereby depressing unit costs. However, an increase in investmant in 
1975/6 had an inm::rliate inpact on airport unit costs. However, it was 
generally concluda:i that the weaker econanic perfonnance in 1975/6 was 
nore the result of the continua:i failure to increase unit revenues; 
revenues had not kept pace with the general escalation in current tenns 
of airport costs. ~ reasons were cita:i, firstly in respect of non-
aeronautical sources of revenue because of the previously negotiata:i 
rre:tium and long tenn contracts, it was frequently not possible to 
increase revenues fran sema of these sources in line with inflation. 
Secondly, the rigidity in the process by which aeronautical charges 
were detennina:i similarly retarda:i adjustmant in this area. The effect 
was that responses to cost increases were likely to be slow and lag 
behind increases in costs. (251) 
Clearly, there are difficulties to be encountered in IIEasuring the 
financial perfonnance of any finn and in atte!rpting to draw canparisons 
between UK airports further carplications arise out of the nature and 
organisation of their operation. As a result, nost studies of airport 
developIEllt in the UK have not sought to address the intemal econanics 
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of airports although steps in this direction have been taken by notably 
the Transport Studies Group of the Polytechnic of Central lDndon. 
Essentially, only general conclusions can be drawn fran the data 
available. Firstly in the period up to the 1950s :regional airport 
operation was characterised by financial deficits, largely reflecting 
the indivisibilities of airport operation. The era of canpetition 
ushererl in the 1960s coupled with an increasing tendency tooards 
concentration of activity at the lDndon area airports only proved to 
exacerbate the situation across :regional airports as a whole. 
In respect of Manchester Airport's financial position relative to 
its regional counterparts, a diversity of experience is h~ 
apparent. Tables 2.17 and 2.18 detail the year by year operating and 
net sw:pluses/deficits recomed for the years 1935/6 to 1980/1. Of 
note are the operating surpluses recomed during the war years and fran 
the mid 1950s and the net surpluses accruing fran 1957/8. It is argued 
that this phenarenon has in part been the outccma of successful 
canpetition with regional airports with the extension of the natural 
catchrrent area beyond local boundaries and the drawback of :regional 
traffic tending towards the South East airports, highlighterl elsewhere 
in this chapter. Whilst the p:rovision of airport facilities to cater 
for intensified air services was a praninent factor in this sense it 
should be noted that other factors ~ contributory. The arrangemmt 
for war-tine use and the subsequent agreem:nt with Central Goverrlnent 
for continued municipal ownership in the post-war era which are dealt 
with in Chapter Five are significant here. 
2.5 (DOnSU:m 
It is clear that fran the early days of the developrent of the UK 
civil air transport industry, the City of Manchester benefitted fran a 
potential dem:md created by a large population which was lacking in 
other centres of the country. Similarly, throughout the years of 
depression in the inter-war period Manchester remllned relatively 
prospeIX>US. It is argued that the early attenpts to acquire the 
Alexandra Park site for a civil aercx::lrcm3 manifested an awareness of 
the potential dem:md for scheduled air services in a period when 
developIEllt was generally retanied by the technical perfornance of 
aircraft which neant that civil air transport could not effectively 
canpete with surface nodes of transport, especially over land. 
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The failure of the Barton Airport to becare the schedulerl service 
airport envisaged in the late 1920s reflecterl a fundamantal desire to 
avoid heavy capital expenditure in land acquisition couplerl with a 
basic lack of expertise in site selection. However, despite this early 
failure, the City authorities ranainerl convinca:i of the neerl for an 
airport to cater for the ~ts of the industrial and caillercial 
camrunity which would becare readily apparent at such tine as 
developtents in aircraft design made air transport a rrore viable 
econanic proposition. Thus in establishing the Ringway Airport site 
selection asSUIIEd priority as suggesterl by the carmissioning of 
aeronautical consultants to advise upon an appropriate site 
irrespective of the nea:i for land acquisition. It is suggesterl that 
not only the approach to but also the timing of decision making 
processes were crucial as in the second half of the 1930s the UK civil 
air transport industry began to shaY' early signs of growth, albeit 
limiterl generally to routes involving a sea crossing in the dateStic 
market with continental :routes tending to centre on IDndon. 
In the .irme::liate post war years the UK civil air transport industry 
undeI:WeI1t a period of substantial growth during which Manchester 
Airport increaserl its share of the UK passenger and freight markets. 
An early dependence upon the Irish market and holiday :routes was 
countered by the developtent of continental and trans-Atlantic air 
services which set Manchester Airport apart fran its provincial 
counterparts and suggesterl the opening of a nay era of stiffer 
canpetition with the IDndon airports. 
Whilst during the 1960s the growth experienca:i in earlier years in 
the industry began to slow down as a result of air transport beginning 
to canpete for nnre marginal traffic and the negative impact of 
technological change in certain sectors, growth was sustainerl at 
Manchester Airport by the successful adjust:nent to changerl market 
conditions and the extension of the natural catchmant area which 
contributed to the intensification of air services. In an era of 
competition bebNeen. UK airports Manchester's scale of operation 
increased substantially which aiderl recovery in the recession of the 
1970s. 
In response to the adverse effects of technological change in the 
civil air transport industry and in surface mxies of transport on 
darestic routes , especially the IDndon :routes, the provision of air 
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services which ~d interline with air services at the IDndon airports 
was maintained as a result of the extension of the airport's catclment 
area. In addition growth was sustained by the increased provision of 
international air services both charter and scheduled. Although the 
developrent of the "Inclusive '!bur" rrarket had offered the prospect of 
growth at UK regional airports in the face of increased concentration 
of scheduled air services at a snaIl number of larger airports, 
Manchester had taken the lion's share of regional traffic in this 
rrarket as a result of the concentration of provincial activity at the 
airport. 
It is argued that an essential factor in p:rcm>ting growth was the 
provision of airport facilities ahead of danand which contributed to 
the attraction of Manchester Airport, especially for international air 
services. Generally, the early planning of runway ilnprovem:m.ts in the 
1950s and the execution of major extension progrannes in the 1960s ~ 
geared to facilitating long-haul jet oper,atians, 
uncertainty of oper,ational requiraIents at the ti:ne. 
despite the 
Indeed the 
planning of terminal facilities had constituted a greater challenge in 
an era of rapidly changing technological advances. ~,the design 
of a tenninal building in the 1950s which was capable of extension 
recognised the need to plan ahead despite the lack of basic knowledge 
of future requi..remants. Essentially, the terminal building planned in 
the 1950s and opened in 1962 saw the airport through the difficult 
decades of rapidly changing aircraft design which dananded adjustmant 
to cope with ever larger numbers of passengers. 
Whilst it is difficult to draw canparisans between the financial 
perfonnance of UK airports, it is suggested that although deficit 
operation will influence inves'blent decisions, there is a circularity 
of cause and effect. In other ~rds, it is likely that the 
carprehensive network of international scheduled air services built up 
at Manchester Airport by the 1960s, which in supply tenus was the 
product of changes in earlier decades consolidated Manchester Airport' s 
financial position in contrast to other regional UK airports. 
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MANCHESTER (RINGWAY) AIRPORT, DEVELOPMENT DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. 
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THE LAYOUT OF MANCHESTER AIRPORT 














ILLUSTRATION OF THE LAYOUT OF AIRPORTS COMPETING WITH 
MANCHESTER c 1982 
(a) BIRMINGHAM AIRPORT 
(b) LEEDS/BRADFORD AIRPORT 
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Figure 2.4 Continued 104 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE LAYOUT OF AIRPORTS COMPETING WITH 
MANCHESTER c 1982 Continued 
(c) LIVERPOOL AIRPORT 
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Table 2.1 













Source: Report of the Carmittee to consider the Developlent of Civil 
Aviation in the United Kingdan, Cmnd 5351, HMSO, IDndon, 1937. 
Table 2.2 
























Source: Air league of the British Empire, 1 Navanber 1929 
Table 2.3 
BARIm AIRRRI', 1W+OIESI'ER, 'IRAFFIC STATISl'ICS 1934 - 1937 
YEAR AIRCRAFr MOVEMENrS PASSEt\GERS FREIGHT 
ARRV DEPART ARRV DEPART ARRV 
1934 495 451 360 378 452 
1935 1,554 1,558 2,282 2,171 9,906 
1936 2,231 2,241 2,972 2,929 5,865 
1937* 2,187 2,182 2,528 2,629 487 







Source: Manchester (Barton) Airport, Traffic Returns - Ccmrercial only, 
January 1934 - 31 August 1937 
Table 2.4 
DESTINATION 











Twice daily, except Sunday 
'Im flights per ~ 
Twice daily with three into and four 
flights out of Manchester on Sundays 
nail Y on weekdays, with one flight into 
Manchester on Sundays 





tUmER OF PASS.JH;ERS CARRIED (J+l PRIlCIPAL RCX1I'ES E'RCM R1JOiAY 
AJRPORT, 1949 - 1953 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
IXMESTIC ROTJrES 
Belfast 13,194 15,623 19,057 23,945 26,139 
Isle Of Man 15,071 16,359 13,319 19,893 23,430 
Channel Islands 1,239 4,008 4,450 10,023 14,453 
Liverpool 5,976 779 599 307 165 
Exeter 93 
Boumarouth 278 453 
Naqlay 122 449 
IDndon 1,181 12,274 28,131 
Glasgow 212 849 10 1,810 10,841 
Edinburgh 1,613 666 
International Routes 
Dublin 27,830 27,694 36,554 41,498 44,149 
Amsterdam 6,270 6,277 8,614 9,672 12,600 
Brussels/Ostend 2,187 2,206 3,400 3,928 5,512 
Paris 7,439 8,066 11,632 1,866 
13,529 
Zurich 4,050 3,073 5,488 4,036 
7,665 






Source: Ringway Airp:)rt, Estinates of Passenger Traffic and Aircraft 
Movarents 1954-63, 15 February 1954, W Barker, B Can, AIMI'A, 
Assistant Treasurer, and G Bardsley, Dip Arch (Manchester), 
MIBA, Senior Assistant Archi teet. 
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Table 2.6 




% UK % UK EXC WNOON 
'!OrAL PASSEN:;ERS 
% UK % UK EXC 
1951 4.4 12.2 4.4 11.4 
1952 5.2 13.9 5.4 13.3 
1953 5.7 14.6 5.7 13.4 
1954 5.9 14.7 6.1 14.1 
1955 6.1 15.1 6.4 14.7 
Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation, Surrmary of Acti vi ties at Aeroc:iraIEs 
in the UK and the Channel Islands, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. 
Table 2.7 
EREIGIH' AND MAIL HANllLED AT RJR;WAY .AIRRRr 1948 - 1953 
YEAR FREIGHT MAIL 'IDrAL (SHORT 'ruNS) --
1948 524 2 526 
1949 1,149 11 1,160 
1950 1,939 25 1,964 
1951 3,114 1,634 4,748 
1952 2,731 2,132 4,863 
1953 3,947 2,350 6,297 




























Source: City of Manchester, Airport Carmittee, 14 February 1963, Survey 
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lWOIESTER Al1U?(Rl' TERMINAL PASSEK;mS - OCMESTIC 
(SCHEDULED) 1955 - 1980 
YEAR NUMBERS % CHAN:;E ON PREVIOUS YEAR 
1955 174,616 
1956 208,453 +19.4% 
1957 243,586 +16.9% 
1958 231,734 - 4.9% 
1959 268,960 +16.1% 
1960 391,632 +45.6% 
1961 513,878 +31.2% 
1962 517,921 + 0.8% 
1963 592,997 +14.5% 
1964 728,626 +22.9% 
1965 776,004 + 6.5% 
1966 738,848 - 4.8% 
1967 692,447 - 6.3% 
1968 675,177 - 2.5% 
1969 656,916 - 2.7% 
1970 686,404 + 4.5% 
1971 655,185 - 4.5% 
1972 685,450 + 4.6% 
1973 743,846 + 8.5% 
1974 760,941 + 2.3% 
1975 772,291 + 1.5% 
1976 823,234 + 6.6% 
1977 725,664 -11.9% 
1978 931,730 +28.4% 
1979 942,491 + 1.2% 
1980 1,074,980 +14.1% 
Source: Canpiled fran Annual sumnaries of Traffic Statistics at 
Manchester Airport (MA PLC .Archive) 
Figure 2.6 
Terminal Air Passengers 
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1WDiES'l'ER .AIRRRr TmKINAL p~ - llCUEIVE 'lOOR 1963 - 1980 
YEAR NUMBERS % INCREASE ON PREVIOUS YEAR 
* 1963 91,655 
1964 125,001 +36.4% 
1965 146,130 +16.9% 
1966 171,641 +17.5% 
1967 233,966 +36.3% 
1968 301,547 +28.9% 
1969 388,379 +28.8% 
1970 521,843 +34.4% 
1971 814,440 +56.1% 
1972 999,814 +22.8% 
1973 1,106,429 +10.7% 
1974 863,805 -21.9% 
1975 1,054,336 +22.1% 
1976 1,129,200 + 7.1% 
1977 1,151,548 + 2.0% 
1978 1,485,691 +29.0% 
1979 1,521,780 + 2.4% 
1980 2,047,036 +34.5% 
* First year in which IT is recordErl as a separate i tan 
Source: CanpilErl fran Annual Sumnaries of Traffic Statistics, 
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Terminal Air Passengers, 1955-1980 
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ROUrE MANCHESTER BIRMnGiAM LIVERPOOL 
wndon 53 7 19 
Belfast 21 19 12 
Glasgow 16 17 10 
Edinburgh 10 10 
Isle of Man 17 1 32 
Channel Islands 28 24 15 
Source : Liverpool City Council , Liverpool Airport Market Research 
Study, Volurre One, Scott, Wilson, Kirkpatrick & Patres, 
Consulting Civil & Structural Engineers, wndon; Econanic 




MAKlIESl'ER AIRPCRl' TmMINAL PASSEH;ERS - EmOPFAN AND 1RANS-
ATIANrIC SCHID1LID Ra1.rES (INrmNATI<H\L PASSEH;ERS MINOO llCIIEIVE 

























































* Canplete tine - series of inclusive tour passengers not available 
before this date. 
Source: canpilerl fran Annual smrmaries of Traffic Statistics, 
Manchester Airport (MA PIC Archive) 
Figure 2.11 
Manchester Airport 
International Terminal Passengers 
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1WDIESI'ER..AIRRRr TEmfiNAL PASSEH;ER MIX (EXCflIDJK; PRIVATE) 1955 
1980 
SCHEDULED % CHARTER % 'lOUR % 
INCLUSIVE 
1955 289,922 97 9,617 3 299,53 
1956 348,719 97 10,052 3 358,77 
1957 414,316 95 22,770 5 437,08 
1958 431,340 95 20,984 5 452,32 
1959 483,421 98 11,316 2 494,73 
1960 644,372 97 22,306 3 666,67 
1961 821,964 96 34,666 4 856,63 
1962 917,201 91 85,225 9 1,002,42 
1963 930,363 83 94,481 9 91,655 8 1,116,49 
1964 1,026,918 83 91,895 7 125,001 10 1,243,81 
1965 1,244,574 84 98,274 7 146,130 9 1,488,97 
1966 1,283,902 82 114,243 7 171,641 11 1,569,78 
1967 1,302,374 80 101,706 6 233,966 14 1,638,04 
1968 1,359,051 77 100,806 6 301,547 17 1,761,40 
1969 1,467,687 76 79,933 4 388,379 20 1,935,99 
1970 1,693,661 74 80,962 4 521,843 23 2,296,10 
1971 1,180,082 57 88,723 4 814,440 39 2,083,24 
1972 1,236,532 53 82,277 4 998,814 43 2,318,62 
1973 1,370,735 53 104,316 4 1,106,429 43 2,581,48 
1974 1,361,059 59 92,321 4 863,805 37 2,317,18 
1975 1,408,459 54 123,888 5 1,054,336 41 2,586,68 
1976 1,499,271 54 134,277 5 1,129,200 41 2,762,74 
1977 1,482,819 53 158,289 6 1,151,548 41 2,792,65 
1978 1,786,138 52 144,926 4 1,485,691 44 3,416,75 
1979 1,768,593 52 148,929 4 1,521,780 44 3,439,30 
1980 1,959,257 45 310,932 7 2,047,036 48 4,317,22 
NB: 
Scheduled = European and Trans-Atlantic Scheduled; IXmastic Scheduled 
and Republic of Ireland Scheduled traffic. '!he larger proportion of 
charter traffic is trans-Altantic charter. 
Source: Ccmpiled fran Annual Surrmaries of Traffic Statistics, 
Manchester Airport (MA PIC Archive) 
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Table 2.14 
'mAFFIC MIX AT W\KlIESl'ER, BJ:RMIR1Il.\H, G£ACnM AND LIVEml(X)L 















Source: Civil Aviation Authority, CAP 394, Passengers at Major Airports 
in Scotland and Central England, CAA, IDndon, December 1976, 
p11. 
Manchester Airport - Freight 
Figure 2.12 
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IKDm .AND EXPE2.mITURE 00 .AJHJHJn!S BY <IlJN1'Y B:JUGJS IN EXiIAND 
.AND WALES 1936/7 
OPERATnG OPERATnG IDSS 
INCCME £ EXPENSES £ CHARGES £ 
Binningham 640 1,290 962 
Blackpool 1,339 473 4,843 
Boumarouth 231 
Bradfoni 352 831 931 
Brighton 1,437 2,812 1,675 
Bristol 1,414 3,532 2,370 
carlisle 428 901 828 
CoventI:y 693 229 3,410 
Derby 632 421 806 
Doncaster 396 2,511 1,701 
Exeter 116 36 63 
Gloucester 88 73 333 
Grimsby 147 1,637 319 
Hastings 151 146 1,467 
Hull 157 1,535 1,830 
Ipswich 511 354 1,061 
leeds 294 576 711 
leicester 923 2,392 3,559 
Liverpool 14,293 17,470 10,494 
Manchester 7,037 10,196 3,482 
Newcastle on Tyne 951 1,339 2,274 
NoIWich 486 1,182 1,846 
Nottingham 248 376 244 
OXfoni 212 304 921 
Plynouth 616 349 1,490 
Portsnouth 6,771 4,051 8,794 
Southampton 5,545 5,819 4,027 
Southend 334 889 965 
Stoke on Trent 870 2,597 1,990 
Walsall 692 1,047 731 
WeI verhampton 187 671 2,534 
York 135 259 832 
cardiff 470 
Swansea 
Source: Ministry of Health, IDeal Government, Financial Statistics 
England and Wales 1936-7, Part II IDeal Authorities in IDncion 
and County 13oroughs, HMSO 1939 pp 174-5 
Table 2.16 
AIlJUSIMJ cn;TS AND RE.VEKJES Em UK.AIRRRrS AT aESTANr 1969/70 VAIIJES 
'IOI'AL REVENUE 
1969/70 -1974/5 

























































































SURPWS/ % CfW\GE IN 
DEFICIT TERMINAL PASS 
EN;ER TRAFFIC 
+5,215 + 41 
21 + 28 
- 464 + 63 
- 589 - 8 
+4,141 + 45 4 
61 ( 4) + 34 
59 ( 2) - 39 
540 (11) - 2 
51 ( 3) + 6 
+ 7 ( 1) + 38 
-1,046 (18) + 27 
186 ( 7) + 18 
139 ( 5) + 40 
205 ( 8) +116 
711 (14) + 35 
160 ( 6) - 2 
Table 2.16 CantinuErl 
l\UJlJSTID cn;TS AND REVEKJF.5 Em UK.AIRRRrS AT c:nBrANr 1969/70 VAIDES CantinuErl 
1969/70 
IDrAL REVENUE 
Regional Airp:?rts Continued 
Belfast 859 
East Midlands 234 
Newcastle 338 





OVERALL IDrAL 44,000 















































SURPWS/ % ~ IN 
DEFICIT TERMINAL PASS 
El'{;ER '!RAFFIC 
1969/70 -1974/ 
- 553 (12) + 15 
- 299 (10) +126 
- 295 ( 9) + 59 
- 833 (16) + 84 
- 569 (13) + 49 
-1,022 (17) + 7 3 
- 821 (15) + 32 
-7,540 + 25 4 
-3,399 + 38 4 
-8,520 
Table 2.16 Cantinuei 
1\IlJUSl'ID CDSTSAND REVEMJES Em UK.AIRRRrS AT amrANl' 1969/70 VAI1JFS Calt:i.nuOO 
Notes: 
1 Costs, revenues and profits have been deflated to equivalent 1969/70 rroney values. 
2 1970/1 figures. 
3 Affected by a series of strikes. 
4 Weighted average figure. 
Source: Doganis, Professor R, and Pearson, Roy, The Financial and Econanic Characteristics of the UK Airport 






:MMCJFSrER (RllOiAY) AIRRRr - ClPERAT1::R; SURPUE« 1935/6 - 1980/1 
YEAR OPERATIOO OPERATIOO OPERATIOO 
EXP £ INCGfE £ SURPLUS £ 
1935/6 1,116 707 409 
1936/7 1,937 255 1,682 
1937/8 2,378 1,693 685 
1938/9 11,321 5,266 6,056 
1939/40 16,151 14,582 1,569 
1940/1 31,931 53,327 + 21,396 
1941/2 33,785 50,095 + 16,310 
1942/3 34,640 53,147 + 18,507 
1943/4 34,999 54,570 + 19,571 
1944/5 33,575 56,944 + 23,369 
1945/6 34,473 60,927 + 26,454 
1946/7 45,493 49,813 + 4,320 
1947/8 40,142 62,948 + 22,806 
1948/9 71,601 84,543 + 12,942 
1949/50 76,167 76,288 + 121 
1950/1 71,715 82,050 + 10,335 
1951/2 93,100 88,567 + 4,533 
1952/3 130,624 122,198 8,426 
1953/4 163,005 141,199 21,806 
1954/5 182,221 175,683 6,583 
1955/6 199,421 213,304 + 13,883 
1956/7 228,352 234,508 + 6,156 
1957/8 275,078 334,704 + 59,626 
1958/9 319,630 395,196 + 75,566 
1959/60 337,798 486,207 + 148,412 
1960/1 387,252 566,963 + 179,711 
1961/2 600,987 856,211 + 255,224 
1962/3 721,981 1,049,856 + 327,875 
1963/4 899,606 1,239,478 + 339,872 
1964/5 901,329 1,325,103 + 423,774 
1965/6 934,761 1,523,704 + 761,366 
1966/7 1,019,433 1,780,799 + 761,366 
1967/8 1,170,281 1,931,944 + 761,663 
1968/9 1,446,556 2,159,450 + 712,894 
1969/70 1,602,910 2,457,016 + 854,106 
1970/1 2,159,565 3,053,058 + 893,493 
1971/2 2,462,527 3,821,687 +1,359,160 
1972/3 2,855,336 4,290,024 +1,434,688 
1973/4 3,379,535 5,127,919 +1,748,384 
1974/5 4,519,567 5,404,249 + 884,682 
1975/6 6,307,224 8,009,553 +1,702,329 
1976/7 8,080,069 10,596,152 +2,516,083 
1977/8 13,240,327 15,535,420 +2,295,093 
1978/9 17,773,200 19,829,000 +2,097,000 
1979/80 19,630,408 23,107,970 +3,477,562 
1980/1 22,560,155 32,214,951 +9,654,795 
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Table 2.17 CaIt.:i.nued 
1WDIES!'ER (RJ:K;NAY) .AlRPCRI' - ClPERAT1N:; SURPIm, 1935/6 1980/1 
CaIt.:i.nued 
Notes: (1) The calculation of operating surpluses/deficit encanpasses 
all regularly recurring operating expenditure and incare 
but also includes various miscellaneous items:-
(2) 
Operating Expenditure includes:-
Air Raid Precautions, Auxiliary Air Force and Volunteer 
Reserve, War Damage, Contribution to National Defence, 
Airways Tenninus (1947/8 - 1965/6) but not debt charges on 
Airways Tenninus, Estate Maintenance, Special V\brks, Loan 
Fund Expenses and Contributions to Renewals Funds. 
Operating Expenditure excludes:-
Expenditure levied out of the Rate for capital purposes 
and Revenue Contributions to capital outlay, debt charges 
and taxation. 
Operating Incare includes:-
Gover:rment Contribution to ARP, Auxiliary Air Force and 
Volunteer Reserve refund of costs and loan charges, War 
Damage Canpensation, Canpensation for :remaining ARP, 
Gover:rment contribution to Health Control, Ministry 
contributions to Special V\brks/Extraordinary Repairs, 
Airways Tenninus, Gover:rment Security Grant, Fees for 
collection of Navigation Service Charge, Estate 
Maintenance . 
Operating Incare excludes:-
Interest received, Ministry contributions to Expenditure 
out of the Rate, Governmant Grant to capital outlay. 
The operating surpluses reconded for 1940/1 to 1950/1 may 
be misleading as sources included Central Gover:rment 
refund of loan charges in respect of facilities provided 
for the Auxiliary Air Force and Volunteer Reserve. Fran 
1939/40 to 1955/6 substantial sums accrued under this 
incana lead ranging fran £3,343 in 1934/40 to between 
£16,000 and £23,000 in subsequent years. 
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Table 2.17 Continued 
1WDIESI'ER (RllOiAY) AIRPCRl' - 0l'ERATDC SURPIDS, 1935/6 - 1980/1 
Qnti.nued 
Source: Canpiled fran statistics available in: 
(1) City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts 1946/7 - 1973/4 
and Estimates 1965/6 - 1973/4 
( 2) CIPFA Financial Costs and. Statistics of IDeal Authority 
Airp:)rts 1977/78; Accounts and Statistics of IDeal 
Authority Airp:)rts 1978/9 - 1981/2 
(3) GMC Abstract of Accounts year ended 31.3.75, 76, 77 and 
78; Annual Report and Accounts 1979/80 
( 4) Annual Reports of MIM. 
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Table 2.18 
1WCJFSfm (lll(;WAY) AI:RRRI.' - Ng{' SURP.UE 1935/6 - 1980/1 
YEAR 'IDrAL INCCME EXPENDITURE NRr SURPLUS 
£ £ (DEFICIT) £ 
1935/6 707 1,116 ( 409) 
1936/7 225 2,820 ( 2,565) 
1937/8 1,693 5,888 ( 4,195) 
1938/9 
1939/40 14,582 28,630 ( 14,048) 
1940/1 53,327 56,297 ( 2,970) 
1941/2 50,095 61,829 ( 11,734) 
1942/3 53,147 61,740 ( 8,593) 
1943/4 54,570 62,512 ( 7,942) 
1944/5 56,944 65,531 ( 8,587) 
1945/6 60,927 61,203 ( 276) 
1946/7 49,813 72,102 ( 22,199) 
1947/8 62,948 66,358 ( 3,410) 
1948/9 84,543 110,085 ( 25,542) 
1949/50 76,288 102,113 ( 25,825) 
1950/1 82,050 94,466 ( 12,416) 
1951/2 88,566 116,604 ( 28,038) 
1952/3 122,198 160,902 ( 38,704) 
1953/4 141,199 188,305 ( 47,106) 
1954/5 178,043 210,530 ( 32,487) 
1955/6 213,943 230,183 ( 16,240) 
1956/7 234,830 267,815 ( 32,985) 
1957/8 335,322 322,744 12,578 
1958/9 395,264 394,073 1,191 
1959/60 505,234 411,736 93,498 
1960/1 566,963 494,770 72,193 
1961/2 856,211 746,850 109,361 
1962/3 1,049,856 1,001,436 48,420 
1963/4 1,247,086 1,210,666 36,420 
1964/5 1,330,648 1,302,152 28,496 
1965/6 1,529,876 1,307,001 222,875 
1966/7 1,807,337 1,479,433 327,904 
1967/8 1,965,781 1,592,721 373,060 
1968/9 2,215,998 1,843,277 372,721 
1969/70 2,522,861 2,102,871 419,990 
1970/1 3,135,061 2,635,486 499,575 
1971/2 3,902,764 2,921,337 981,427 
1972/3 4,413,837 3,555,012 858,825 
1973/4 5,250,333 4,445,608 804,725 
1974/5 5,689,629 6,148,592 (458,963) 
1975/6 8,138,858 8,074,743 64,115 
1976/7 10,649,961 9,968,734 681,227 
1977/8 15,940,702 14,952,635 988,067 
1978/9 20,169,000 17,190,633 2,978,367 
1979/80 24,373,000 22,621,697 1,751,303 
1980/1 32,215,000 28,420,000 3,795,000 
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Table 2.18 Calt:inuerl 
lWDIES'I'ER (RJK;WAY) .AIRRRr - NEr SURPUJS 1935/6 - 1980/1 
nnt..inuBi 
NB: calculation takes account of debt charges, expenditure out of 
the Rate levied for capital purposes, revenue contributions to 
capital outlay, taxation and interest on investmants. 
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Annual Reports of MIM. 
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PAR T I 
M U N I C I PAL E N T E R P R I S E 
AND THE L 0 CAL E 
154 
3.1 :I:NlR(lXCrIOO 
The primary aim of Chapter Two was to present an overview of the 
process of growth and developrent at Manchester Airport. This provides 
a general frarrB\Urk for the nain core of the study - a detailed. 
appraisal of the institutional setting - at local and national levels-
wi thin which growth and developIEIlt has taken place. This chapter aims 
to discuss the impact of municipal ownership structures on the 
developrent of Manchester Airport which may by its nature be regcu:ded. 
as operating in an international carmarcial envirolment. A key 
objective is to ascertain the extent to which the mxle of ownership 
affected the developIEIlt process through policy fonnulation, the 
setting of specific goals and the provision of a stable yet evolving 
institutional franework to accamodate the needs of a growing and 
rapidly changing industry. 
The operation and managarent of airports is a branch of the IDeal 
Governrrent Service which differs fran any other service or trading 
undertaking in that it extends beyond the bounds of the administrative 
area. Nevertheless, local authority airports are subject to the 
consequences of characteristics of IDeal GovenIIrent in general - which 
are not encountered in other fonns of enterprise - deriving in part 
fran the internal organisation of the Service and fran the close 
association with central goveJ:.TllIEllt. For example, it is clear that the 
overall policy makers, that is, the elected. rranbers, may regard the 
pursuit of political goals as of primary significance. 'Iherefore, in 
studying the growth and developrent of a municipal airport it is 
necessary to identify the potential constraints and advantages which 
flow fran the nature of nnmicipal ownership structures in general. 
Fmphasis is placed upon the manner in which airport operation has been 
subsurred into local authority structures and the consequences of 
existing alongside other related services. 
The chapter is divided. into two main sections. The first addresses 
the fonnulation of airport developrent policy, and the second considers 
the nature of the managarent process under nnmicipal ownership. 'lhus 
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the consequences of rmmicipal ownership nay be examined both fran the 
perspective of elected rranber and officer. The first section is 
further sub-divided in order to initially identify policy objectives 
set by the Manchester Corporation and subsequently discuss the broader 
~lications of rmmicipal ownership structures fran which policy 
objectives ~ derived. 
It is argued that although the developlent of Manchester AiI:port 
cannot be regarded as a typical local enterprise because of the 
extended market served, the injection of a local invol varent in setting 
the agenda for developrent undoubtedly nade a positive contribution to 
the growth process. Despite the potential constraints on investnent 
decisions introduced by rmmicipal ownership structures, the end result 
of decision making processes has been the prcm>tion of Manchester as a 
centre for civil air transport. The evel ving developrent policy has 
tended towards "enterprise", technological awareness, effective 
marketing and the pursuit of econanic ends. The pursuit of political 
ends has been of secondat:y consideration. It is further argued that 
whilst municipal ownership structures prcm>ted developlIent, as the 
scale of activity increased and financial independence was achieved, 
this was accanpanied by a conscious policy to afford greater autonany 
to the AiI:port both financially and nanagerially. Thus airport 
operation becane increasingly insulated fran the potential conflict 
with other priorities, establishing it on a self-supporting basis 
operating at anna length fran the broader local authority setting. 
3.2 'IHE FrnMUI.ATIGl OF .AIRRRl' D~ roLICY 
3.2.1 Rllicy Cbjectives far Civil Air TransfX}CL in Handlest:er 
Despite the failure of early attempts to establish scheduled air 
services in Britain in the 1920s, as previously highlighted, it is 
clear that the Manchester Corporation supported the view that a 
potential market for air transport in the City existed, given its role 
as a ccmrercial and business centre. For the Corporation, the returns 
of the Provincial Bank Clearing Houses provided sufficient evidence of 
the relative prosperity of the North west which could support the new 
venture. (1) 
As suggested in Chapter ~, the Corporation was quick to consider 
possible landing grounds and to establish a special sub-carmittee of 
the City Council to formulate concrete proposals to provide adequate 
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facilities to cope with the percei veri needs of business and camerce. 
Funcianentally, the construction of the Barton. aerodrare in 1930 
reflected a recognition by the Corporation of the nea:i to provide an 
aerodrare with the necessary facilities to ensure, at an early date, 
the introduction of scheduled air services providing a direct air link 
joining the carrrercial and industrial camnmity of Manchester and its 
hinterland with other large cities in the British Isles and on the 
continent. ( 2 ) 
Records suggest that the Manchester CoI:pOration was willing not on! y 
to provide facilities for air services, but also to consult and act 
upon the advice of the airlines - their .inm3di.ate custanars. For 
example, in 1928 representatives of Imperial Ail:ways had been consulted 
regan:li.ng the case for establishing air transport facilities in 
Manchester, and although the Coopmy had advised that the inmadiate 
developrent of intemal routes was "out of the question" and that 
supplemantary continental and direct continental air services vvere 
similarly "very inprobable " involving uneconanic distances of less than 
200-250 miles, the Corporation had been encouraged by the fact that in 
the longer tenn the Canpany envisaged the possibility of the City 
fulfilling a need for an intenrediate station be~ for example, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow in the ~rth and Croydon in the South. (3) 
'!he responsiveness to the needs of airlines and their changing 
aircraft fleets is a factor which has figured consistently in the 
developrent of Manchester Airport. In Chapter Two the operational 
problems at the Barton .AerociraIe which PInliPted. the search for an 
alternative site were highlighted. It is suggested that the main 
impetus for change carre fran the airlines. In 1938, CoI:pOration 
representatives sought to negotiate with the Royal Dutch Airline, KIM, 
the possibility of a direct service be~ Manchester and Amsterdam or 
Rotterdam via Hull. '!he Chief Pilot of KIM, captain Smirnoff, who 
landed the Fokker 12 at Barton on 22 January had inspected the 
aerod.raIe and virtually condemned it: 
" Even with the maximum extensions this ground will never fulfill 
the conditions necessary for camercial flying ... Taken fran the 
neteorological standpoint this is the w::>rst flying ground of any 
mown to ne in Europe. . . '!he surrounding obstructions such as high 
tension pylons high factoq chinneys and high radio nasts make the 
approaches to -ilie ground very dangerous: . . Our advice to the l~ 
authorities is not to spend nore on this ground, but to tq to find 
a nore open ground in the neighbourhocrl of Manchester." ( 4 ) 
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Clearly the decision to establish Manchester' s second airport had been 
influenced by such jucigE!lBl.ts. 
'!he subsequent developrent of the Ringway site (as detailed in 
Chapter Two) likewise proceeded with the general objective of providing 
"sufficient" facilities to cater for the needs of rapidly changing 
aircraft design, providing ever longer runways and lal:ger tenni.nal 
facilities. For example, the runway extension programre of the 1960s 
had been praupted by the airlines intimating in the 1950s that Boeing 
707s and the like would be brought into service in the next decade. It 
is important to note however, that underpinning such inves1::m3nt 
decisions was the Co:qx>ration I s interpretation of the market and the 
potential role envisaged for the airport. During the 1930s the City 
aspired to providing air carmunications with other large towns in the 
UK and. the Continent, but after the Second Vbrld war objectives 
J:ega1rling the role of the airport in an intemational market were 
extended, despite the difficulties of accurately fo:r:ecasting the 
requirare:nts of new aircraft designs. 
In the 1950s, although the need to encourage direct links with the 
Continent was still regarded as important, efforts were by then 
directed tCJWards placing Manchester in a favourable position to act as 
a trans-Atlantic tenninal with the ultimate intention of increasing the 
frequency of service on trans-Atlantic routes, making it rro:re 
convenient to interline at Manchester rather tban IDndon or Prestwick. 
As trans-Atlantic airports tended to be dependent for the greater part 
of their revenue on tourism, to rraximise traffic steps were taken to 
try to encourage US and Canadian airlines to operate tlu:ough Manchester 
as rrost tourists preferred to travel by their national airlines or 
charters. ( 5 ) For example, in furtherance of the Airport Carmi. ttee 's 
policy of stimulating the choice of Ringway as a British port of call 
by trans-Atlantic airlines, the 'lbwn Clerk corresponded with Trans-
Canada Airlines of Montreal :regarding the possibility of establishing a 
direct Canada - Manchester service. H<Jr...eler, at the tine, the traffic 
volUIIE between the UK and Canada was shara:l with 00lC and it was only 
at the height of the surmer season that the canpany felt it oould 
operate rrore than one daily flight between the n..u countries. Previous 
obligations had required the Canpany to land sare of these flights at 
Prestwick and others at Shannon en route to IDndon. It was suggested 
that Ringway ~uld have to J~ another en route stop on other flights 
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tenninating at IDndon as it seem:rl that insufficient traffic would 
originate at or be destined for Ringway to allow it to act as a 
tenninal point. It was argued that in the first instance this would 
increase considerably the overall ti1re of flights. However, nore 
importantly, the use of Ringway Airport would have required a 
nodification of the UK-canada bilateral agreemant which it was thought 
would neat with serious objections fran the UK air authorities who 
already felt that they had been nore than generous in allCMing Trans-
canada to land both at Prestwick and lDndon on sare of its trans-
Atlantic flights. (6) 
In essence, the encouragem:mt of trans-Atlantic traffic represented 
an attempt to establish Manchester Airport as the second lcu:gest 
airport in Britain. (7) In deciding in the 1950s to extend the main 
runway to 7,000 feet, the Airport Director had supported the project on 
the expectation that half the trans-Atlantic traffic at Prestwick ~d 
be attracted to Manchester and that a number of continental and North 
Anerican airlines might transfer their operations. It was also 
asserted that much of the northern traffic could be attracted away fran 
IDndon. (8) 
At the public inquiry into the proposed stopping up of roads to 
accamodate runway extension fran 5,900 feet to 7,000 feet held in 
1958, Manchester Corporation's air policy was stated unajUi.vocally, 
" It is the policy of the City Council, who are the owners of the 
airport, to develop it so that it may attract and retain direct 
services to all parts of the world that are justified by the 
camercial and industrial importance of the densely populated. area 
servai by the airport" (9 ) 
Developrent throughout the next decade was again geared towards 
providing facilities to cater for the lcn:gest aircraft of the tine 
which operated on trans-Atlantic services, despite the incidence of 
surplus capacity. The prina:ry object of extending the runway to 9,000 
feet had been to allow Manchester Airport to take its place in the 
category of the largest airports by international standards, as laid 
down in Armex 14 to leAD and by the Ministry of Aviation standards as 
laid down in "The Licensing of Aerodrares" (CAP 168). (10) 
On this basis, it is argued that the policies of the Manchester City 
Council regarding airport developrent were progressive and forward 
thinking in :responding to the opportunities offered by the grcwth of 
Bri tish civil aviation . Particularly, in the developrent phase of the 
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1950s and 1960s such policies were significant in transfonming latent 
dem:md into effective demand. 
Given the camercial and trading role of the City, it is perhaps to 
be expected that the Corporation should be convinced, at an early 
stage, of the potential market for air services. However, fran the 
outset, the Corporation's ambitions extended beyond the City's 
boundaries · As far as the airport's inmediate catclment area for 
trans-Atlantic traffic is concemed the Corporation envisaged it 
extending fran Stafford, Oswestry and Nottingham in the South to 
Penrith and Durham in the North bounded by the east and ~t coasts. 
Manchester was regarded as the hub of a group of towns including IEeds, 
Bradford, Halifax, Huddersfield, Wakefield, Dewsbury, Sheffield, Stoke-
on-Trent and "5 towns", Stafford, Chester, Crewe, Northwich, 
Warrington, Runcom and Widnes, Liverpool, Birkenhead, Preston, 
Blackburn, Burnley, Salford, Altrincham, Bolton, Bury and Rochdale. As 
the bulk of the trans-Atlantic trade of this area passed t.lu:ough the 
ports of Liverpool and Manchester, it was felt that similar conditions 
\\UUl.d apply to Manchester Airport as a trans-Atlantic facility. (11) 
In essence, the ma jar objective of the Corporation was to provide 
"adequate" facilities, (despite the potential risks of invest:rrent in 
airport infrastructure referred to in Chapter One) , which would 
increase the likelihcxxi of capturing the IlDre lucrative markets in 
trans-Atlantic and other intemational traffic. 'Ihis in tum increased 
the revenue earning potential of the airport in a nmnber of ways. 
~ major sources of revenue for airports may be identified. 
Firstly, aeronautical or traffic relatai incare arises fran charges 
levied on the airline per aircraft landing, per passenger handled and 
charges levied for the parking of aircraft. The second source of 
revenue, termed non-aeronautical or camercial revenue, may be 
generated fran rents for office accamodation and other facilities, 
fran recharges to tenants for the cleaning and heating of areas 
occupied and fran a variety of camercial outlets like restaurants, 
banks, car parks or shops which may be let as concessions. ( 12) 
In general, the pattem of costs at any airport is, in large part, 
determined by traffic characteristics. '!he distinction be~ 
scheduled aircraft novem:mts and non-scheduled may be important as 
passenger loads in the latter are larger for any given aircraft type. 
If plane load sizes affect labour and equiptent requiI:arents or the 
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sizes of passenger tenni.nal departure and arrival lounges then 
variations in the relative canposition of total aircraft ITOVE!lEnt rate 
between scheduled and. non-scheduled rroveman.ts will be important in 
detennining varying levels of planned labour and ~plBlt ~ts 
and. hence varying levels of costs for any planned level of capital 
investnents in the capacity of the facilities. '!he size distribution 
of aircraft JroVEmant rate nay also be important. For exanple, aircraft 
weight which is highly correlated with size and. which varies directly 
with aircraft freight and. passenger loads, is an important detenninant 
of aircraft "footprint" pressure and. hence runway, taxiway and apron 
wear and tear, affecting variations in unobserved depreciation, 
naintenance and replacemant costs. As far as naintenance costs are 
concerned, non-scheduled IlOVE!leTlts - due to high load factors - tend to 
be nore service intensive than scheduled novatEllts, that is naintenance 
of a non-scheduled IlOVE!leTlt is greater than a scheduled novarrant. 
Maintenance costs are also affected by average passenger loads imposed 
on passenger transit areas. (13) 
'!he distinction between intemational and dcm3stic passenger traffic 
is also relevant as in addition to services provided by airports to 
domestic traffic, international traffic requires a variety of 
certification services with the need for custans buildings or receiving 
halls, in-transit lounges, etc. variations in passenger traffic mixes 
nay, therefore, result in variations in cost centres affected by 
changes in these facilities and. services. ( 14 ) As for capital cost, in 
the long nm passenger tenninal areas and sizes of departure and 
arrival lounges, other passenger transit areas and. runway, taxiway and 
apron systems including aircraft stands, piers, gates, etc, will be 
tailore:i to the average planeload size using the airport: ( 15 ) 
'!he costs of airport operation will, therefore, vary for different 
sizes of ail:port and different traffic mixes, each airport will have a 
relatively unique cost structure. '!hus in developing pricing 
structures for the use of airports, the general econanic rule would be 
to chal:ge on the basis of marginal cost. Havever, because of the high 
fixed costs of snaIl airports, it is unlikely that chal:ges fixed on 
such a principle would enable the airport to cover its costs. (16) If 
general subsidies for ail:port operations are rejected, then there is 
the problem of raising sufficient revenue to cover costs, while at the 
sarre tine ensuring that chal:ges do not deter traffic and lead to under 
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utilisation of the airport. If there are opportunities for 
substitution, that is, say for trans-Atlantic flights, Paris is a very 
close substitute for IDndon, a rise in the landing fee for IDndon nay 
bring about a substantial diversion of traffic. rrhe corollary is that 
if all canpeting airports in a region raised. landing fees there would 
be little effect on air transport :rrovarents but the demand for a 
particular airport's operations nay be affected if it alone put up its 
fees. The nain reactions nay be expected. fran those operators for whan 
displacarent to another airport is not expensive, such as the package 
tour and charter finns. ( 17 ) 
In respect of charging policies, the tendency within the industry 
has, therefore, been towanis a tmifonn pricing structure for aviation 
related. costs and emphasis has been placed. upon budgetary objectives 
rather than the efficient allocation of resources. Given that accounts 
are presented. in tenns of historical costs, the pursuit of budgetary 
objectives can lead to econanically perverse pricing since the airports 
which were constructed. first are low cost and therefore low priced.. 
(18) Certainly, Manchester Airport, in developing facilities at a very 
early stage, nay fall into this category. 
However, of equal significance has been the second principle in 
airport pricing, that of "ability to pay". 'nlis "taxation" pricing 
policy takes account of the resources of the aircraft operator in 
p:roviding a particular type of service and the ability to recover fran 
passengers a reasonable proportion of airport costs within a 
canpeti ti ve fare structure. (19) The tendency has been towanis 
charging higher landing fees for the larger aircraft operating on 
international routes. Moreover, the principle of "ability to pay" has 
also underpinned. the levying of passenger service charges since their 
introduction in May 1952. This charge was initially levied. on 
operations in respect of aircraft flying for hire or reward, whose next 
stopping place was not in the UK, Isle of Man or Charmel Islands. Thus 
the initial financing of passenger teI:mi.nals was provided. by 
international and intercontinental passengers alone. The subsidisation 
of dooestic traffic again canplied. with the rule of thumb for landing 
fees, that relatively large payload aircraft, deployai on intemational 
and intercontinental routes have a greater ability to pay than 
relatively smaller payload aircraft deployai on darestic routes. With 
relatively large planeload revenues on international and 
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intercontinental flights, operators are nnre likely to be insulated 
fran the effects of a passenger service charge than operators on 
shorter dcnestic routes. ( 20) In the 1970s, the Passenger Sel:vice 
Charge was replaced by a Passenger IDad Supplemant which applied to all 
passengers both dcnestic and international, although a differential 
rate was maintaina:i to reflect the different level of service required 
in passenger tenninal buildings. With the intrcxiuction of the 
differentiated Passenger IDad Supplemant, it could be cu:gued that 
efforts were being nade to nnre nearly reflect real costs, but the 
differential in itself reinforces the principle of ability to pay and 
given the other objective of making airports pay, nay be reganied as 
purely an altemati ve sources of revenue which had retained untapped in 
the past. (21) 
Because of the nature of charges levied at UK airports, the 
objective of securing trans-Atlantic and other international traffic at 
Manchester Airport has been significant in increasing the scale of 
activity. Although trans-Atlantic flights nay have been few in 
canp:rrison with total flights, they have been of disproportionate 
importance fran the revenue point of view. '!he larger aircraft used on 
such routes have been liable for fees calculated on an "all-up weight" 
of aircraft basis irrespective of the number of seats occupied and the 
surcharge for flights beyond Europe doubled the landing fee. '!he 
importance of trans-Atlantic traffic to Manchester Airport nay be 
indicated by estilnates prepared for 1962/3 which assurre:i that revenue 
fran trans-Atlantic services would be about £250,000 or one third of 
the total revenue accruing fran landing fees, baggage handling and 
passenger service charges. (22) 
In addition to maximising the aeronautical revenue eanting potential 
of the airport, the proootion of international traffic also allowa:i 
revenue sources to be diversified with a greater proportion being 
generated by camercial outlets or concessions. Fundamantally, a 
concession is a right to use land or premises to sell gocxis or 
services. A concession contract does not create a tenancy or confer 
any right to the exclusive use or occupation of land or premises. In 
granting concessions the object of the airport authority is to ensure 
that an increasing level of trade in the concession area will be 
reflected in the paynents nade to the airport authority. A reduction 
in passenger traffic could reduce the level of paynents recei veri and so 
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a guaranteed :mi.n.i.mum paynent of not less than the anount the authority 
would receive fran a tenant is often written into the contract. (23) 
An arrangemant which usually represents the closest canpranise to the 
ideal source of incare which is relatively insulated fran reductions in 
traffic, yet at the sarna tine increases in step with inflation, is 
given by the charging of a basic rent for the space occupied coupled 
with a concession charge given by an agreed percentage of tunlover. 
(24) 
As far as the historical developnant of concessions at UK airports 
is concerned, after the Second World War concessions generally existed 
only for the services necessary to provide for the basic needs of the 
passengers, such as catering areas, newsagents and small gift shops. 
(25) By 1959, certain continental airports like Brussels, Copenhagen, 
Amste:rdam and Shannon were offering passengers on foreign flights the 
facility to obtain duty free goods in orner to maximise revenue. The 
potential of this activity had been adequately datDllStrated, 
particularly at Shannon, where it was found that many Arrerican 
passengers returning to the US specifically flew via Shannon to obtain 
the benefit of duty free gcxx:ls. In one year, £1~ million pounds worth 
of business had netted £100,000 for the Shannon Airport Developnant 
Ccmnittee. (26) By the 1960s, Duty Free Shops and other concessionary 
facilities becam3 increasingly regarded as a source of revenue which 
could potentially reduce the level of incare l:8qUiI:ed fran direct 
charges on aircraft and airline passengers. (27) 
The potential for maximising non-aeronautical revenue is detennined 
in large part by total airport passenger throughput. Non-aeronautical 
revenue per passenger increases because as traffic increases so the 
number of different types of concessions activities that it is able to 
sustain rises, provided sufficient terminal space is made available to 
accamodate concessions. ( 28 ) However, for any given throughput which 
an airport handles, the proportion of international passengers will be 
significant in detennining the potential for eaming non-aeronautical 
revenues. International passengers generally spend longer in the 
tenninal building and camercial areas, especially the duty free 
facility therefore camercial revenue per intemational passenger is 
much greater than the corresponding revenue fran darestic passengers. 
(29) 
It may be argued - especially by those on the airline side of the 
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civil air transport business - that in order to be viable, an airport 
needs substantial camercial operations and the corollary of this is 
that to be attractive to concessionaires, a high voltme of passenger 
throughput on international services is required and this volune will 
not be forthcaning if an authority is reluctant to provide the 
necessary capital inves1:Irent to fulfill the requiremants of larger 
aircraft both in tenns of runways and tenni.nal facilities. (30) 
In general, a number of stages of airport revenue developllent nay be 
identified. For the snaIl airport with lOW' passenger throughput 
attatpting to attract air services, incare fran rents nay be lOW' 
because of 1000danand, nevertheless, in tenns of the proportion of non-
aeronautical incare deriving fran this source, the contribution nay be 
relatively high as any regular air service requires basic services 
which are not divisible, such as offices, maintenance areas, stores, 
etc. (31) Secondly, the snaIl airport will have no concessions or 
they will be only partially developed, thus airport revenues will be 
daninated by aeronautical sources. ( 32) 
At a level of about 200,000 to 500,000 teIJninal passengers per year, 
greater pressure will be exerted on tenninal space so rents will be 
nore carnerciall y related. Scope will be inproved for the develop1El1t 
of sare concessions and at this level of throughput, approxima.tely 15-
20% of revenue nay accrue fran non-aeronautical sources. ~, if 
an airport remains primarily a darestic facility, it is unlikely that 
further developrent will take place. ( 33 ) 
It is argued that with the develop1El1t of tenninal facilities at 
Manchester Airport and the encouragemant of international traffic, the 
Airport Ccmnittee achieved the diversification of revenue sources which 
Y.Uuld sustain future growth and developrent. An examination of Table 
3.1, Incare fran Rents and Concessions as a Percentage of 'Ibtal Incare 
at Manchester Airport, suggests that up to the mid 1950s, the 
characteristics of the "srrall " airport were displayed, where a 
relatively high proportion of incare is derived fran non-aeronautical 
sources, largely in the fonn of rents. With the opening of the new 
tenninal building in 1962, a gradual trend. of increasing proportions of 
revenue accruing fran non-aeronautical sources set in a trend. which was 
reinforced by the tenni.nal building extension of 1974. Table 3.2, 
Aeronautical Revenue as a Proportion of 'Ibtal Revenue, Manchester 
Airport, supports the contention that with the growth and developrent 
165 
of airport facilities came a diversification of incare sources, with 
the proportion of revenue deriving fran aeronautical sources declining 
sharply fran 1962/63 . Finally, Table 3.3, Concession TeI:ms and Incare, 
1973-75, provides evidence of the range of concessions activity taking 
place in extended tenninal facilities. 
In essence then, the need to canpete with other airports to capture 
and retain air services translated into a policy of providing superior 
facilities at Manchester Airport which - given the natural wide 
catchment area highlighted in Chapter Two and the positive 
encouragarent of international traffic - ensured that the financial 
structures necessary to sustain future grcMth and develop1El1t would 
eval ve. However, it is significant that in detemrlni..ng the level of 
aeronautical charges, the municipal owners of Manchester Airport 
similarly exercised caution and were selective in judging "what the 
traffic \\Quld bear" in order to develop a sound financial basis for 
future grcMth and developrent. 
Prior to the Second Vhrld War, the aeronautical charges imposed at 
Manchester's airports of Barton and Ringway confo:rned to the .Aerod:raIe 
Owners' Association "Standard Schedule of .Aerod:raIe Fees and Charges". 
A schedule of landing fees was introduced by the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation to operate at all state controlled aerodrares fran 4 July 
1946, however, as a municipally owned airport, these charges did not 
have to apply at Barton and Ringway. (34) In contrast to the 1930s, in 
the post war years, the owners of Manchester Airport exercised 
judgarent in considering the recamendations of the NJA and did not 
necessarily adhere strictly to the recarma:ndations of this body. For 
example, with respect to fees for night landing, the NJA schedule for 
1948 had provided that the fee for night landing should be the nomal 
daytine charge, although flexibility was introduced in that the 
aercxi.raIe owner was free to nake further charges at night or at any 
other tine for the provision and operation of aeroc:irale lighting and 
other night flying facilities. At the tine, the practice at Ringway 
had been to charge a night landing fee double the nomal dayt.i.ne fee 
and, in considering the recamendations of the NJA, this position had 
been m:xti.fied, but only to the degree that the excess charge was 
amanded to 50% over and above the nonnal dayt.i.ne charge for night 
landings. (35) 
During the 1950s, although not obliged to do so, the Airport 
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Ccmnittee noved increasingly towards the application of landing fees 
and other charges in operation at state aerodrcmas, regarding these 
larger aerodrcmas as the major carpeti tors for traffic. When the 
Ministry introduced the Passenger Service Chal:ge in 1952, the City 
followed suit levying a charge of 5/- per passenger departing on 
international flights. At the sane tine, the surcharge on the landing 
fees for heavy intercontinental traffic was increased flXlIl 50% to 100%, 
again keeping in line with state aeroch:ares. (36) In respect of 
short-haul :rebates, Manchester Airport adopted an 80% rebate for stages 
of scheduled flights not greater than 45 statute miles; 70% for stages 
greater than 45 miles but not greater than 80 miles and 55% for stages 
of nore than 80 miles but less than 115 miles, all in camnn with the 
Ministry of Aviation :rebates. In contrast, the optional rebates 
recamended by the ADA ~ less, being 70%, 50% and 33% respectively. 
In this sense, Manchester offered similar incentives to darestic 
traffic as those offered at the state owned aeroch:ares. ( 37 ) 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the basic objective of the municipal 
custodians of the Airport remained the extension of direct air services 
overseas, whilst ensuring that the financial security of the Airport 
should not be placed in jeopan:iy. '!he overriding principle applied was 
that the financial structure had to sustain investIrEnts which appeanrl 
to be necessary to the Airport's total developuent. ( 38) Whilst many 
local authorities believed that traffic would bear only a m:xiest level 
of charges and, therefore, the only way to attract traffic was to offer 
financial incentives, the Manchester International Airport Authority 
and its predecessor the Airport Ccmnittee contended that if such 
incentives became a pennanent feature of an airport's financial 
structure, their withdrawal at any tine would cause traffic to 
disappear. (39) 'Ibis does not nean that Manchester wholly rejected 
financial incentives but that discrimination was exercised in their 
application . 
As early as 1966, the Airport Db::ectors of Manchester, Binningham, 
Glasgow and Liverpool had agreed upon a general pattern detenni.ning the 
extent to which landing fee concessions could be granted.. Although the 
granting of a concession was to remain a matter for individual airport 
authorities, certain principles ~ agreed upon. Concessions were to 
relate to landing fees only and not to other transactions such as 
baggage and freight handling charges or nmtals, which could be subject 
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to considerable local variations. Concessions on existing routes could 
on! y be granted in exceptional circumstances; on darestic routes 
concessions ~re not to be grantErl in cases where the rErluced landing 
fee for short stage flights already appliErl; concessions for a new 
service which nerely supplarented an existing service providErl by 
another operator could not be granted except where roth operators were 
in the first year of operation when any concession appliErl equally to 
roth. Any concession granted was to be initially limitErl to 50% for 
the first year of operation and continuance into a second year was to 
depend upon the load factor achieved in the first year, the degree of 
regularity with which the service was operatErl and the anount of 
prarotion of the route undertaken by the operator. ( 40) 
Within the context of this general frarre,."urk, concessions had been 
granted in the early 1970s, for example, to British AiI:ways, to operate 
new routes fran Manchester to Geneva, to Munich, to Nicosia and to 
Milan. After operating the first two services with a 50% rErluction in 
landing fees for two years, the passenger load factors ~ found to be 
only 21.1% and 22.5% respectively and although British AiI:ways had 
wantErl the concessions to be granted for a further period the Airport 
Authority decided not to extend. the concession judging it to be unwise 
to continue concessions on routes which sh~ no ilmecliate sign of 
profitability. (41) Clearly, in the long run, the Airport Authority 
was not prepared to subsidise its airport users and in principle, 
deared it nore appropriate in attempting to attract traffic to convince 
airport users that appropriate facilities ~ being provided to the 
standa:td required. ( 42) 
In the early 1970s, carplications ~ introduced to the charging 
policy with the Govenlmant price legislation designed to curb inflation 
in the econany as a whole. Having constantly reviewed the level of 
airport charges in order that increases in the cost of labour , 
materials and services could be taken into account, in the 1970s the 
nomal resistance of airlines and other airport users to increases in 
charges was reinforced by price restrictions. (43) In November 1972, 
maasures were introduced involving a carplete standstill on prices and 
wages for a limited period of 90 days followed by a further period of 
60 days. Under the terms of the price restraint airport cha1:ges could 
be increased for scheduled international flights only fran 1 April 
1973, all other charges to darestic and charter air services and all 
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landside chaJ:ges were subject to the standstill. Similarly, proposals 
to increase charges after 28 April, that is during Stage II of the 
price freeze, ~ subject to criteria detennined by the Price 
Ccmnission. (44) Whilst operating within the constraints of price 
legislation, the costs of airport operation at Manchester continued to 
increase rapidly and although basic landing fees ~ increased fran 
£1.10 per tonne to £1.20 per tonne, this increase was lower than the 
average rate of cost increases. Given the adverse econanic conditions 
which were affecting airlines at the t.inE it was deciderl to restrict 
the increases in charges relating to aircraft and. canpensate for this 
by increasing the variable elem:mt applying to passenger aircraft. 
Effectively, this recognised the need to develop the carriage of goods 
by air and. the ~t to recover a substantial part of revenue 
charges fran the Passenger IDad Supplem:mt intenderl to cover the costs 
of services provided for passengers in tenninal buildings. These 
charges had not been increased since Novanber 1970, whereas the costs 
of providing terminal facilities at Manchester had escalated 
particularly with the opening in 1974 of a third pier, multi-storey car 
park and other extension to the tenninal building. ( 45 ) In Table 3.4, 
Breakdown of Aeronautical Revenues, Manchester Airport, the long tenn 
effect of this change of policy regarding passenger related charges may 
be reflected in the proportion of aeronautical revenue deriving fran 
this source, increasing fran be~ 10% and. 14% in the period 1969/70 
to 1974/75 to 25% to 30% in the period 1976/77 to 1978/79. 
As suggested in Chapter Two, within a year of the inpact of the oil 
crisis in 1973, many regional airports ~ suffering fran the effects 
of attendant price increases and. cut-backs of air services. In 
September 1976, the Joint Airports Ccmnittee of IDeal Authorities 
considered five alternative formulae for increasing revenue in real 
tenns on the basis of a five year progranne. Proposals put foIWard by 
Manchester Airport ~ accepted as the rrost effective nethod of 
equating revenue with costs in the future. Thus, fran 1 April 1977, 
rrost regional airports in the UK anbarked upon a five year plan for 
increasing charges in real tenns and. in the sane year, the principle of 
standa1:di.sing on chaJ:ges was reinforced by the caning together of 
JACOIA and. the ADA to create the Joint Airport Charges Ccmnittee 
( JACC). ( 46 ) 
The schare for the planned developtent of airport charges in the UK 
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supported by JACC, envisaged the follo.ring rates of increase in real 
tenns for application to the resic chal:ges applying on 1 April 1977 and 
on 1 April of the following four years:-
Basic landing fee 
Navigation Service Charge (at 
airports where the CAA did not 
prescribe the charge) 
Passenger IDad Supplem:mt 
Aircraft Parking Charge 




Source: JACOLA and the ADA, Reca'rm3ndations regarding the charges to be 
applied at nanber airports on 1 April 1977. 
'lllese rates ~ added to the inflation rate, being the noving 
armual increase in RPI which applied during the 12 nonths ended on 31 
July in the pmvious year. An airport was at liberty to adopt the 
reccmrended increases or defer them, so the :recamended standard 
charges effectively fomed a "ladder" as illustrated in Table 3.5. 
Charges at airports which had achieve:i or expected to achieve a 
required rate of return could remain on a lower rung of the ladder 
until financial circumstances required adoption of the :recamended 
standard. Within the structure it was recognised that each airport 
should consider an array of neans by which the financial position could 
be ilnproved, for example, aid in the fonn of revenue subsidy or 
Govennrent/EOC grant to finance capital developn:mt, subsidy fran the 
IDeal Authority in recognition of the value of the airport to the local 
carmunity and finally the maximisation of non-operational revenues. 
( 47) In effect, the plan was designed to prescribe chal:ges which would 
enable all nanber airports to recover the costs of providing airport 
services. In reality nost of the airports involved in the schare had 
to adopt the :recamended charges either because their surpluses were 
insufficient to warrant a drop down the ladder or deficits were being 
incurred. (48) 
With respect to its place in the schare, by the 1970s Manchester 
Airport was in a much nore favourable financial position than its 
counterparts, so in applying the schare a nmnber of considerations were 
taken into account. 
Firstly, regarding its canpetitive position with the London 
airports, account was taken of the fact that charges levied at 
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Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted owned by the British Airports Authority 
were generally 10M3r than at the provincial airports. Manchester 
Airport was in a p::>sition to adopt charges below those recamended by 
JACC which 'WOUld place the airport in a rrore catq;)etitive p::>sition than 
for example, East Midlands, Binningham, ~/Bradford and Liverpool. 
However, another consideration had to be the heavy demands which \\UUld 
be placed upon the Runway Renewals Fund and the General Reserve Fund 
over the next fEM years. (49) Whilst making provision for future 
developrent, the authority also had to consider that being the largest 
provincial airport at that tine, Manchester was open to the criticism 
that it had adopted the camon charging structure purely as a rreans of 
amassing substantial p:rofits. Its pre-eminent p::>sition could have been 
threatened if Ira jor airlines had been able to p::>int to indications that 
a rronopoly pricing p::>licy was fleecing air travellers to the benefit of 
the Manchester ratepayers. In such circtmlstances, airports like 
Binningham, East Midlands , Liverpool and I.eeds/Bradfolrl could have 
rrodified charges by providing a te!rp:>rary rate subsidy in the hope of 
gaining a substantial increase in diversion of traffic away fran 
Manchester. (50) 
Following a reference to the Office of Fair Trading, the JACC was 
disbanded in 1981. However, during the period of operation of the JACC 
scheme for the planned developrent of charges, the Manchester 
International Airport Authority was able to increase the level of 
Passenger lDad Suppleman.t by about 46% and the basic landing fees by 
about 11% in real tenus. ( 51 ) These increases were achieved despite 
the fact that Manchester - being in a rrore favourable p::>si tion than its 
counterparts - operated on a lower nmg of the "ladder". For example, 
whilst the JACC recamended an overall landing charge of £4.20 (per ~ 
tonne over two tonnes) to apply fran April 1978, at Manchester Airport 
a 10M3r fee applied, as rather than adopt the recamended £2.10 for the 
navigation services eleman.t of the landing charge a reduced charge of 
£1.75 was adopted. Thus the overall landing charge for darestic and 
international flights at Manchester was £3.85 • Similarly, in the next 
year the airport adopted the JACC landing fee eleman.t of the landing 
charge, but naintained the navigation services elanent at £1.75 two 
steps below the JACC recamendation. (52) 
In daronstrating an awareness that the financial needs of the 
airport had to be balanced against the needs of the airline canpanies, 
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and. rejecting the opportunity for possible gain fran the adoption of a 
nonopoly pricing policy during the pericxi of the JACC developlent plan, 
reasonably gocxi relations ~ naintainoo with the airlines which had 
been convinced that by adopting stagoo increases in chaJ:ges the Airport 
Authority was only trying to provide contributions to renewals funds 
and reserves for asset replacanant and obtain a reasonable rate of 
retunl to the parent authorities. (53) Data provided in Table 3.2, 
Aeronautical Revenue as a Proportion of 'lbtal Revenue, Manchester 
Airport, tends to support the argtlIlBlt that Manchester Airport did not 
use its praninent rrarket position to chal:ge nonopo1y prices to airport 
users. In the absence of the ability to eaD1 substantial revenues fran 
concessions prior to 1961, aeronautical revenues constituted an 
increasing proportion of total revenue. This began to reduce in 
subsequent years and although the proportion of incare deri VErl for 
aeronautical revenue increasoo during the pericxi of the JACC chal:ging 
schare 1977/78 to 1980/81, the increase was marginal. The Table 
indicates that in fact the proportion of revenue deriVErl fran 
aeronautical sources tendoo to be cyclical suggesting a finIer 
relationship with the developrent of traffic and the investnent cycle 
rather than any specific nonopoly pricing policy. 
After the disbanding of the Joint Airport Charges Carmittee, the 
camon chal:ging policy cane to an end. Differentials in the chal:ging 
structures of provincial airports in the North of England ~ rrore 
apparent and Manchester Airport was again in a rrore canpetitive 
position than other provincial airports which canpeted for its traffic, 
as shown in Table 3.6. 
As suggestoo, the policy in respect of aeronautical chal:ges adopted 
at Manchester Airport generally secured the gocxiwill of the airlines 
and the developnant of air services tlu:uughout the pericxi of rapid 
developrent of the civil air transport industI:y and the subsequent 
years of econanic restraint. However, it should also be noted that 
Manchester Airport had to sam da:Jre9 reaped advantage fran its 
exclusive provision of baggage and freight handling services in 
securing a sound financial strategy for developnant and in this 
respect, evidence suggests a fundanental conflict with airline 
interest. Fran Table 3.4 , it is clear that the provision of this 
se:rvice has always fomed a major source of revenue for the airport 
since charges were introduced in 1951/2. As early as 1961, the issue 
172 
was taken to the High Court of Justice by British European Ail:ways 
which disputed the airport's right to perfonn "apron handling 
services", ie the handling of baggage, cargo, mail and stores fran and 
to aircraft which land or take off fran the airport, noving steps up to 
the aircraft, positioning aircraft chocks, etc. Charges for such 
services had risen on a number of occasions and BFA arguoo that the 
cha:r:ges were excessive, reflecting nonopol y provision where there was 
no incentive to minimise costs. On this basis the Canpany clained the 
right to provide its own apron handling services. ( 54 ) 
Basically, this case centroo on the interp.retation of various 
clauses of the Air Navigation Order, 1960. For example, in issuing an 
ae:roc:lrctre licence the Ministry of Aviation granted the use of an 
aerodrare for the take-off and landing of aircraft engagoo in flights 
for the purpose of the public transport of passengers subject to the 
najor condition that the aerodrare should be "available to all persons 
on equal terms and conditions". However, subject to this condition, 
nothing in the licence conferred on any person the right to use the 
aerodrare "without the consent of the licensee". In essence, BFA 
arguoo that the Corporation could not stop them fran landing their 
aircraft at the aerodrare, so long as they were willing to pay the 
appropriate cha:r:ges for landing and that the condition of availability 
on equal tenns and conditions gave the ccmpany the right to use the 
aerodrare without observing any conditions which the licensee might 
choose to impose. It was also arguoo that the right to land carrioo 
with it the right to do everything incidental to landing and that even 
if the Corporation were entitloo to impose conditions subject only to 
providing the sane condition for all, such conditions could only relate 
to the actual take-off or landing or the aircraft. (55) 
The Corporation arguoo that as CMllers of the airport, they retainoo 
all the ordinary rights of owners of land, except in so far as those 
rights were limitoo by statute. The right to regulate the use of the 
aerodrare and wake charges for that use dependoo partly on the fact 
that the Corporation was owner and partly on the fact that the rights 
as owner were largely governoo by special provisions rendered necesscu:y 
for protection of the public. rrhe statutory limitations imposed upon 
the Corporation did not give BFA the absolute right to use the airport, 
but only the right to use the airport on the sarna tenns and conditions 
as all other users. In effect, the Corporation contended that it could 
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impose whatever tenns and conditions for use ~ deara:i necessary 
subject only to the Minister's ~s to control their charges and the 
conditions prescribed by the Minister for the perfonnance of services 
under powers established in Article 62 of the Onier. (56) 
The High court found. in favour of the Coxporation, so BEA proceeded 
to the High Court of Appeal arguing that it could perfonn apron 
handling services much nore cheaply with its own staff to land and 
unload the baggage not only of their own aircraft, but the aircraft of 
many other airlines for whan they acted as agents. BEA allegedly 
claimad that they could make a saving of £36,000 if they carried out 
services themselves, but no evidence was prcxiuced to support this 
claim. (57) Again it was judged that under the Air Navigation Onier, 
1960, the Corporation could impose "equal tenns and conditions" as to 
the use made of the airport by airlines in regard to bringing porters, 
vehicles and equiprent onto the aerod.rare. As long as the tenns and 
conditions were equal for all users such a conditions was legitimate. 
Any other view would lead to an "absurd result" that each airline would 
be able to have its own porters, vehicles and equiprent at Manchester 
Airport and be able to go to and fran their aircraft at will, which 
could lead to chaos. It was also judged that there could be no 
difficulty about the charges as the maximum charges could be laid down 
by the Minister under Article 62 of the Onier. (58) 
Table 3.4 suggests that prior to BEAs canplaint regarding the 
airport's exclusive provision of baggage and freight handling the 
proportion of aeronautical incare derived fran this source had 
increased fran the late 1950s, which may have reflected increased costs 
and nonopoly pricing. At the tima baggage and freight handling tend.erl 
to be a labour intensive acti vi ty and the greater proportion of any 
increase in charges reflected in larger part the wage awards for staff 
engaged on baggage and freight handling. In this sense BEA may have 
been justified in its contention that costs were escalating 
mmecessarily as a result of the Corporation giving way to excessive 
pay dem:mds. However, it may similarly be contended that BEA's claim 
to be able to discharge this function at a lower cost than that being 
incurrerl by the airport was misleading. For the airport, achieving the 
quickest turn round of all aircraft - i.rrespecti ve of the operator 
involved - had to be apriority. 'lb achieve this substantial numbers 
of staff needed to be employed for a m.nnber of off-peak hours when few 
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aircraft ~d need to be handled, with the object that when the peak 
occurred, there ~d be no delay in tum round. Apron handling 
charges therefore, always appeared to be greater than the cost of 
providing labour and e}Uiprent for the actual period of loading and. 
unloading. ( 59 ) 
In surrmary, it is argued that the Oil!lers of Manchester Airport, 
convinced of the potential for the developrent of air services frr:m the 
City, adopted what might but be described a "progressive policy" 
towards airport developrent. The progressive nature of this policy is 
reflected in a nmnber of ways. Firstly, in an era of difficulty in 
forecasting the requirarents of new aircraft designs, the Corporation 
dE!lDIlStrated a willingness to consult and. act upon the advice of the 
airlines, constantly responding to the needs of their new aircraft 
fleets. An awareness of the need to canpete with other airports for 
traffic is also apparent, but priority was given to developrent of 
facilities to attract and. retain air services rather than offering 
financial incentives which could have in the long tenn threatened the 
financial stability of the airport. In developing airport facilities 
at an early stage, substantial advantage was gained in that such 
facilities were, therefore, provided at relatively low cost . Given the 
application of the principle of ability to p:ty in pricing the resources 
of the industry, in the adoption of progressive policies gea.rerl towards 
the provision of facilities to cope with international traffic, the 
owners of Manchester Airport successfully consolidated its financial 
position at an early stage , diversifying revenue sources, which 
contributed towards the relative market damnation in the 1960s which 
was highlighted in Chapter 'Thou. In respect of aeronautical charges it 
is significant that whilst applying the same principles pursued 
elsewhere in the UK, the Oil!lers of Manchester Airport effectively 
adopted pricing structures to suit their own objectives rather than 
following the nann. An awareness of the need to canpete with the state 
aerodrares for the market has been a constant feature of the charging 
policy adopted at Manchester Airport, and this has been canplaIBlted by 
a rejection of the adoption of the widespread use of incentives to 
attract traffic. It is clear that by the 1970s, with consolidation of 
the market position, Manchester Airport was in a position to undercut 
its regional ~titors and generally this was the policy pursued 




'lhe Potential Cmst.rai.nts of the HunicjpU Ormership RegjJIe 
'1lle Duality of lDca.l Goven1man.t Finance and the Pursuit of Non-
Camercial Objectives 
Generally, it has been argued that the Manchester Corporation 
consistently adopted "progressive" polices towards the developnent of 
civil air transport for the City and its hinterland. HCMeVer, it 
should be boD'le in mind that the decision-making processes involved in 
policy naking differ fran that which might have applied under 
alternative ownership regines. '!he fact that local govemmant as a 
fonn of enterprise differs fran any other in a number of fundana'ltal 
ways could have potentially constrained airport developrent at various 
stages p:roviding a negative influence upon investment decisions arising 
fran considerations exogenous to airport operation. 
Essentially local govemmant cannot be regarded as a corporate or 
unified activity. Unlike the private finn the purposes and. objects of 
a local authority as a whole are diverse and. local govemmant cannot be 
identified with one concrete rranageable purpose. Functionally, 
departments have little in eamon, they carp3te for resources 
especially finance but do not contribute to any single overriding 
objective and this carp3tition for resources and the need. to prioritise 
nay significantly influence investment decisions. (60) 
IDeal govemmant finance differs significantly fran the private 
sector in that the financing of services is divorced fran the spending 
process. 'Illis "dualism" means that spending depa.rt:nents are isolated 
fran the responsibility of raising revenue to finance activities, this 
being in the hands of a "treasury" depart:nent. (61) Given this 
duality, sare system of budgeting is inevitable if only to calculate 
the anount of revenue required. '!he primary emphasis in local 
government finance has been on accountability, ensuring that 
infonnation is available for control over those in charge of public 
funds. '1lle criterion against which those held to account are judged is 
legality or authority for expenditure. Given the plethora of 
legislation which detennines the powers and duties of a local 
authority, the budgetary process provides the only nechanism which, as 
~ll as allowing revenue ~ts to be calculated, allows the 
authority for expenditures to be established. Essentially then local 
authorities balance budgets and fix a rate levy and the najor 
constraint is that of ensuring sufficient incare to cover all 
-
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expenditure in the year ahead. ( 62) 
'!here is no autanatic rreasure of success to influence inves1::nEnt 
decisions such as that provided by the balance on profit and loss 
accounts of camercial concerns. Even when such rreasure has been 
available, as in trading undertakings, the nonopolistic nature of such 
enterprises or the non-camercial elarents in policy fonnulation have 
detracted fran their usefulness. (63) With respect to these non-
carmarcial elarents, Fowler goes so far as to suggest that the raison 
d' etre of local goverrment is not the provision of services and that 
policy fonnulation is guided nore by the political rather than 
functional role of local goverrment. In this sense, local C01n1cillors 
may see their primary role as being one of nodifying and reducing 
central goverrment power thereby spreading the darocratic process nore 
widely, providing gIeater arphasis on local interests. Fowler also 
alludes to the political notivation in the extension of local 
government into numicipal trading running gas works, tranlrays, 
electrici ty supply, crema tori a , slaughter-houses, cold storage 
facilities, airports, etc, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. He concludes that the origins of numicipal trading lay in 
political theory, the primary concern being the regulation of nonopoly 
power of private undertakings in the public utility field. r.rbe 
sweeping powers granted to local authorities to set up trading 
organisations in the nineteenth century \\1ere, however, reversed in the 
~tieth century with the refonns of the post-war labour goverrment 
which centralised than in central goverrment or in public co:rporations 
acting at the national level or in single purpose authorities not 
subject to local political control. (64) '!he nost obvious camercial 
services \\1ere centralised, for exanple, the public utilities of 
electricity in April 1948 and gas in May 1949. (65) r.rbe provision of 
scheduled service airports which had developed fran the 1930s was 
nationalised fran 1946. ( 66) For Fowler by the late 1940s it had 
becaIE clear that the financial and technical danands of high 
technology functions \\1ere not being net by the politically shaped 
nature of local goverrment finances and structures which resulted in 
public utilities being under-capitalised and unCCK>ntinated. (67) 
Fowler also maintains that local govemrrent becane increasingly 
characterised by the conflict between narrow operational efficiency and 
the political needs of an elected assembly continually seeking to 
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resist the concentration of power either of central goveD1IlEIlt or of 
single pw:pose authorities not subject to direct elected rranber 
control. (68) 
'!he concentration hypothesis is to Sate degree supported by the 
empirical ~rk of Professors Peacock and Wisanan, although they tend to 
see its origins lying in an earlier pericxi and highlight the 
significance of war as the principle agent in accustaning nations to 
freer governnent spending. Data suggests that in 1910 local 
expenditures were 6.1% of Gross National Product and alnost 48% of all 
governmant expenditure, by 1921 local expenditure had increased to 8.2% 
of GNP but had reduced to 28% of all goveD1IlEIlt expenditure. Fran this 
data Peacock and Wisanan conclude that in the years iImB:tiately 
following the cessation of hostilities, local authority expenditures 
shared the displacarent effect of Vbrld war I but not to the sane 
extent as central goveD1IlEIlt; a concentration process had emerged in 
the fom of a relatively IlDre rapid growth of central responsibilities. 
(69) Between the wars the share of local expenditures in total 
goverrment spending and as a percentage of GNP remained relatively 
constant. Similarly, Peacock and Wisanan rraintain that the share of 
GNP had been little affected by the Second Vbrld War being 9.6% in 1936 
and 9.5% in 1948. Nevertheless, as a proportion of total governrrent 
spending, local spending declined fran 38.8% to 23.4% over the sane 12 
year pericxi. '!herefore, for Peacock and Wisanan the displacarent 
effect in the post war era had again favoured central governrrent. (70) 
Despite the general trend towards centralisation in the post war 
years, local authorities continued to play a significant role in 
capital accumulation. By 1965, local authorities were responsible for 
about one fifth of the total investmant program of the country. 'lbtal 
expenditure on goveD1IlEIltal service, both central and local on revenue 
account was £11,000 million per annmn, local authorities accounting for 
about £2,300 million or 21%. (71) 
Essentially, the characteristics of local goveD1IlEIlt outlined above 
have manifested themselves at various stages of ail:port d.eveloprent in 
Manchester. 'lb Sate degree it can be argued that ail:port developtent 
has been influenced by non-carmarcial objectives and "municipal 
prestige" has been a detennining factor. Whilst the primary 
consideration in constructing the Barton Aerodrare in the late 1920s 
may have been to satisfy the danand for air services, the establishnent 
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of the temporary aerodrome at wythenshawe reflected purely 
considerations of nnmicipal prestige. As the Barton Aerod.rcma was 
undergoing construction, it becarre apparent that Hull was likely to 
have a suitable site at Hedon in operation before Manchester. '!he 
decision to prarote civil air transport in Hull had been taken after 
Manchester. It was only in Septanber 1928 that the Hull Chamber of 
Camerce had appointed a special ccmn:i..ttee, "to advance a proposal for 
the establisl1IIent of an air service for the transport of mails between 
England and the Continent, with Hull as a fol:WaI:ding point." (72) '!he 
Manchester Corporation, therefore, ilnpl:uvised the temporary site at 
Wythensha\\19 in order to becare the first local authority to establish a 
rrnmicipal aerodrare in the country; it was licensed on 22 April 1929. 
(73) 
The debate regarding the future ownership of Manchester Airport 
consequent upon the re-organisation of local goverrment under the IDeal 
Governmant Act 1972, also provides evidence to suggest that municipal 
pride was a detennining factor, although this case also dem::>nstrates 
the priority given by local authorities to resist the extension of 
central goverrment power. In effect, local goverrment re-organisation 
in 1974 resulted in the first major change in ownership structures in 
the history of Manchester's airports. At the tine, powers to own and 
operate airports were exercisable by county borough councils and 
concurrently by county and county district councils. Of 30 local 
authority airports in the country, 20 were operated by single local 
authorities, as in the case of Manchester and 10 were operated by 
consortia of local authorities. The IDeal Governmant Act 1972 created 
a new county council for Manchester stretching fran Rochdale in the 
north to Wilmslow in the south and fran Wigan in the \\19St to Oldham in 
the east. The counties of lancashire and Cheshire \Vere to lose all 
powers and control in the new administrative area and County Boroughs 
like Manchester were to cease to exist. '!he new County created was to 
canprise ten districts, as shown in Figure 3.1a, with the new authority 
representatives being elected in April and May 1973. '!he new Greater 
Manchester County Council was to have 107 councillors with the 
Manchester District electing 20 representatives. '!he new Manchester 
District was to cover the old Manchester County Borough and to 
incorporate the parish of Ringway in the rural district of Bucklew, as 
shawn in Figure 3.1(b) and (c). '!he new district canprised a 
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population of 590,000 and continued to elect 99 councillors. (74) 
Although the general rules for the transfer of property under IDeal 
GovernrrEn.t re-organisation suggested that the ownership of Manchester 
Airport would remain with the Manchester District, in effect, the 
Secretary of State had powers under the IDeal Goverrmen.t Act 1972, to 
transfer airports to such local authorities as he considered 
appropriate. So although under the provisions of the IDeal Authorities 
(England) (Property etc) Order 1973, Manchester Airport should have 
been vested in the new District Council, the Secretal:y of State took 
reserve powers to make supplemantal:y orders to anend this general 
principle. (75) Three possible courses of action could be taken, 
firstly the airport could remain with the District; secondly the 
airport could be vested in the Greater Manchester County Council by 
supplarental order; or thirdly, the Secretal:y of State could exercise 
an option to acquire the airport . Basically, it was held that re-
organisation offered the opportunity for the local re-appraisal of 
responsibility for each local authority airport to ensure that the full 
potential benefit Tt."Ould be obtained fran the new structure of local 
govenment. In essence, a number of considerations underpinned the 
case for the wider involvemant of the county authorities in 
responsibility for the larger airports, either alone or as nanbers of 
consortia. For exarrple, responsibility for such airports could be nore 
closely related to the areas served and for which they might create 
envirormeltal problans. In addition, it was possible that the often 
considerable burden of running local authority airports could be spread 
over a wider area. (76 ) 
This view had in fact been supported in the past by Jack Jackman, 
the Airport Director at Manchester Airport. When the Royal Ccmnission 
on IDeal GovernnEnt (the Maud Ccmnittee) envisaged the possible 
creation of a Manchester, Salford and District Council, which \\Uuld 
embrace the whole of the airport area, the Airport Director had 
registered his support for any nove which Tt."Ould place the airport 
geographically within one local authority rather than the 
administration of the airport estate being fragmanted - as a 
consequence of the site extending across local authority boundaries-
between the Manchester City, Wilmslow UOC, Bucklow ROC and. the County 
of Cheshire. '!he Maud Report also envisaged the new District Council 
existing alongside another eight councils which 'YtUuld collectively fall 
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wi thin the South East Lancshire and North East Cheshire net.rop:>litan 
area as far as responsibilities for transportation ~ concerned. '!he 
Airport Director had argued that such an extended area embracing a 
population of Sate 3.2 million would be nore representative of ail:port 
users which originated fran a catchnent area extending beyond the 
bounds of the City. (77) It was postulated that although the ail:port 
undertaking had in the past been a viable proposition for the City of 
Manchester, this might not necessarily be the case in the future as the 
cost of capital scheres for the provision of rna jar tenninal and 
operational facilities could outstrip revenue. In this sense, 
therefore, the Airport Director supported the notion of spreading the 
costs of developrent very thinly over a large rate paying population. 
(78) 
Similarly, with the prospect of local governmant re-organisation in 
the early 1970s, the Airport Director at Manchester supported the 
transfer of responsibilities to the new Greater Manchester County. 
However, this was not a view held by the elected representatives of the 
Manchester District authority and a fundanental difference of opinion 
ererged between the existing ail:port owners and the newly created GMC 
which was only resolved by canpranise necessitated by the prospect of 
central goverrment intervention. '!he newly created Greater Manchester 
authority had indicated an early intention to take on a significant and 
active role in the prarotion of industry, camerce and anploymant in 
the whole of the Greater Manchester area which was reganied as the 
focal point of the North of England, with increasingly important links 
with Europe and other foreign markets. '!he traffic, wealth and 
anploynent generated by Manchester Airport was seen to be essential to 
the prosperity of the North, therefore, the Greater Manchester County 
Council maintained that in orner to fulfill its designated role in the 
developrent of the area's econany, ownership and control of the ail:port 
was essential. It was argued that the new authority ~d be nore 
appropriate to administer the ail:port as it ~d develop a greater 
awareness of developrent needs across a wider spect.nnn and be nore 
favourably situated to detennine the potential for future growth. (79) 
Other fundanen.ta1 argmrents supported the case for the transfer of 
ownership rights. Firstly, the growth of the ail:port had brought in 
its train problans of noise and disturb3nce outside the City, and it 
was argued that it was nore equitable and just that the County 
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Authority which enjoyed the benefit of having the airport within its 
area. should also be the authority upon which the obligation to nest the 
costs of re:ra:lial ~rks and any canpensation necessitated by the 
existence of the airport should fall. Secondly, it was cn:gued that 
airports are erratic in their needs for capital finance and are large 
carmarcial risks and the importance of the airport to the North West 
neant that its future developlIent should not be pI:ejudiced by the 
possible non-availability of capital and revenue finances at the right 
tine and in the right anount. Thirdly, the newly created County 
Council was the traffic and transportation authority for Greater 
Manchester and Manchester Airport forrra::l a highly significant link in 
the traffic and transportation system. '!he provision of suitable and 
convenient road and public transport access to the airport was regan:ied 
as a continuation of the sane transportation network which air 
passengers and persons who wished to transport their goods by air were 
using when they used air transport. On this basis, it was cn:gued that 
the County, assuming I:esponsibility for the totality of transport, 
should logically asstm¥3 I:esponsibility for the airport. (80) 
The Manchester District labour Party also favoured control by the 
new County Council but the majority of elected :t'epI:esentati ves on the 
District Council, partly influenced by the Airport Carmittee, were 
detennined that control of the airport should continue in District 
hands. At one particular nesting of the District Party in Novenber 
1973, the Wythenshawe Constituency proposed that the County Council 
suggestion for control of the Airport be deplored, however, this notion 
was defeated. In essence though, such policy decisions made by the 
Party weI:e not binding on the District Group. (81 ) Arguably, the 
Chainnan of the Airport Carmittee held noI:e sway with the District 
Council, maintaining that the developrent of Manchester Airport had 
been one of the IlDSt striking exanples of local goverrntE11t enthusiasm, 
initiative and enterprise and that the developrent to international 
status since the Second World War had been the I:esult of the 
detennination of the City and the support given by its ratepayers. 
Like the County, the District Council was anxious to maintain 
Manchester Airport's intemational status and improve facilities and 
the Airport Carmittee weI:e of the view that the progressive policies of 
the Carmi ttee and the City Council reganling developlIent would be 
continued by the new District Airport Carmittee and District Council. 
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(82) In essence, it may also be assmred that the City Council derived 
considerable prestige fran ownership of an airport which over a 15 year 
period had contributa:l £1,789,404 to the City's Rate Fund despite the 
need for heavy capital expenditure. (83) 
At an Airport Carmittee neeting on 13 September 1973, a resolution 
was passa:l unartinously, 
"That the Depart.nent of the Environrrent be inform:rl that the 
Manchester District Council hold the strong view that the ownership 
and responsibility for the control, nanagemant, operation and 
developrent of the existing Manchester Airport should vest in the 
Manchester District Council." (84 ) 
The views of the new District Authority and the new County regarding 
the future ownership of Manchester Airport ~ dianetrically opposed, 
the District Council maintaining that the City had developed and 
prarvta:l the airport well enough in the past and since Manchester 
ratepayers had financed this developrent, the airport should ranain 
with than for their benefit; whilst the GMC held that since the airport 
served the region, the benefits it brought to the camnmity and the 
envirornrental disadvantages for those living nearby should be shared by 
people residing in the new larger netropolitan area. 
Though it appeared that the two local authorities ~ entrenched in 
opposing camps, they ~ in agreement on one fundanental principle, 
that is, that the airport should ranain under local goverrment control 
and that any proposal that the British Airports Authority at sare 
future date, should resurre responsibility should be resisted. In this 
regard, it was essential that the matter be settla:l amicably, avoiding 
any risk of central gove:rnnBlt invol vanant in decision making. (85 ) 
Thus a canpranise of joint ownership was reached with the Manchester 
District and the Greater Manchester County Councils appointing a 
ccmnittee known initially as the Manchester Airport Joint Ccmnittee, 
and later the Manchester International Airport Authority, to discharge 
all functions relating to Manchester Airport. The Joint Ccmnittee was 
to have ~l representation with ten nanbers appointed by the 
Manchester District and ten by the County. The Chaillnanship and Vice 
Chairnanship of the Carmittee was to be held by a County representative 
and. by a City representative for alternate periods on the understanding 
that the two positions would not vest in representatives of the same 
authority at anyone tine. (86 ) 
A provision was made in the proposals for the transfer fran the 
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airport's accounts to the Manchester City Rate Fund of £300,000, 
£200,000 and £100,000 during the three financial years 1974/5 to 1976/7 
dependent upon profitability of the airport. However, short! y after 
these arrangemants for transitional payments were agreed, the national 
econanic situation deteriorated. seriously as a result of the energy 
crisis which was expected. to have a direct effect upon the airport's 
operation and consequent profitability in the .imrediate future. '!bus, 
the question arose as to hCM the three proposed. payments in aid of the 
rate could be guaranteed. Both the County and City Treasurers examined. 
the position and it arerged. that although the three paynents could be 
guaranteed the nethods of securing it \\UUld probably not be in the best 
interests of the airport and its developlent, so a "once and for all" 
paynent of £400,000 in aid of the Rate was agreed to be paid in 1974/5. 
(87) 
'!he County and City Councils conferred various functions and powers 
upon the Ccmni.ttee including the managarent, control, operation and 
administration of the airport and all activities there. The Carmittee 
was to exercise and discharge all duties and powers of the City and 
County under the Civil Aviation Acts of 1949 to 1971 with the exception 
that it had no power to levy or issue a precept for a rate or to borrow 
IlDney. So, in effect, the Authority could enter into agrearents or 
contracts regarding any activity at the airport including the fixing of 
fees, charges, concessions' rents; expend nonies in maintenance and 
developrent of the airport in acconiance with estimates approvai by the 
Authority and approve bye-Iaws relating to the airport. As far as 
airport assets are concemed. these were to be held by the City for the 
joint use and benefit of the City and County Councils. Staff fonterly 
anployed in the Corporation's Airport Departnent were to be under the 
exclusive control of the Carmi. ttee which detennined. their numbers, 
wages and conditions of service and exercised. rights of appoin1:rrent and 
dismissal. ( 88 ) 
As regards the financial arrangarents applying to the airport's 
operation in the i.ntrv:rliate future, the accounts which had been 
maintained. by the Corporation, including the Airport Revenue Account, 
the Airport Vehicles and Plant Renewals Flmd and the Airport General 
Reserve were to be maintained. by the County Treasurer, l:alances being 
transferred to and maintained. by the County for, on behalf of and under 
the direction of the Carmi.ttee. For the financial year 1974/5 and 
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during a "prescribed period." detennined by the Authority any net profit 
after the allocation of rronies to Renewals Funds and after the 
deduction of debt charges was to be paid into the airport's General 
Reserve. In essence, net profit was to continue to be transferred to 
the Reserve until such tine as the StnTl held ~lled one tenth of the 
total value of fixed assets, thereafter net profit could be distributed. 
~lly between. the t\\U parent authorities. In practice, however, 
because of the precepting arrangarents the Manchester District received 
IIDre than a 50% share, that is 50% accrued to the District as joint 
owner of the airport but as a constituent authority of the GMC a 
further percentage flowed to the authority. (89) Any deficit in the 
Revenue Account after allocations to renewals and deduction of debt 
charges was to be made good. by the transfer of funds fran the General 
Reserve. If the Reserve had insufficient funds to cover any deficit it 
was to be made good. by equal contributions fran the County and the 
City. If the Ccmni.ttee resolved to incur capital ex:pendi ture to carry 
out its functions and to rreet expenditure by borrowing the County 
Council was to borrow funds and advance than to the Ccmnittee. All 
repaynent of debts outstanding at 31 March. 1974, were to be debited. to 
the airport's Revenue Account with interest being charged at the rate 
applying to the Consolidated IDans Fund of the City Council. Sums 
advanced by the County were to be repaid over a period. detennined by 
the Ccmnittee by charging the Airport Revenue Account . Essentially, 
the possibility of capital being financed out of the City's 
Consolidated loans Fund had been rejected. on the basis that a disguised 
subsidy fran the City to joint ownership could arise as a result of the 
application of the relatively favourable average rate of interest 
charged on loans fran the Fund. New debt to be raised by the County 
Treasurer was however, to be related to Public Works !.Dan Board rates 
of interest. (90) 
I.ocal Governnent re-organisation had far reaching implications for 
the future ownership and developnant of Manchester Airport . Given the 
establishment of a large metropolital county area with wide 
geographical responsibilities and overall responsibility for 
transportation throughout Greater Manchester, it may be argued that 
ownership should have vested exclusively in the new authority which 
could spread the burden of airport developnant across a wider field 
IIDre representative of the airport's catchrrent area. However, the 
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validity of this conclusion is questioned when it is considered that in 
1970 sare 59% of intemational passengers were generated fran outside 
the area canprising the new County. Taken to its logical conclusion 
the concept that ownership should reflect the area served would suggest 
that the ownership of Manchester Airport should have been transferred. 
to Sate regional body at a much earlier stage. However, the 
developtent of Manchester Airport to intemational status and the 
extension of its catchnent area had taken place under City ownership 
and it is argued that the transfer of ownership \\Uuld have penalised 
the authority for its past enterprise. Certainly there is no rationale 
in private enterprise to suggest that ownership structures should 
reflect the narket base and with respect to airport operation which 
differs fran other local govemmant Services, in that the opportunity 
to make profit exists, depending upon the goals specifie::i there again 
seems to be no case for assuming that the authority dischal:ging 
responsibility should reflect the area served. 
Whilst airports are erratic in their needs for capital finances and 
represent large camercial risks, evidence presented in preceding 
sections supports the contention that the City Council had already 
proven itself willing to accept the risks of investmant in airport 
infrastructure. In the face of the prospect of transfer of ownership, 
the City could claim, on the basis of its past record, to be willing to 
adopt "progressive" policies. The acceptance of the sum of £400,000 
into the City Rate Fund, which appears to be minimal given the 
airport's long tenn prospect of profitability, may in itself, be viewed 
as a manifestation of the City's continued willingness to prarote the 
developnant of Manchester Airport to the exclusion of other objectives. 
Having been involved in civil air transport for Sate 50 years, the City 
could legi timatel y claim that maintenance of the status quo \\Uuld 
further promote developrent drawing on a wealth of expertise, 
experience and knowledge particularly regarding the fonnul.ation of 
policy. At the end of the day the ultimate canpranise of joint 
ownership had little to do with operational efficiency but 'WaS pLUlipted 
by the OV9l:Wh.eJming desire to ensure that Manchester Airport ranained 
in IDeal GovernrlEnt control, which is to a great degree reflective of 
the character of IDeal GovernrlEnt across the 1:x:ard which embcdi.es the 
rejection of centralisation in favour of local dem:x:racy. 
As previously suggested, airport developrent in Manchester could 
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have been constrained by other factors which underpin the nature of 
local govenment enterprise. Whilst on the one hand the extension of 
local derocracy nay support the expansion of the local govemmant 
service, the duality of local governrrent finance and the danands placed 
upon financial resources by canpeting claims can engender a conflict of 
interest and disag:reemmt between elected nenbers over those seI:Vices 
which are deem:rl appropriate for local provision and those which should 
be supported by central governrrent. In the fonnulation of Manchester' s 
airport developrEnt policy again such considerations ~ nanifest in 
the early years of developrEnt when the Airport displayed the rrost 
fundanental characteristics of the srrall airport, that is, the absence 
of surpluses highlighted. in the previous chapter. 
rrhe Ringway schare, considered by the City Council on 25 July 1934, 
aroused much opposition and was only approved by 55 votes to 54 in 
Council. Whilst Aldennan Sutton noved the rrotion reccmrend.ing the 
acquisition of 664 acres of land at Ringway for Manchester's second 
pennanent municipal airport, Councillor J Toole opposed the schere on 
the principle that it should not be supported by the local rates. It 
was argued that central governmant should provide aerodrares for the 
national defence. Misgivings ~ also expressed regarding the scope 
for the developrEnt of civil aviation in a country the size of Britain, 
and the econcmic consequences of devoting large expenditures to an 
industry which was undergoing such rapid change. Social considerations 
were also given an airing when it was suggested that "only the rich 
could afford to fly". (91) In February of the following year, further 
noves were nade to quash the airport schere during a discussion on the 
City's rates. Councillor J watts proposed the deletion of an estimate 
of £75,000 for work at the airport on the basis that expenditure was 
"unjustified" under existing econcmic conditions and watts appealed to 
the Council to consider the requiremants of their public health 
services and to provide better acccmrodation for those applying for 
public assistance. Councillor Watts' anendrrrant to delete the i tan of 
£75,000 was defeated by 60 votes to 45 and. his subsequent notion that 
the City should not proceed with the schere was rejected by 57 to 35 
votes. (92) Councillor watts nevertheless continued his dogged 
opposition to Ringway Airport and. two years later propounded an 
"ingenious schare" to his colleagues for the help and furtherance of 
British aviation. His resolution suggested that because the Council 
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thought anti-aircraft defences should be a national charge and because 
the Maybur:y Carmittee recarmanded the national co-ordination of civil 
aviation, the Airport Carmittee should be instructed to offer the whole 
of their property for sale to the governrrent for use as anti-aircraft 
and/or civil aviation stations and/or aircraft ITBllufacture. '!he 
Council at large, however, considered that Mr Watts "had missed the 
point" which was that Ringway had been. purchased to link the City with 
the camercial air services of the world and ought soon to have an 
important bearing on the prosperity of Manchester. Aldernan Titt 
suggested that based on the argurrent presented, "the Governm:mt might 
as well take over the gasworks" because it would be useful to than in 
the event of war. (93) 
As far as the Finance Carmittee of the Council is concerned, the 
evidence suggests that initially the Carmittee was willing to support 
the City's invest:Irent in airport facilities in the absence of any 
possibility of central government assuming responsibility for 
provision. In consideration of the proposal to establish the Barton 
Airport in 1929, the Finance Carmittee generally accepted the benefits 
which could accrue fran Manchester's involvenent in aviation, 
"'!he proposals now under consideration show a financial burden on 
the City which under ordinary conditions the Finance Carmi ttee would 
wish to avoid, but having regani to all the circumstances, including 
a prospective benefit to Manchester trade generally, the Finance 
Ccmnittee approve the proposals of the Airport Special Ccmnittee as 
to the application for borrowing powers for £30,000." (94) 
'!he observations of the Finance Carmittee in respect of the Ringway 
schare considered sare five years later suggested much the sane 
attitude, again despite the creation of a financial burden on the City, 
the Ccmni ttee were:-
"of the opinion that looking to the future econanic developrent of 
the City satisfactory airport facilities are essential, they approve 
the proposals of the Airport Special Ccmnittee as to an application 
for borrowing powers for £179,295." (95) 
Despite this initial support, it is clear that in general, the 
Finance Ccmnittee supported state rather than municipal ownership of 
aerodraIes which could be a potential rate burden. '!his contention is 
adequately supported by the Finance Ccmnittee' s reaction to the 
possibility of state take-over in the 1950s which will be considered in 
greater depth in Chapter Five which deals in part with central 
gavernrrent policy reganting the planning and. ownership of UK Airports. 
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By March 1953, Ringway had cost the Corporation £493,250 on capital 
account; the total rate-borne expenditure between 1935 and 1953 being 
£202,000. (96) In effect, the net deficit on Revenue Account also 
represented an additional subsidy fran the local authority's rate. 
With regard to the possible nationalisation of the Ringway Airport, the 
position taken up by the Finance Ccmni.ttee, the "treasw:y departm:mt" 
responsible for safeguarding the interests of the Corporation as a 
whole and that of the Airport Ccmni.ttee, the "spending depart::mant" nore 
concerned with airport developtent, adequately manifests the "duality" 
of local goverrment finance. In essence, the Airport Ccmni. ttee 
remained convinced that if the City retained control of the airport and 
developed it, in the long run sw:pluses would accrue. For the Finance 
Ccmnittee the assessnent of alternatives hinged upon consideration of 
the short tenn financial position with respect to the airport which, as 
suggested in Chapter One, is inappropriate given the long gestation 
pericxi involved. 
As the irrnEdiate custodians of the airport, the Airport Ccmni.ttee of 
the Corporation was likely to be in support of any reasonable schere 
for continued nnmicipal CMIlership and in preparing its :report for 
consideration of the City Council, was quick to highlight the 
advantages to be gained fran this . Firstly, it was maintained that the 
position which Manchester held in the \\Urld of civil aviation was 
unquestionably the result of the insistence of the City Council that 
Manchester should not fall behind in a changing \\Urld. At every stage, 
the Airport Carmittee had pressed the clailns of the Greater Manchester 
area for the best that civil aviation could provide and had enlisted 
the co-operation of the Manchester Chamber of CcmrErce in its efforts. 
The detailed knowledge of the requi.rarents of the area, local drive, 
ente:rprise and initiative ~d all be required in the future, if 
Ringway was to develop. It was argued that if on the other hand 
Ringway w:rre taken over by the State it would be only one of a number 
as far as the Ministry ware concerned and in tenns of its developrvant 
would have to take its place with others in a prograrme laid dCMIl fran 
IDndon, by an authority lacking the special knowledge which the City 
had regarding the trade and other requi.rarents of the area. (97) 
Certainly, in presenting these argunents the Airport Ccmnittee oould 
point towards the relatively recent experience of attaIpts to obtain 
Ministry approval of capital projects proposed for Ringway, when 
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projects had been retardEd as a result of limitations on Central 
governmant capital allocations. (98) In this sense, it was likely that 
in the future the Ministry would continue to regani lDndon as nost 
~rtant with Prestwick assuming a secondary position and given these 
priorities, was not likely to be very anxious to prarote international 
status at Ringway. (99) Similarly, it was arguEd that because there 
had been a strong Airport Ccmnittee and because Col:pOration officials 
had lookEd after the interests of the City, Ringway had not been 
~sitionEd during the war and as a :result was in a position to grasp 
the opportunity to arrange for the quick relocation of the Parachute 
Training School after the cessation of hostilities and anbark upon the 
developrent of civil air seJ:Vices to the exclusion of its main 
canpeti tor, Speke. ( 100) 
Whilst the Airport Carmittee considered exclusively the future of 
Ringway, the Finance Carmittee as the "treasury" carm.i.ttee of the City 
had to consider wider implications. If the Col:pOration were to :retain 
Ringway under the tenns ag:rea::i, which are detailEd in Chapter Five, 
they would have to pay to the Ministry of Civil Aviation 25% of the 
capital cost of works already carriEd out, that is £99,750. In 
addition, the Council were to be asked. by the Airport carmi.ttee to pay 
25% of a substantial am::nmt of capital expenditure in expectation that 
at sene future tine, the airport would operate at a profit. Fran the 
Finance Ccmnittee's viewpoint, the City was going to have to incur 
heavy capital expenditure in the caning years on a nmnber of capital 
projects and the level of debt chal:ges on the borrowing of large 
capital smns was increasingly becaning a cause for concern. (101) In 
canpeting for the City's financial :resources, the Airport Ccmnittee may 
have been vi~ as just another "spending carm.i.ttee" whose perceived 
needs v.ere placing an ever increasing burden of debt on the City . 
However, it is argued. that capital expenditure by the Airport carmi.ttee 
was at the tine in an entirely different class to the capital 
expenditure of say the Health, Cleansing or welfare Services carmi. ttees 
as "the Airport Carmittee was the only one which oould offer the 
prospect of bringing increasEd revenue to the City Council. 
Nevertheless, for the Finance Ccmn:ittee, transfer to the state 
offered a number of fundanental advantages, Firstly, the City would 
receive £420,000 representing the greater part of Manchester's capital 
expenditure on Ringway (on which a debt of approx.inately £278,000 was 
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still outstanding). '!he Corporation \\UUl.d similarly be relieverl of the 
resp:>nsibility for further capital developrent and of further rate 
bul:dens against "Vvhl.ch would have to be set the relinquishing of any 
enti tlem:mt to future profits. On the other hand, if the City decided 
to retain the Airport , it would have to find 25% of £1,529, 000 of the 
estimated capital expenditure approve:i by the Minist.I:y, including, 
inter-alia, a sum of £300,000 - £400,000 for the extension of the 
runway and a nmnber of new hangars "Vvhl.ch might cost £100,000 - £200,000 
each. In addition, the City \\UUl.d have to fund any further capital 
expenditure not falling within these two classes and cover any 
operational losses. (102) 
'!he major concern was that inccma should increase at a rate 
sufficient to overtake expenditure. It was asserted that although 
traffic at Ringway had increased in recent years, expenditure had 
increased at a faster rate with the result that the loss falling to be 
bcnne by the ratepayers of Manchester was increasing notwithstanding 
increased traffic. (103) 
In assessing the potential for future profitability, the Finance 
Carmi ttee drew upon an analysis of the characteristics of the traffic 
passing through Ringway at the tine. In assessing the nonthly totals 
of passengers in 1951 and 1952, the Ccmni.ttee highlighted the impact of 
the peak load in August, when one fifth of the total annual throughput 
was recorded as opposed to only one tenth in the nonths of January to 
March inclusive. It was concluded that if facilities were providerl to 
cope with the August peak then inevitably the airport \\UUl.d be under-
utilised throughout the rest of the year. ( 104 ) 
The very existence of the peak also suggested what was to the 
carmittee an unhealthy dependence upon holiday traffic:- in 1952 62% of 
the total passenger traffic had been concentrated in the nonths of June 
to September inclusive. On the assurrption that the traffic processed 
in the nonths of Novanber to April was generated by the "nonnal" 
business user then over 50% of all passengers using the airport were 
holiday travellers. (105) An analysis of the distribution of passenger 
traffic as between scherluled and other air services and a separate 
analysis of foreign scherlulerl services dividerl between various 
destinations and points of departure similarly suggests a number of 
interesting conclusions. Firstly, the negligible value of inland 
traffic other than on the Manchester to IDndon service (re-intrcrluced 
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in 1952) was highlight.erl, along with the preponderance of traffic on 
the Ireland and Isle of Man routes. In 1952, these two sEmTices alone 
had accounted for nearly 60% of the total passenger throughput. As for 
continental traffic although passenger traffic had increased. by 33% in 
1952, only 1% of this increase had been attributable to passengers 
using continental services and a larger proportion of passengers on 
these routes had been concentrated on the Paris and Amsterdam services. 
Apart fran the re-introduction of the Manchester - london services, the 
increases in passenger traffic experienced in 1952 had in the main been 
the result of increases on services operating to Ireland, the Isle of 
Man and the Charmel Islands. ( 106) In analysing the distribution of 
freight for 1951 and 1952 it was concluded. that a very high proportion 
- approximately 70% of the total in both years - was carried. on the 
service to and fran Ireland, whilst inland traffic was concentrated on 
the IDndon route and continental traffic on the Amsteroam route. 
Similarly, for mail a very high proportion of the total was carried. on 
the air services operating between Ireland and Manchester. ( 107 ) 
'Ihe Finance Carmi ttee' s analysis of traffic throughput at Ringway 
over a two year period led to a mnnber of seemingly incontrovertible 
conclusions. 'Ihe concentration of the peak load in the smrrrer nonths-
due to the dependence on holiday traffic -necessitated the provision 
of facilities which would only be fullyanployed for a short period of 
the year. Heavy capital and revenue provision would have to be made to 
cope with the four nonth peak and this traffic ~uld have to bear the 
cost of maintaining nost of the facility during the ranaining slack 
period. 'Ihe rapid growth of traffic on services to Ireland and the 
Isle of Man had been the principal source of developrent as 
geographically Ringway was well placed to act as a collecting and 
distribution point for these services. Excluding the service between 
Manchester and IDndon, inland traffic was relatively uninp:>rtant and 
the only developrent of Ringway for inland traffic had been as a branch 
tenninus on one of the services radiating fran IDndon, rather than as a 
central distribution point. As far as freight was concerned there 
appeared to be little dem:md for freight facilities other than for 
newspapers and mail. Finally continental traffic had developed nore 
slowly than the average and had declined. in relative importance. 
Facilities had been made available for a range of continental traffic 
which did not sean to have availed. itself to any appreciably increasing 
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extent of the facilities. (108) 
Whilst the Finance Camtittee appreciated that aviation was in its 
infancy which could augur substantial developrent, it felt that the 
risks and potential liabilities in retaining Ringway were unacceptable 
as substantial arortive expenditure could have been involvOO if new 
aeronautical discoveries changed the direction of developrent. 
Consistent with past recarnendations, it was held that Manchester as a 
centre of vast population had great potential for personal and 
carmarcial air traffic. It was accepted that even if the airport 
ranainerl permanently a charge on the rate imponderable benefits could 
accrue to the camercial life of the City, which dependerl on 
cormections with distant parts of the world. However, in carp:rrison 
with the nost significant contribution of the City to transport in the 
past, that is the construction of the Manchester Ship Canal, the 
Ccmni.ttee concluded that any indirect benefits would not be likely to 
be anything approaching those following the funding of this ma.jor 
project. (109) The difference be~ the t\\U projects was regan:led as 
of paranount importance. Without the Corporation's support the Canal 
would not have been built, whereas the importance of assuring airport 
developrent around Manchester was not in question. The Finance 
Ccmni.ttee was not convincerl of the significant .impetus which municipal 
ownership would give to airport developlent. It was arguerl that the 
Ministry had a much greater body of teclmical aeronautical knowledge at 
their disposal and that their ma.nagarent of Ringway would have 
advantages to be derivOO f:ran a policy nore closely co-ordinated with 
the Ministry's t\\U other ma.jor airports. (110) For the Finance 
Ccmni. ttee then, the issue was whether the airport should be developerl 
at considerable initial expense and at the risk of continuous financial 
loss to the City ratepayers under strict ministerial control or the 
airport should be developerl on similar lines at the cost and risk of 
the Ministry of Civil Aviation. 
In sunmary, the contention that the developrent of a trans-oceanic 
and inter-continental airport in Manchester could bring SarE indirect 
benefits to the camercial and industrial life of the City and region 
was not really in question, but the contention that municipal ownership 
would bring an adderl impetus to developrent, sufficient to justify 
additions to the capital financing programre and the rate burden which 
would be likely to follow developrent for ma.ny years, was, it was 
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argued that the possibility of future profits and the prestige of local 
ownership was insufficient to outweigh the added rate burden because it 
was felt that projected developIEnt ~d take place whether or not the 
Council retained ownership. Because this developrent was seen to 
involve very heavy capital carmit:man.ts in the future, the Finance 
Carmittee did not consider that the City Council ~d be justified in 
accepting the risks and liabilities involved and, therefore, 
recarm:mded that the City Council disapprove the recamend.ations of the 
Airport Carmittee and instruct it to nake arrangemants for the transfer 
of the airport to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. (Ill) 
At a neeting on 31 March 1953, the City Council had br.u options 
before it in respect of Ringway, the first being to accept the tenns 
offered by the Ministry of Civil Aviation for retention by the 
Corporation of Ringway Airport and to nake application to the Minister 
of housing and local Governnent for sanction to borrow the sum of 
£100,000 being 25% of the expenditure incurred by the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation at Ringway during the course of negotiations; and the second 
being to disapprove the recamend.ations of the Airport Carmittee and to 
instruct it to nake arrangemants for the transfer of the Airport to the 
Ministry. Clearly the decision was not one to be taken lightly as the 
Council adjourned on that date with no vote having being registered. 
(112) The question was considered again on 29 April 1953, and it is 
clear that a lively and saret.ines erotive debate ensued. Aldennan SP 
Dawson's (Conse:rvati ve ) contribution to the debate was recorded in the 
Manchester Evening News as follows, 
"If you hand over control you are admitting to the ~rld at large 
that Manchester feels it is not capable of doing the job it took on 
in 1934. . . The success of Ringway may be so glorious that in a few 
years you will get a profit as you are now beginning to get f:ran the 
Ship canal." (113) 
Councillor R E Thams, Secretary of the Labour Group, opposed the 
Airport Carmittee's reccmrendations largely on the grounds that the 
problem of air transport was not a local, but national one and 
questioned whether it ~uld be "a good thing" for Whitehall to control 
other large airports in the country with Manchester as an exception, 
"Because the Minister is to put foI:Ward 75% of the noney needed for 
initial developrent there is bound to be discord. Surely those who 
put fo:cwaro so much noney will want to have the controlling voice." 
(114) 
Councillor E Mendell (Labour) said that since 1945 there had been a 
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substantial increase in incare fran Ringway but a greater increase in 
expen.di ture, 
"There is no indication that this trend in not going to continue. 
A1m::>st every nonth there is a supplementary estimate for rro:re noney. 
• • Are \<Je justified in incurring extrarel y high capital expenditure 
when all \<Je a:re to get is the doubtful honour of owning an airport?" 
(115) 
It appears that the argumants in council hinged upon whether the 
Airport Carmi ttee or the Finance Carmittee were deemed to be rro:re 
accurate in the picture of Ringway's future which was put befo:re the 
Council. However, srne years later, the Town Clerk was to ranark that 
when the City were considering whether or not to accept the Ministry's 
offer, it had not been expected that the airport would break even for 
sare 15 to 20 years, even allowing for only 25% of the cost of capital 
works falling to the City, thus the Council was clearly willing to 
subsidise airport operation. (116) If the City Council was 
sufficiently convincerl that the airport offered potential in the long 
tenn, the question then arose as to which institution could best 
maximise this - the Manchester Corporation or the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation. Certainly the Association of Municipal Corporations had long 
held the view that whilst there was no clear advantage in public 
ownership by the State as against local authorities, the IIDst 
significant issue :relating to the Goverrment's plan for State 
acquisition had been the fact that local authorities would not only be 
deprived. of ownership, but of management :responsibilities as \<Jell. The 
distinction was :regarded as an ilnportant one in that the management of 
an airfield was :reganied as a function best undertaken by the local 
authority which would stimulate local interest in the developrent of 
civil air services and ensure that management proceeded on dEfIDCratic, 
efficient and progressive lines. (117) Similarly, the ADA in 1952 had 
:referred to the reluctance of central governnent to unravel the 
complications of requisitioning aeroc::lrares in war t.i.ne and the 
avoidance of the problan by the policy of nationalisation and continued 
requisition which had :resulted in those aerodrcmes administered by the 
Ministry becaning inpersonal "white elephants" administered by "S\\Ullen 
staffs" engendering little local interest in civil aviation. (118) 
For the Manchester Corporation, continued managarent was synonynous 
with continued ownership and to continue the management function 
implied acceptance of the Ministry's terms. HCMeVer, the City would 
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probably not have considered :retention of the airport without grant as 
it would have been difficult to justify the provision of a sendce 
which could be regarded as essentially national in character and 
certainly predaninantly regional and charge no:re than 2d or 3d on the 
rates. Basically, no nnmicipality could afford. to bear the whole 
burden of expenditure involved in airport deve1optent, but a gocx:i case 
could be made for keeping the Airport with the aid of capital grant, as 
it would be valuable to have the second airport in the country 
available for inter-continental services. (119) Clearly, in achieving 
such a status, the City Council was convinced that its Airport 
Carmi ttee was in the ccmnandi.n.g position. 
On the question of the future ownership of Ringway, the Airport 
Carmittee won the day with a majority of 86 to 32 on a free vote at the 
end of a 90 minute debate. (120) To:retain ownership, the City had 
been prepared to neet a loss of up to the product of a 2d rate, the 
~valent of approximately £52,000. ~, the optimism of the 
Airport Ccmnittee was justified when in the financial year 1957/8 
inccma exceai expenditure on the airport accounts and over £12,000 was 
paid towards the rate. ( 121 ) 
Clearly in :respect of the nationalisation question, the Finance 
Ccmnittee had been concerned about the financial risk involved in 
further invest.nent on the part of the City, in an industry which was 
characterised by uncertainty as a :result of rapid technological 
developrent. Another funda:rrental consideration had been the need to 
curtail non-essential capital invest:nEn.t across the board. Evidence 
suggests that although the question of the future ownership of Ringway 
had effectively been settled in 1953, the Finance Ccmnittee continued 
to press the need to justify expenditure , especially in the light of 
the increasing costs of the proposed developrent. 
By October 1955, estimates of the costs of the proposa::i new tenninal 
building and the main runway extension at Manchester Airport had 
increased by 162% as carp:rred with the original estimates subnitted to 
the Council in 1953. (122) Whilst appreciating that the original 
estimates had been canpiled by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the 
Finance Ccmnittee nevertheless held that the wide disparities ~ 
unacceptable, suggesting that the City Council had care to an inp:>rtant 
decision based on financial estimates which were substantially 
understated. The Ccmnittee registered the fact that it was " ... IlOst 
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disturbed. ." that the inadequacy of estimates had not been 
challenged at the tine by the Airport Ccmnittee. (123) 
Concenl was expressErl at the financial repercussions of revisErl 
capital estimates on the prospective rate bm:den and it was thus 
suggested that they required fl.Uldanental examination. Despite past 
assurances from the Airport Carmittee that additional revenue 
expenditure, that is, debt charges on capital expenditure and 
maintenance costs to deal with developing services, would be covered. by 
developing traffic and other incate, the Finance Ccmni.ttee still held 
to the view that all the evidence pointErl towards expenditure 
increasing at a nore or less corresponding rate. ( 124 ) During the 
pericx:i of rapid developrent, increases in traffic had produca:i an 
incate in 1954 nore than two and a half tines that received in 1950, 
nevertheless the charge on the rate had increasErl because the increase 
in incate had been nore than offset by greater expenditure. Although 
the rate charge had fallen in 1954/5, it was argued that this had been 
the result of increases in traffic taking place tarporarily in advance 
of increases in capital expenditure as capital schemes had still been 
under discussion. Anongst other things the Airport Carmi ttee was 
pressErl to consider the three fold increase in the estimatErl cost of 
the proposErl tenninal building and apron and to detennine whether or 
not part of the increase in costs might have originatErl f:ran too 
elaborate a standard of architecture and/or unnecessary scale of 
provision. In respect of the doubling of estimatErl costs of the 
extension of the main runway to 7,000 feet, the major concenl ranainErl 
that a large anount of expenditure sunk into the acquisition of land 
and construction of the extension could prove abortive if the 
developrvant of aircraft design achieved substantial reductions in the 
length of take-off required. The possibility of developrent schemes 
proceeding at a slower rate was also raised in order to ensure that 
trends in traffic and the nature of requiremants could be better 
establishErl before embarking upon substantial expenditure. In general 
tenns, the Finance Ccmni.ttee also pressErl the Airport Carmittee to 
indicate whether or not at Sate tine in the future, incare could be 
expected to increase without a corresponding increase in running 
expenditure. ( 125 ) 
In defence of its proposals, the Airport Carmittee arguErl that like 
the Finance Ccmnittee, it had in 1953 had no reason to suspect that the 
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figures supplied by the appropriate Ministry responsible for civil 
aviation matters would prove to be so unrealistic. The only way of 
testing the validity of estimates had been to subsequently carry out 
extensive research and investigation which had revealed anongst other 
things that the tenninal building could only be erected on one 
particular si te, involving considerable dem::>lition of existing 
buildings. (126) The schema devised for the tenninal building was not 
regarded as being in any way extravagant and a major consideration, 
acco:rding to the Airp:)rt Carmi. ttee, had been the need to avoid the 
possibility of not p:roviding sufficient aCCQlllociation of a satisfactory 
standard and thereby having to incur extra expenses which could be 
avoided by making existing proposals adequate as far as could be 
envisaged for a reasonable future pericx:l. ( 127 ) Regarding the scale of 
provision, it was maintained that this had been detennined lcu:gely by 
consultation with airline operators in an effort to make provision to 
:rreet their requi:rarents in such a manner as to ensure that buildings 
would be operationally efficient. (128) '!he Airp:)rt Carmittee held 
that much of the increase in expected costs of the runway extension had 
emmated fran the difficulty of forecasting requi:rarents in 1953, in 
particular the lack of infonnation reganting the need to provide 
consolidated stopways at each end of the extension - a requi:rarent 
which had only care to light in subsa;IUent discussions with the 
Ministry and mAC. (129), In support of funding the increased costs, it 
was cu:gued that, if the airport was to attract long distance services, 
it was essential that the runway should carply with the standa:rds 
agreed internationally as necessary to :rreet the lcu:gest types of 
aircraft likely to use the airport. (130) Finally, the Airport 
Carmittee confirnB:i its intention that the airport should becare a 
p:rofitable concern and it was maintained that the prospect of this 
would be much inp:roved if the Ccmni.ttee ~ allowed to erect the 
tenninal building proposed by the City Architect rather than an 
inferior building. (131) 
Although at this point in tiIre the Airp:)rt Ccmni.ttee was successful 
in convincing the Finance Carmittee of the validity of its case in the 
face of further escalations in costs, the Finance Ccmni.ttee in 1957, 
advised the City Council that - because there had been so many material 
changes in proposals and costs - councillors should have before then a 
rrore carprehensive picture of what was involva:i in the at'te!rpt to 
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establish Manchester Ai.rp::>rt as the second largest airport in the 
country. (132) Thus the Ai.rp::>rt Ccmnittee was instructed to carpile a 
review of the econanics of the administration of the airport generally, 
covering the probable ultimate capital costs and consequent maintenance 
costs and incare. ( 133 ) In attempting to fulfil this requirerEnt the 
Ai.rp::>rt Ccmnittee was faca::l with a nmnber of difficulties arising out 
of the nature of the airport investnen.t. 
Firstly, it was difficult - if not impossible, to forecast 
expenditure that \\UUld be incurnrl upon the operation of the airport at 
any period nore than say five or six years ahead, or the incare which 
could be expected. Uncertainty arose fran the fact that the type and 
size of aircraft in use for civil aviation purposes were constantly 
changing and the types likely to be in use in five or six years tine 
were only at the "drawing }:x)ard" stage of developnant. Before these 
aircraft v-uuld care into service, they \\UUl.d have been subjected to 
considerable m:xtification and, therefore, it v-uuld be several years 
before their weight and perfonnance requirerEnts could be forecast with 
any accuracy. Secondly, even if aircraft types and their perfonnance 
requirerEnts had been known, it was nevertheless difficult to forecast 
the particular scheduled services upon which they \\UUl.d operate or 
their frequency. Thus the Ai.rp::>rt Ccmnittee could only refer to p:iSt 
experience and anticipate future trends as to the possible volUIIe and 
type of traffic which could reasonably be expected to operate fran 
Manchester under given circumstances by 1963. (134) 
An attaIpt was made to assess the financial position of the airport 
at three different ti1res and under different sets of circumstances. 
Firstly, the position in 1960 assuming that the main runway and 
tenninal building had been carpleted by that tine was assessed and a 
net deficit of £56,000 was forecast. However, it was stressed that 
this figure was sarewha.t misleading because at that tine the accounts 
v-uuld have to bear maximum debt charges, whilst the expected incare to 
flaw fran capital expenditure v-uuld not have been fully accrued. (135) 
On the other hand, assuming that by 1962 airport extensions were fully 
operative and maximum rentals were being obtained, a surplus of £13,000 
was forecast on the basis that traffic would be attracted fran 
Prestwick Ai.rp::>rt and that a greater proportion of the northeDl traffic 
passing through wndon could also be captured. (136) Finally, a third 
estlinate was canpiled for 1963 in the event of it having by that tine 
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beccue necessary to extend the rrain nmway to 10,000 feet across the 
Bollin valley. In this case deficits of £27,000 and £52,000 were 
forecast depending upon the level of incare to be expectErl. (137) '!he 
difficulty in forecasting future incare lay in the extent to which long 
range aircraft could be expected to operate. It was asSUIIErl that 
trans-Atlantic traffic would transfer to Manchester, but also that 
larger aircraft would operate on these routes. Given the introduction 
of larger aircraft, the smaller deficit assurred a doubling of landing 
fees charged on trans-Atlantic operations and the larger deficit rather 
less than a doubling of traffic incare, whilst it was generallyasSUIIErl 
that the changeover would also result in fewer landings for sare tiIre. 
(138) 
Despite the difficulties of forecasting, the Airport Ccmnittee 
sought to deny as far as possible the now fairly entrenched contention, 
that expenditure on substantial runway extensions might within a short 
period prove to be abortive if the developteIlt of aircraft design 
achieved large re:iuctions in the length of take-off require:i. Evidence 
suggested that although research on vertical take-off and land aircraft 
was undeI:WaY, there was little sign of the principle being developed to 
the extent so as to pennit its application to heavy long distance 
aircraft. (139) On this basis, it was argued that the necessity for 
longer runways was not likely to be avoided for the next 20 to 25 
years. The Airport Ccmni.ttee concluded that certainly over the next 
ten years - which was the period in which it was expectErl that 
Manchester Airport would consolidate its position as the second airport 
in the country - shorter runways would not be feasible. (140) Thus 
unless the natural developrent of the airport was to be retarded, 
facilities had to be consistent with the type of traffic which the 
Council wanted to attract and the Carmittee rejected any suggestion 
that services should be restricted to those capable of operating on a 
limi ta:i basis. Of great significance was the fact that the airport 
extension envisaga:i was necessary not only to attract additional 
services, but also to retain existing services operating under a weight 
penalty across the Atlantic. Airline operators could not be expectErl 
to continue to operate obsolete types of aircraft to enable than to 
operate through Manchester. The corollary was that if the necessary 
ground facilities ~ not provided, services would be transfen:ai to 
other airports where those facilities existEXi, a conclusion which the 
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Finance Ccmnittee contested. (141) It was contended that the ability 
to nove elsewhere was limited by the availability of larger runways 
elsewhere and given this condition, the owners of b.u or three relevant 
airports were in a position to co-operate with airport operators in 
other countries to canpel airline canpanies to take into account the 
capital costs and the sterilisation of valuable land which the use of 
larger aeroplanes involved. (142) 
In principle, the Airport Carmi ttee naintained that when the City 
Council had decided to retain the airport it had accepted the 
responsibility to neet the agreed. proportion of the cost of securing 
the provision of air services. Although capital expenditure was 
considerably in excess of that originally forecast, it was stressed 
that in the past it had already been suggested that the Council should 
not be too mindful of the unavoidable charge on the rate which an 
airport must make in the early stages of developrvant. (143) Once 
again, the Airport Ccmnittee' s argurrE1lts were nore convincing to the 
City Council and as previously suggested, those who had in the past 
supported. the ccmnitnent of funds to airport developrvant were 
vindicated, when in 1957-8 the airport accounts recorded a surplus. 
(144) 
In sumnary then, it is clear that nnmicipal ownership structures 
introduce a number of factors to the internal decision making processes 
regarding investnent, which could potentially constrain airport 
developrent - including canpeti tion between services for the funds and 
resources of a local authority, the division of responsibility between 
the policy making spending ccmnittees; and the "treasury" ccmnittee 
whose overall objective is to ensure that budgets are balanced and 
sufficient incare is generated to cover all expenditure in the year 
ahead, and finally the intrusion of political objectives which may have 
little to do with the operation of a fundanentally camercial concern 
such as an airport. 
The potential constraints of nnmicipal ownership have nanifested 
thanselves in the early opposition of elected nanbers to investnent in 
airport facilities at Ringway and the subsequent misgivings of the 
Finance Ccmnittee regarding the justification for further rate burden 
in an essentially risky business. Similarly, with local govenment re-
oIganistion, the desire to retain the airport in local govenment hands 
took precedence over considerations of operational efficiency. It is 
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argued that despite such potential constraints, municipal prestige 
proved to be a detenni.n.ing and stimulating factor in airport 
developIEIlt. This in itself encouraged the City COlmcil to adopt the 
long tenn view of investm:mt supporting the Airport Ccmni. ttee' 
argurrents for capital ccmni.tm:mt. Although the question of future 
ownership in the 1970s was settled primarily by carprcmise, it is 
argued that given the GMC' s detenni.nation to be involved in decision 
making processes, such a carprcmise was the IIOst efficient solution as 
it ensured that the drive, initiative and enthusiasm shown by the City 
Council in the past \\OUl.d continue to influence developrent in the 
future. 
(b) ResJX)nses to Central Governnent Control and Direction of IDeal 
Governnent Finance 
The intervention of Central Governnent in the direction and control 
of the financing of local authority services is a :fundanental 
characteristic, again distinguishing local goverrment fran the private 
finn. Since the mid 1960s, local authorities have increasingly been 
regamed as tools in econanic regulation and IlDl1etary managallent of the 
econaI¥ and the pace of local authority invest:nent has, therefore, been 
influenced by the "stop-go" policies of central governmant. (145) With 
the balance of paynents and debt crises of the 1960s, anphasis was 
placed on the reduction of taxation and the role of the State in the 
econaI¥. ~,in the face of rising unenployrrent efforts were nade 
to stimulate danand in the early '70s. 'rhus public expenditure 
accelerated during the "Barber Bocm", growth being reinforced between 
1973 and 1975, but over the next two years, cuts in spending were 
instituted in the face of the exchange and debt crisis of 1976 and as 
part of the negotiations with the IMF. ( 146 ) 
Although local authorities ~re subjected to these "stop-go" 
policies econanic noneta:ry managatB1t had to be reconciled with the 
perception of high spending need and the labour Governnent of 1974-79 
was broadly prepared to support the high spending of labour local 
authorities with grant because of this shared perception. 'lb a 
significant degree local authorities continued to be regan:led as agents 
of incrne redistribution. In 1975, local govemnent spending accounted 
for more than 18% of GNP even though in the previous year 
responsibility for water sewerage and local health services had been 
relinquished. (147) 
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The overall econanic strategy of the Governrrent elected in 1979 has 
canprised a nmnber of key elarents including a reduction in the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirarent to relieve darestic pressure on interest 
rates, to lower tax rates, to reduce the State ownership of assets and 
to secure tight constraints on the real level of total public spending. 
The 1980 Public Expenditure White Paper underlined this final 
objective, "The Governrrent intend to reduce public expenditure 
progressively in volune tenns over the next four years." (148) The 
reduction in local govenment spending achieved in the late 1970s was 
concentrated alnost entirely in capital expenditure. ( 149 ) 
Whilst central objectives have detennined the general trends in 
local govenment expenditure it is ilnportant to note that the 
effectiveness of control depends essentially on the nethod of control 
adopted . Firstly, the direction and anount of capital expenditure 
undertaken by local authorities has generally been controlle:i by 
programres and loan sanctions. For exanq;>le, in the Autumn of 1955 as a 
consequence of a general policy designe:i to reduce total demand in the 
econany which had evolved fran the concern that productive resources 
~ "can:ying too heavy a load" resulting in the u~ IIOVE!IEnt of 
costs and prices at hare as well as pressure on sterling abroad, local 
authorities ~ aske:i to undertake an :i1rna:li.ate review of capital 
expenditure for the period to 31 March 1957, and to review current 
expenditure in order to secure econanies where possible. They were 
also asked to refrain, except in cases of exceptional nee:i, fran 
undertaking new services which \\Uuld involve additional expenditure 
fran goverrment grants or fran rates. The nee:i to ensure that total 
capital expenditure - excluding expenditure on housing in the case of 
county district councils - in 1956-7 did not exceed the 1954-5 level 
was also stressed and it was suggested that no new \\Urks, even those 
already authorised should be camen.ce:i unless urgently necessary to 
nest the needs of the area. Whilst appreciating that sare authorities 
would have special problems which might prevent them fran fully 
can:ying out the aims of the review, especially those with rapidly 
expanding populations and those whose capital projects were 
concentrated on one service in which they were already carmitted to 
expansion, the Governrrent nevertheless suggested that sare authorities 
should be able to reduce their capital expenditure to belCM the 1954-5 
level. Under such constraints the need to prioritise expenditure in 
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the light of local circumstances was thereby reinforced. 'Ib give 
effect to the request of central govemrrent, local authorities had to 
consider the postponaren.t of inprovarents envisaged in the standards of 
service provided in nany areas. (150) 
Whilst central govenmen.t initially resisted any mandatol:}' maasures 
to curb local authority spending, the initial requests made to local 
authorities were reinforced six rronths later when the Govemnent 
outlined its general policy towards local authority loan sanctions, 
"IDem sanctions will be severely restricted for six rronths. During 
this period, it should be assumed that there will be a virtual 
embargo on all new capital projects or expansions of existing 
sch€!TEs." (151) 
Such provisions applied to: 
"all capital expenditure which has not already received. loan 
sanction, even though it may already have been approved in principle 
or for the purfOse of grant." ( 152) 
rrhe only exceptions to the general rule were to be housing and school 
buildings and certain major road projects where defement would involve 
"risk to health or other vital interests". As far as airports are 
concerned these may have been reganied as constituting what was known 
as "other services " within the Minister's sphere of responsibility and 
the intention was not to authorise any new loans for capital 
expenditure whatsoever "except in cases of special urgency". (153) 
It is suggested that whilst, as argued in the previOUS section, the 
Finance Ccmnittee of the Manchester Corporation was unwilling to accept 
the risks and liabilities involved. in airport developrent in the 1950s, 
in their concern to ensure that the rate buI:den was minimised they will 
inevitably have been equally influenced by such pressure emanating fran 
central gavernmant. 
The evidence suggests that during the 1960s similar control 
machanisms were used to achieve objectives of econanic managemant, for 
example, a Ministl:}' of Housing and IDeal Goverrnrent Circular 62/65 
issued on 6 August 1965, introduced maasures to eliminate the balance 
of paynen.ts deficit and to maintain the strength of sterling. I£x::a.l 
authorities were called upon to slow down expenditure on capital 
projects whether financed fran capital or revenue and whether loan 
sanction had been secured or was~. (154) 
In the 1970s, with local govenmen.t re-organisation, the ITEthod of 
control over capital invest.nent p:rogramres was ostensibly eased with 
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the issue of the Depart:m3nt of Environrrent Circular 2/70 which set out 
the basis of central control over local authority capital invest:Irent. 
The objectives outlined in this circular included the provision of 
greater f:reedan for local authorities in planning their capital 
expenditure and the simplification of administrative procedures by 
eliminating the need for individual loan consents and for consents to 
use sale proceeds and by relaxing sare of the limits on capital funds. 
In essence, the goverrment sought to maintain its ability to m::mi tor 
the total level and main trends of expenditure while reducing the 
detailed control of individual projects. (155 ) 
In the "locally detennined sector" capital expenditure could be 
funded by a block borrowing allocation, fixed and allocated to each 
local authority each year. For "key sector" capital expenditure 
specific loan sanction was IaIUired by the Governmant. In the context 
of local authority airports the construction and extension of runways 
required Depart:ma:nt of Transport approval but all other capital 
expenditure fell within the "locally detennined sector" and could be 
financed by a local authority without specific loan sanction. (156) 
In furtherance of the objective of curtailing local authority 
spending IXJWers, the IDeal Governmant Planning and. Land. Act, 1980 
introduced new annual cash limits effective fran 1 April 1981 on the 
total capital expenditure of local authorities i.rrespecti ve of the 
nethcxi of finance (borrowing, lease/leaseback, capital funds, rates, 
revenues, etc). Each local authority received up to five annual block 
capital expenditure allocations for transport, education, housing, 
personal social services, and "all other services" (including 
airports) . ( 157 ) In the "all other services" block, each local 
authority CMIli.ng an airport had to assess the canpeting claims and 
decide whether the airport justified capital ccmni:t:nent. Whilst local 
authori ties provided forecasts of expenditure for each of the 
succeeding four years and. the resources available were detennined by 
Ministers each year, the Governmant prepared global public expenditure 
forecasts. In respect of airports, it was up to Depart:nent of 
Transport Ministers to ensure that adequate provision was made for 
particular airport developrent projects. Fundamantall y, there was no 
central intervention in detennining capital spending priorities except 
under Section 73 where Ministers could ea.mark resources for a 
designated "project of national or regional ~rtance." ( 158) For 
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airports, Section 73 covered firstly, 
"significant capital expenditure on the expansion or improvement in 
line with national airports policy, of operational facilities' at 
airports fulfilling a national or :regional :role." ( 159 ) 
and, secondly, 
"Exceptional capital expenditure required by the national regulatoxy 
authorities to nest national or international standanis of health 
safety or security." (160) , 
Under the schene then the provision of new tenninals, runways and 
navigational aids could be considererl, but not car parks, staff 
facilities, noise insulation schenes, etc. Other considerations 
establishing priorities included the appropriateness of the p:roject 
size to the airport's anticipated developrent, the timing of the 
p:roject, the rate of return, future p:rofitability, etc. It has been 
argued that under this system of allocation nore restrictive cont:rols 
were inp:>sed upon local authority airports in contrast to the State 
owned BAA airports where much capital could be funded fran p:rofits. 
Only in the event of the BAA requiring oorrowing for investm:mt was 
reference made to an External Finance Limit set annually by Govemrrent. 
(161) 
Whilst loan sanction and PIOgrBImeS affo:rd Govemrrent a direct rreans 
of cont:rolling local governmant expenditure, cont:rol may also be 
exercised indirectly via the nature of oorrowing and in this respect, 
significant trends arerge in the post war years. Before the Second 
World War, local authorities had the general freedan to raise loans 
subject only to the general oversight of goverrment. (162) In the 
early post war years, the Public Works lDan BoaI:d (PWLB) becane an 
increasingly significant institution funding local authority oorrowing. 
The Board received funds fran the IDeal lDans Fund administered by the 
National Debt Camri.ssioners and initially the capital requirarents of 
the Fund were met by the issue of IDeal lDans Stock. However, in 1947, 
outstanding stock was redeared by paynent fran a consolidated fund and 
the net capital requirarents of the IDeal lDans Fund were net by 
advances fran the Exchequer. (163) ~ of the Exchequer to make 
necessaxy loans to local authorities was embodied in the IDeal 
Authorities lDans Act and at the sane time the lending powers of the 
PWLB were extended, progressively lending to a local authority for any 
purpose for which it had a statutoxy right to oorrow. (164) 
'!he major benefit to local authorities funding capital expenditure 
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fran loans with the PWLB was that the interest rate chal:gej in the 
early post war years was belOW' the rate at which the Governmant could 
borrow for long tenus. However, although a purpose of the IDeal 
Authority IDans Act had been to allOW' local authorities to borrow 1lO:re 
cheaply at the sane tine the freedan in outside borrowing which local 
authorities had fo:rnerly enjoyed allowing than to borrow short term at 
very favourable interest rates had been taken away. ( 165 ) 
Although in theory local authorities had free access to the funds of 
the PWLB, the canplexity of administrative arrangemants was a 
constraining factor. As access to the extemal long tenn capital 
narket was :restricted the incidence of te!tp>rary borrowing to neet 
capital expendi tu:re pending the raising of longer tenn loans increased 
in the 1950s. (166) 
In August 1959, the Radcliffe Ccmnittee labelled the large increase 
in short tenn borrowing by local authorities as contrary to the funding 
policy of the nonetary authorities. The proportion of total debt 
funded in this way had increased fran 3.2% in 1955 to 15% by 1963. 
( 167 ) Borrowing for new ~rks alone am::runted to £550 million in 1962 
and by this tine local authorities \\19re also having to re-finance a 
rising anount of maturing long tenn debt am::runting to £370 million. 
Central Governmant argued that borrowing on such a large scale on the 
part of the public sector, particularly the impact of short tenn 
borrowing, affected not on! y the Governmant' s own borrowing operations, 
but also nonetary conditions generally. It was maintained that 
carp3tition for short tenn funds by local authorities had pushed up 
temporary borrowing interest rates, but rising costs had not held 
demand in check: as the only alternative had been to carmit for longer 
tenns at generally higher interest rates. In essence then, the 
developrent of the local authority borrowing narket had :resulted in the 
growth of a large voluma of short tenn debt which was insensitive to 
interest rate policy . Given the ease with which liquid assets could be 
turned into cash without loss, the greater the stock of liquid assets 
the no:re difficult it was for govemmant to influence spending 
especially on capital account. (168) In 1963, limits ~ placed on 
local authority borrowing for up to three nonths and between three and 
12 rronths. Borrowing for up to three nonths was to constitute no 1lO:re 
than 15% of outstanding loan debt and borrowing between three and 12 
nonths was limited to 20%. (169) 
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In the post war era then, there is evidence suggesting a general 
tightening of central control of local authority expenditure by control 
of borrowing. '!he fmedan of the pre-war :years was undennined by the 
invol valent of the Excha;IUer. Freedan to oor:rcw short tenn has been 
increasingly Iestricted and the quota system introduced for the PWLB 
coupled with the attractiveness of interest rates may be regarded as a 
nove towan:is less autonany for local authorities. 
Not all capital outlay in local goveD1IrEnt, h~, is financed 
fran loans, and a major loop-hole in central goveD1IrEnt control of 
local authority capital expenditure is apparent in the charging of 
capital expenditure to revenue thus circumventing control. (170) 
'!here are several ways in which a local authority can fund capital 
costs fran revenue. For local authority trading undertakings, profits 
may be allocated to a Reserve Fund and invested, such. sums may then be 
used at a later date to fund capital expenditure. (171) Renewals am 
capital costs and noney spent on the renewal of assets of a long tenn 
life and transfers to renewals funds repIeSent contributions f:ran 
current ineate to future Ieplacem:m.t. ( 172) 
As a greater awareness of the ability of local authorities to 
circumvent central control has developed, so the ability to supplE!lB1t 
capital allocations through the profits of trading services has also 
been curtailed by the rEKlefinition of surpluses accruing f:ran such 
undertakings in local authority accounts. 
Traditionally, as suggested in Chapter Two, local authority accmmts 
have not specifically provided for the depreciation of assets or their 
valuation. Although provision has been made for the repayrtEIlt of loan 
charges this has not equated to the trading profit of a CClIm3rcial 
lllldertaking. ( 173 ) The applicability of Current Cost Accounting to 
local authority accollllts has been the subject of a paper by CIPFA's 
IDeal Authority Accmmts sub-group, prepared in March. 1979 - SCIIE 
Ielevance was seen for local authority trading services and, theIefoIe, 
experiments in presenting CCA accollllts on live data for 1979/80 ~re 
put into operation. In April 1981, the local authorities assesSIIEflt of 
the validity of CCA for trading services was pre-empted by the issue of 
Department of the Envirorment Circular 14/81 which. introduced the 
calculation of trading profits on a Current Cost ACCOllllting basis. 
( 174) Applying current costs involves the valuation of each asset 
adjusted to take account of the current valuation at the end of each 
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accounting period, creating reserves for depreciation to facilitate the 
purchase of a new asset at the end of its useful life. (175) For local 
authority ai:rports even if the cost of a project can be rret fran 
ai:rport reserves, approval has to be sought fran the Depa.rt:mant of the 
Environmant to items of public expenditure by illustrating that on a 
current cost accounting basis the ai:rport would generate sufficient 
profits for the appropriate financial year in order to rreet the cost of 
capital works undertaken fran its profits. ( 176 ) 
In respect of Manchester Airport, it is clear that given rrrunicip3.1 
ownership, investment decisions nay have been influenced by external 
factors emanating fran the relationship with central government in the 
post war years. In this respect, the direction and arrount of capital 
expenditure of local authorities has been subject to direct control via 
progranmes and loan sanctions, but tighter control has been exercised 
in recent years via the institution of cash limits. Similarly, the 
trend has been towards tighter control via the nature of oorrawing, 
which local authorities have sought to by-p3.ss through the introduction 
of rrore elaborate nethods of capital funding and by the use of surplus 
revenue to support capital investment. Havever, in this direction 
also, local authorities have been constrained by the intrcx:iuction of 
such practices as current cost accounting, equating the process of 
investment decision naking rrore nearly with that of the private 
concern. 
It has been argued that during the period when the Airport was a 
burden on the rate, that is up to the late 1950s, the Finance Ccmnittee 
were probably influenced by such external pressures in the advice put 
foIWaId to the City Council. It is argued that with the incidence of 
surpluses fran 1957-8 such direct pressure acting against airport 
developrvant was eased. H()V,,19V8r, it should be boDle in mind that given 
the nature of IDeal Gove:rnment and the factors highlighted in the 
previous section such as the pursuit of non-carmarcial objectives and 
competition with other services for resources the very incidence of 
surpluses could have curtailed future ai:rport developrent. In other 
words, given political objectives, not least being the desire to ra:rain 
in paver, it is possible that elected :menbers could have sought to 
employ surpluses to reduce local rates in the face of a reduction in 
funds fran central government. In effect, surpluses fran airport 
operation could have been used to subsidise other local authority 
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services. However, it is argued that this generally was not the case, 
as ITEasures YJere introduced providing greater autoncmy distancing the 
financing of the airport from other services. 
The Manchester Corporation (General Powers) Act, 1930 had enpowered 
the Corporation to establish a fund for defraying expenditure on 
naintenance and renewal of v.urks, plant appliances, or i tans the cost 
of which was chargeable to the General Rate Fund. This provision had 
encanpassed the Ringway Airport. Thus the Airport Ccmni ttee began to 
build up sums for the renewal of plant and equipnent at an early stage 
of developTETlt. (177) Up to the early 1960s the Renewals Fund had 
adequately covered. vehicles, etc, but by 1963 the Airport Ccmnittee was 
facing heavy expenditure on the re-surfacing and re-construction of 
aprons, aircraft standings and access roads inter-alia . Given the 
proposed extension of the airport at that tine, and the expected growth 
in traffic, the Renewals Fund cover for the airport was extended to 
embrace works as well as plant and equipnent and an initial 
contribution of £30,000 was rrade in the year ending 31 March 1963. 
( 178 ) The effect of this rrove is highlighted in Table 3. 7, where it 
can be seen that contributions to Renewals Funds as a percentage of 
operating expenditure increased from 2.6% in 1961-2 to 8.0% in 1962-3. 
As Manchester airport expanded, further IIEasures were taken to 
secure funds for its future developnent. Section 30 of the Manchester 
Corporation Act, 1965, extended the definition of trading undertakings 
to include the airport. This rreant that although remaining ostensibly 
part of the General Rate Fund of the City, a revenue surplus in anyone 
year could be applied for the repayment of loans and for renewing, 
extending or improving works and equiprent. A Reserve Fund could also 
be set up which could be used to rrake good to the General Rate Fund any 
deficiency in revenue pertaining to the airport, to meet extraordinary 
claims or demands arising against the Corporation in respect of the 
undertaking, or to renew, extend or improve any v.urks fonning part of 
the airport. In essence, whereas prior to 1965, any revenue surplus or 
deficiency on the airport accounts was autanatically credited to or 
charged against the Rate Fund, in subsequent years surpluses could be 
used for specific purposes related to the airport. In effect the City 
Council retained the right to use the profits of the airport for the 
benefit of the rate, but had no compulsion to do so; it also retained 
the right to set profits aside to establish the airport on a self-
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supporting basis and Table 3. 8, provides an indication of the way in 
which the airport's general reserve was built up frcm this period. 
(179) 
In establishing Manchester Airport as a trading undertaking, the 
City Council also had to prescribe the max:i.nn.mt anount to be accumulated 
in the Airport's Reserve Fund. At 31 March 1965 capital outlay stood 
at £5,761,324 but was expected to increase substantially with the heavy 
programtE of capital expenditure. It was thus agreed that an arbitrary 
10% of capital outlay at anyone time was appropriate to provide for 
the reserve. The sum of £293,264 standing to the credit of the Airport 
Carmi ttee in the General Rate Fund Renewals Fund was, therefore, 
inmediately transferred to the Reserve Fund set up specifically for the 
airport undertaking. ( 180 ) 
Given the constraints imposed upon IDeal Government finance by 
central governmant in the mid 1960s, the specific aim of setting sums 
aside for the future developnent of Manchester Airport and for enabling 
it to becare self-supporting came into conflict with the general 
objectives of the local authority as a whole. To sc:m:= degree the 
reduction in contributions to renewals funds fran 1965/6 to 1967/8 
shown in Table 3. 7, may be seen to reflect this phenc:m:=non. Again, the 
Airport Carmittee and the Finance Ccmnittee of the City Council were at 
variance. Although the Airport Ccmnittee was concerned about the need 
to spend large sums of capital to develop Manchester as an 
international airport, the Finance Ccmnittee requested that a 
contribution of £108,000 equivalent to the prcxiuct of a permy rate be 
made to the General Rate Fund for 1965/6 and 1966/7. Various argunEIlts 
supported the Finance Ccmni ttee position. For example, by virtue of 
being a Corporation department, the airport saved substantial sums 
( about £80,000 per annum) in taxation exemptions eml:xxiied in the 
Finance Act of 1965. (181) 
Even after acceding to this request the arrounts held in reserve 
would renain not far below the 10% of capital outlay prescribed. 
Ul timatel y, the Finance Cc:mni ttee' s request had to be acceded to. 
Prior to suggestions that rate contributions should be naximised in 
order to relieve the financial pressure on the Authority, operating 
surpluses of the airport had been increasingly applied to supplEmaIltary 
debt redemption to reduce the burden of debt charges and IIDre finnly 
cement the airport's future. In this way, the prcxiuct of airport 
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operation had been ploughed-back rather than being dispersed to the 
General Rate Fund which ~uld have represented a subsidy fran the 
airport to other local authority services. HCMeVer, as pressure for 
increased rate contributions intensified, nore fOD'Palised arrangarents 
were introouced with the developnent of a fonnula for ascertaining the 
contribution to be made from the airport's profits in aid of the rate, 
leaving the Airport Ccmnittee free to transfer the balance of profits 
to reserves. (182) With the scale of capital investment needed to 
provide for the new range of aircraft caning into service during the 
perioo, and the impact of inflation the Airport Ccmnittee argued that 
heavier demands were likely to be made on reserves during the 
construction phase so the maximum reserve for the airport was raised to 
20% of capital outlay which at 31 March 1968 represented £7,250,223. 
(183) 
As suggested in Chapter Two, the major construction project which 
was to take the airport into the next decade was the extension of the 
1962 tenninal building which, by its canpletion in 1974, was expected 
to involve a capital cost of £10,588,000. 
( 184 ) Having maintained financial policy in the past to cater for 
future developnent, the proposed re-develOprEIlt of the tenninal 
building represented a viable proposition although a forecast net 
incane of £950,000 was expected to be reduced to £260, 000 under the 
impact of increased debt charges and maintenance costs. In funding 
this capital expenditure substantial reserves, as indicated in Table 
3. 8, could be called upon to supplarent borrowing. However, with the 
intrcxiuction of tighter controls on borrowing, new methods of capital 
funding were intrcxiuced. Warburgs, the Merchant Pankers, supplied 
£800,000 for five years at an interest rate of 8-9% per annmn on 
security of the third pier which was to be constructed as part of the 
extension. In effect, this represented a "lease/lease-back" 
arrangement under which at the end of the loan period, the Corporation 
could "buy-back" the pier. The advantage of such arrangemants was that 
capital expenditure was in effect deferred but in the long run 
ownership of an asset could be retained. (185) 
The tenninal building extension was canpleted in 1974, but 
in the same year, the financial stability of the airport was threatened 
by the decline in air traffic, as highlighted in Chapter Two. In the 
financial year 1974/5, Manchester Airport reported a loss of £459,000 
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after re-p:tynent of debt charges. As previously m:mtioned, with the 
institution of joint Otmership by the City and County the srnn of 
£400,000 had been paid to the City of Manchester for the transfer of 
assets in the same year. (186) 
With the institution of joint Otmership of the Airport, the question 
of the future distribution of profits to the two parent bodies had to 
be considered and under the "Airport .Agrearent" two conditions were 
specified to gove:m this . Firstly, until the end of a "prescribed 
period" all profits - after allocation of contributions to Renewals 
Funds and after paym:mt of debt charges - were to be transferred 
directly to the airport I S General Reserve. '!he "prescribed period" was 
defined as the number of years ra;IUired for the airport to ad just to 
joint ownership arrangements and to consolidate its position as an 
inte:rnational airport. After the end of the "prescribed period" no 
distribution of profits was to be made until such time as the funds 
held in the General Reserve were restored to 10% of the total value of 
fixed assets. (187) 
Although the misfortunes of 1974 and 1975 had reduced the General 
Reserve fran a peak of £1.25 million to about one third of that figure 
and the Renewals Fund ba.lance fran £974,000 on 1 April 1973 to 
£772,000, as suggested in Chapter Two, traffic improved in 1975 
revealing better prospects of substantial surpluses being ea:med prior 
to any major runway developnent. (188) 
As the period of large disposable surpluses opened up, the Airport 
had to counter the impact of the econcmic restraint emanating fram 
central gaverrmEl1.t. A Depa.rt:ment of the EnviroImEIlt Circular 37/77 
had indicated a reduction in capital resources between 1977/8 and 
1978/9 of 4% on key sector services and 12.2% on locally determined 
sector services. '!he Airport Authority had to consider the developrvant 
of a prograrrrre to cater for a nmnber of requirerrents . Firstly, 
renewals fund expenditure had to be analysed to detennine reasonable 
contributions to be made in future years . Secondly, the level of debt 
charges or leasing charges to be incurred subject to estirrates of 
capital expenditure had to be considered . Thirdly, the extent of 
revenue contributions to capital outlay had to be detennined along with 
a guide figure for the profit distribution which the parent authorities 
could expect each year. ( 189 ) As indicated in Tables 3. 7 and 3.8 
greater sums were allocated to Renewals Funds and the General Reserve 
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in the financial years 1956/7 to 1979/80. 
As the airport had continued to consolidate its trading position in 
the second half of the 1970s, increaSingly canpeting with rrajor BAA 
airports for the traffic of the West Midlands and the Northern regions, 
the need to establish a rate of return to align the financial structure 
of Manchester Airport rrore closely with that of the BAA had been 
pressed by airport rranagem:mt. However, the institution of a budgeted 
rate of return was also regarded as offering the facility to budget for 
the creation of Renewals and Reserve Funds "free fran political 
intervention" in the shape of pressures for greater profit 
distributions. ( 190) 
In 1979 it was agreed that the distribution of profits \\Duld be 
based upon the achievE!IEIlt of an average rate of return calculated over 
a number of years as there \\Duld be periods when the airport's 
financial position would allow for distribution above average rate and 
others when the distribution would, of necessity, be lower. The target 
average rate of return agreed was 5% of the value of capital assets for 
the first three years following the end of the "prescribed period" on 
31 March 1980. Estimates for 1980/1 and 1981/2, therefore, provided 
for about £1 ~llion to be paid to each authority in 1980/1 and £1.3 
~llion in 1981/2. Provision was rrade for increasing the revenue 
contribution to capital outlay (funding a large proportion of capital 
spending fram the Airport Authority's own reserves) and debt charges 
were to be reduced by the receipt of aid fram the European Regional 
Developrvant Fund and by supplementary debt redanption. ( 191 ) 
Further pressures had been placed on airport finances under the 
IDeal Goverrnrent Planning and Land Act, 1980, which restricted the 
level of capital expenditure at local authority airports through 
capital allocations for "Projects of National or Regional Importance". 
Under this new allocation, capital expenditure by borrowing was limited 
to £8.1 ~llion in 1981/2. (192) Capital expenditure, therefore, had 
to be nore closely rronitored to ensure that cash limits were not 
breached and as borrowing powers were curtailed, the need to increase 
revenue contributions to capital outlay was reinforced. (193) Thus 
revenue contributions to capital outlay were increased fran £0.5 
~llion in 1979/80 to £3.3 million in 1980/1. Whereas in 1975/6 
capital expenditure of £0.760 million had been funded fram borrowing in 
later years the sources of capital finance were rrore diverse. In 
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1981/2 82.4% of capital expenditure was funded fran oorrowing, 1.7% 
fran leasing, 13.8% fran Revenue Contributions to Capital outlay and. 
2.1 % fran the Renewals Fund.. In the next year, these proportions were 
37.1%, 10.5%, 49.9% and 2.5% respectively. (194) 
Whilst the Manchester International Airport Authority faced tighter 
controls on oorrowing and cash limits the sama applied to the two 
parent authorities. As suggested, it had been hoped that the 
establishment of a rate of return would pre-elll't any pressure fran the 
Authorities for increases in profit distribution. However, in 1980/1 
and 1981/2 the parent authorities, facing cash limits, began to press 
for distribution in excess of the originally agreed 5% of capital 
outlay. As a result, distributions of £3.8 million and. £5.0 million 
were made. The source of the increased distributions was supplementary 
debt :redemption. An estiInated supplementary debt redelll'tion of 
£1,770,000 for 1980/1 was deleted, resulting in additional debt charges 
of £318,610 in 1981/2. Estimated supplementary debt redelll'tion of 
£3,268,808 in the 1981/2 estimates was also reduced to £596, 798 to 
allow for a total distribution of £5 million to the parent authorities 
representing a rate of return of 9.45% on capital assets calculated on 
a historical cost basis. (195) Whilst in the second half of the 1970s 
priority had been given to building up the airport's general reserve in 
1980/1 and 1981/2 no contributions were made to the reserve. 
Although central govermrent policy regarding the financing of local 
authority services created the potential for a conflict of interests 
between the needs of the airport and the wider needs of its rmmicipal 
owners, clearly in the deficit years, airport developIB1t took priority 
in Council and the short tenn view was rejected. As surpluses began to 
accrue, no doubt a la:rger distribution of profits could have been 
achieved by elected nanbers but with profitability carrE greater 
autonat¥ and the designation of the Airport as a trading undertaking. 
During the decades preceding the institution of cash limits, funds for 
the future developrent of the Airport were made available. Surpluses 
tended to be ploughed back whilst relatively small distributions eased 
the overall rate burden when local authority finance was constrained. 
Indeed, in the recession of the 1970s, when the Airport's profitability 
was threatened, priority was given to the recovery of reserves, again 
reflecting a long tenn view and the rejection of short tenn gain in the 
fonn of distributions of profit. In this respect , it is argued that 
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despite the pressures of central gove:rnm::mt control of the distribution 
and level of local authority capital funding, the City Council and 
later the Manchester InteInational Airport Authority, tended to operate 
much like any carmarcial concern. 
3.3 .AIRRRr ~ S'lRl£TlJRES UNDER MUNICIPAL ~ 
As suggested in Chapter One, as the scale of airport operation 
increases so too does its canplexity. Organisational structures will, 
therefore, be evolutionary in nature, depending partly on previously 
existing structures and partly on the pressures for change. Although 
such a trend is generally discernible at Manchester Airport, nrunicipal 
ownership has introduced a number of factors to the equation which 
would have been absent under al ternati ve ownership regines. It is 
argued that such factors as the support of the operation by a large 
1:x:xiy of professional IDeal GovernrrEnt officers proved advantageous 
particularly in the decades of rapid planning and developrEIlt in the 
1950s and 1960s. However, the process of developrEIlt in itself called 
forth the need for greater specialism and auton~ in airport 
operations which was reflected in the extension of the Airport 
Departmant. Whilst under City Council ownership, the transition was 
gradual and organisational structures tended to evolve. However, the 
institution of joint ownership intrcxiuced difficulties in co-ordination 
of functions which accelerated the process towards greater auton~, 
distancing the Airport fran its nrunicipal custodians. 
In the inter-war years, nrunicipal airports could be rranaged in a 
number of different ways. Sane municipalities, like Binningham and 
Liverpool, chose to operate their airports as direct trading services. 
'Ibis approach afforded maxinrum control but also greatest risk and a 
local authority anxious to attract the interests of the airlines had to 
be cautious in the selection of an aerodrc::alE rranager who would have to 
cajole the airlines into establishing routes. An alternative 
arrangemant was to place the responsibility for the day to day 
operations with the local aero club as was the case at Cardiff, Renfrew 
and Newcastle. '!hus local knowledge and enthusiasm could be channelled 
into the scheme, but on the other hand, the amateur approach of such 
voluntary associations could prove to be a disadvantage, as Cardiff 
Corporation felt to be the case, pranpting a later decision to wanage 
their airport directly. A fEM local authorities engaged the services 
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of private finns, specialising in airport m:magarent and essentially 
this was the case at Manchester. (196) Northern Air Lines (Manchester) 
Limita:i ~ given a contract initially to m:mage and operate air 
services fram the tanporary aerodrcma established at Wythenshawe in 
1929. The Corporation allowed the canpany the use of the landing 
ground, hangar and workshops at a naninal rent, no landing charges ~ 
levied for their aircraft, but all other fees were paid to the 
Corporation. (197) Although engaging a private finn to m:mage the 
aerodrome, the fundanental link with the local aero club was 
tentatively maintained in that John Ieeming of the Lancashire Aero Club 
had been responsible for establishing Northern Air Lines. A private 
managalent finn established in this way could effectively build upon 
the financial incentives given by Government to light aeroplane clubs 
which received grants for general expenses and for training pilots. 
(198) 
Subsequent arrangarents at the Barton aercx:lrare ~ m::xiified to the 
extent that the Manager of the aerodrcma had been jointly enployed. 
The Manager's responsibilities covered a wide spectrum including not 
only aerodrcrne managarent but also "proper keeping of books, returns, 
accounts, etc, as may be reasonably required by the Corporation, Air 
Ministry or other approved bcxiy. " The specification of duties included 
dea 1 j ng with "Weather reports, storage , visiting aircraft, petrol, oil, 
signals, etc, and. ensuring that all navigation regulations were 
properly adhered to. Northern Air Lines provided the services of 
office staff and. nechanics, whilst the Corporation contributed the 
posts of two groundsman or labourers ~pped with such itE!IIS as 
spades, roller, tractor, etc. At the t.ine it was felt that this 
arrangem:mt 'iNOuld be mutually advantageous. The managemmt fee would 
assist the canpany in the early and difficult stages of develop1El1t and 
would constitute a fonn of support in fostering ccxrnercial air services 
in Manchester. (199) 
In effect, the arrangemmts proved to be unsatisfacto:r:y with 
Northern Air Lines going into liquidation in 1933, nevertheless, the 
Corporation engaged another private finn, .A.in..urk Limited, to manage 
the Barton aerodrare. .A:i.nurk had been established by Alan Muntz and 
Nigel Nornan, the latter being an aviation consultant who had gained 
his business experience with the Metropolitan Railway. .A:i.nurk's first 
project had in fact involved the design of the Heston Airport which in 
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1929 had been constructed as the nodel airport catering for the amateur 
pilot. However, despite a wider invol VE!IEIlt in aviation Ai1:work prova:i 
to be little nore successful than Northern Air Lines and in 1937, the 
City Treasurer investigated the operations of the canpany. It was 
revealed that the financial results of the canpany's trading at 
Manchester vvere as follows: 
5 nonths to September 1933 
Year to September 1934 
15 nonths to December 1935 





Over the pericxi of operation of the managalent agrearent, the 
Canpany had, on the whole registered a loss of £689. As it was 
anticipated that the bulk of the traffic using the Barton aerocil:are 
would transfer to Ringway once it opened, it was likely that the 
Canpany would sustain a heavy loss during the ranaining ~ years of 
the agreem:mt, and, therefore, the Corporation was asked to concede 
SCll'E relief. HCMeVer, tennination of the agrearent was deared to be 
the nost appropriate course of action. Clearly, given past experience, 
the Corporation favourerl an option offering maxinrum control and it was 
deared appropriate for the Airport Manager to assuma resp:msibili ty for 
both the Barton and Ringway airports allowing then to be administered 
and staffed nore or less in parallel. Although this arrangeuent 
implied the loss to the Corporation of receipts fran Airwork, paynents 
in respect of the managslent fee, housing and landing fees, etc, could 
be saved. Similarly, all rents payable by F Hills and. Sons Limiteri, a 
tenant at Barton would pass to the Corporation rather than a proportion 
being claimed by AiIwork. In total, a saving of £485 per annum was 
anticipated against which had to be set the E!11ploynent of a Deputy 
Manager and clerical staff at Barton to relieve AiIwork of their 
responsibilities. Whilst additional expenditure of £85 per year was 
involved in the Corporation assuming the managarent of the Barton 
.Aerodrcm3 it was decided that this w:::>uld be outweighed by the , 
advantage to be gained fran establishing a staff which could be readily 
interchangeable between the ~ airports. ( 200) 
Fran 31 April 1938, Manchester's airports were directly managej by 
the Corporation and a separate Airport Depart:rrent was establisherl. By 
October 1939, a total of nine Corporation staff were anployed at 
Barton, including a Deputy Manager, General Assistant, Jtmior, 
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groundsman/foreman, three groundsrren and tv.u night watchrmn, one 
pe:rm:ment and the other temporary. The Ringway site consti tuta::i the 
nanagarent and administrative centre of the Depart:Irent and assisting 
the Airport Manager \\1ere a senior administrative assistant, a general 
assistant, a junior, two shorthand typists, a telephone operator, a 
rraintenance engineer, six laOOurers and one night watchnan. (201) 
With the establishrrent of the Airport Depart:mant, it had been agreed 
with the Town Clerk that the Airport Manager would undertake all 
administrative work of the Airport Ccmnittee except carmittee work 
which was carried out by the Town Clerk, one :rranber of staff was thus 
transferred fran the Town Clerk's Depart:Irent to the Airport DepaL brent. 
( 202 ) The transfer of responsibilities fran other functional 
depart:nents tended to be relatively limited throughout the early period 
of growth and developlBlt at Manchester Airport and the Airport 
Depart::rrent received considerable professional support fran other 
depart:nents of the Corporation. For example, the City Treasurer's 
Depart:.nent was responsible for the payrtEllt of accounts and processed 
all concessionary payrtEllts consisting of the quarterly invoicing of any 
flat rate paynents provided for in concession ag:rearents and the 
calculation of any variable charges according to the detail of the 
ag:rearent. The Treasurer's Depa.rt:nent also issued invoices for rental 
charges on property CMIled by the Corporation. Any applications 
received for tenancies, etc, of accarmxiation at the airport, if 
approved by the carmittee, were passed to the City Estates Officer to 
negotiate terms and conditions. (203) Throughout the period of runway 
and tenninal developrent of the 1950s and 1960s, the City Architect 
discharged the design function in respect of buildings and supervised 
the work of private consultant architects, where necessary. (204) 
Similarly, the City Engineer and Surveyor's DepartIrEnt had been heavily 
involved in the design of five runway extension schares including 
ancillary works and the construction of roads, etc, to the new tenninal 
building, often supervising the work of civil engineering contractors. 
By the early 1970s, a section of the depart::Irent was virtually devoted 
to airport work whilst the professional advice and guidance of the City 
Engineer, his deputy and top echelon officers was provided on a part-
time basis. ( 205 ) When the Town Hall Ccmni ttee proposed the 
appoint:nEnt of an Infonnation and Publicity Officer to develop the 
existing infonnation services and intrcduce a publicity service in 
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1963, it was assurred that this officer would absorb responsibility for 
publicity and infonnation regarding Manchester Airport. (206) 
Whilst by the late 1950s the Airport Depart:mant had grown 
substantially with an Airport Director and Assistant heading relatively 
large sections discharging administrative, accounting, rraintenance, 
fire and police functions, generally speaking the activities of airport 
based personnel were satisfactorily co-ordinated with the support 
services provided by the other functional depart:nents of the 
Corporation. However, there was an early trend towards greater 
auton~ within the Airport Depart:rrent in certain areas of activity. 
As early as 1964, the Depart:rrent pressed for a dedicated Press and 
Public Relations Officer to answer queries fran the Press regarding day 
to day matters; to dissaninate infonnation to local and national press 
agencies; to deal with enquiries regarding the airport and its 
facilities; to arrange press conferences and interviews and prepare 
prarotional publications and brochures; to arrange VIP receptions; to 
co-o.rdinate the activities of public relations officers of the airlines 
reganling publicity; to prarote freight and passenger traffic by 
supplying information to industrial organisations; to publicise 
arrangenents for organised visits; to give lectures on the airport's 
history and developrent; to negotiate the sale of advertising 
facilities at the airport and finally, to control the activities of 
press agencies on the airport. 'Ibis post was finally established in 
1970. (207) 
Whilst up to the late 1960s the implementation of capital schares 
remained largely a responsibility of the technical depart:nEnts of the 
Corporation, with the need to implement rna jor passenger tenninal 
extension schares over a five to six year pericxi, the need for 
establishment of a separate developrent section based pennanentl y at 
the airport was stressed. The passenger tenninal extensions proposed 
were unlike any past developrent of tenninal facilities, that is, the 
existing tenninal building had been built on a separate site sene 
distance away fran the passenger tenninal which had been in use at the 
time of construction. The extension of facilities proposed in the late 
1960s, however, was to involve much critical planning to maintain the 
building progranrre and at the SanE t.ine, ensure that the operation of 
the airport was maintained with the minimum of disturbance. Also, the 
urgency of carrying out the passenger tenninal project dictated an 
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ext.:r'aIEI Y tight phasing progranma necessitating carplicate1 functional 
plarming work. As a result of these requirEm:mts it was resol VEri that 
a developIEIlt section be establishe1 responsible for the planning and 
implaren.tation of all capital building developrvant fran 1969. (208) 
In addition to establishing new specialisms by the 1970s the Airport 
Depart:rrent had expande1 its senior management structure to include an 
Airport Director, a Deputy Airport Director and five Assistant Airport 
Directors responsible for Personnel and General Administration, 
Developrent (Buildings and limdside) , Operations, Engineering and 
Finance (the organisational structure applying at this tine is 
illustraterl in Appendix 3.1), nevertheless, the fun.danental link with 
support services fran the City Council was maintaine1. (209) 
With the institution of joint ownership of the Airport by the City 
and the County, the question arose as to how the p:rovision of such 
support services should be divided between the two authorities. In 
principle, it was agreed that the Manchester Airport Joint Ccmnittee 
should be serviced by a joint secretariat with the Chief Officers of 
roth City and County being able to subnit reports either joint! y or 
separately on matters affecting the airport. Thus, in tenns of the 
adviso:ry role reganling the Ccmnittee' s future policy, this was seen as 
fundanEntall y a joint responsibility. Support services were generally 
divide1 on the basis of each authority being responsible for the 
p:rovision of particular services. The County was to caDY the 
responsibility for routine financial services including insurance of 
airport assets, payment of staff and the raising of capital. The 
County also discharge1 the personnel function. Although staff of the 
airport were ostensibly under the direct control of the Manchester 
Airport Joint Ccmni ttee (MAJC) , for payroll purposes they were 
naninally on the establishment of the County Council. The City Council 
administration provided support in the secretarial, legal, 
architectural design, building maintenance and construction, and 
valuation spheres of activity. (210) 
The single support service which was maintained by the two 
authorities concurrently was the pIOVision of engineering services. 
The County and City Engineers discussed the pIOVision of civil 
engineering services for the MATC and conclude1 that it would be 
appropriate to split the function with the County Engineer controlling 
activities, assuming responsibility for major projects allocated by the 
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MATC like, for example, the possible provision of a second runway. In 
discharging this function, the County Engineer was to organise the 
service on the basis of a joint design unit with specialist staff being 
seconded fran both the City and County Engineers' offices. '!he City 
Engineer was to carry the responsibility for all raraining minor civil 
engineering functions. (211) Whilst it would appear that sufficient 
care was taken to dem:rrcate the bounds of activity between the two 
officers, within two years of the operation of the airport agreerrent, 
such lines of demarcation became a source of conflict. '!he Senior 
Assistant Airport Director noted that before re-organisation when all 
of the civil engineering works had been carried out by the City 
Engineer the system had worked "very satisfactorily", work had been 
canpleted on tine, specifications had been correct and the whole 
operation had "run very srroothly". It was claimed that since re-
organisation and the institution of split responsibilities and 
workloads difficulties had aoorged fran a lack of continuity and 
differences of professional opinion which had led to unnecessary 
IIEetings and added expense. ( 212 ) 
At the t.ima the views of the Chief Officers regarding their 
respective roles \\Jere at variance. Having decided that the allocation 
of responsibilities for civil engineering services at the airport under 
the Heads of Agremant had not operated satisfactorily, the County 
Engineer proposed a radical re-arrangemant of functions which would 
have the effect of making one engineer responsible for civil 
engineering including maintenance, on "airside" (that is, the airfield 
proper, including runways, taxiways, aprons and all other aircraft 
bearing surfaces). If these duties \\1ere made the responsibility of the 
County Engineer, then the City Engineer would be resp::>nsible for 
"landside" including access roads, car parks and all other areas 
outside the airfield proper where aircraft would not penetrate the 
ground. This division of resp::>nsibilities was fairly camonly applied 
in the US and was also in operation at BAA airports. ( 213 ) 
Technical considerations supported the County Engineer's proposals. 
It was argued that there was a need to associate the design of all 
aircraft- bearing pavements with maintenance as the design of such 
surfaces was not well founded in theory and in contrast to highway 
design there was little statistical data available to support design 
considerations. '!hus the design of aircraft-bearing surfaces was 
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regarded as essentially a tentative and developing process not 
susceptible to precise analysis and, therefore, heavily dependent upon 
the detailed Jmowledge of the way in which aircraft pavaIEIlts perforned 
in practice which could only be provided by the feedback of infonnation 
obtained fran the lind ted maintenance experience available. It was 
also held that dangers arose fram the division of responsibilities, as 
m:mifested by a particular problem regarding airport pavaIEIlt work at 
Manchester where reflective cracking of relatively thin layers of 
asphalt laid over joints in concrete paving had occurred . Five years 
earlier, it had seem:rl that the problem regarding the \'v"estern taxiway 
had been sol veri, however, in the interim, this had proven not to be the 
case. '!he proposed arrangement of responsibilities was seen to offer 
practical advantages in that it would concentrate specialist airport 
engineering under one engineer providing a greater continuity of work 
by reason of a larger and nore diversified workload; design staff 
involveri in the design of a second runway could gain experience of 
other schemes at the airport; there would be one strong airfield 
organisation instead of attempting to maintain two airport groups, 
either of which could became weak through a lack of experience and the 
City and County could organise staffing with nore certainty of the 
workload for which it was being provided. (214) 
'!he City Engineer held a professional opinion which was canpletely 
opposed to that of the County Engineer being unable to agree that the 
concept of an "airside/landside" breakdown of civil engineering and 
maintenance works was either logical or justifiable. If, as claimad, 
the existence of a separate unit for maintenance was inevitably 
problemcttical, then logically there would be no place in the industry 
for the consultant in airport construction. It was argued that when 
the new Authority had been set up, the City had employed an adequately 
~ll experienced airport section in the Engineer's depa.rt:nent and had 
the City continued to be the sole ow.ner of the airport, then an ad-hoc 
second nmway team would have been organised within the section to deal 
with this concentrated workload. (215) The alleged benefits of the 
proposed re-arrangement of functions were hotly contested because, for 
example, the County Authority had no :main drainage responsibilities, 
whereas the airport group within the City fell within the orbit of the 
Main Drainage Section, hence having irrmadiately available the necessary 
specialist staff to deal with this aspect of the airport's developIEIlt. 
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( 216 ) Whilst the Chief Officers rrade their professional opllllOns 
freely available to the nanbers of the Manchester International Airport 
Authority, the status quo prevailed not for any particular reasons of 
operational efficiency but rather because there was a general concern 
regarding any consideration being given to any changes in the draft 
agreem:mt at such an early stage. (217) 
By the late 1970s, the problem regarding the respective roles of the 
Joint Engineers had still not been resolved and difficulties of co-
ordination had e.marged in other areas of activity. In addition, 
another problem area had arisen; that of demarcating between the roles 
of senior airport managem:mt and the authorities' Chief Officers 
providing support services. As early as 1974, the responsibility for 
the processing of concessionary paymants had passed fran the City 
Treasurer to the Ineans sub-section of the airport and in the late 
1970s, the issuing of invoices regarding rental charges on property 
awned by the Airport Authority had also been transferred. However, 
senior managem:mt at the airport registered dissatisfaction with the 
arrangem:mt whereby the County Treasurer ranained primarily responsible 
for the collection of ineans through invoices raised by the airport's 
Finance Division. In principle, the need for involvement of u..o Joint 
Treasurers in the provision of financial services was questioned, 
claiming that all routine accountancy should be carried out at the 
airport to facilitate the recovery of incame. (218) Similarly, the 
distinction between the roles of the Assistant Airport Director 
(Personnel) and the County Personnel Officer had became blurred because 
although a post had been newly created ostensibly responsible for all 
personnel and industrial relations rratters affecting Manchester 
International Airport Authority employees, discharging a full range of 
personnel duties with special emphasis on negotiation with Trade 
Unions, the County Personnel Officer could also claim responsibility 
for all industrial relations ma.tters at Manchester Airport. In 
essence, the County Personnel Officer also consulted and negotiated. 
with shop stewan:is and full-tiIrE Trade Union officials on all aspects 
of pay and conditions, conciliated. and arbitrated. on a wide range of 
disputes between. employers and managem:mt, negotiated. at national level 
on national pay settlem:mts and assisted. airport ma.nagerrent in the 
fonnulation of efficient staffing structures and working arranga:nents. 
(219) In general, it was argued. that same departments did not always 
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maet the airport's priorities creating delays and that the County and 
City professionals ~ taking res{X>nsibility for project nanagerrEl1t 
without consulting airport nanagerrEl1t, the reason given being that they 
had to intervene where airport nanagem:mt did not provide an efficient 
service. (220) 
In the light of these difficulties a funciarrEntal restructuring of 
arrangarents was recamended and, as a result, greater res{X>nsibili ty 
was placed. with airport senior nanagerent and a new organisational 
structure, as depicted in Appendix 3.2, was recamended. Whilst the 
City Engineer continued to provide a civil engineering maintenance 
service, both the City and County Engineers ~ to discharge their 
functions as contractors and, where necessary , consultants on rna jor 
civil engineering works operating under a strengthened airport based 
canbined operations and engineering function. Similarly, the City 
Architect and the City Estates and Valuation Officer had their lines of 
responsibility clearly demarcated, being res{X>nsible to the Airport 
Director via the Director of Planning and DeveloprEIlt. The County 
Treasurer continued to act as Treasurer to the Airport Authority 
responsible for budgetary and strategic financial {X>licies, for 
borrowing and for audit purposes, consulting with the City Treasurer on 
policy matters. Whilst the County Treasurer, therefore, continued to 
be an independent financial adviser to the Airport Authority, neither 
the County nor City Chief Officer was to be involved in the detailed 
financial issues relating to the airport. As far as the personnel 
function is concern.ed, it was reccmnended that the senior personnel 
officer at the airport should advise the Airport Director on personnel 
issues with back-up fran the County Personnel Officer. Hc::w3ver, 
emphasis was placed. on the contention that the County Personnel Officer 
should advise and support the Airport Director and his staff and not 
provide independent advice to carmittee or operate separately fran 
airport managem:mt. In essence, such pro{X>sals involved a {X>int of 
principle that airport managerrEl1t and not the Airport Authority should 
be allCJl.oBi to manage all aspects of the operation of Manchester 
Airport. ( 221 ) 
Fran the establishment of a separate Airport Department in the 
1930s, the res{X>nsibilities of airport based personnel had been 
adequately co-ordinated with sup{X>rt services provided by the City 
Council's functional departments and despite the devolution of greater 
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responsibility to the Airport DepartnEnt to cope with the requirarents 
of the process of growth and developnent, continuity had been generally 
maintained. Havever, the institution of joint ownership threatened to 
upset established patterns of administration. Ini tiall y, the status 
quo was undennined by the invol verrent of tcx) rrany professionals 
operating fran the centre and later by conflict between the central 
administration and airport m:magerrent. However, ultimately the 
solution was provided by the strengthening of the specialist airport 
managerrent function which, similar to the effect which the fornation of 
a semi-autonomous airport authority had on nanber involverrent, 
distanced airport administration fran the Chief Officers of the u..u 
parent authorities. 
3.4 CIHllEICHi 
I.ocal Goverrmen.t control of Manchester Airport has had ilnplications 
for its developnent and operation which bear little relation to the 
econcmic needs of airports in general. However, whilst invest:n'Ent in 
airport facilities has involved a high level of risk, the Manchester 
City Council has consistently adopted "positive" policies towards 
airport developnent which have tended to be nore reflective of 
cc:mrErCial objectives and the primary pursuit of profit, rather than 
any broader based purely political ends. The adoption of progressive 
policies tcMards the provision of airport facilities ensuring that 
rapidly changing technological requirements were accamOOated and that 
at the early stages of developnent the largest aircraft of the day 
could operate through the airport ilnplied a policy of revenue 
naximisation by capturing the nore lucrative rrarkets. 
Throughout the periods of developnent an awareness of the need to 
canpete with other airports has been rranifested by the pricing policies 
adopted. As the scale of activity increased and financial security was 
established, a policy of price differentiation further consolidatErl an 
increasingly dominant market position. 
Despite the constraining influence of central gaverrment control of 
the direction and level of local authority spending and the misgivings 
expressed by the custodians of local goverrment finance within the 
Authority, the policies of the "spending carrmi ttee" have always taken 
precedence over the priorities of other bodies and representatives 
concerned with wider issues. With financial independence positive 
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steps were taken to ensure that profits accruing fran airport operation 
were "plougherl back" rather than being disperserl to the General Rate 
Fund to subsidise other local authority services. 
Greater financial autonomy has been accanpanierl by greater 
managerial autonomy and a tendency towards "arms length" 
administration. Local Government re-organisation had direct 
consequences for airport administration, however the tendency towards 
greater autonany had enErgerl prior to 1974 as a result of the need to 
foster specialist nanagerial skills to cope with the neerls of airport 
developrent. Whereas this early trend towards greater autonany had 
been gradual and evolutionary, the inp:ict of IDeal GoverrmEnt re-
organisation threatenerl to undennine past continuity and thus served to 
accelerate the process towards "anns length" administration. 
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Table 3.1 
DIIJm E1UI REN.rS AND ClH:ESSIOOS AS A % OF '!UrAL nnJm 
MAlD'JESI"ER AIRRRl' 
(1) (2) (3) 
YEAR Y FRCM RENl'S AND 'lOI'AL Y (£ ) (2) AS % OF (3) --
CONCESSIONS ( £) 
1946/7 10,502 16,236 65 
1947/8 10,454 31,616 33 
1948/9 15,730 38,560 41 
1949/50 15,385 49,338 31 
1950/1 16,482 54,394 30 
1951/2 18,177 62,584 29 
1952/3 26,599 92,065 29 
1953/4 32,105 112,381 29 
1954/5 16,317 140,261 12 
1955/6 23,836 172,974 14 
1956/7 36,945 216,982 17 
1957/8 50,000 312,702 16 
1958/9 38,789 378,332 10 
1959/60 35,714 472,188 8 
1960/1 36,660 551,999 7 
1961/2 69,726 841,457 8 
1962/3 152,579 1,030,616 15 
1963/4 229,152 1,194,664 19 
1964/5 251,283 1,294,165 19 
1965/6 266,972 1,506,177 18 
1966/7 308,535 1,773,641 17 
1967/8 385,286 1,950,914 20 
1968/9 493,650 2,196,013 24 
1969/70 596,880 2,501,286 26 
1970/1 800,481 3,110,973 25 
1971/2 956,920 3,869,582 25 
1972/3 1,162,092 4,380,687 27 
1973/4 1,353,179 5,113,513 26 
1974/5 1,612,605 5,677,009 28 
1975/6 2,098,461 7,878,775 27 
1976/7 2,786,902 9,913,315 28 
1977/8 3,169,105 14,471,823 22 
1978/9 4,306,000 18,434,000 23 
1979/80 5,041,000 21,944,000 23 
1980/1 6,444,000 29,105,000 22 
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Table 3.1 C!nt:i.nuOO 
IKIJm :mcB RENrS AND CXH:ESSI(H) AS A % OF 'lDrAL nnJm -
lWDIESTER AIRRRr C!nt:i.nuOO 
Notes: In calculating total inccma for this purpose, the following 
items have been excluded as distortions to the analysis of 
inccma fran rents and concessions as a proportion of 
operational inccma:-
( 1 ) Miscellaneous inccma and interest 
( 2) Revenue grant/Government grant 
( 3 ) Fees for navigation service charge collection 





City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts 1946/7 - 1973/4 
and Estimates 1965/6 - 1973/4 
CIPFA Financial Costs and Statistics of IDeal Authority 
Airports 1977/78; Accounts and Statistics of IDeal 
Authority Airports 1978/9 - 1981/2 
GMC Abstract of Accounts year ended 31.3. 75, 76, 77 and 
78; Armual Report and Accounts 1979/80 












































AERONAUI'ICAL '!OrAL(1) AS % OF (2) 
REVENUE (£) REVENUE (£) 
4,605 16,236 28 
18,209 31,616 58 
21,055 38,560 55 
32,394 49,338 66 
35,949 54,394 66 
41,401 62,584 66 
62,696 92,065 68 
78,834 112,381 70 
98,649 140,261 70 
117,542 172,974 68 
148,937 216,982 69 
230,851 312,702 74 
313,364 378,332 83 
412,708 472,188 87 
476,624 551,999 86 
720,027 841,457 86 
789,506 1,030,616 77 
855,518 1,194,664 72 
922,554 1,294,165 71 
1,060,035 1,506,177 70 
1,235,350 1,773,641 70 
1,295,090 1,950,914 66 
1,395,507 2,196,013 64 
1,540,593 2,501,286 62 
1,882,293 3,110,973 61 
2,428,792 3,869,582 63 
2,651,584 4,380,687 61 
3,028,604 5,113,513 59 
2,942,095 5,677,008 52 
4,507,992 7,878,775 57 
5,725,983 9,913,315 58 
9,216,626 14,471,823 64 
11,846,000 18,434,000 64 
13,211,000 21,944,000 60 
19,739,000 29,105,000 68 
25,017,000 33,252,000 75 
Compiled from statistics available in: 
City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts 1946/7 - 1973/4 
and Estimates 1965/6 - 1973/4 
CIPFA Financial Costs and Statistics of IDeal Authority 
Airports 1977/78; Accounts and Statistics of IDeal 
Authority Airports 1978/9 - 1981/2 
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Table 3.2 Coo:t.i.nued 
(3) 
(4) 
GMC Abstract of Accounts year ended 31.3. 75, 76, 77 and 
78; Annual Report and Accounts 1979/80 
Annual Reports of MIM. 
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Table 3.3 












"W H Smith Limited" 
TERMS 
'lliree year period, ending 
30.4.78. 75% of gross 
annual tumover. 
29 .4. 70 for one year then 
tenninable by 3 nonths 
notice either side, rental 
£150 pa for two sites. 
35 years ending 14.1.2004 
2~% of gross annual 
turnover, first £200,000 
exempt. 
1.6.71 indefinite, 
tenninable by 6 IIDnths 
notice either side; 2~% 
gross annual turnover. 
Guaranteed minimum: 
£2,390 pia. 
Three years ending 30.11. 78 
23% of gross takings on 
newspapers, periodicals, 
etc; 7% on cigarettes, 
toba.cco and srrokers' 
requisites; 18% on 
confectionery; 27% on toys 
and souvenirs; 20.75% on 
sale of transistor radios, 
record players, records, 
cassettes, etc; 5% on 




















Table 3.3 Ccntinued 
CDD!SSIOO' TERMS AND IKDm 1973-1975 Ccntinued 
CONCESSION 
Car H.il::e: 
"Avis Rent a Car 
Limited" 
"Godfrey Davis Limited" 
"Hertz Limited" 





Seven years ending 30.11.80 
10% of gross annual tUIllover 
Guaranteed minimum: 
£13,652 pia. 
Seven years ending 30.11.80 
15% of first £50,000 gross 
annual tUIllover, 17~% up to 
£75,000, 20% over £75,000 
Guaranteed minimum: 
£10,000 pia. 
Seven years ending 30.11.80 
8~% gross annual tUIllover. 
Guaranteed: £16,000 
1st year; £17,500 2nd; 
£19,000 3rd, £20,500 4th 
and 5th - 7th inc 22,000 
pia. 
Three years ending 30.11. 78 
60% gross takings on 
liquor and cigarettes; 
45% on gifts 
Guaranteed minimum: 
£1.4M 1st year; £1.6M 
2nd and £1.8M 3rd 
1.12.74 -
£1,005,728) 
35 years ending 14.1.2004 
8 3/4% of gross takings 























Table 3.3 Ccntinued 
<D£ESSICE TERMS AND IKDm 1973 1975 Qntinued 
CONCESSION 
Fruiteners and Florists: 
"Willerbys Limited" 
FuelFann 
"Shell-Max & BP" 
Joint lease 





Gift Shop and Phannacy: 
"Hills Airport Shops 
Limited" 
TERMS 
Three years ending 30.11. 78 
7 3/4% of all gross takings 
Mi.nirnum: £520 
21 years ending 31.12.91 
£12,000 pia and £1,250 





Seven years ending 30.11. 76 
15% of gross takings on 
rreals and refreshnents; 
18~% alcoholic and non-
alcoholic drinks; 12% ice 
cream and confectionery; 
5% cigarettes and srrokers' 
requisites. 
Mi.nirnum: £50,000 
Three years ending 30.11. 78 
15% gross turnover. 
Minimum: £1,000 
Three years ending 30.11. 78 
17% of all gross takings 
not exceeding £110,000 
18~% over £11,000; 22~% 
over £160,000. Minimum 1st 




















Table 3.3 Ccnt.:i.nuOO. 
ax::ESSICB TmMS AND nnJm 1973 1975 Cattinued 
CONCESSION 
Filling Station: 





"British Automatic Co" 




Contact Limi tErl" 
TERMS 
35 years ending 15.12.2009 
£10,000 rent plus ~ per 
gallon sold. 
1.1.72 and shall remain 
binding subject to 
detennination by either 
party with 6 IIDnths notice. 
15% of all annual takings in 
all public coin boxes, all 
call boxes to exceErl £200 
pia before % is paid. 
29 .1. 70 for three years and 
then tenninable by 3 IIDnths 
notice. Rental: £150 pia 
for all sites. 
Six IIDnths trial fran date 
of installation, when 
contracts exchangErl one 
IIDnths notice by either 
party. 33% gross receipts, 
£12.90 per machine per week. 
50% £13.00 to £17.90 
66 2/3% £18.00 or IIDre. 
Three years ending 31.8.78 
Tenninable by mutual 
agreem:mt after 1st 12 IIDnths. 
10% of turnover up to £40,000; 
15% of turnover £40,000 to 
£50,000; 20% of turnover 











rnmle 3.3 Ccntinued 
cncE5SICE TERMS AND IKDm 1973-1975 Ccntinued 
CONCESSION 
Amusemant Machines: 
"Music Hire Group" 
Bank and Bureau De Change: 
"Midland Bank Limited" 
TERMS 
One year, three rronths 
notice either side, 
"Music Hire Group" take 
first £5 of weekly inCarE 
and balance is split with 
MIM. 
Five year lease ending 
16.6.74. Rental of £5,000 
pia plus a yearly 
concessio~ fee of £7,500. 
INCCME 
1975: £49 





YEAR AIRCRAFr PARKIN; % BAG & FR HANDLIN; % 
1946/7 
1947/8 922 5 
1948/9 1,634 8 
1949/50 3,076 10 2,500 
1950/1 2,527 7 5,000 
1951/2 1,745 4 8,329 20 
1952/3 4,859 8 9,848 16 
1953/4 5,424 7 14,638 19 
1954/5 5,837 6 17,991 18 
1955/6 4,866 4 22,061 19 
1956/7 4,812 3 48,041 32 
1957/8 6,734 3 68,552 30 
1958/9 8,078 3 93,665 30 
1959/60 7,496 2 110,378 27 
1960/1 6,759 1.5 130,478 27 
1961/2 7,243 1 171,843 24 
1962/3 6,972 1 193,174 24 
1963/4 3,423 0.5 218,553 26 
1964/5 3,359 0.4 269,585 29 
1965/6 4,314 0.4 321,526 30 
1966/7 5,650 0.5 391,777 32 
1967/8 5,315 0.4 430,053 33 
1968/9 7,946 0.6 463,469 33 
1969/70 5,545 0.4 500,605 32 
1970/1 22,785 1 642,054 34 
1971/2 26,425 1 784,791 32 
1972/3 31,114 1 925,689 35 
1973/4 42,231 1.4 1,032,363 34 
1974/5 42,965 1.5 1,112,521 38 
1975/6 71,225 1.6 1,057,262 33 
1976/7 93,486 1.6 1,850,005 32 
1977/8 113,642 1.2 2,060,733 22 
1978/9 182,000 1.5 2,040,700 17 
1979/80 241,000 1.8 2,680,000 20 
1980/1 409,000 2.0 3,808,000 19 
1981/2 519,000 2.0 4,505,000 18 
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IANDllG FEES % PSC/PIS % IDrAL 
4,605 100 4,605 
17,287 95 18,209 
19,421 92 21,055 
29,318 90 32,394 
33,422 93 35,949 
31,327 76 41,401 
39,847 63 8,142 13 62,696 
48,049 70 10,723 14 78,834 
63,213 64 11,608 12 98,649 
76,430 65 14,095 12 117,542 
79,930 54 16,154 11 148,937 
134,377 58 21,188 9 230,851 
187,542 59 24,079 8 313,364 
261,710 63 33,124 8 412,708 
295,232 62.5 44,156 9 476,625 
485,903 67 55,038 8 720,027 
521,146 66 68,214 9 789,506 
558,951 64.5 74,591 9 855,518 
567,636 61.6 81.974 9 922,554 
641,862 60.6 92,333 9 1,060,035 
731,145 58.5 106,778 9 1,235,350 
745,128 57.6 114,594 9 1,295,090 
795,173 57.4 128,919 9 1,395,507 
887,023 57.6 147,420 10 1,540,593 
1,020,275 55 197,179 10 1,882,293 
1,289,485 53 328,091 14 2,428,792 
1,323,861 50 370,920 14 2,651,584 
1,515,176 50.6 438,834 14 3,028,604 
1,410,582 47.5 376,027 13 2,942,095 
1,663,775 37.4 1,265,730 28 4,507,992 
2,080,844 36.4 1,701,648 30 5,725,983 
4,749,149 51.8 2,293,102 25 9,216,626 
5,785,000 52.5 3,472,000 29 11,846,000 
6,222,000 41.2 4,068,000 31 13,211,000 
9,153,000 47 6,369,000 32 19,739,000 
11,363,000 45 8,631,000 35 25,017,000 
Compiled from statistics available in: 
(1) City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts 1946/7 - 1973/4 
and Estimates 1965/6 - 1973/4 
( 2) CIPFA Financial Costs and Statistics of IDeal Authority 
Airports 1977/78; AcCOilllts and Statistics of IDeal 
Authority Airports 1978/9 - 1981/2 
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Table 3.4 ecnt.:i:nue:l 
( 3 ) GMC Abstract of Accounts year ended 31.3. 75, 76, 77 and 
78; Annual Report and AcCOllllts 1979/80 
( 4) Annual Reports of MIM. 
.... 
'l'i1ble 3.5 
JOINI' AJ:RIUn' 0iAR;ES <ll1MTITEE. A HYIUlHETICAL ILIlJSTR1\TIrn OF THE OPERATIrn OF THE SCHF11E R:R THE PIl\NNE[) DEVJlli)fMENl' 
OF AIRRRr ClU\RGF.S 
Total landing ch.aI:ge (Basic landing Fee plus Navigation Services Charge) - 3.50 at 1 April 1977 
Annual rate of increase (excluding inflation) 2 % 
(i) Annual rate of 
increase to 31 July 
in previous year (%) 
(ii) Increase 
recc:mrended (%) 
(iii) New rate to te 
appliErl ( ) to 
nearest 5p 
(iv) The operation 





















Other 191 \ Other 19 
1978 1978 1979 1979 
APRIL OOV APRIL OOV 
16.9 8.5 
19.4 11.0 
4.20 4.20 4.65 4.65 
On wsis No On wsis No 
of traffic Change of buoyant Change 
situation, traffic 
A decides situation 
to increase and adequate 
ch.aI:ges up level of 
to a::mron profit, B 
rate. decides to 
defer 
increase. 
Other 19 Other 19 
All 20 All 20 B B 
1980 1980 1981 1981 
APRIL OOV APRIL OOV 
7.0 5.5 
9.5 8.0 
5.10 5.10 5.50 5.50 
On wsis B C No 
of anticipates anticipates Change 
continuing increase reduction 
favourable in debt in traffic 
situation, charges and returns 
B decides due to to cxmron 
no change. rrajor rate. 
Also capital 
contero- sche:re and 
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KRlH OF EX;IAN[) IANDIH.; CHARGES IN 1981/2 Fm A OOEIH.; 737 FUlLY 
LADm 
AIRPORT LANDThG FEE (£) INDEX 
Manchester 1,083 100 (P) 
I.eErls/Bradfom 1,092 101 
Binningham 1,173 108 (P) 
Blackpool 1,201 111 
Liverpool 1,226 113 
Fast Midlands 1,260 116 (P) 
(P) = Profitable in 1981/2 
Source: Canparison of North of England Landing Charges for Boeing 737 
Fully Laden, set of transparencies prcx:lucerl by Manchester 
International Airport Authority. 
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Figure 3.1 
THE GREATER MANCHESTER COUNTY, 1974 
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YEAR RUNWAY TRANSPORT & OPERATJN3 RENEWAIS 
HEAVY PIAN!' EXPENDITURE % OF OP EXP 
1939/40 265 16,151 1.6 
1940/1 410 31,931 1.3 
1941/2 389 33,785 1.2 
1942/3 879 34,640 2.5 
1943/4 584 34,999 1.7 
1944/5 677 33,575 2.0 
1945/6 511 34,473 1.5 
1946/7 504 45,493 1.1 
1947/8 525 40,142 1.3 
1948/9 515 71,601 0.7 
1949/50 522 76,167 0.7 
1950/1 398 71,715 0.6 
1951/2 435 93,100 0.5 
1952/3 1,000 130,624 0.8 
1953/4 1,000 163,005 0.6 
1954/5 1,600 182,221 0.9 
1955/6 2,500 199,421 1.3 
1956/7 2,700 228,352 1.2 
1957/8 5,000 275,078 1.8 
1958/9 4,175 319,630 1.3 
1959/60 7,710 337,795 2.3 
1960/1 9,260 387,252 2.4 
1961/2 15,390 600,987 2.6 
1962/3 30,000 27,710 721,981 8.0 
1963/4 80,000 22,000 899,606 11.3 
1964/5 80,000 30,000 901,329 12.2 
1965/6 20,000 12,000 934,761 3.4 
1966/7 20,000 12,000 1,019,433 3.1 
1967/8 24,700 17,560 1,170,281 3.6 
1968/9 148,000 39,500 1,446,556 13.0 
1969/70 123,000 80,000 1,602,910 13.0 
1970/1 350,000 82,000 2,159,565 20.0 
1971/2 300,000 86,000 2,462,527 15.7 
1972/3 250,000 92,000 2,855,336 12.0 
1973/4 150,000 27,000 2,279,535 5.2 
1974/5 50,000 4,519,567 1.1 
1975/6 495,000 90,000 6,307,224 9.3 
1976/7 900,000 200,000 8,080,069 13.6 
1977/8 2,300,000 250,000 13,240,327 19.3 
1978/9 5,300,000 250,000 17,773,200 31.2 
1979/80 4,300,000 19,630,408 22.0 
1980/1 1,000,000 500,000 22,560,155 6.6 
1981/2 2,194,400 500,000 26,598,000 10.0 
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Table 3. 7 Cont.i:nued 
cnmmur:r(H; '10 ~ FUNOO AS A PERCF.NrN;E OF 0PEm\TIl(; 
EXPEmITURE Ontinued 
Notes: 1 Figures for 1939/40 to 1959/60 are presented in sources 
as one overall figure, h~, it is likely that such 
contributions were towards equiprent replacaren.t. 
2 £80,000 for runway renewals in 1964/5 were not an 
expenditure iten, but deducted fran the appropriation 
account. 





City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts 1946/7 - 1973/4 and 
Estimates 1965/6 - 1973/4 
CIPFA Financial Costs and Statistics of IDeal Authority Airports 
1977/78; Accounts and Statistics of IDeal Authority Airports 
1978/9 - 1981/2 
GMC Abstract of Accounts year ended 31.3. 75, 76, 77 and 78; Annual 
Report and Accounts 1979/80 
Annual Reports of MIAA. 
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'!able 3.8 
.AI.UD\TICE OF NEr SORPIIE ID AIRRRl' GEmRAL RESERVE/DIVIDmD (CR 
<IN.lRIBUI'ICE IN AID OF WE RATE) 
YEAR AIRPORT GENERAL RESERVE (£) DIVIDEND ( £ ) 
1964/5 30,154 
1965/6 176,875 46,000 
1966/7 219,904 108,000 
1967/8 253,060 120,000 
1968/9 200,000 172,721 
1969/70 209,955 209,995 
1970/71 249,788 249,787 
1971/2 540,714 440,713 
1972/3 479,414 379,414 
1973/4 452,368 352,367 




1978/9 Data Not Available 
1979/80 1,751,303 
1980/1 3,795,000 
1981/2 15,000 5,000,000 





City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts 1946/7 - 1973/4 and 
Estimates 1965/6 - 1973/4 
CIPFA Financial Costs and Statistics of IDeal Authority Airports 
1977/78; Accounts and Statistics of IDeal Authority Airports 
1978/9 - 1981/2 
GMC Abstract of Accounts year ended 31.3. 75, 76, 77 and 78; Annual 
Report and Accounts 1979/80 
Annual Reports of MIAA. 
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'Ihis Chapter examines the extent to which the local carmuni ty and 
i ts representative agencies have influenced the growth and developrEllt 
of Manchester Airport. Fran the preceding Chapter it is clear that 
particular goals and objectives are detennined by the party in which 
ownership is vested. However, the achieverrent of these goals may be 
affected by the perception of institutions within an airport's 
iIrrrEdiate vicinity. In tUD'l, the way in which an airport is viewed 
depends upon the relative position of various groups in respect of the 
externalities created by airport operation. 
The objectives set by the airport owner can directly conflict with 
those set by the institutions responsible for planning in the local 
area, especially if such goals include, for example, to slow down the 
expansion of a highly urbanised region or to preserve an area as a 
valuable agricultural open space or recreational resource. In the 
local arena amenity groups often support planning authorities in 
opposing airport developnent, acting as a counterweight to airport 
"b::x>ster groups" such as local Chambers of Carmerce. 
At the outset it is ilnportant to note that with particular reference 
to aircraft noise statutory provision is generally weighted in favour 
of the airport owner. The protection of aircraft in flight dates fran 
teh. Air Navigation Act, 1920, and was extended to cover aircraft on the 
ground by the Air Navigation Act, 1947. Sections 40 and 41 of the 
Civil Aviation Act, 1949 reinforced basic principles by prohibiting 
actions for nuisance arising fran civil aircraft in flight or on 
aercx:iraIes. Section 41 provided that no action could be taken in 
respect of nuisance related. to noise or vibration caused by aircraft on 
an aercx:lrane. Although this provision carrE into force only if applied 
to an aeroclrarE by Order in Council its effectiveness was confirned by 
the Air Navigation Order, 1960 which placed in the Minister's hands the 
powers to protect any aercx:iraIe owner against an action for nuisance 
due to noise or vibration. Whilst earlier legislative protection had 
been provided because it was feared that unless individual's rights to 
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take action were restricted the civil aviation industry might not 
develop, by the 1960s Parlianent had recognised that it nay be 
inp:>ssible to avoid a noise nuisance but it was not in the national 
interest that aerodrcmas might be put out of action by proceerlings in 
court. As public awareness of the general problan of industrial noise 
heightened the Noise Abaterent Act was passed in 1960. However, 
Section 1 ( 7 ) again exempted aircraft noise. As recourse to litigation 
has been constrainOO in this way, representations at public inquiries 
has been the only means by which the views of the local carmunity have 
been pressed. 
For the airport owner the incidence of externalities suggests a need 
to strike a balance between the interests of the airlines and their 
custcm3rs and the interests of those living in the iImediate vicinity 
of an airport. However, in respect of Manchester's airport at Ringway, 
the local authority ownership of an airport si too outside the City 
boundaries has itself had implications for developnent. In effect, the 
question of airport developnent has ernneshOO with the municipal 
rivalries which exist between the local representatives of rural areas 
and those of large Iretropoli tan areas. 
This Chapter is dividOO into three main sections addressing firstly 
the implications of the ownership of an airport si too outside the local 
authority boundary and then examining the influence of airport 
"booster" groups and opposition groups in setting the local agenda for 
developrent. 
It is arguOO that although the Manchester Corporation carre into 
conflict with other local authorities in which the control of land was 
vested the needs of the ratepayers of Manchester took precOOence over 
the interests of the rural carmuni ty in which the airport was si too. 
As aerodrcma owner the Corporation was conscious of the need to 
minilnise the extent of disanen.ity within its own area and thus 
attenpted to shift the opportunity cost of developnent onto other local 
authorities. In essence , opposition to airport developnent fran both 
local authorities and anen.i ty groups was futile. 
Similarly the role of local interest groups in praroting airport 
developrent has been limi too whilst ini tiall y the establishmant of 
airport facilities in Manchester was supportOO, the position of airport 
"booster" groups was often ambivalent particularly when faced with the 
uncertainty regarding developre1t requiranents . Essentially then 
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influence of the local carmunity on airport developrent has been 
limited and the overriding influence on the local agenda has been the 
local authority in which airport ownership is vested. 
4.2 ~ OF AN .AIRRRr SITID CXJrSIDE '!HE AI:MINIS'IRATIVE 
IDlNDARY 
Manchester Corporation's decision in 1934 to establish an aerodrome 
on a 664 acre site of land to the south of Manchester involved 
encroachmant into the neighl::ouring county of Cheshire. As shown in 
Figure 4.1 only 24 acres of the site fell within the boundaries of the 
City of Manchester, whilst the remaining 640 acres fomed part of the 
parishes of Ringway and Styal in the rural district of Bucklow. The 
parish of Ringway was a rural area having only 602 people inhabiting 
it's 2,436 acres and the parish of Styal constituted a "scattered 
hamlet" of fanns with a population of 1,336. (1) It can be argued 
that the Ringway site represented a reasonable choice in enviromrental 
tenns, being situated in an area of limited p::>pulation. HCMeVer, the 
rural carmunity has regarded airport developrent as an intrusion 
addressing the needs of the business and carm:rrcial interests of a 
large city, and not their awn. FollCMing the public notice announcing 
Manchester Corporation's intention to construct an airport, on 4 August 
1934, the Cheshire County Council received camnmications fran local 
authorities expressing their disapproval of the proposals. This action 
had been delayed due to a lack of prior knowledge. Preceding the 
public notice , virtually no publicity had been give to the p::>ssibility 
of Ringway as a site for an aerodrane. As late as May 1934, the Press 
had carried reports of inspections around the areas of Audenshaw and 
Bury and it was suggested that, 
"Extraordinary secrecy has been exercised by the Airport Ccmnittee 
to prevent their plans for Ringway being made public. Even the 
fanners concerned have not been officially infonra:i of the reasons 
for surveys on their land, and the staff undertaking the work have 
been pledged to silence. Airport Ccmnittee nenbers have visited the 
site and walked across the land without infonning the tenants of 
their identity. Officials have stated that the work was being 
undertaken "for a finn in wndon"" (2 ) 
Further references Yfere made to the "cavalier" treat:nEnt of 
landowners and tenants. Geoffrey Raingill whose 200 acre fann fonra:i 
part of the proposed airport site said that, in his absence, rrEn had 
visited the fann and "rreasured up" buildings. He was quoted in the 
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Evening Chronicle of 28 July 1934: 
"I heard about it fran an Employee when I returnoo.. Without asking 
anyone's consent, the surveyors entered my fannyani and proceedoo. to 
take a number of measurements. Then they went round the house 
measuring the walls and so forth. To do this they had to pas~ 
through the garden. It makes one feel that if the door were left 
unfastenoo. they would go inside." ( 3 ) 
Colonel E W Grey who ownoo. land adjoining the Ringway site CClTplainoo. 
that, 
"This plan has been carrioo. through in a disgraceful manner . 
Eve:ryt.hing has been done in secret and Manchester seems to think it 
can force it through like a Hitler without any regard for those who 
will be affectoo. and even without consulting them." (4) 
On 8 August the Parlia:rrentary Ccmnittee of the Cheshire County 
Council decidoo. to lodge fornal notice of objection with the Secretary 
of State for Air and to appoint a joint ccmni ttee CClTprising eight 
members of the County and one mamber each fran the principal district 
authorities opposing the schema. ( 5 ) 
In support of the Council's position the North Cheshire Regional 
Planning Ccmnittee, the Urban District Councils of Alderley Edge, Hale, 
Wilms lew , BaNdon, Sale and Handforth, the Rural District Council of 
Bucklew and the Ringway Parish Council all lodgoo. their own objections. 
(6) 
A fundamental ground for objection was that the land was not 
suitable for the purpose of an aercxirare, being in a part of Cheshire 
which was developing rapid! y as a high class residential district. The 
rural district of Bucklew had specifically zonoo. the area for 
residential developrEl1.t and this had encouragoo. the owners of property 
to erect houses of very high rateable value. It was arguoo. that the 
use of the land as an aercxirare would constitute serious nuisance and 
annoyance to those already residing in the vicinity. In the long tenn, 
districts covering a much wider area would be affectoo., with 
developrEl1.t of the aerodrane sterilising rrore land and further 
depreciating the value of amenities in all districts within close 
proximity to Ringway. (7 ) 
Opponents also questionoo. the validity of proceErling under the 
Public Works Facilities Act of 1930 which had grantoo. ~ to local 
authorities to execute works which would contribute to the relief of 
unEmployment. Circular 1141 of the Ministry of Health issuoo. on 22 
August 1930 was ci too. in suggesting, 
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" That it was not the intention of the GovenmEnt that SchE!IES 
under the Act should be praroted for carrying out \\Qrks of wide 
public controversy for which a Bill would be rrore appropriate" 
The Ringway Schane was regarded as a public controversy but 
opponents ~t further in suggesting that whilst providing tanporary 
employrrBlt, the proposed works - involving the conversion of a large 
area of highly cul ti vated agricultural land - would in the long tenn 
displace a large number of agricultural \\Qrkers. (8 ) 
It was argued that if the camErcial needs of Manchester and South 
Lancashire requira:i an aercx:irane, it should be situated within the 
district it served. The Manchester Corporation had recently acquired 
5,000 acres of Cheshire including the Wythenshawe estate, in close 
proximity to the Ringway site and it was felt that 600 acres of the 
land could easily have been reserved for this purpose. The importance 
of "local" govenJIlEl1t was emphasised and it was argued that the wishes 
of the inhabitants of a district should be carried into effect by their 
duly elected representatives and not through the elected 
representatives of an extemal camrunity. (9 ) 
A public inquiry into the Ringway Schere was held in October 1934 
where 51 objectors were represented. Landowners, famers and local 
councils .iIrmediatel y affected by the proposals were supported by 
influential landowners occupying outlying areas, including wni Egerton 
of Tatton and Sir Humphrey de Traffoni. At the public inquiry the 
Cheshire County Council elaborated upon its contention that property 
values %Quld be depreciated, thereby depriving the County of an area of 
potentially considerable rateable value which under the Town Planning 
Schane had been zoned at eight houses per acre. Extension of the 
Barton aerodrare to encanpass 216 acres of land was put forward as an 
econanic al te:rnati ve as land in the vicinity of this airport would be 
likely to appreciate in value. The report of Messrs Norman, Muntz and 
Dawba.:m which had estimated that a sum of £104,000 \\Quld be involved in 
the extension of the Barton aerodrare to an area of 133 acres was 
questioned. It was suggested that the aerodrare could be nodified to 
!tEet the requirem:mts of the Corporation at a cost not exceeding 
£50,000. ( 10 ) 
Sir Alan Cobham, who had been notable in praroting aviation in 
earlier years, supported the contention that the only real objection 
which could be levelled at the Barton AiI:port was that it was not large 
270 
enough to cater for the aeroplanes of the future: 
"Anybody who has fla.-m round Manchester and got mixed up with the 
chimneys rrust have been a very bad pilot. .. years ago . . . at 
all the ae:r0drc:m3 sites there was a high power cable across them. We 
discussed five or six years ago what we regarded as dangerous was 
passed with impunity. The fact remains you will not be able to 
build an ae:r0drc:m3 near a town without being in close proxiroi ty to 
cables, either near an ae:r0drc:m3 or in the line of flight ... That 
is why Chat Moss, a wonderful open area, should be preserved. as a 
caming down area." ( 11 ) 
The case for the Corporation was largely based upon population size 
and the extent of cc:mrercial acti vi ty in the area which J:aIU.ired that, 
". . . a city in which no less than £21 million was spent on the 
Ship Canal in bringing direct access to the sea rrust have the rrost 
up to date facilities ... " (12) 
Whilst the preceding considerations directly related to the issue as 
to whether or not the Corporation should establish a second airport in 
the environs of the City, underlying objections was the func:iarrEntal 
dissatisfaction with the City's attempt to plant an outpost further 
into the County - a factor which could fund.arrentally affect the future 
control of land. Prior to the public hearing local press reports had 
already suggested the strength of feeling on this issue. Mr A B 
Ireland of the BucklCM Rural District Council had been identified as 
one of the major opponents of the schE!lE who referred to "Manchester's 
efforts to spoil a rich Cheshire district", claiming that ever since 
the acquisition of WythenshaW9 the Manchester Corporation "driven by 
greed" had tried to penetrate farther into the shire. Ireland 
demanded that "Cheshire rrust oppose the invasion of lancashire" (13) 
Reference had also been made to the County ParlianEIltary Carmi ttee' s 
concern about Manchester's attitude towards Cheshire, recalling the 
circumstances of Manchester's "successful fight for Wythenshawe and 
district" ( 14 ) . Mr E C Pearson appearing at the public inquiry for the 
Styal Parish Council suggested that the acquisition of 664 acres of 
land for the ae:r0drc:m3 could be purely a "jumping off ground". The 
Corporation had maintained at the inquiry that in the event of the 
landing area proving to be too large, expenditure incurred in the 
acquisition of land \\1Ould not be wasted as any surplus to airport 
requirements could be used for any purpose not inconsistent with 
airport operation. This was interpreted as a potential threat to the 
future control of land. If the Corporation were allowed to purchase 
the site, they might be tempted, 
271 
"to pluck still further at the forbidden fruit, nanely the 
incorporation of this area into the City of Manchester . . . a 
p:rospect highly resented by the inhabitants of Styal" ( 15 ) 
The Town Clerk, acting for the Manchester Corporation at the tinE, 
maintained that the issue was an irrelevant one. Whilst, 
"questions of incorporation between Counties and big cities do 
create feeling . . . there are people who would place an entirely 
wrong interpretation on the position of the Corporation." 
It was asserted that the question was "not in the mind of the 
Corporation anyway." (16) 
Consideration as to whether or not Manchester should have an aiIp:>rt 
in Cheshire thus becane tied to the wider issue of the impingemant of 
expanding metropolital areas on the surrounding countryside. The 
bounda:r::y of the City of Manchester had been extended progressively 
throughout the early twentieth century. Table 4.2 which details 
extensions between. 1885 and 1931 reveals that in many instances, 
incorporation into the City had been at the request of the particular 
districts concerned or had at least been unopposed. However, the 
extension of the City boundary prc.xroted in 1927 to incorporate the 
parishes of Baguley, Northenden and Northern Etchells for developrent 
as part of the Wythensha~ estate had been seriously opposed and 
defeated by Bucklew ROC in that year. The prarotion of a further bill 
in the 1929 - 1930 Parliamentary session signalled the City's 
detennination to expand it's boundaries and, on this occasion, the 
Corporation was successful despite continued opposition fran the 
Cheshire County Council and Bucklow. ( 17 ) 
Whilst the local public inquiry into the proposal of the Manchester 
Corporation to borrow £179,295 for the canpulsory purchase of 664 acres 
of land lasted only eight days and in his closing ranarks the Inspector 
intimated that he expected to report within two weeks, it was not until 
February 1935 that the Town Clerk received an intimation fran the Air 
Ministry that the Secretary of State had confirIred the City of 
Manchester (Ringway Airport) Canpulsory Purchase Order. The delay in 
confinnation may ~ll have been the result of a disagreemant between 
the Ministry of Aviation and the Ministry of Health, the latter being 
reluctant to upset the developrent of "such an excellent residential 
district as Ringway." (18) H~r, despite parliamentary support fran 
Sir Edward Grigg, MP for Altrincham, the Air Ministry proved unwilling 
to reconsider it's decision and refused to publish the report of the 
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Inquiry. (19) 
Manchester Corporation later cla.i.mad that the Cheshire opposition 
had failed to establish that the Ringway site could not be made into a 
m:xiern airport at the cost estimated by the Corporation; that Barton 
could be extended in the appropriate manner and that the cost involved 
in the extension had been over estimated. ( 20 ) 
Having been defeated at the public inquiry the strength of 
opposition to the City's scherrE may be judged frc:m the fact that in 
March 1935, the Cheshire County Council lcxiged an appeal in the High 
Court against the City of Manchester (Ringway Airport) Ccmpulso:ry 
Purchase Order, 1934. Mr H P Greg, a Cheshire landowner and cotton 
magnate, joined the ranks of the appellants represented by Sir Stafford 
Cripps KC. In general, the case for the appellants had to rest on 
technicalities. The contention was that the canpulso:ry purchase order 
was not within the powers of the Public rk>rks Facilities Act 1930, for 
several reasons. Firstly, it was argued that the Secreta:ry of State 
was biased and had no jurisdiction over the Order or any objection to 
it. the canparati ve IYEri ts of extending Barton and establishing a new 
aerocirarE at Ringway had been the principal issue in dispute and, in 
this context, the Secretary of State had already considered a report of 
an inspection of the sites at Barton and Ringway on 25 June 1934, a 
fact which had not been brought in evidence to the public inquiry . 
Objection was raised to the fact that the inspection had been carried 
out without the invol vernent of the opponents of the Ringway site and 
that the Secretary of State had not kept opponents infonrai regarding 
his carrmunications with the Corporation in respect of both the 
carpllsory purchase order and the local inquiry. The Inspector, G 
Ewart Rhcxies Esq, M Inst CE, was silnilarly criticised for a lack of 
carrmunication when, as a result of the raising of the question of 
safety on approach, he had visited the rival sites and had been piloted 
on flights by the chief air witness representing the Corporation. (21) 
Whilst the actions of individuals were criticised, the whole 
procedure was also brought into question. It was argued that the 
inquiry which had been held was not "public" in the spirit of the 
Public WOrks Facilities Act, 1930 because it had been held before the 
appointed Inspector with Wing Carm:mder Allen AFC assisting on the 
technical questions relating to aviation. By reporting to the Air 
Council, in favour of the land proposed for purchase prior to his being 
273 
appointed adviser, Wing Camander Allen had denonstrated a bias and had 
effectively pre-judged the issue to which the public inquiry related. 
In essence then it was argued that the inquiry was in fact rrore of a 
joint inquiry rather that an inquiry by the Secretary of State alone; 
the Air Ministry having already pre-judged the issue, therefore, 
appointed an adviser who had expert Jmawledge but also biassed 
opinions. ( 22 ) 
The validity of having proceeded under the Public Works Facilities 
Act was raised, as it had been in the original inquiry. It was argued 
that although the primary intentions of the Act had been to relieve 
unemploynent by simplifying the procedure for the acquisition of land. 
by local authorities, the matter of establishing a carIllarCial aerodrc:xIE 
was so controversial as to be outside the scope of the Act. Thus the 
Corporation should have proceeded via a Private Bill which would have 
ensured. that the views of all interested parties would have been 
adequately accounted for. Counsel for the appellants raised a point of 
principle for the future, 
" OppoSition at the Inquiry was formidable and. if this type of 
opposition is pennitted to be outweighed marely because the Council 
of a large nnmicipal authority has selected a site, which the Air 
Council consider to be best for the purpose, then there would appear 
to be little object in opposing any such schE!IIES which may in future 
be prc:noted by other large municipal authorities." ( 23 ) 
The High Court case pranpted questions to be asked in the House of 
Camons about the ccmmmication which had taken place between the Air 
Ministry and the Corporation and about the position of the adviser to 
the Inquiry. HO\NeVBr, the local authorities' appeal was dismissed by 
Mr Justice Branson. The contention that the Order was not within the 
scope of the Public Works Facilities Act failed on the grounds that 
despite the Air Council having expressed a tentative view in July 1934, 
this had not made it impossible or even unlikely that the Secretary of 
State could bring a judicial mind to bear upon the matters at issue. 
Given the procedures laid down in the Air Navigation Act 1920, and. the 
Air Navigation (Consolidation) Order 1923, the Corporation was bound to 
consult the Air Council on the Ringway site and the Air council was 
obliged to give a view. As regards the position of Wing ccmn:md Allen, 
Mr Justice Branson ruled that even disregarding the possibility that he 
was not technically a rrember of the Tribunal, his invol verren.t could not 
be questioned as the appellants had failed to nake any objection to his 
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participation in the proceedings at any tine. ( 24 ) 
Basically, with defeat in the High Court, all reasonable avenues had 
been exhausted. At the original public inquiry, all possible evidence 
against the Ringway Scheme itself had been presented and the Councils 
of Hale and Altrincham had been reluctant to incur expense involved in 
the appeal to the High Court. The High Court case had represented the 
last resort in attempting to defeat the Manchester Corporation by 
questioning procedure. In the face of further expense involved in an 
appeal to the House of IDrds, which offered little prospect of 
overturning past judgrrents, opposition began to breakdown. ( 25 ) The 
needs of the business and ccmrercial interests of the City of 
Manchester had taken priority aver those of the surrounding rural 
carmuni ty. At the end of the day, opposition had been little IIDre than 
costly and futile. 
with the ruling in the High Court in favour of the Manchester 
Corporation, the authority was free to canpulsorily purchase the 664 
acres of land and construct its airport. CMnership was vested in the 
Corporation although canplete control of developrent could not be 
achieved so long as the ITa jor part of the airport remained outside the 
City Boundary. Whereas in 1934 the Town Clerk had assured the local 
authorities involved that incorporation of the land was not an 
objective, the question was again raised in the 1950s when 
consideration had to be given to a ITa jor extension of the rrain runway. 
In effect, although Manchester Airport existed as a single entity, 
it was administered by four local authorities - the Manchester 
Corporation, the Cheshire County Council, Wilmslow Urban District 
Council and Bucklow Rural District Council. This arrangement maant 
that administration was both canplex and ambiguous. Cheshire County 
Council was the highway authority and as such was responsible for 
carrying out the diversion of the A538 necessitated by runway extension 
at the Corporation's expense. (26) Cheshire was also the authority 
responsible for planning and the 1956 County DeveloprE11t Plan included 
proposals for the North Cheshire Green Belt which was intended to 
prevent the further expansion of the South Fast Lancashire conurbation. 
Figure 4.2 shows the extent of Green Belt in 1961 which was the 
culmination of plans laid in these earlier years. It was felt 
desirable that a tract of rural land should be retained wi thin 
reasonable distance of the conurbation to provide for the recreation 
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and enjoymant of it's inhabitants. The Green Belt envisaged was to run 
along practically the whole of the southern boundary of Wythensha~. 
The outer boundary had been sited so that the Green Belt would be wide 
enough to prevent donnitory developrent on the side furthest fran the 
conurbation. It effectively covered the whole of the Ringway area 
encanpassing both the existing boundaries of the airport and land 
proposed for airport extensions. For the City Council these proposals 
introduced an elem:mt of uncertainty regarding future developralt of 
the Airport. ( 27 ) 
The Bucklow Rural District Council held responsibility for the 
disposal of dooestic refuse fran Manchester Airport, charging the 
Corporation for any excessive collections. The Council was also 
:responsible for the disposal of sewage fran that part of the airport 
which fell within it's area. However, it had not provided a sewage 
disposal works for this purpose and with plans to develop new tenninal 
buildings in the 1950s, the need for a proper drainage system becane 
urgent. Whilst Bucklow failed to proceed quickly enough for the City 
in drawing up a satisfactory scheme, the City devised it's CMI1 scheme 
costing £19,500 with an additional annual cost of £1,000 for treating 
and disposing of sewage. A sewer or drain was constructed to 
carmunicate with the Eastern Intercepting Sewer of the Corporation in 
Manchester so as to discharge sewage fran Manchester Airport to the 
DavyhuJ1re Sewage WOrks. This private sewer was constructed by and at 
the expense of the Corporation Bucklow ROC, therefore, had to make 
annual paymants to the Corporation for the cost of treating and 
disposal of sewage. ( 28 ) It should also be borne in mind that the 
Manchester City Council had to pay local rates to both Bucklew ROC and 
the Wilmslow UOC on airport land and buildings in either Corporation or 
tenant occupation which fell within their area. As new acccmrodation 
was occupied and the runway extended, the rating assessrrent of 
Manchester Airport increased. ( 29 ) 
Although initially the question of whether the City boundary should 
be extended to encanpass the 250 acres which canprised the actual 
airport itself or the total of 664 acres of land purchased by the 
Corporation in 1934 was debated, it was finally decided that 1,184 
acres of land, including fannland adjoining the airport, should be 
incorporated. Thus the land required to carry out the proposed runway 
extension which also necessitated the diversion of the A538 Wilmslew to 
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Altrincham road would care under the control of the City, 890 acres of 
this land fell within the Bucklow rural district with the rarainder 
being in Wilms low . ( 30) 
The principal argurrent for incorporation was to facilitate airport 
administration by bringing it under the control of one single 
administrative area, that being the area in which ownership was vested. 
The inference was that the ownership of land outside the City 
boundaries justified incorporation. 
supported on the grounds of equity. 
However, incorporation was also 
The airport was Manchester's 
enterprise and Manchester ratepayers had borne a heavy capital 
expenditure in producing it as well as heavy losses. It was argued 
that if extension was granted, it would not hanq?er or disrupt in any 
way the IDeal Government Services of any of the three authorities 
concerned. (31) 
Whilst not raising any objection to the plans to extend the nain 
runway at Manchester Airport, Cheshire County Council decided after 
discussions with the Bucklow and Wilmslow authorities to reject 
Manchester Corporation's proposals for incorporation. Nevertheless, 
the City proceeded to subnit it's proposals to Parliament in the 1955-
56 session in Part Three of the Manchester Corporation Bill. (32) 
Bucklow ROC and Wilrnslow UOC registered. their opposi tion largely on 
financial grounds. It was estimated that the Councils would lose land 
of a rateable value of £18,000 and £6,813 respectively. To Bucklow 
this represented 12% of the total rateable value of lands in the 
district. (33) The Clerk of Bucklow Council, Mr C Walker, stated, "We 
contend that, as a rural district trying to give services to the 
inhabitants we must be allowed to keep rateable value brought in by 
developrE11ts in our area" and Councillor G R Moxon, the Chairman of 
Wilrnslaw Council maintained that, "the county districts should not be 
impoverished by the expanding needs of large cities and boroughs" ( 34 ) 
In support of it's case, the Manchester Corporation cited a number 
of examples where local authority boundaries had been altered. to allow 
the local authority which owned an airport to control its developrEIlt 
too. This evidence is reproduced as Table 4.3. It was also suggested 
that over a sixty year period, the area which had been lost to the 
Cheshire Administrative Council had been relatively small in tenns of 
acreage, population and rateable value, indeed even after the secession 
of the lands at Ringway, the effect on rateable values in the County 
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VvUUld be mininal (see Table 4.4 a). HR Askew ~ asserted that the 
rateable value of the airport had been created by Manchester and the 
petitioners had tried their hardest to stop the airport being built: 
"Now it is there they want to keep it. The rateable value we have 
created is a sheer windfall to these local authorities. . . It has 
care through no effort of theirs and in the teeth of their 
opposition". (35) 
As these broad issues were being debated municipal rivalries were 
tri vialised in the local press. The Manchester Guardian of 17 January, 
1956 alluded to the suggestion in Cheshire that one of the reasons for 
the Manchester Corporation wishing to incorporate Ringway within it's 
boundaries was that the wni Mayor could not suitably wear his chain of 
office when neeting important guests at the Airport since the ground 
did not fall wi thin his jurisdiction. In response, the Town. Clerk of 
the City of Manchester held that such a suggestion was "absurd", there 
being no reason why the wni Mayor should not wear his chain of office 
there, and continued, 
"I have heard it said. . that it is rather ridiculous for 
distinguished visitors to be :received first of all at the airport by 
the wrd Lieutenant of Cheshire and then at the gates by the lord 
Lieutenant of lancashire." 
The House of wnis Select Carmi ttee which considered the Manchester 
Corporation Bill agreed with the City that much of the land in the 
parish of Ringway on which Manchester Airport stood should be 
transferred. to the Manchester Corporation. ~,on appeal to a 
House of Camons Select Ccmnittee the proposals for incorporation were 
rejected. (36) An article published in the Evening Chronicle entitled 
"Airport stymie" surrm:rl up the public reaction in the City of 
Manchester. Whilst accepting that big cities were all too eager to 
bite into the surrounding countryside, the writer maintained that this 
case was "a triumph for parish pump pcmposity" and the decision was 
seen to suggest that Manchester WJuld be handicapped at every turn in 
developing the airport. 
Although it is clear that on both sides valid argmrEIlts had been 
placed for and against incorporation, it is WJrth considering that in 
reality the issue of airport incorporation continued to fonn only a 
snaIl part of a much wider issue of the encroachnent of a City on it's 
rural surroundings. In considering the House of Carnons decision, it 
is necessary to elaborate upon the nore general problan of the housing 
over-spill fram Manchester into Cheshire in the ilmatiate post war 
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years, as this again confinns the notion that to a great degree, the 
rivalries aver Manchester Airport were only suggestive of these nore 
fun.danental problems. 
After the Second World War, the Manchester City Council decidErl that 
to neet it's housing neErls, a site at Mobberley should be purchasErl 
compulsorily to build houses for about 50,000 people. However, after 
trial hole boring which revealErl that part of the site was underlain 
with salt, in 1948 the Corporation revisErl it's proposals to include 
the building of a town with a population of about 25,000 people in self 
contained. units on the nodifiErl site. The Minister of Housing and 
Local Governrrent had approved this developIETlt on the specific 
condition that: 
"Manchester should not seek: to extend it' s boundary to incorporate 
the new town as that v.ould defeat the whole purpose of the view of a 
self contained. entity, but if at any tine the schema for the 
establishment of a Manchester County Council became a possibility, 
then the question of Mobberley caning into such a county council 
\\UUld ranain entirely open." ( 37 ) 
By 1952, Manchester's housing deficiency stocxi at sites for 9,965 
houses and although Cheshire County proposErl the developrent of a new 
town at Congleton, the Manchester Corporation renainErl convincErl that 
sooner or later there v.ould neErl to be a large scale developrent at 
Mobberley and Lymn. Thus the Corporation appliErl for planning 
pennission to build 10,500 houses at Mobberley and 12,000 houses at 
Lymn. In both areas, the Corporation intendErl to provide appropriate 
new industry, anenities and services to accamodate inhabitants. The 
council basErl it's case on the magnitude and urgency of the neErl for 
houses. It was estilratErl that in all 90,000 dwellings "WOuld be 
required to replace those unfit to live in, to provide for families 
with no separate harre and to neet the expectErl increase in population. 
The Council wanted. to build at the rate of 2,500 to 3,000 houses per 
year and given the scale and proposErl pace of the developrent it was 
difficult to find a suitable site elsewhere. In addition, both areas 
were deened well situated. for satellite towns. The only solution for 
the Corporation was to push ahead with this developIETlt whilst at the 
sane time carrying out slum clearance and re-d.eveloprent in other 
areas. (38) 
Manchester Corporation's application for planning pennission was 
resistErl by the Lymn Urban District Council, BucklOW' Rural District 
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Council and Cheshire County Council on the basis that very good quality 
agricultural land would be sacrificed and that both areas were too 
close to Manchester to accommodate such large scale development. The 
Cheshire County Council naintained that there were other areas within 
the County where many thousands of houses could be built to IrEet 
Manchester's needs, with less in jury to agriculture and without the 
objection that they would ultima.tely result in the enlargement of an 
already too large city. (39) 
In judging the case for the granting of planning pennission for the 
developrent of Lymn and Mobberley the Minister for Housing and IDeal 
Governmant took the view that , given the agricultural quality of the 
land involved and the importance of preserving Manchester's natural 
gI'eeIl. belt, the developrent of the area was inappropriate. Any large 
scale developrent at Mobberley would mean the extension of the City 
into open countryside and it was doubtful whether the situation would 
be attractive to industry on the scale required. The Minister 
naintained that probably only a donnitory suburb rather than a new town 
would emerge. (40) In respect of the proposals for Lymn, again the 
agricultural value of land becanE an important issue and developrEllt on 
open land which assisted in reducing the urban spread was once IIDre 
deemad inadvisable. Thus the developrent proposals were rejected and 
the Manchester Corporation was advised to maximise the use of land 
within the City in the course of re-developrEllt; to build on the 
smaller alternative sites which had been suggested by the Counties of 
Cheshire, Lancashire and Derbyshire, details of which are provided in 
Table 4.5 and to develop IIDre intensively on soma of the sites already 
in view. Although it was likely to be IIDre difficult and IIDre tine 
consuming to build on these smaller sites and soma of the developrEllts 
which would be a long way fran the City would be likely to entail 
problems of Employment and tenant selection, decentralisation was 
thought to be preferable to extension of the City. (41) 
Clearly, the perceived needs of rural Cheshire and the City of 
Manchester had clashed prior to the question of the incorporation of 
airport land and extension of the City boundary as a result of housing 
over-spill had been feared for soma tine. Ultimately, the question of 
incorporation of airport land in the parish of Ringway was only 
resolved under the tenns of IDeal Governnent re-organisation in the 
1970s, although earlier reviews of the IDeal Governnent structure 
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tacitly accepted incorporation in principle. For example, the IDeal 
Gove:rnment Ccmnission for England had CCXlIlEIlced a review of the 
organisation of IDeal Government in the South East Lancashire Special 
Review Area in 1962. The authorities canprising this area are listed 
in Appendix 4.1. Reporting in 1965, the IDeal Government Ccmnission 
accepted the contention of the Corporation that the airport should be 
brought into the City. HCMeVer, it's proposals were not implem:mted 
due to changes in Government. ( 42) Subsequently, the Royal Ccmnission 
on IDeal Government (Redcliffe-Maud) reporting in 1969 offered an 
opportunity to resolve the ananalous position of the airport. The 
Ccmnission dealt with the main structure of English IDeal Government 
which had re:nained virtually unchanged since the 1888 and 1894 Acts of 
Parliamant which established county councils, county boroughs and 
county district councils (both rural and urban). The Ccmnission 
identified the need for a ma.jor rationalisation of IDeal Government to 
reduce the number of units with executive responsibility and to end the 
anachronistic division between town and country recognising the 
requi:r:Em:mts of planning and ccmnunications in a rrodern age. The 
report proposed a new administrative map of England outside Greater 
lDndon divided into 61 new IDeal Government areas. 
In 58 a single authority was to be responsible for all services. In 
the other three matropolitan areas of Binningham, Liverpool and 
Manchester, responsibility was to be divided between a netropolitan 
authority whose key functions \\1Ould be planning, transportation and 
ITa jor developrrant, together with police and other services and a number 
of matropolitan district councils whose key functions would be 
education, housing and local authority personal social services. The 
Redcliffe-Maud Ccmnission' s report thus offered the prospect that the 
whole of the airport area 'WOuld be included in a new Manchester, 
Salford and District Council, although once again plans for re-
organisation were shelved. (43) 
The re-organisation of IDeal Goverrment in 1974, which created the 
Greater Manchester County, did result in the incorporation of the 
Ringway parish into the City, as previously shown in Chapter Three. In 
fact, this was the only extension of the City boundary to take place at 
that time. The transfer of Ringway maant that about four fifths of 
airport lands including the main runway, tenninal building, car parks, 
etc, had finally been ceded to City control. ( 44) The snaIl proportion 
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of land which renained outside the City's jurisdiction was in Styal, 
fornerl y part of the Wilmslow DOC pa.ssing to the Macclesfield Borough 
on re-organisation. Wilmslow had opposed the boundary change partly 
for financial reasons and plarming considerations although by 1974, the 
additional factor of noise from the airport had entered into the 
argmnant. It was felt that given Wilmslow's close proximity to the 
airport aircraft, noise caused injury to am:mities and that alm:::>st by 
way of compensation the Wilmslow district or it's successor should 
retain what rateable incooe they received fram certain hereditamants 
within the airport. Similarly, it was suggested that in the interests 
of local residents, it was essential that the authority should retain 
the control of land ~ order to give due recognition to the views of 
the residents in the area. ( 45 ) 
Clearly, the siting of a local authority airport outside the 
boundaries of the authority in which ownership was vested maant that 
the question of developren.t of airport facilities for Manchester becarre 
enmeshed in the rrnmicipa.l rivalries engendered by the spread of large 
cities into their rural surroundings. Although this could have had a 
negative impact on developIB1t obscuring the central argurrEIlt, it is 
suggested that, on balance, ownership by a large city authority proverl 
decisive in defeating the early opposition of those local authorities 
which perceived themselves as bearing the costs of developrent in the 
loss of amenity. 
4.3 rmE IUiITIVE ROLE OF :ux:AL IN1'EmSI' GROOPS 
The development of airport facilities in Manchester has been 
supported by local institutions, pa.rticularly the Lancashire Aero Club 
and the Manchester Chamber of Carrm:rrce. The forner was established in 
1922 initially constructing and then flying gliders. It was the first 
of the recognised Light Plane Clubs to cc:nm:mce flying and in order to 
prarote public interest in aviation becarre involved in the organisation 
of flying meetings both at harE and in other pa.rts of the country. (46) 
John F IBeming, the President of the Club, becarre the leading 
protagonist of an airport in Manchester. In 1926 he wrote to the 
Manchester Guardian advocating the establishment of an aercx:irarE in the 
area, suggesting Brooklands as a possible site along with a snaIl 
parish known as Ringway, just to the south of Wythenshawe. ( 47) 
IBeming also published a pamphlet stating his case for supporting civil 
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aviation ill· which he ~; """tained that . d .u~.. consl.; eration had to be given to 
trade and other relations with a far-flung empire which required 
transport over long distances. It was argued that Britain could assume 
in the air, as on the sea, the role of llcarriers to the world ll . 
With specific regard to Manchester's role within the air ne~rk, 
Ieeming envisaged an aerodrcne whose primary function would be to link 
the City with other parts of the country. Ieeming suggested that 
several hours could be saved for example, in the transportation of 
Arrerican nails by the intrcx:iuction of a Manchester to Southampton night 
service and that Manchester could fonn a junction connecting Newcastle, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow airlines with Hull, london and Plynouth air 
services. An air service to london "WOuld link Manchester with such 
diverse trade centres as Buenos Aires, Constantinople, Moscow, Teheran, 
Cairo, Baghdad, Basra and, eventually, India and Australia. Business 
with continental cities was expected to benefit fran a direct aerial 
connection to Croydon as businessman could leave Manchester in the 
norning and be in Berlin or Prague that night. lBeming speculated that 
in the early nineteenth century businessman being accustOllEd to goods 
taking five days to reach london had probably not inmediately realised 
the benefit to trade of a railway journey of just a few hours, but 
supply had created it's aNl1 demand and the same would be true of an 
aercx::h:are in Manchester. ( 48 ) 
In pursuit of the objective of encouraging aerial transport in 
Manchester, the Lancashire Aero Club organised a luncheon on 27 
January, 1928 at which consideration was given to the possibility of an 
airport for Manchester in the near future. This event brought together 
the interests of the Manchester Corporation and the Manchester Chamber 
of Ccmrerce. Mr W E Thanpson, the President of the Chamber, presented 
the views of that institution stating that although four years earlier 
the Chamber had concluded that there was little to be gained given the 
limited size of the country, in the interim attitudes had changed 
dramatically and proposals for the developrent of the air facilities to 
l.inJ:c Manchester directly with the Continent had gained support. At the 
same venue, Aldenran William Davy pledged the support of the City 
Council for the building of an aerodrc:tlE. So the Lancashire Aero Club 
had been instrurrEntal in achieving for the first tine the official 
approval of these two rna jor decision making bcxlies to an aerodrare 
schalE. ( 49 ) In the following nonth, a public rreeting was held at 
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Houldsworth Hall, Deansgate, at which a resolution was proposoo by John 
Ieeming and secondOO by H Fildes, ex MP for Stockport. The resolution 
read: 
"That this Meeting calls on the Municipal Authorities of Manchester 
to at once take steps to obtain an Airport for the City, and to 
appoint a Carrmi ttee, or some other vehicle to consider haY best 
Manchester nay adopt an Air Policy." ( 50 ) 
This resolution was carriOO unaninously and, in response, the 
Parlianentary Sub-Carrmittee of the City Council resolVErl on 14 March, 
1928 to appoint a special sub-carrmittee to confer with representatives 
of the appropriate Govern:rrEnt DepartnEnts, the Chamber of Ccmrerce and 
the Lancashire Aero Club "with a view to obtaining full infornation." 
(51) Within six IIDIlths sufficient infornation had been gathered to 
allow the Town Clerk to organise a neeting of interestOO parties 
including the Manchester Cotton Association LimitOO; the Manchester 
Association of Importers and Exporters; the British Cotton Growing 
Association, the Manchester Coal Exchange, Manchester Ship Canal 
Ccmpany; Manchester Royal Exchange LimitOO; the Manchester Corn Grocery 
and Produce Exchange Limi too; the Manchester Chamber of Carmerce; the 
FOOeration of British Industries (Manchester District Branch); the 
Lancashire Aero Club and John I.eEming. This neeting furtherOO the 
scheme by the passing of a resolution, 
"That this Conference recognises the need. for an aerocirc::'ma being 
establishOO at Manchester, and recarmands the Corporation to arrange 
for a suitable site being reserved for such a purpose without 
further delay." (52) 
Having been instrumental in encouraging the City Council to invest 
in airport facilities for the City, John I.eEming also assistOO in the 
selection of an appropriate site although, in this respect, a 
difference of opinion with the Corporation errergOO. The site IIDst 
favoured by John Ieeming was an area canprising some 115 acres situatOO 
on the Wythenshawe estate, on the south side of Northenden, in the 
rural district of Bucklow. As suggested in Chapter Two, the IIDst 
suitable site in the opinion of the sub-carrmittee was an area on the 
Chat Moss Estate CMllOO by the Cleansing Ccmni ttee where the Barton 
Airport was established in 1930. 
The Lancashire Aero Club was unconvincOO of the efficacy of the 
chosen site which failOO to become the schOOuled air service airport 
which had been envisagOO. A representative of the Club wrote to the 
Manchester Guardian in October 1929 counselling caution in regard to 
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expenditures at B:rrton on the grounds that whilst camercial aviation 
was expanding , it was subject to liroi tations and disadvantages in 
Britain which ~uld not be rem::wed "until such t.ima as aeroplanes can 
arrive at and depart fran liroi ted spaces, such as a flat roof, in the 
centre of the districts which they serve". The rna. jor concern was that 
should the B:rrton schene prove expensive wi th only a small retUDl on 
investm:mt, the reaction could darna.ge the developTEIlt of aviation in 
the Manchester area in the long tenn. (53) 
In effect, the B:rrton Airp::>rt was unsuccessful but not for the 
reasons postulatOO by the writer and when the Corporation decidOO that 
an alternative site was required at Ringway the early support of the 
Club, which had largely been encouragOO by John I.seming, was not 
forthcaning. Alan Goodfellow, a praninent figure in the Club, forecast 
that designers would either concentrate on the highest possible degree 
of inmuni ty fran engine failure, thus increasing landing speeds, or 
that there ~uld be a revolutionary change in design allCMing take-off 
and descent vertically. Goodfellow rna.intained that if the fonner v.;ere 
the case, the congestion around cities would preclude the required 
developnent at a city airport, if the latter were to transpire then 
airports would be requirOO in the heart of cities. In contrast to the 
Club's earlier position, it was arguOO that the need for an additional 
city airport was unproven and that Manchester was not ideally 
posi tionOO to act as a terminal airport because of hilly country and 
areas of bad visibility. (54 ) 
In effect, the support of the Lancashire Aero Club was limitOO to 
the 1920s and awed much to the views of it's President, John F I.seming. 
Whilst the Lancashire Aero Club had only a limi too role in prarroting 
air transport in Manchester, the local Chamber of Camerce was IIDre 
supportive of the Corporation's case for air routes although again this 
support ebbErl fran t.ima to t.ima. The Chamber had been establishOO in 
1820 as a continuation of the Camercial Society foundOO in Manchester 
in 1794. Since that t.ima it had extendOO it's nenbership to represent 
a wide range of manufacturing , distributive, transport, professional 
and service activities. The Officers and Board of the Chamber v.;ere 
drawn fran electOO directors, the Chainnan of the Standing Ccmni ttees 
of the Board and of the Executive Ccmnittees of the various Trade 
Sections. ( 55 ) 
In 1928, the Board of Directors of the Chamber passOO a resolution 
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supporting the establishnent of an aerodrane in future years although 
this support was qualified by the assertion, 
"At this present Il'OlEIlt . . . reductions in Municipal rates are of 
such importance to the ca:rmercial ccmmmity that they could not 
support suggestions that the Corporation should shoulder any 
financial responsibility which is not of pressing urgency ... If 
those interested in aviation can shCM' that arrangerrents can be made 
to secure a Manchester aerodrane without undue additions to the 
City's rates, the Chamber will give it's approval and sympathy to 
their suggestions." (56) 
Although the Chamber was ultinately to urge the necessity for the 
provision of facilities for speedy air travel to and fran all business 
centres, especially on the Continent, it is clear that in the early 
years of developtEIlt the attitude of the Chamber was lukewann. For 
example, in the autumn of 1929, Northern Air Lines Limited, the canpany 
which had been carmissioned by the Corporation to manage the ternpora:ry 
aerodrane at Wythenshawe was forced to appeal to the Chamber for 
business. The Cc:mpany stressed that whilst in GlasgCM', Edinburgh, 
Binningham and Liverpool ccmpanies were regularly using their machines, 
not one Manchester business house had 
"hired a 'plane fran than in four nonths. Of a substantial 25,208 
passengers carried by the Cc:mpany between April and October only 12% 
had care fran Manchester." ( 5 7 ) 
City traders were urged to place a yearly contract for the use of 
harmer advertising and air taxi services for both passengers and goods 
in order to secure the future of the facility at Manchester. The 
:minimum number of hours thought to be necessa:ry to continue the 
Northern Air Lines depot was 2,500 per annmn. (58) However, the 
Chamber maintained that it could not convince it's rranbers of the 
benefit of "harmer flying". In the face of criticism the Chamber 
denied that it had ever stated that there was a need for aviation at 
Manchester, but only for an aerodrare for the future when a cOIIlIErcial 
need for flying services arose. Although appreciating the Canpany's 
pioneering efforts, the Chamber did not lend it's general support, and 
so after having considered the possibility of transferring it's 
headquarters to the new aerodrane at Liverpool, NortheIll Air Lines 
(Manchester) Limited was forced into liquidation in 1933. (59) 
The relative lack of interest in these early years is supported by 
the fact that it was only in October 1938 that the Manchester Chamber 
fonned its Air Transport Carmi ttee. In contrast, the lDndon Chamber of 
Cc:mrerce had fonned a civil aviation section by the early' 30s bringing 
286 
together individual finns, canpanies and organisations involved in all 
aspects of aeronautics which, through the Chamber's Council, was in 
touch with SOlIe 60,000 finns. However, once the special ccmnittee had 
been set up in the Manchester Chamber a joint sulrccmni ttee was fome:i 
with the Corporation's Airport Carmi ttee to consider future policy . 
( 60 ) This signalled the general acceptance of the importance of civil 
aviation to trade and camerce and was folla.ved by the issue of a 
policy docmnent. 
'!he Chamber expressed the view that internal air routes had been 
allowerl to grow in a haphazard manner - uncontrolled by any guiding 
policy or principle. The lack of national policy to guide the 
enterprise of those responsible for the maintenance of civil airports 
was hindering the progress of the efforts of local authorities like 
Manchester which had embarked upon a long tenn policy involving heavy 
financial carmi tm::mts. The Chamber maintained that the importance of 
the lancashire export trade to the nation demanded that Manchester 
should keep abreast with m:xiern JIEaIlS of transport, and that if air 
services were provided both the need for and use of such services could 
develop in Manchester "to an exceptional degree". However, it was 
emphasised that this demand was latent and would not becare apparent 
until the means to meet it cane into existence. The Chamber thus hoped 
that operating canpanies \\Uuld be able and willing to plan services 
which 'WOuld foster the developrent of Manchester as an active centre 
for air travel. Whilst appreciating that there were financial risks 
involved in providing facilities in order to create demand, it was 
argued that the risks in air travel were less than in sc:xre other 
spheres of travel, 
"planes cost less than ships or rail tracks and planes which prove 
redundant on one service can be transferred to other places." ( 61 ) 
In order to prarote the early and adequate developrent of air 
traffic to and fran Manchester, the Air Transport Ccmnittee of the 
Chamber offered to work in close collaboration with the Airport Special 
Carmittee of the Manchester Corporation, 
"believing that since the problero is a new one, it cannot be left 
for a haphazard solution to emerge in the course of tine but needs 
planned and consistent attention especially in the early stages." 
(62) 
Perhaps one of the lIDSt significant features of the policy docurrent 
was the recognition of the need when services were provided, to 
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publicise them with rapidity and persistence. This was an activity in 
which the Chamber rega:rdErl itself as playing a posi ti ve role. Building 
upon the work it had already undertaken to prarote the Royal Dutch 
Airlines first direct air link between Manchester and Amsterdam in 
1938, a special carmittee of the Chamber had made the service widely 
known throughout the business ccmnuni. ty . leading members of Manchester 
camerce had been invitErl to take short flights in KIM machines; 
articles on Ringway and the new service had been published in the 
Chamber's "Monthly Record" and supplied to the Press' leading chambers 
of carmerce on the continent had been invited to send representatives 
by air to Manchester as guests of the Manchester Chamber, the civic 
authorities and KIM. (63) 
In effect the support of the Chamber of Cc:mrErce regarding publicity 
was essential to the prarotion of air services in these early stages 
largely because use could be made of it' s extensive links with all 
manner of business interests. For example, the Handbook of the Chamber 
in 1939 listErl 80 Trade Organisations and Associations representing 
individual ccmrercial and industrial interests in the surrounding area. 
'!he Manchester Raw Cotton Association and the Joint Ccmnittee of Cotton 
Trade Organisations represented vast trading interests, the farner 
importing one million bales of raw cotton through the Manchester Ship 
Canal in 1938 for the use of the textile industry in East Lancashire, 
and the latter representing the central organisation of the cotton 
trade which was at that time the largest manufacturing industry in the 
country , involving several thousand finns. '!he Royal Exchange in 
Manchester was also the centre of day-to-day operations connected with 
the cotton industry. In tenns of their involvemant in overseas trade 
the Timber Trades Association, the Manchester Provision Exchange and. 
the Association of Fruit Brokers of Manchester Limited, were all 
prospective users of air transport - as the tilnber trade had close 
connections with the whole of Europe whilst the other two organisations 
had trade connections with Holland, De.mnark and the Baltic countries on 
the one hand and the Mediterranean on the other. Although about half 
of the Chamber's 2,600 members were involved in the cotton trade, many 
others \'11ere connected with engineering - for which Manchester was the 
largest centre in the country - and in chemical manufacture, an 
industry which exportErl nore fran the Manchester district than any 
other area in the UK. ( 64 ) 
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In addition to publicising services when they carre into operation, 
the Manchester Chamber of CarrtrErce also supported. the Manchester 
Corporation in presenting evidence to the Air Transport Licensing 
Authority. In this respect, the Chamber sought to prevent the 
stabilisation of the "unsatisfactory state" and to ensure that no 
single operating carpmy was in a rronopoly position to the detrimant of 
the developnent of air transport in Manchester. When Railway Air 
Services Limited applied to the Authority in January 1939 for a licence 
to operate between lDndon and Glasgow, the Chamber produced evidence 
which suggested that Manchester and the surrounding bull t-up area 
represented the largest industrial concentration in the world; export 
trade being the main interest of manufacturing bringing international 
cormections which made overseas travel a necessity. It was held that 
increased canpetition in trade had made personal contact with custarers 
"absolutely essential". The Chamber also stressed that finns overseas 
had an interest in visiting Manchester which, with it's large 
population, was a great consurrer of raw materials and foodstuffs. In 
support of a greater role for Manchester in air travel, the Chamber 
carried out a survey of the non-textile industries of South East 
Lancashire and North East Cheshire covering 6,000 finns each employing 
nore than 20 people and the following evidence of the interest of the 
Chamber's Il1E!11bers in European markets was placed before the Authority, 
as detailed in Appendix 4.2. It was argued that such evidence 
supported the contention that the concentration of business daranded. 
frequent journeys to custcmars in all the large business centres on the 
continent. ( 65 ) 
Finally, in the pre-war era the Chamber also decided. to extend its 
activities in a nmnber of directions. For example, direct app:roaches 
to operating canpanies not engaged. in services to and fran Manchester 
were made in order to attract interest. Steps were taken to secure the 
support of the Parlianentary Air Carmittee and of MPs representing 
local constituencies, to the Chamber's air policy. It was proposed. 
that a roll of IIlE!l1bers of the camercial ccmnuni ty who would be 
prepared to use satisfactory air services or alternatively a roll of 
finns whose business interests would justify the assumption that 
support fran them could be reasonably expected. be canpiled.. Support 
was gi veIl to the establishrrEnt of a central office in a praninent place 
in Manchester, whose sole function would be to provide infomation 
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about air travel. Finally, the Chamber resolved. to support efforts to 
attract people to the airport by special displays and the prarotion of 
facilities for occasional flying, by the provision of attractive 
catering, improved access by road and amibus at cheap rates and by 
social functions. ( 66 ) 
In the years ilrnEdiately following the end of World War Two, when it 
1JecaIre clear that the potential for air travel had been boosted by 
greater public awareness resulting fran war tine experience, the 
Chamber 1JecaIre nore involved. in attempting to influence central 
governrrent depart:rrEnts. As early as Decanber 1944, the Board passed a 
resolution stating that plans should be developed to ensure that the 
post-war needs of the trading camrunity in the matter of air transport 
should be adequately provided for. (67) '!he Ministry of Civil Aviation 
was infornEd of this resolution and in order to assist the Depart:mant 
of Civil Aviation in its deliberations, the Chamber supplied details of 
Manchester's fonner ccmrercial relations with the Continent. 
Although no fixed priority between routes was detennined because of 
the future possibilities of camErce were unJmown and the relative rate 
of recove:r:y of markets could not be foreseen, it was maintained that 
cOOJIErCial relations with certain groups of countries justified direct 
overseas services. '!he nost important custcmrrs of the region could be 
found in an area stretching fran Holland north eastward enccmpassing 
the Scandinavian countries of Demnark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. In 
the past a considerable trade had taken place with Poland and it was 
anticipated that with Ge:many eliminated as a ccmpeti tor this country 
could become a much more important market for British goods. 
Substantial business had also been done with custcxrers in Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia in the past and, as far as the USSR was concerned, 
although it was impossible to predict what this country's future trade 
policy might be, it was anticipated that demand for capital goods would 
be considerable requiring the presence of UK expertise. Finally trade 
relations with Czechoslovakia, Danubia and the Balkan countries had 
been dcminated by Germany in the inter-war period but opportunities 
were anticipated to allow Lancashire to re-establish and develop its 
trade connections in this area. 
Whilst expressing no special preference for any particular service 
on the basis of the foregoing infonnation, the Chamber advisErl that 
Amsterdam was probably the nost important connection which should be 
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restored in the sort tenn, as this would allow the Manchester business 
camrunity to re-establish it's trade links with Holland, Finland, 
Dernnark, Sweden and NoI.Way. A second group of countries ~re 
identified including Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, France and Portugal 
as offering potential in trade, involving relatively short distances. 
The non-stop routes to Paris and Brussels were also supported by the 
Chamber. ( 68 ) 
As well as providing such information to policy makers, the Chamber 
of Ccmnerce was quick to make it's views known on proposals which ~ 
being drawn up for the conduct of civil air transport in the UK in the 
ilmaliate post-war years. For example, it was critical of the early 
post-war policy which envisaged the developrent of facilities being 
dependent upon the course of air transport developrent, arguing that 
this might represent too long a delay in neeting "the IIDst urgent needs 
of the industrial and ccmnercial ccmmmity of the Greater Manchester 
area. " When central governrrent identified the need for on! y three 
trans-oceanic airports in the country with lDndon and Prestwick already 
being designated, the Chamber supported the notion that Manchester 
should be designated the thil:d. (69 ) 
As envisaged in the pre-war years, joint deputations of Chamber and 
Corporation representatives impressed upon the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation the need for greater priority being given to the needs of the 
City, and by the 1950s, consideration was being given to the 
possibility of cementing relations between the two institutions by the 
election of a Corporation representative to the Chamber's Air Transport 
Canmittee. Nothing concrete energed fran this suggestion because the 
Corporation was conscious of the need for the Chamber to remain 
independent and in a position to add another perspective to the 
Corporation's case. (70) 
In subsequent years, although both the Manchester Chamber of 
Ccmnerce and representatives of the Federation of British Industries 
were regular visitors to the airport and the Airport Developrents 
Special Sub-Canmi ttee met with local business interests to discuss 
natters of mutual concern, the Airport Ccmnittee of the Corporation 
became increasingly wary of establishing any fonn of joint bcrly. 
Basically, members ~re concerned about the possibility of any joint 
body pursuing or recCXIllEIlding a course of action which might be 
"inimical or even contrcn:y to the interests of the Ccmni ttee who 
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alone are responsible to the City for the developIEnt, operation and 
nanagemmt of Manchester Airport." ( 71 ) 
However, evidence also suggests sare concern regarding the close 
relationship which had been developing be~ the Chamber and the 
airline canpanies which had joined its ranks. In the early 1950s, the 
Air Transport Ccmnittee of the Chamber had excluded any body which had 
financial interests in the industry. However, as rrore operating 
canpanies joined the Chamber, it was placed under increasing pressure 
to admit representatives to the Air Transport Committee. 
Representatives of the Corporation Airport Ccmnittee expressed concern 
about the need to prevent the operating canpanies becaning too powerful 
and dictating policy in line with their own financial interests, rather 
than those of the camrunity served. Councillor Lionel Biggs maintained 
that much of the gcxx:l work that the Chamber had done in the past and 
the status which it had achieved could be i.rrp:ti.red by operating 
canpanies taking charge of the Air Transport Ccmnittee. (72) Although 
there seems to be little evidence to support this contention it is 
clear that whilst the Corporation and the Chamber pursued similar 
objectives, the extent of collaboration diminished as the Airport 
ccmnittee became rrore conscious of its independent responsibilities. 
Whilst the airline canpanies sought to influence the Chamber of 
Camerce, so the Corporation sought to ensure that direct relations 
with the airlines would be maintained by the institution of annual 
neetings between Corporation representatives and those of airline 
canpanies fran 1952. As collaboration diminished, the Chamber of 
CCIlllErce assmned. a much closer relationship with it's nanbers, the 
airline canpanies, conducting surveys, on their behalf, of the air 
transport requirements of business finns to further the developIEl'lt of 
passenger and cargo traffic through Manchester Airport. (73) Although 
meetings between the Airport Developnants Sub-Ccmnittee and the Air 
Transport Carmittee of the Manchester Chamber of Camerce ~re 
encouraged in the late 1960s, it was stressed that such meetings should 
be for consultation only and the deliberations of the special sub-
carmittee in this respect ~re strictly constrained. For example, the 
carmittee had no ~r to act and had to report back to the full 
Airport Carmi ttee after each meeting regarding rratters discussed. ( 74) 
Essentially then, whilst the Chamber of Ccmnerce dem::>nstrated a 
reluctance to take any positive action to support airport developnant 
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in Manchester during the 1920s and 1930s because it's overriding 
concern was to minimise the rate burden, the role of airport "booster 
group" was largely taken up by the Lancashire Aero Club. However, the 
record suggests that the Club prevaricated when faced with the 
uncertainty which pervaded likely future requirarvants. In later years, 
the Chamber of Cc:mnerce assurrai greater responsibiIi ties as it becarre 
clear that airport operation could be a viable proposition for the 
City. An era of collaboration with the Cor.poration was ushered in in 
the i.nm:rliate post-war years but this eventually gave way as the 
Airport Carmi ttee of the Cor.poration becama nore wary of the possible 
IlDtivations of the Chamber and becama IlDre jealous of it's independent 
responsibilities as aerocl:I:are owner. 
4.4 urAL ()IJREITICE 
As suggested in Chapter ':&u, the 1950s and 1960s ~re a period 
characterised by the planning and execution of nmway developner1t at 
Manchester Airport to cope with the new generation of jets such as the 
Boeing 707. The use of larger jet aircraft and the attendant increase 
in aircraft noise was to bring the aerodrc:lre owner into conflict with 
its surrounding environs . Individual members of the local carmunity 
carre to feel that the developnent of civil aviation was taking place at 
their cost. They found that they had little recourse to successful 
litigation and could at best hope to exercise influence through 
interest groups with the ult.im:l.te objective of curtailing air.port 
developrEIlt. 
The main instrurrEnt nmway at Manchester, which in the early 1950s 
was 5,900 feet long, was insufficient to meet the needs of certain 
aircraft operating out of the airport. SarE operators 'WOuld only use 
the airport under the IlDst favourable weather conditions and heavy 
aircraft operating under a weight penalty on trans-Atlantic routes had 
to stop at PrestwiCk or Shannon to take on board sufficient fuel for 
the East-West crossing of the Atlantic. In September 1955, BOAC's 
proposed withdrawal of services from Manchester created the urgent need 
to extend the main nmway as soon as possible. (75 ) Initial 
investigation revealed the need for an overall field length of 8,100 
feet with 7,000 feet of paved surface, 900 feet of preparai stoIWclY at 
the north east end, and 200 feet of stop.vay at the south ~sterly 
corner of the runway . Basically, the IlDst important factor to consider 
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was which end to place the 1,100 feet of runway extension in order to 
cause the minimum disruption. ( 76) 
Fran the administrative point of view, extension to the north east 
involved land which fell within the Manchester Corporation's 
administrative area, therefore, planning pennission might have been 
facilitated as under the Town and Country Planning (Developrent by 
IDeal Planning Authorities) Regulations of 1951 an authority did not 
require planning pennission to carry out developnent within its own 
area of jurisdiction. ~r, the land involved was not owned by the 
Corporation and the canpulsory purchase would probably have called 
forth opposition fran powerful business interests. Extension at the 
north easterly end of the main runway would have alnost undoubtedly 
increased the incidence of noise, as aeroplanes taking off would have 
passed lONer over the Heald Green, Cheadle, Gatley and Shadow Moss 
areas. (77) 
Experience with the runway as it existed was sufficient to suggest 
the likelihood of stiff opposition. A row of houses was sited only 800 
yards away fran the north easterly threshold of the existing 5,900 feet 
runway; tenants living in the area and representatives of the Renold 
Chains ccmpany nearby had already lodged ccmplaints about the intrusion 
of aircraft noise. (78) Ferranti Limited, who had research and 
developrent laboratories and factories enploying rrore than 1,100 people 
in close proximity to the north eastern boundary of the airport, also 
made its views on the issue known to the City. The Canpany had ~ll 
advanced proposals for the large scale developrent of a site adjoining 
its existing laboratories, a developrent which was estilnated to involve 
a cost of £3.4 million and to enploy rrore than 4,000 people. It was 
suggested that if the north easterly end of the runway was extended, 
despite the installation of sound proofing, noise levels would nake 
working conditions intolerable. (79) Extension of the main runway to 
the south V\est could be accamodated on land already owned by the 
Corporation. Although planning pennission had to be sought fran the 
Cheshire County Council, this authority's willingness to carry out the 
road diversion necessitated by a south ~sterly extension, suggested 
that it would be unlikely to lodge any objection against the 
Corporation's plans. (80) 
The Corporation opted for the schare involving the placing of 1,100 
feet of paved surface on the south V\esterly end of the main runway, and 
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the diversion of the A538. Work proceeded initially on the land owned 
by the Corporation but as the vvorks progressed, it was found that the 
proposed developrEllt was insufficient to canpl y with lCAO requirEments 
for Class "B" ae:rodranes. (81) Firstly the runway extension itself 
needed to be enclosed in a strip I, 000 feet wide as shown in Figure 4.3 
(1955); at the south v.est end a run up area and a length of taxiway 
associated with the extended runway and proposed tenninal building also 
had to be constructed as shCMIl. in Figure 4.3 (1955). In order to 
acquire the land necessary to canplete the vvorks, two ccmpulsory 
purchase orders had to be made. Canpulsory Purchase Order Number One', 
which was confinre::l in January 1958, provided for the acquisition of 
26.67 acres of land at the north east end to provide for the stopway, 
clem:way and strip. The planning proposals ~re publica.ll y advertised 
to allow objections to be lcxiged, but none ~re forthcaning. (82) 
Canpulsory Purchase Order Number Two, made in 1957, related to 42.13 
acres of mainly agricultural land, situated in the Parish of Ringway, 
required to allow for the strip containing the runway extension, the 
run up area and taxiway. Planning pennission for the developrent was 
granted by Cheshire County Council in March 1957, h~, a public 
enquiry had to be held as two of the six owners of land invol va::i raised 
objections. (83 ) 
Objections were lcxiged by J and A Jackson Limited, a finn which 
supplied bricks to the area. In 1934 the canpany had sought land in 
the district for establishing a brickworks as clay supplies on other 
sites had been exhausted and the developrEIlt of housing at Wythensha~ 
had lilnited opportunities for clay extraction. In 1948, Oversley Ford 
bri~rks was acquired, an already ~ll established concern, which did 
not involve planning pennission. At the sane tinE, two local fanns 
v.ere purchased with the long term intention of clay extraction, 
although they continued in the interim to be used for agricultural 
purposes. Jacksons maintained that the land and premises proposed for 
acquisition v.ere not required for airport purposes and fonood an 
integral part of the business of brick nanufacture carried on by the 
canpany at Oversley Ford; that the land purchase w:>uld deprive the 
canpany of the means of access to and frcm ad joining w:>rks; and finally 
that land owned by the Carp:my which was not the subject of the 
Canpulsory Purchase Order, but fonood part of 
YeN Tree Fann, w:>uld be affected by the loss of fann buildings. ( 84 ) 
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The second objector, Joseph Mshead, was the tenant of ~ 
~ Fann, again owned by Jacksons. His prinary occupation was 
sand merchant , delivering IlOstl y in the Wythensha~ area fran a sandpi t 
located in Macclesfield. It was argued that the premises ~re of great 
importance to the business as it was becaning increasingly difficult to 
find accarm:xiation because of the requi.rem:mts of green belt policy and 
the expansion of residential areas. Mr R H Mais, Barrister at law, 
representing Mr Mshead, referred to the Corporation's objective of 
maintaining the second airport in the country, 
"But this wish of theirs for aggrandisEm3Ilt ought not to prevail 
against private individuals, who should be protected by the Minister 
against the ambition of a powerful Corporation." (85 ) 
In putting its case, the Manchester Corporation concentrated on the 
potential of Manchester Airport and the need. for its extension. The 
Deputy Town Clerk, C A Marsh, maintained that the only question was 
whether it was reasonably necessary in the public interest to confinn 
the CPO. The rna. jor consideration was that the airport, as it existed, 
was inadequate and, therefore, the Corporation had to acquire land in 
order to ensure freedom from transient obstructions, such as combine 
harvesters or haystacks. (86) 
In appraising the case, A N C Shelley, Barrister at law, surrm:rl up 
the main argurrents which centred on why private persons should be made 
to suffer to satisfy the needs of an international convention which 
detennined the requiranents for a Class "B" certificate to be awarded 
to an airport. If ccmpliance with the international convention at such 
a cost was a condition of the future developrent of Manchester Aiport 
then the airport should not be developed further. In addition, the 
Minister should not acquiesce in depriving persons of their hO£l'ES and 
businesses merely to satisfy the ambition of a p::Merlul corporation. 
This final contention was ruled out of order, as putting the matter in 
the wrong perspective. The situation would have been exactly the sarre 
if the airport was in private ownership and it was suggested that what 
was at stake was not the ambition of the airport owners but the 
requiranents of a camercial carmunity in the twentieth century. The 
fact that Ringway was already the second airport in the country 
denonstrated that international trading called for the existence of a 
rna.jor airport in the North of England. Aircraft ~ projected to grow 
larger and nore powerful and, in view of this, the extension of the 
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airport was incontestible. The south westerly proposal offera:i a 
favourable contour and very few buildings, whilst extension to the 
north east vvould have required the acquisition of nore land to avercane 
the effect of the contour and the destruction of ten t.iIres as mmy 
buildings. Taking all of these factors into accOlmt, the CPO was, 
therefore, confimed. (87 ) 
Having acquired the land needed for the strip, run up area and 
taxiway and canpleted the 1,100 feet extension of the paved. area of the 
runway by the middle of 1958, the problem of hCM to deal with the A538 
which traversed the area, still remained outstanding. As suggested, to 
accamodate the runway extension to the south west, a diversion of the 
A538 had originally been proposed, as depicted in Figure 4.3 (1955). 
However, BOAC had, in the interim, made known their intention to seek 
the consent of the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation to operate 
Boeing 707 aircraft rather than II BritanniasII on their trans-Atlantic 
services fran Manchester Airport. Other international airlines had 
also announced plans to e:nploy the larger 707s or Douglas OC8 aircraft 
on the highly CCXl'p9titive North Atlantic routes fran 1960. (88) 
As these aircraft, at the t.iIre, were still at the experimental stage 
of developrEIlt, the length of the nmway which they required was not 
yet known, but it was nooted that they could need nmways longer than 
the maximum field length of 8,900 feet which could be attainErl at 
Manchester, assmning road diversion. In effect, if the A538 was to be 
diverted, as originally proposed, the airport 'WOuld have been boxErl in 
at the south west end incapable of extension in the future. ( 89 ) 
Revised proposals were, therefore, called for. Initially the Aiport 
Carmittee had considered an imnediate diversion of the road into a 
tunnel, as shown in Figure 4.3 (1956), under the main runway extension 
and this proposal had brought support fran local groups. In 
particular, the Cheshire Federation of Ratepayers and Kindra:i 
Associations expressed the view that the future of Manchester Airport 
as a major world air terminal vvould be very seriously jeopardisErl if 
runways were not extended and provisions made for future additional 
extension. The Federation suggested that the diversion of the A538 by 
way of a wide sweeping loop westerly towards the River Bollin 'WOuld 
entail roadworks of expensive proportions and the diversion of the 
River Bollin over a considerable stretch of its present course. The 
ma jar factor to be considered, as far as the Ferleration was concernErl, 
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was the need. to extend the runway at Manchester Airport to accamodate 
larger aircraft with the mininrum of delay. The solution proposed was 
that the A538 should continue on its existing course until reasonably 
short of the airport at the Hale B:n:ns approach and then be depressed 
and finally sunk to go under that part of the airport which it 
traversed. ( 90 ) 
Although the construction of a tU1U1el represented a viable long tenn 
solution in view of the uncertainty at the tine regarding the 
perfonnance and requil:arents of jet aircraft, it was decided that as a 
temporary expedient, the highway fran Al trincham should be closed where 
it net the taxiway fran the runway extension. The road was then to go 
onto the taxiway following it until it could rejoin the old road at the 
end of the extension, as shown in Figure 4.3 (1956). Police controls 
\'\lere to be established at each side, and traffic held up when aircraft 
were landing or taking off. ( 91 ) 
At a public inquiry into the proposed road closure order held in 
1958, objections made by the Cheshire County and Wilmsla,v District 
Councils were purely conditional; WilmslOW' Urban District Council had 
favoured a pennanent alte:mative road not affected by landings or take-
offs, but was satisfied that the proposals could \\Urk as a temporary 
expedient. Cheshire sought guarantees that if the road closure was 
implemanted it should be subject to rigid safety neasures for road 
users and air traffic alike. The only fun.danEntal opposition to 
proposals came fran individuals who felt that they \\Uuld be adversely 
affected by the proposals. Owner occupiers of Higher Mainwocx:l Fann 
argued that the proposals \\Uuld rrake the fann an uneconanic unit and 
that there would be no access to fann buildings or the fannhouse 
although they were prepared to negotiate with the Corporation for the 
purchase of their fann. The Corporation again clashed with J and A 
Jackson Limited because the boundaries of land ONIled by the finn 
fronted, in part, onto the lengths of the highway concerned. The 
canp:my argued that the stopping up of the A538 would deprive it of 
access and that hardship and loss would be inflicted on the carpmy 
unless an alte:mative route could be found. However, once again the 
company was defeated by the Corporation's argumant that the temporary 
roadway across the rtm-up area might cause SarE inconvenience, but 
would not materially affect the business. (92) 
It seems then that the developrent of Manchester Airport in the 
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1950s excited relatively little public opposition with objections to 
developIEIlt tending to be restricted to those who felt that airport 
developnent was threatening their livelihoods. However, the next 
decade of developnent was accanpanied by fierce opposition enanating 
fran a much wider base of representation - including local interest 
groups and local authorities who perceived the airport making 
unjustifiable encroachments on the surrounding area. The increasing 
use of large jet aircraft at Manchester and the drawing up of 
provisional plans for develop:nent, provoked a growing public awareness 
of the potential conflict which existed between airport owners and the 
cc:mmmity. 
By the end of 1960, the AiIp:>rt Ccmnittee of the Manchester City 
Council had hecana concerned that the remunerative trans-Atlantic 
traffic, which provided about 50% of the airport's incana fran landing 
fees, could be lost if airlines sought to withdraw their services 
because of the need for large jet aircraft to operate under a weight 
penalty. Initially extension of the nain runway to 10,500 feet was 
considered as a means of surnounting this difficulty. The extension 
could again be acccmrodated wholly to the south west projecting into 
the Bollin Valley, cul verting a section of the river, filling in the 
valley and placing the Altrincham - Wilmslow road into a tunnel under 
the nmway extension. Alternatively, the runway could be extended at 
each end providing 1,500 feet at the south west end and 2,000 feet at 
the north eastern end. (93) Extension to the north east would have 
brought the threshold of the runway to within 600 feet of Ringway Road, 
the clearances required v.uuld have necessitated the diversion and 
partial closure of the road and 206 dwellings, a school and the Airport 
Hotel would have had to be denolished. (94) The Corporation was 
reluctant to denolish property wi thin its area and did not wish to 
bring the runway much nearer to hares, including those on the fringe of 
the Wythenshawe housing estate. Again extension in a south westerly 
direction offered the advantage that it would allow for future runway 
extensions and so on 1 February 1961, the City Council gave the go-
ahead for a south westerly extension of the nain runway at a cost of 
£3~ million. (95) 
Although these original plans for developtEIlt were shelved in the 
interests of econany, they had already aroused strong public feeling. 
When plans vvere nodified to provide an extension to 9,000 feet in a 
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south \\'esterly direction as shown in Figure 4.3 ( 1964) , they were 
viewed with suspicion and engendered opposition fran local authorities 
and interest groups as well as private individuals. Much conceDl was 
voiCErl regarding the future intentions of the Corporation in respect of 
airport developnent. 13cM:ion DOC stressed. that if the proposal to 
extend to 9,000 feet carne to fruition, this could lead to further 
extension aver the River Bollin. (96) Hale DOC similarly expressed. the 
view that it was not convinced. that the Corporation had abandoned. the 
desire to extend aver the River and regarded. proposals to extend to 
9,000 feet as "only the first bite" to be followa:i and used. as 
justification for further extension across the valley. The original 
proposals for an extension to 10,500 feet coupled. with the planning 
application to extend to 9,000 feet were descri.ba1 as a "psychological 
trap" being an example of the "technique of demanding the whole cake in 
order to make a demand for half the cake seem reasonable" . The Council 
did not consider the current application to be Manchester's "last 
territorial demand" for nmway extension, and appealed to the Cheshire 
County Council not to grant planning pennission. 
"It is the opinion of the Hale DOC that the Cheshire County Council 
has a unique opportunity to strike a blow for peace and quiet and 
the rights of the individual by refusing the application; if this 
opportunity is not taken it will be lost forever and will result in 
an unjustifiable risk of the erosion of the amenities and viability 
of the area of Hale VOC." (97) 
In essence, the plea made by the Hale DOC to Cheshire reflected the 
ultimate conCeDl regarding the runway extension which was the likely 
effect of the increase in aircraft noise. The Council expected. 
increased. noise nuisance, especially in the easteDl part of the 
district, the southeDl half of which contained. sema of the IIDSt 
valuable rrodeDl properties developed in the post-war era. It was 
feared that the rrere reputation for excessive aircraft noise in the 
area would reduce property values and so cause a substantial reduction 
in rateable values. (98) 
The Clerk of the 13cM:ion DOC expressed similar views, maintaining 
that the extension of the nmway would in itself indicate an increase 
in the operation of large jet aircraft which could !lean an increase in 
aircraft noise aver a wide area likely to include the district of 
~on. Once the longer runway was available its use could grow far 
beyond that originally envisaged, notwithstanding any possible 
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undertakings to keep noise within acceptable limits. (99) Finally, the 
DOCs of Knutsford and Wilmslow also made their conceDl about the 
possibility of increased noise nuisance fran heavier loads carried by 
aircraft known to officers of the Cheshire County Council. Wilmslow in 
fact urged that there should be no further extensions to nmways at 
Manchester Airport and suggested that the County Council should 
reccmrend the use of Burtonwooci as an international airport instead of 
Ringway. (100) 
The position of Cheshire County Council regarding the proposals for 
runway extension was sCXIEWhat ambivalent which may have reflected a 
conflict of interest between supporting the views of its constituent 
districts, whilst taking the wider visv of what would be in the best 
interests of the County as a whole. An article in the Evening 
Chronicle of 14 March 1962 quoted a Cheshire County Councillor, 
Lieutenant-Ccmnander Bruce Butcher thus, 
"We all know Manchester's ambition. They would probably take over 
all Cheshire if they got the chance. . . We don't want to appear a 
batch of red flag wavers stopping progress. But we must do 
sarething about the increasing noise. . . No doubt the things will 
be taking off vertically and flying backwards within the next ten 
years - but we want to curb the noise IIEnace now." 
However, the Guardian of 31 July 1964, referred to Lieutenant-
Ccmnander Butcher telling nanbers of the Cheshire County Council that 
the North West bad! y needed the extension of Manchester Aiport if it 
was going to keep in the forefront of air traffic and air tenninals, 
adding that no objection should be raised as long as the Corporation 
provided sufficient landscaping protection around the Bollin Valley. 
Although local councils rrountErl stiff opposition to proposals, 
public awareness was also heightenErl by the activities of interest 
groups, particularly ratepayers' associations. As early as April 1960, 
the Ratepayers' Associations of Heald Green and Hale Barns and the 
Federation of Manchester Ratepayers' Associations, representing rrore 
than 30,000 ratepayers in the area, had callErl for a ban on the 
operation of Boeing 707s at Manchester Airport, alleging that 
Manchester's prestige anong international airports had taken priority 
over the interests of people who would suffer noise nuisance fran the 
aircraft. (101) 'lWo years later, facErl with the prospect of further 
runway extension to accamodate the nee:is of these aircraft, the Heald 
Green and Hale Baros Associations net with the Handforth Ratepayers' 
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Association to spearhead opposition. Other groups were also active, 
such as the "Cicero Circle", an independent political research society 
based in Cheshire, which maintained that the Manchester schE!IE was 
inspired by "a certain am::mnt of political ambition". (102) 
A new departure in organising opposition was ushered in when these 
interest groups joined with the local authorities to fonn the North 
East Cheshire Confederation, described as a "fight Manchester" 
organisation which a..irrB:i to quell any ambitions Manchester had of 
developing Ringway for trans-Atlantic air services. ( 103 ) The 
Confederation, representing a wide base of public opinion, viewed. the 
fact that aircraft operators ~re expanding their jet fleets with srne 
trepidation - drawing upon recent experience at the wndon Airport. It 
was alleged that at wndon excessive noise affected not only the line 
of flight on the extended runway, but also areas several miles away 
fran the airport, and that an inordinate increase in noise intensity 
had far exceeded anything envisaged by the Wilson Ccmnittee which had 
investigated the problem in 1961. Despite pranises and undertakings 
given by the airline operators and airport operators to keep noise 
within acceptable limits by, for example, a ban on night flights, 
IIEasures had been whittled away in the interests of "econcmic" 
operation. (104) 
As the runway controversy of the 1960s centred upon the problem of 
aircraft noise it was characterised by another issue, that of general 
concern for the enviroI1TIEIlt. The Cheshire Conservation Trust, whilst 
being tolerant of the schE!IE in principle, registered its concern to 
protect a nature reserve known as the Cotterill Clough CcMard Mem:::>rial 
Reserve. The Trust considered the actual reserve area and the two anus 
of wocxied valley extending towards the existing Al trincham - Wilmslow 
Road to be an ecological unit, and they suggested that any interference 
with the natural rrovement of wildlife of any kind up or down the valley 
would destroy the scientific interest and essential nature of the 
reserve area. The Nature Conservancy also stipulated various 
conditions for the diversion of the A538 to ensure that the scientific 
interest of Cotterill Clough would not be impaired. (105) 
Finally, in addition to this opposition to the extension of 
Manchester Airport's main runway to 9,000 feet , private individuals 
affected by the scheme registered. their own objections. The business 
of J and A Jackson Limited was once rrore to be affected by developrent 
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proposals as all of the 142.95 acres of land covered b¥ the City of 
Manchester (Airport Extension) Nmnber 'Ihree Canpulsory Purchase Order 
was owned. either by this canpany or its subsidiary, Oversley Ford 
Brickworks Limited.. The Corporation proposed to canpulsoril y purchase 
all land owned. by Jacksons, even though strictly speaking this was rrore 
than that required to accarm:xiate the nmway extension. When part of 
Jackson's land had been acquired in 1958, the Corporation had been told 
that it 'WOuld be preferable for any future canpulsory purchase orders 
to include all land. (106) 
Apart fran the land on which the brickworks stood, 10.75 acres of 
the land. proposed. for canpulsory purchase foDIEd part of Oversley Ford 
Fann which ccmprised. a total holding of 80 acres, and which was nm as 
a mixed. fann. Basically, the proposed ne;...r road to accarm:xiate the 
runway extension effectively split the holding in two, leaving the 
majority of land on the opposite side of the ne;...r roadway to fann 
buildings and fixed. equipnent. It was alleged that the construction of 
the ne;...r road \YOuld also adversely affect the drainage of part of the 
fann. The rerrainder of the land which was the subject of the 
canpulsory purchase order foDIEd part of Cherry Tree Fann, a tenanted 
87 acre holding, run in con junction with Cherry Tree Farm, Yru:wood 
Heath, Altrincham. Cherry Tree Farm was also nm as a mixed fann 
carrying a milking stock of about 50 head. About half of the land 
affected. was ploughed. in rotation and the remainder was used for dairy 
cattle and beef cattle. Again, the main concern expressed was the 
effect that the Corporation's proposals 'WOuld have on access. Although 
only the four parties mentioned. were directly affected. b¥ the 
canpulsory purchase order, it should be noted that other fanns had been 
involved. in land. acquisition, although it had been possible to acquire 
the necessary land by ag:reem:mt (107). Details of these properties are 
provided. in Table 4.6. 
Given that objections had been raised. to the carpllsory purchase 
order, it was again necessary to hold a public inquiry. At the 
inquiry, conducted. by Mr R F F Williams for the Ministry of Housing and 
IDeal Government and the Ministry of Civil Aviation, George carman, 
representing the Councils of Hale and 13ch."don, whose areas lay wi thin 
three and a half and four and a half miles of the runway, asked. the 
public inquiry whether the Manchester Corporation was seeking the 
status symbol of an international airport and naintainerl that the 
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Corporation had failed to prove the necessity for the runway extension 
which was at heart a prestige project. According to CaI:m:m, the 
Corporation was basing its case on inference as there was no evidence 
to suggest that the absence of the extension would prove a serious 
inconvenience to trans-Atlantic passengers. He asked, "Is the Minister 
satisfied that this extension is really necessary? If it is, for wham 
is it really necessary?" On the subject of noise levels at the aiport 
it was argued that, "There are legitimate grounds for people to fear 
that the noise nay grow insidiously and regularly year by year." (108) 
Mr P H Oswald, the Assistant Regional Officer of the Nature 
Conservancy, gave evidence to suggest that the nain concern of this 
organisation was that the road diversion required by the schene should 
not follCM along an ann of Cotterill Clough as geological features 
would be obscured by the road diversion as proposed. and a rare fern 
would be lost. (109) 
Counsel for J A Jackson suggested. that the ccmpulsory purchase order 
could be confimed so long as it was limited. to the area of 43 acres 
actually required and Jacksons \'\l'8re left free to work the renaining 
land. It was argued that this was not a unreasonable request. The 
brickworks had been established. in 1927, long before the airport and 
since then much rebuilding and reconstruction had taken place. In 
addition, it was pointed. out that the Ministry of Works had requested. 
increasErl brick production of 600 million bricks per annum. The 
working life of the area still to be excavated. was estimatErl at 20 
years, whereas if the ccmpulsory purchase of the total 143 acres was 
confimed, this would on! y leave a period of five years for continued. 
excavation. (110) 
Putting the case for the Corporation, Mr C A Marsh, the Deputy Town 
Clerk, described the proposErl extension of the main runway as 
"reasonable", and argued. that it was justified by the increasing volurre 
of passengers on trans-Atlantic services which, during the last three 
years, had doublErl fram 25,000 to 50,000. It was held that the airport 
was not operating at its :rraximum efficiency because its main runway was 
too short. In respect of the claims roode by Jacksons, the Corporation 
maintainErl that the loss of brick production would not constitute a 
"major disaster" as the objectors owned several other factories in 
South lancashire and Cheshire and the output of 200 million bricks per 
annum for Oversley Ford was only a fraction of the total. (111) 
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In answering the contentions that the runway extension ~d 
increase noise levels thereby affecting property values, it was 
suggested that fran the earliest days when extension of the main runway 
had became a possibility, it had been realised that the problem of 
noise would loc:m large in any local inquiry so the Airport Corrmi ttee 
had camlissioned Dr G E Bell, OBE, consultant in acoustics to examine 
the problem. Dr Bell gave evidence to the inquiry to the effect that 
given the runway schema proposed, the landing threshold at the north 
east end VVGuld stay in its existing position and noise fran an aircraft 
landing over property in the area would, therefore, not be expected to 
be any different fran that applying at the tine. Although the 
extension VVGuld allow turbo-jet aircraft like the Boeing 707 and OC8 to 
take-off carrying a naximum ~ight of 290,000 pounds rather than the 
existing 260,000 pounds, it was suggested that the lower rate of climb 
necessitated by increased ~ight would be unlikely to increase noise 
because the start of take-off would be at a p:>int further away frcm the 
north easterly area. In general, Bell concluded that turbo-jet 
aircraft of ~ights up to 290,000 pounds at take-off could use the 
proposed extended runway with little or no change in the noise pattern 
around the airport, and that only over a very narrow track directly 
under the flight path VVGuld the noise of aircraft be slightly 
increased. (112) 
Mr Frank IDngcion, the City Estates and Valuation Officer, gave his 
viev.r of the likelihood of airport developnent affecting property values 
in the area, 
"While I have no doubt there are SOllE people who would consider the 
noise fran aircraft to be a depreciating factor, there are nany 
others who find a great convenience in living near Manchester 
Airport. ( 113 ) 
According to lDngcion, airport workers , especially those on shift 
VVGrk, who could not rely on public transport, would display this 
preference, along with a nmnber of executives who needed to ccmnute 
between various British cities and abroad. "The demand they create does 
carp:msate for those people to whan aircraft noise is a nuisance" (114) 
Apparently, where houses had been built for sale, they had been sold 
without difficulty and nany had since been resold by their original 
owners easily and without any apparent drop in price. Four properties 
in Heald Green which had been sold since March 1960 were taken as 
examples and it was stated. that these properties had sustained. a 57.3% 
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increase in value over approxilnatel y five years. In contrast, an index 
of housing prices for December 1961 had shown that in the North West, 
the average increase since December 1959 had been in the region of 35 
to 39% (115) 
Finally, whilst arguing that airport developrEllt would not generally 
be hannful to the residents in its environs, the Corporation recognisEd 
that nonetheless in view of claims alleging a rOO.uction of amani ty, 
disturbance of privacy and. despoilation of the countryside, it was 
clear that a conflict of interest had arisen between the residents and 
the City Council in seeking to provide adequate facilities for a 
densely populatEd and highly industrialisEd area which the airport 
served. However, in weighing the argu:rren.ts, it was suggestEd that "due 
weight should be given to the interests of the larger nmnber involved" 
(116) 
At the end of the day , only limitEd recognition was given to the 
strong opposition which had been voicErl at the public inquiry . 
Jacksons were successful in achieving a rOO.uction to 43 acres of land 
to be acquired, but the only other change fran the original plan was a 
suggestion that the line of the A538 diversion be slightly rrodifiEd to 
reduce its effect on the Cotterill Clough nature reserve. The HOUSing 
Minister, Richard Crossmm, agreed with the inquiry's Inspector that 
the ilnportance of the :North West in the nation's econClT¥ justifiEd the 
provision of facilities for direct flights to Arrerica. Although the 
nmnbers making those flights at the time were canparatively srrall it 
was felt essential that consideration be given to the future needs of 
the industrial and ccmrercial interests of the North. Also, whilst 
appreciating the natural concern of local people regarding the 
possibility of increasEd noise, the Minister again agreed with the 
conclusions of the inquiry that on the evidence suhni tted it was 
unlikely that the runway extension ~d give rise to any significant 
increase in noise fran heavier jet aircraft. (117) 
The granting of planning pennission on 17 February 1966, naturally 
engendered disappointment - especially arrong the :rrenbers of the Hale 
and Hale Barns Ratepayers' Association. Referring to the suggestion to 
reduce the effect on Cotterill Clough, a spokesmm for the Association 
asserted, 
"It would appear that wildlife has rrore priority than the nany 
thousands of people who will be affected by noise. . . We don't 
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accept the Minister's statemmt of the unlikelihood of noise being 
increased." (118) 
With the opening of the 9,000 foot runway on 7 January 1969, the 
Corporation had generally satisfied the needs of the airlines operating 
through Manchester Airport aver the next decade. Although a further 
extension of 200 feet was added at the north easterly end in August of 
the sarre year, this was constructed in order to maximise runway 
utilisation. Basically, the airfield pattern which had existed after 
the canpletion of the extension to 9,000 feet had one serious 
deficiency in that runway access and the turning arrangarents at the 
north east end were inadequate. 900 feet of the runway projected 
beyond the taxiway system and the turning pan for a Boeing 707 had been 
provided at the end. This rreant that an airline wishing to use the 
full length of the runway had to backtrack 900 feet and turn through 
180 degrees on the runway in the turning pan, thereby seriously 
restricting runway capacity at peak hours. In order to increase runway 
utilisation, what was required was the extension of the taxiway systan 
to the end of the existing runway. At the north east end of the 
runway, developrent had not quite reached its limit and it was felt 
that a further 200 feet could be added with little difficulty. As the 
taxiway system required developrent, it was deemad prudent to extend 
the runway to its ultimate limit at the sarre ti.nE. (119) 
Following a period of planning and rapid developtEllt of the main 
runway at Manchester Airport, projecting fran the mid 1950s into the 
next decade, sufficient runway length had been provided for the heavier 
turbo- jet aircraft to operate without penalty across the Atlantic, and 
in the 1970s there was a lull in runway construction activity. 
Nevertheless the period was characterised by growing discontent on the 
part of local residents regarding the intrusion of aircraft noise. By 
the 1970s the noise problem had becare rrore intensified with the 
increasing incidence of night jet rrovemmts during the surrrrer peak 
period between April and October, as detailed in Table 4. 7 . 
In essence, the problem of night jet rrovemmts reflected. the dilemra 
which had dogged the Airport Ccmnittee for sc:xre tine. A desire to 
maintain good relations with local residents had to be balanced against 
the contrary requirarEnts of airline operators wishing to maximise 
aircraft utilisation and, indeed, against the financial interests of 
the airport itself. For example, in refusing airline and tour 
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operators' dem:mds for 1,000 extra night flights in 1970, the Ccmnittee 
faced a potential lost revenue of £50,000 in the following year. (120) 
The clash of interests between airlines and the airport on the one hand 
and local residents on the other became sarething of a regular 
phencm:mon. For example, in 1969 prior to the knowlerlge of estimaterl 
demand from the airlines, a provisional limit of 2,250 night jet 
IlDVE!tE11ts had been set by the Airport Carmittee for April to October 
1970 which had been baserl upon a projection fran the previous year's 
actual IlDVE!tE11ts of 2,186. Havever, in the face of airline operators' 
dem:mds for 3,400 flights between the hours of 11.3Opn and 6. OOam, this 
was reviserl upwards to 2,750. (121) 
Manchester Airport at the tine was unique in offering a nmnber of 
nightly jet freighter services to the major ccmnercial centres of 
Eu:rope and the North Amarican continent, so providing a facility for 
the region's industry. (122) The Airport Carmittee was anxious that 
these air freight scherlules should be interfered with as little as 
possible in view of the asset which they representerl to trade (the 
value of freight handlerl in 1968 being £77 million) and the region's 
export business. It was, therefore deciderl that two thirds of the 
2,750 night :rrovemants be allocaterl to freighters with the reduction 
being shouldered by tour operators offering Inclusive '!bur holidays and 
charter aircraft. Holiday tour operators at Manchester estimaterl that 
this limit could potentially affect the holidays of up to 8,000 people. 
Clearly the demands of airline operators had been limiterl in the 
interest of residents around the aiport, but still much dissatisfaction 
was voicerl over a wide spectrum. Ronald Stenson, Secretary of the 
special aircraft noise carmittee fo:r:m:rl by the Heald Green Ratepayers' 
Association, regarderl the reoammendation as a major blow to its 7,000 
rrenbers. (123) Representatives of the Marple Ratepayers' Association 
describe::l night flights as "irresponsible and anti -social acti vi ties" 
inflicting "misery and suffering" accusing the Airport Ccmnittee of 
displaying "a callous disregard for the ordinary conveniences of life". 
( 124 ) Mr R A Law, Chair of the Cheadle Hu.lrrE Residents' Association in 
a letter to the Airport Director, Jack JackrrEn suggesterl 
"If you are not satisfierl at this tine that disturbErl sleep is a 
social in justice, I challenge you to advise me of your hare 
telephone number so that residents may nake their protests to you at 
the appropriate tine next sUlIllEr" (125) 
At the meeting of the City Council on 3 DecEmber 1969, where the 
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limit was to be ratified, Councillor Brian Williams said of the AirIx>rt 
Carmittee, 
"They are turning Wythensha1f11e, Moss Nook and Heald Green into an 
audible slum. There is need for nore rigid procedures to ensure 
pilots do not exceed noise limits on take off" (126) 
However, the nove to stop the AirIx>rt Cc:mni ttee increasing the 
nmnber of night flights by 500 was defeated 59 votes to 24 and the 
Cheadle Hulme Residents' Association interpreted the Council decision 
as once again showing that it was prepared to put "econcmics" first. 
(127) 
Faced with the powerful lobby of the airlines, the scattered 
interest groups which had attempted to influence the decision-making 
processes in respect of Manchester AirIx>rt, began to form separate 
specialist organisations specifically concentrating on the airport and 
its impact on the ccmmmity. For example, the Moss Nook AirIx>rt Action 
Carmi ttee was fonned representing the interests of the people resident 
in Heald Green, Cheadle and Gatley, Styal and Wythenshawe. The 
Manchester AirIx>rt Joint Action Council was also fornai representing a 
consortium of the Manchester Federation of Owner Occupiers, the 
Woodhouse Park AirIx>rt Action Group, the Moss Nook and District 
Ratepayers' Association and the Styal Village FellCMShip. Such groups 
1f11ere active in pressing for reductions in rent and rates and the 
provision of sound proofing grants for those living in close proximity 
to the airport. (128) However, it is interesting to note that whilst 
there was clearly opposition to night jet flights at Manchester 
Airport, perceptions as to how the problem should be dealt with varied 
between different groups largely dependent upon whether complainants 
resided within the City or not. For example, the Wcxxlhouse Park Anti-
Noise Association had planned little militant action in response to the 
decision to increase night novements at the airport, but concentrated 
its efforts nore upon achieving a reduction in the local rates to 
compensate for noise disturbance. Initially, 52 residents su1:::mitted an 
application to the Rates Tribunal, and by 1971 nore than 1,500 
householders living near Ringway had achieved reductions in rateable 
values set by the Inland Revenue Valuation Officer, of between 10% for 
houses closest to the airport and 2 to 3% for those farthest away. 
(129) In contrast, the Heald Green Ratepayers' Association's Noise 
Sub-Ccmnittee called for a "war" and a "plan of unified action", and in 
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their efforts were supported by the Cheadle and Gatley Council which 
enphasised the fact that because Ringway was "privately" owned, the 
Manchester Corporation alone was responsible for deciding if a noise 
nuisance existed, and maintained that reports on the effects of noise 
at the aiport had been limited canpared with those carried out at 
Heathrow, one of the largest airports operated by the British .A:i.rpJrts 
Authority and thereby subject to Board of Trade noise control. (130) 
As far as the Cheadle and Gatley Council is concerned the position 
of the Corporation had been adequately daronstrated as early as 1966 
when the DOC had requested the support of the City Council in an 
approach to the Minister of Aviation to secure the introduction of 
legislation relating to the insulation of houses in the Heald Green 
area, similar to the provisions of the .A:i.rpJrt Authority Act, 1965 in 
relation to land around Heathrow .A:i.rpJrt. The City Council had 
maintained that the noise problem as it existed did not justify 
insulation and that it would be unreasonable to expect an airport 
authority to initiate action, which would involve them in considerable 
expense. In effect, the Manchester Corporation was under no obligation 
to introduce a sound proofing scheme which would involve it as owners 
of the aiport in shouldering the expense, in contrast to the position 
at Heathrow where the cost of grants was met from taxation. (131) 
Given the lack of infonnation regarding noise disturbance, the 
Cheadle and Gatley Public Health Departnent published its own report on 
noise from aircraft using Manchester .A:i.rpJrt in October 1969. This 
report showed that 35% of daytine flights measurerl were louder that the 
limit enforced at Heathrow. The report concluded that aircraft noise 
in the district was a serious environmantal health problem and was 
increasing. ( 132) It was suggested that as the frequency of aircraft 
nove:rents was a significant element in the total noise nuisance, it was 
certain that the problem would increase severely unless action was 
taken to minimise it. The report also speculated that the increasing 
use of B7 4 7 aircraft \\1Ould increase the noise at ground level 
underneath the main flight path. As there seared to be little 
possibility of limiting the noise nuisance to its existing level in the 
period before the introduction of quieter aircraft, it was recamended 
that the airport owner should lay down and vigorously enforce noise 
abatement procedures. Procedures suggested includerl power cut-back by 
aeroplanes taking off over Heald Green to produce a noise abatement 
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climb over the district; rroni toring noise levels at the fringe of the 
district to ensure that they net limits not higher than those laid down 
at Gatwick and Heathrow; and finally the establishrrEnt and publication 
of rrdnimum noise routes. (133) 
Whilst locally interest groups began to fonn larger collective 
cohesive organisations, and local councils began to collect their awn 
data on the noise problem, central goverrment cane increasingly to 
recognise that there was a need to set up fonral structures for local 
consultation and this culminated in the provisions of Clause 8 of the 
Civil Aviation Act, 1968 which specified that aercx:lrane managarent were 
to: 
"provide for users of the aerc.rlrarE for any local authority (or if 
the person managing the aercx:lrane is a local authority, for any 
other local authority) in whose area the aercx:lrane is situated or 
whose area is in the neighbourhood of the aer<JdranE, and for any 
other organisation representing the interests of persons concerned 
with the locality in which the aercx:lrane is situated, adequate 
facilities for consultation with respect to any ma.tter concerning 
the managerrEl1.t or administration of the aercx:lrane which affects 
their interests" ( 134 ) 
In the face of the likelihood that the BoaJ:d of trade would 
designate Manchester Airport as one of 12 aerc.rlrarEs (including the 
local authority owned Binningham, Fast Midlands, Glarrorgan, Glasgow, 
leeds/Bradford, Luton, PortsrroUth' Shoreham, Southend and NoIWich) 
where provisions were required for consultation with local interests, 
the Airport Ccmnittee decided to infonn the BoaJ:d of Trade in March 
1969 that the Corporation would welcare designation of Manchester 
Airport under Section 8 of the Act. Subject to designation the 
Corporation had approved terms of reference and a constitution for the 
consultative ccmnittee at Manchester Aiport. Pending a fonral Order 
under Section 8, a ccmnittee on infornal lines and without legal status 
was set up. The proposed tenus of reference for the Ccmnittee were 
wide-ranging and the ccmnittee was charged with advising the Manchester 
City Council of any matter which they might refer to the ccmnittee; 
considering any question in connection with the problems of the airport 
as they affected carmunities and persons represented on the ccmnittee; 
naking suggestions to the Airport Director on any matter connected with 
the administration of the airport which could further the interests of 
the carmunities and persons represented; and, finally, to stimulate the 
interests of the local population in the developrent of the airport. 
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(135) The constitution of the Consultative Carmittee at its inception 
involved both airport "booster" groups and opposition groups as listed 
in Appendix 4.3. 
Much of the effort of the Consultative Carmittee was devoted to 
devising :rreasures to curb aircraft noise, praroting a schEm3 for sound. 
proofing grants, and advising the City Council on appropriate limits on 
night jet flights. However, difficulties E!l'Erged regarding the role 
and constitution of the carmittee fran the outset. After an initial 
flood of applications, the Cheshire non-county boroughs were admitted 
to the Ccmnittee along with the Heald Green and IDng Lane Ratepayers' 
Association, but membership of the Moss Nook was turned down to avoid 
the ccmnittee becaning too large. It was argued that the Heald Green 
and IDng Lane Ratepayers' Association could act as a channel of 
camrunication for the Moss Nook area supplementing the existing 
representation which was afforded via City Councillors. The refusal of 
membership for the Moss Nook ONner Occupiers' Association was passed to 
the full City Council for consideration but an anendment to the effect 
that nenbership should be granted was defeated 43 votes to 32. 
Ul timatel y , an appeal was made to the Air Minister, Goronwy Roberts, 
but it was pointed out that the Board of Trade was not empowered under 
the Civil Aviation .Act to prescribe who should or should not be 
represented on Consul tati ve Carmi ttees . ( 136 ) 
As the work of the Carmittee progressed, it was increasingly clear 
that within certain circles it was regarded as a powerless institution. 
The fact that the Carmittee had no executive powers was a bone of 
contention. For example, when the decision had been taken to allow 
2,700 night jet novem:mts for the SurmEr of 1971, the Consultative 
Ccmnittee had maintained that such decision was null and void by virtue 
of the fact that it had not been consulted on the matter. ~, 
airport management maintained that in reality there was no statutory 
obligation to consult the Carmittee. (137) The Cheadle and Gatley 
Council which regarded its area as the rrost affected by noise charged 
the "watchdog" Consultative Carmittee with having "no teeth" in curbing 
noise and stopping the unrestricted growth of the airport. Elsewhere 
it was maintained that the Carmi ttee could be assured that if any of 
its proposals ~re deemed to be hannful or likely to hinder the 
"econanic muscle" of the airport, they would be ignored. ( 138 ) 
The Cheadle and Gatley Council in particular increasingly pursued 
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its objectives independently. For example, being dissatisfied with the 
reduction of night flights fran 4,000 to 3,250 in 1973, the Council 
called for a total ban on StnllTEr night jet flights out of Ringway. 
( 139 ) However, calls for a total ban on night jet IIOVEmaIlts at 
Manchester Airport had the effect of splitting the anti-noise lobby, 
because of the possible effects on airport employmant. Councillor 
Keith Roberts, the Labour representative for Woodhouse Park, who had 
been a leading light in the novement in the past said, 
"I'm against the increase in sumner charter flights but I am also 
against any attempt to ban night jet flights at the airport (it 
should be remembered that) there are 3,000 people ~rking at the 
airport and 1,000 of than live in Wythenshawe" (140) 
The call for a ban on night jet flights also aroused the hostilities 
of the Trade Unions. The 'IGWU backed the views of Councillor Roberts, 
opposing the restriction of aircraft IIOVEmaIlts during the hours of 
darkness: 
"such restrictions can have a drastic effect on the present labour 
force by causing serious reductions in manpower required and in the 
loss of traffic on a permanent basis. For example, it is estimated 
that approximately 750 employees are at present required to service 
night flights. It is known that not nore than 10% of present 
traffic could be transferred to day t.i.ne operations which ~uld 
require on! Y 50 employees to transfer fran night to day work. The 
other 700 \VOuld be surplus to requirements, thus further increasing 
serious unemployrrent in this area." (141 ) 
Whilst the Consultative Committee may be criticised for 
ineffectiveness, it is clear that to sare degree the local carmruni ty 
was successful in increasing the public awareness of the problan of 
aircraft noise and in influencing the City Council as airport owner to 
take appropriate measures to minimise its effect. 
Although the report on noise canpiled by the Cheadle and Gatley 
Public Health Deparbnant in 1969 had been disputed by the Airport 
Carmi ttee, nevertheless, it is likely that this publication had been 
instrurr¥:mtal in encouraging the Ccmni ttee to anbark upon its own noise 
study - with the intention of publishing minimum noise routes and 
applying to Parliament for powers to provide sound proofing grants. 
( 142) Mclaren, Ward and Partners had been ccmnissioned to carry out 
the study and published interim conclusions in the latter part of 1970 
which confirmed the major findings of the Cheadle and Gatley report. 
It was found that a significant number of private houses were exposed 
to noise which "may be regardErl as unacceptable in tenns of daylight 
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stan.daJ:ds" . The level of noise at the south east end. of the Woodhouse 
Park Estate was deened so great that the Consultants urged the 
Corporation to provide alternative acccmroda.tion or other cc:xrpensation. 
Special attention was suggested for the Ringway Road area of Moss Nook 
because of the constant exposure to noise which might be detrinEntal to 
health. It was recarmended that the IDndon airports limits on noise 
should be applied at Manchester, and that a scheme for the sOillld 
proofing of hares similar to that operating at Heat.hI:ow be established. 
Finally, an autanatic rronitoring system was deaned to be an essential 
elem:mt in assisting the control of noise nade by aircraft landing and 
taking off with night flying being increasingly restricted to quieter 
aircraft. (143) 
Arising out of the conclusions of the report of McLaren, Ward and 
Partners, and under continuing pressure fran the Consultative 
Ccmnittee, Manchester Corporation praroted a Bill in the 1970/71 
session of Parliament to enable it to pay grants of up to 90% towards 
the cost of insulation of dwellings in the vicinity of any aercx:irc:m3 or 
landing site under its ownership. The Bill also ~ any local 
authority with part of its area included in the scheme to contribute 
towards the costs incurred by the Corporation, a clause which was 
supported by the Cheshire County COilllcil which in 1973 agreed to make a 
30% contribution towards the actual cost of grants in the case of 142 
properties in Wilmslew and Bucklew falling within the new Cheshire 
County boundary. ( 144 ) 
Supplem:mting such measures to canpensate for the effects of 
aircraft noise, the Planning Ccmnittee of the City COilllcil in 1971 
intrcx:luced a scheme to restrict developnant near the airport with 
control being based on a noise zones nap prepared by independent 
consultants. All developnen.t was to be banned in areas where the NNI 
was over 60 which included part of Wocxihouse Park, Moss Nook and 
Ringway Road, in the 50-60 NNI zone which included the rest of 
Woodhouse Park and a section of Peel Hall, only carmercial developnants 
and schools with sound proofing were to be pennitted. (145) In the 
same year, penal measures to force pilots to adhere to laid down noise 
abatem:mt procedures 'Were considered, but it was felt that the greatest 
iroprovarent would be achieved with the co-operation of pilots and 
airline canpanies so it was decided to publish a nonthly noise bulletin 
for circulation to every airline canpany using the airport, allowing 
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ccmparison of achieverren.ts or otheIWise between canpanies using the 
same types of aircraft equiprent. The element of canpetition 
introduced succeeded in reducing the average noise levels by just under 
3 PNjB by the mid 1970s and the percentage of infringements similarly 
reduced fran 2.1% to 0.56% By 1975 a "Quiet Jet Rebate Schare" had 
been introduced offering a 20% rebate in landing fees for aircraft 
rreeting noise certification standards and aChieving reduced noise level 
readings at appropriate m:::mitoring points. (146) 
In addition, the introduction of Standard Instn:arent Departure 
Routes was agreed with the CAA designed to route aircraft away fran the 
IIDst heavily built-up areas and nom taring positions were decided on 
this basis. All departing jet aircraft and any others over 12,500 
pounds maximum total weight (ie all airlines) had to adhere to these 
routes unless instructed otheIWise by Air Traffic Control or required 
in the interests of safety to, for example, avoid a thunderstann. (147) 
By the late 1970s, the great public outcry of an earlier decade had 
dissipated. It is likely that the introduction of quieter aircraft and 
the various noise abatement measures introduced by the airport 
authority contributed towards this effect. Although the issue was to 
remain a bone of contention at future stages of airport developrEIlt, 
opposition was not so widespread. This nay have reflected a tendency 
towards a IIDre general acceptance of airport developrEIlt on the part of 
the local community and a greater awareness of the positive 
extemali ties of airport operation. HaNeVer, it is argued that whilst 
this nay be true of local authorities and other institutions in the 
local ccmnuni ty , the lack of opposition fran local interest groups, 
particularly those representing residents, was probably nore reflective 
of the fact that developrer1t in later years was percei veri as involving 
a lesser cost in terms of aircraft noise and generally placed greater 
danands on the ecology of the area. 
With the increasing developnent of long haul routes and the 
expectation of growth in traffic to the Middle East, West Africa and 
the US interior, (destinations which were beyond the reach of direct 
non-stop services fran Manchester Airport), runway extension again 
became a necessity in the late 1970s if the opportunities to expand 
traffic were to be grasped. Existing long haul services operated by 
Boeing 747 and 707 aircraft and OC10 and OC8s suffered penalties in 
range of between 350 and 700 nautical miles and/or in payload of 
315 
between 60 and 145 passengers and the only way of overcaning these 
penalties was to extend the runway by a further 800 feet. The total 
area covered by the developnent plan was 130. 6 acres, 52.3% of which 
was in Cheshire. ( 148) 
This proposed extension, as shawn in Figure 4.3 (1982), involved 
much more complex considerations in terms of landscape and 
environm:mtal impact than anything which· had preceded it, although 
there is a parallel with the tentative plans for a 10,500 feet runway 
which had been drawn up in 1960, also involving traversing the River 
Bollin. It was estimated that over a two year construction pericxi, 1.6 
million tons of naterial would be requirerl to cross the expanse of the 
Bollin. One million tons of boulder clay and narl were to be taken 
fran a "borrowpit" and transported via internal airport roads. In the 
borrowpi t area it was proposed that a gently sloping pasture area would 
be created with additional tree planting around the periphery on 
canpletion of the excavation works. The renaining 600,000 tonnes of 
sandstone or gritstone requirerl was to be transported frcm areas in 
Greater Manchester such as Rossendale and B:icup. The Bollin River 
required diversion into an open channel in a curved sweep around the 
foot of the ne;.v valley anbankrnent with the new aliCJI1lIEIlt being on the 
lines of the river's natural flow. Although the scheme involved the 
loss of existing wocx:iland, it was proposed that banks should be fomed 
by sheet steel piles and gabions with typical vegetation fonning a 
disguise. At the foot of the anbankrnent, in order to give access for 
naintenance and emergency vehicles, a bridge was to be fonned . Finally 
a localiser area or radar and navigational installation needed to be 
installed on the south western side of the river valley on agricultural 
land. Although potentially this area and perineter fencing could have 
been a harsh intrusion into the rural scene, it was decided that its 
impact could be lessened by additional tree planting. (149) 
'!he runway extension involved land to the South and South West of 
the airport which fell within the North Cheshire Green Belt and was 
included in the draft Green Belt Subject Plan for Cheshire. The Green 
Belt across North Cheshire had, by the late 1970s, been supplE!lETlted by 
a proposal in the County Structure Plan to designate the Bollin Valley 
an Area of Special County Value in recognition of its high landscape 
value, as shawn in Figure 4.2 (1988). Planning policies within such 
areas were restrictive, that is , prohibiting any housing, industrial or 
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carmercial developte1t in order to safeguard the essential landscape, 
ecological or archaeological characteristics. ( 150) 
Although initially declared a county rratter, the Secretary of State 
for Envirol1ITEl1.t "called in" the planning application to satisfy himself 
that the developnent proposed was acceptable - bearing in mind that it 
required a departure fran the approved Developte1t Plan in which the 
land was shawn as an area where existing land would remain undisturbed. 
The probable effect on the North Cheshire Green Belt and the existing 
landscape , especially the Bollin Valley, had to be considered. The 
problan of site access fran the A538 for contractors' vehicles also 
warranted consideration, along with the general environmantal issues 
:regarding noise and air pollution, the necessity for the proposal and 
the camrunity benefit which was likely to accrue. (151) 
In attempting to assess the likely reaction to the runway extension 
98 national, regional and local organisations \'¥ere advise:i of the 
planning application including Governmant departrrEnts and Parish 
Councils. As a result of the publicity, 84 letters \'Vere received by 
the Airport Authority, 11 supporting the developnent and the rerraining 
73 lodging objections :rrainl y for reasons of noise and disturbance from 
aircraft and surface traffic. (152) 
Whilst the Cheshire County Council received carmants fran various 
borough and parish councils affecte:i by the developnent and fran other 
interested parties including the Nature Conservancy Council, the 
Cotterill Clough Nature Reserve, the Countryside Ccmnission, the Bollin 
Valley Steering Ccmnittee, the North West water Authority, Civil 
Aviation Authority, the National Trust, the Council for the Protection 
of Rural England, the Styal Action Association and Friends of the 
Earth, only the latter organisation oppose:i the proposals in principle 
because with the depletion of energy resources, it was regardErl unwise 
to encourage the expansion of air travel. (153) 
As far as the rrore imre:liatel y affectErl institutions are concerne:i, 
in contrast to the views expresse:i in earlier years, objections \'¥ere 
tempered by an appreciation of the airport's role in the local econcmy. 
For example, the Wilmslow DOC highlightErl the fact that the Council and 
the City had workErl in close hanrony, "for the good inhabitants of the 
respective districts" ( 154 ) 
Whilst concerned about the possibility of increase:i noise and 
expressing a desire to preserve so far as possible the aneni. ties which 
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the area en joyed, the Council also expressed a willingness not to take 
any action which would interfere with the status which Manchester 
Airport had achieved. ( 155 ) The Macclesfield Borough Council, which 
represented the district plarming authority for all of that part of the 
application site which fell within the County of Cheshire, purely asked 
that the Airport Authority give attention to the need to minimise the 
effect of constructional traffic and the transporting of lirrEstone 
surfacing materials, by making use of the noto:rway system and rail 
network. The only other concern expressed was that the visual impact 
of the extension on the surrounding area be lessened by landscaping and 
tree planting in the Bollin Valley, around the borrowpit and the 
localiser areas. (156) 
Fran the County viewpoint, Cheshire was obviously conscious of the 
need to protect the envirol1m3Il.t, as suggested by the Green Belt policy 
which reflected the need to protect agricultural land in the County 
which was being lost at the rate of 2,500 acres per annum. HOwever, 
the County Structure Plan also contained objectives and strategies 
directly relevant to the developnent of Manchester Airport. Broad 
objectives included the strengthening of the econany of Cheshire, the 
North West region and the nation whilst providing for the basic 
employment needs of Cheshire's inhabitants. The staterent of 
employment policy in the Structure Plan made specific reference to 
Manchester Airport, 
"One major advantage (in the prarotion of enploynen.t and econanic 
growth) is the proximity of Manchester Airport with its growing 
international status. It is easily accessible via the noto:rway 
network fran nost parts of Cheshire. It is a stinrulant to 
employment growth over a wide area . . . Manchester Airport itself 
could provide an extra 3, 000 to 6, 000 jobs before 1986" (157) 
A further broad objective of the County was the developIBlt of a 
carq;>rehensi ve transport system to provide for increased accessibility 
and the efficient :m:wemant of goods. Again the transport strategy 
section of the Structure Plan recognised the value of Manchester 
Airport in the context of Cheshire's transport network, 
"Cheshire does not have an airport, but relies on the services of 
Ringway and Speke. The strategy is to support services at these 
existing airports" ( 158 ) 
This appreciation of the significant econcmic role which the airport 
had assUIl'Ed was supported by certain local interest groups as well. As 
a result of tentative plans to construct a second main runway at 
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Manchester, the Styal Action Association had been forna:i in 1971. In 
1973, the responsibility for representing the interest of the people of 
the village had passed. to the Styal Action Association. Whilst the 
Association naintained. that, in principle, Manchester Airport was badly 
sited. in respect of urban residential developrEIlt, it also accepted 
that the airport was a successful enterprise providing ernploynent for a 
large nmnber of people as well as services and facilities for rrany 
holiday and business travellers to and fran the North West. On 
balance, whilst not -welccming further intrusion into the Bollin Valley, 
the Association did not oppose the 800 foot extension. (159) 
Although on this occasion IIDst objections to developrEIlt were purely 
conditional, they still had to be aired at a public inquiry and, in 
ccmron with past experience, the issue of aircraft noise asstmEd 
greatest praninence and was the IIDst technically difficult area to be 
deal t with. The Authority again appointed. Mclaren, Ward and Co to 
produce evidence regarding the incidence of noise at the airport and 
their study concluded. that in tenns of the NNI contours there would be 
little change in the level of noise experienced to the north and west 
of the airport, whilst to the east and north east it was likely that 
SCIIE improvement would be registered. Similarly to the south west 
there would be very little change except for a minimal worsening of 
conditions when occasionally heavier aircraft would take off in the 
direction of Knutsfond. (160) 
In dealing with the general concern that increased. air traffic 
itself rather than the use of heavier aircraft would increase noise 
levels, it was concluded. that any increase in traffic would be m:xiest 
as with the continued. introduction of larger aircraft the number of 
aircraft movements would not increase in direct proportion to 
passengers. In essence then it was argued. whilst certain cc:mnuni ties 
around Knutsfond, Mobberley and parts of the Stoclqx:>rt Borough already 
faced. persistent noise disruption, the noise clinate would not be 
worsened. by the runway extension. 
As regands the problem of potential air pollution fran airport 
operation, this had been investigated. as early as 1974 and studies 
suggested. that the pollution generated. by Manchester Airport was 
insignificant canpared. with estinates of urban pollution emissions 
emanating fran Manchester as a whole. On this basis, the Airport 
Authority argued that claims in respect of increased air pollution were 
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unfounded. (161) 
CooIplaints regarding the runway extension's effect on agricultural 
interests largely centred around the absolute loss of agricultural land 
which would be involved. However, the Authority again argued that in 
terms of total acreage available, the anount cla.ima::i by the airport was 
insignificant as substantiated by the fact that when consul ted about 
the application, the Ministry of Agriculture had lodged no objection. 
As far as enviromnental impact is conce:med, the Airport Authority 
admitted that the proposal would initially have a detrimantal effect 
upon the existing landscape and upon the appearance of the land 
designated for the localiser strip, but it was argued that these 
effects would be mitigated by the provision of a canprehensive 
landscaping schare which in the vicinity of the end of the runway 'WOUld 
improve vegetation cover. (162) 
Finally, in respect of the potential road traffic problen created by 
the transport of 0.6 million tons of material to the site which implied 
one round trip of a twenty tonne lorry every ten minutes during the two 
year construction period, it was maintained that the scale of the 
problem depended largely upon sources. Supplies fran North Manchester 
could be transported via the IIDtOrway network whilst supplies fran 
Derbyshire and sites to the east and north east of Macclesfield would 
have to be carried via "A" roads which \\Jere already congested. ( 163 ) 
Set against these issues was the Airport Authority's justification for 
the proposal and ilnfx>rtance of an efficient, developed airport to the 
econany of the region which constituted a major employer. Evidence 
produced at the Inquiry suggested that although the greater 
concentration of the airport's business catchnent area fell within 
Greater Manchester, businessmen fran Lancashire , Liverpool, Yorkshire, 
Binningham, Scotland and Northe:m Ireland \\Jere also frequent users of 
the airport. Perhaps the overriding consideration was that in catering 
for this darand, British and overseas airlines had been reticent to 
ccmnit themselves to ccmnencing new services without a thorough 
investigation of their carmercial viability which was being held up 
until completion of the runway scheme. (164) Following the hearing of 
the views of all interested prrties, in 1980 planning pennission was 
granted and the runway extension to 10,000 feet was canpleted in 1982. 
Clearly, the developreI1t of Manchester Airport has net with stiff 
opposition fran individuals and insti tutions within the inm:rliate 
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locale. Whilst objections to developrent in the 1950s were largely 
limited to private individuals :i.mra::liatel y affected by proposals, by 
the next decade fierce opposition was e:nanating frcm a wide base of 
representation reflecting the grcwing general public awareness of the 
potential conflict between airp:>rts and the ccmnuni ty. Whilst frcm the 
end of the 1960s there was little activity in runway developrEnt, the 
increasing scale of activity with the institution of night jet 
IllJVEm3Ilts resulted in further deterioration in ccmnuni ty relations and 
fostered the fornation of specialist canpllgn groups directing their 
efforts exclusively to the question of disarrenity arising fran airport 
operation. However, despite the consolidation of opposition, efforts 
to curtail the developrent process were fruitless as the needs of the 
regional econarw and industrial/ ccmnercial interests took priority. 
The institution of forrral consul tati ve arrangarents may be regarded 
as purely a palliative to those groups who found their efforts to 
curtail developrent frustrated. However, although having no legal 
status, it is likely that the Consultative Ccmnittee did influence the 
ae:rcx::irare owner in encouraging the institution of rreasures to mitigate 
the effects of aircraft noise. 
The very establishIrEnt of fornal consultative procedures, and the 
introduction of quieter jets, etc, and noise abatarent rreasures, may 
have helped to quell opposition. In addition, a greater awareness of 
the positive externalities of airport operation may have effected a 
change in ccmnunity attitude by the 1980s. By this time airport 
operation had probably transfonned what had been in the past a 
predcminantl y rural area into one where industrial and cCJI([OOrcial 
interests held sway. Thus objectives which had been or overriding 
significance in the past, such as the protection of agricultural 
interests, assumed a secondary importance to the stimulation of 
econcmic growth. However, it is argued that the major contributory 
factor accounting for the lack of opposition to nore recent developren.t 
has been the perception that such developrent involved. :rni.ninal costs to 
the carmuni ty in tenns of aircraft noise. 
4.5 <nOlJSlCES 
The siting of a local authority airport outside the boundaries of 
the authority in which ownership was vested neant that the question of 
airport developrent was :i.mra::liatel y associated with the broader issues 
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relating to the general spread of ITEtropolitan areas into the 
surrounding ccmnuni ty. '!he rural carmuni ty surrounding Manchester 
Airport regarded developtalt as an additional intrusion into their 
domain as increasingly rural areas had already been transfornrad by 
other demands fran the urban area such as housing over-spill. Early 
reconis suggest that the Manchester Corporation was cognisant of the 
likely reaction to proposals for an airport sited in Cheshire in that 
consultation was limited and initial investigations were carried out in 
a covert m:mner . Although the siting of Manchester's airport outside 
the city boundaries could have been a negative factor in developrEIlt, 
it is argued that on balance ownership by a large municipal authority 
was decisive in defeating the early opposition of individuals and 
institutions which regarded thansel ves as bearing the costs of 
developnent in tenns of loss of aITEnity. Essentially, the opposition 
levelled against the Ringway proposal in the 1930s suggested that the 
interests of a large city authority claiming to represent an extensive 
industrial and crnmarcial ccmnunity would always take priority over any 
other consideration. Future opposition v.uuld be costly and futile. 
Inevitably, the ownership of an airport outside the Manchester 
Corporation' s administrative area eventually involved the question of 
ultimate incorporation of land into the City given the canplexities of 
airport operation and the suggestion that it was only equitable that 
ratepayers who had borne the direct rate burden arising out of 
developrEIlt W3re entitled to the benefit of the attendant increase in 
rateable values of land. In the event, the settle1EIlt of this issue 
bore little direct relation to airport operation and was rrore the 
outcare of a desire to recognise that the differentiation be~ 
"town" and "country" was becaning blurred given the needs of a "rrodem" 
econaI¥. 
In the face of rrounting opposition fran a wider representative base 
in the 1960s, fornal consultative arrangements were instituted. 
However , it is argued that the influence of the local ccmnuni ty in 
decision rraking processes renained :miniJnal. In balancing the needs of 
the local residents, interest groups and authorities on the one hand-
and those of the airlines and their custClIErs on the other , generally 
the econanic lobby of the airlines ou~ighed ccmnunity interests. 
Whilst opposition to airport developrent was fruitless, it is 
equally clear that the role of "airport bJoster" groups in praroting 
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developrent was limited. Whilst the Manchester Chamber of Carm:rrce 
dem::mstrated a reluctance to offer support in the 1920s and 1930s, 
being primarily concerned with minimising the rate burden, the 
Lancashire Aero Club assunai the role of "booster" group. H~r, 
such support was again limited as the Club prevaricated when confronted 
with the uncertainty which characterised future .requireIrEnts. In 
subsequent years, when it became apparent that airport operation was a 
viable proposition, an era of close collaboration be~ the City 
authorities and the Chamber was ushered in. H~, this was short-
lived as the Airport Carmittee became increasingly wary of the 
noti vations of the Chamber and IlDre conscious of its independent 
responsibility as ae:r::oclrare owner for p:rcm::>ting a developrent process 
fran which it could gain both in tenus of prestige and finance. 
Generally, it is argued that as far as the airport in its inmadiate 
locale is concerned, despite the incidence of externalities, the local 
camnmity has been neither a positive nor negative influence as the 
aspirations of a large municipal authority and the needs of the econany 
have taken precedence. 
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Figure 4.1 
THE ORIGINAL RINGWAY AIRPORT SITE AS PROPOSED IN 1934 
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Table 4.la 
PLN:E OF RESIDHCE OF Em'.UJYEES OF 1W'IlIESl'ER CIJUUmTICti AIRRRl' 
DEPARIMENI', 1956 
~ AUrHORITY EMPIDYEFS 
Bucklew ROC 6 
Cheadle and Gatley DOC 12 
Stockport 4 
Stretford 4 
Sale DOC 5 
Alderley Edge DOC 2 
Willnslew DOC 9 
Hale DOC 3 
Altrincham 12 
Unnston 2 
Hollingsworth (Cheshire) 1 
Manchester 110 
'Ibtal Staff and Industrial Employees: 170 
Source: Manchester Corporation Airport Depart::rrent, 1 March 1956 




ARFAS OF RE.SID~ OF EMPIDYEFS 00' '!HE AIRRRI.'« 1956 
Ia::AL AurHORITY 








Alderley Edge un 
Bredbury and Raniley un 
Cheadle and Gatley un 
Hale un 
Knutsford un 
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Source: Manchester Corporation Airport Depart::nent, 1 March 1956 and 
Town Clerk's Depart::nent (P) Town Hall, Manchester, 29 March 
1956. 
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~ ~ 1NID 'IHEJR LCCAL AIJ1KRITY AREAS 'ill 1955 
I II 
r..cx:AL I ACr OR ORDER II~~~)I AERODRCME AurHORITY AIJI'HORISrn:; EXTENSION 
Bristol Bristol COlmty Somerset and Bristol 32 
(Whitchurch) Borough (Alteration of Boundaries) 
Order, 1951 
Carlisle Carlisle County I 
Carlisle Extension Act, II 350 I (Kingston) Borough 1950 
Ipswich Ipswich County East Suffolk Review Order, (214) 
Borough 1934. East Suffolk and (58) 
Ipswich (Alteration of 
Boundaries) Order, 1952 272 
I 
Liverp::x:>l I 
Li verp::x:>l I 
Li verpcx:>l Extension Order, II 284 I (Speke) County Borough 1932 
Plyrrouth Plyrrouth County I 
Plyrrouth Extension Act, II 
85 I (Rodlx:>rough) Borough 1950 
Luton Luton Borough MinistJ:y of Health 368 
Provisional Orders 
Confirmation (Luton 
Extension) Act, 1939 
Source: In Parliament session 1955-56, Manchester Corporation Bill, Schedule of 
Municip::il Aercx:lrc:xres in England and Wales which are within the area of 
the IDeal Authority by which they were provided as a result of the 





ST.AT:EmNr OF UES.ES IN '!HE AREA OF '!HE CIX1NI'Y OF OiESI'ER AND 01HER 
COUNTIES 1891/1955 
AREA CHFSHIRE lANCASHIRE DERBYSHIRE YORKS/WEST 
RIDrN; 
Acres in 
1891 646,027 1,124,450 654,100 1,701,386 
Acres in 
1955 621,825 1,033,479 635,456 1,609,761 
Area lDst 
to the County 24,202 90,971 18,644 91,625 
% 3.75 8.09 2.85 5.39 
Table 4.4b 
<IJnlARATIVE mPUlATICH; OF '!HE CHESHIRE COONrY '!HE 1WCIESTER CITY 
AND '!HE 'DI) DISIRICIS INVOLVED IN :r:tUJUlrnATICB 1911 1955 
AREA 1911 1921 1931 1951 1955 
Cheshire (a) 
Admin 676,275 625,227 675,190 824,438 840,200 
County 
Manchester (a) 
City 714,333 730,307 766,333 703,175 692,200 
Willnslow (b) 
Urban 8,153 8,282 9,760 19,531 19,450 
District 
Bucklow (a) (c) 





Under the Manchester Extension Act, 1930, a population of 5,467 
fO:rIlErl y in the Rural District of Bucklew was included in the 
City. 
Under the County of Chester Review Order, 1936, the Wilmslew 
Urban District was enlarged by 2,604 acres and population 
increased by 2,802. 
Under the County of Chester Review Order, 1936, the area of 
Bucklow Rural District was reduced by 5,208 acres and 
population reduced by 16,803. 
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Table 4.4c 
EFFECT OF PRlJlUiID ~<E <E AREA, RJPUl..ATICE AND RATFABLE 
VAUJE <E '!HE rnESHIRE <IX1Nl'Y 
AREA POPUlATION RATEABLE 
(Acres) VALUE £ 
Existing 621,825 840,200 9,791,916 
After deduction 
of incorporated 620,641 9,766,895 
areas 
Sources: Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Camtission on IDeal 
Government, Part IV Ordnance Survey Depart::rrent; Census of 
Population Reports; Registrar General's Estimates of the 
Population of England and Wales at 30 June 1955 reprcx:iuced 




AUIHORITY SITE CAPACITY 
Cheshire Bredbury and Raniley tID (Goyt Valley) 260 
Bredbury and Raniley tID (Bredbury Green) 320 
Cheadle and Gatley tID (two sites) 350 
Hazel Grove and Bramhall tID 420 
Knutsfo:r::d tID 250 
Marple tID (two sites) 600 
Bucklow RD (Partington) 1,250 
Sale MB 400 
Wilmslow tID 800 
Stalybridge MB 850 
Hyde MD and lDngendale tID (Hattersley) 4,000 
lDngendale tID (Hollingsworth) 1,000 
* 10,500 
Derbyshire Glossop MB (Hadfield) 350 
lancashire Middleton MB (langley) 4,639 
Whitefield tID 1,970 
~MB 1,715 
8,324 
* Cheshire also offered sites at Congleton, Crewe, Macclesfield and 
Sandbach but the Corporation only agreed to consider sites at Crewe 
(3,500) and Macclesfield (4,500) 
Source: In Parliamentary Session 1955 - 56, Manchester Corporation 
Bill, Brief of Prcm:>ters, Accarp:mying Doc 41 Note on 






<Dfi'ITUEN.l' ux:AL AI1.lHIUTIES OF mE mJIH FAST IMO\SHIRE SPEOAL 
RE.VlHi AREA, 1962 
County Boroughs: 
Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport. 
Non-County Boroughs: 
Alderley Edge, Audenshaw, BcJr..rlon, Bredbury and Ramiley, Chadderton, 
Cheadle and Gatley, Crampton, Denton, Droylsden, Failsworth, Hale, 
Hazel Grove and Bramhall, Horwich, 1rlam, Kearsley, Ises, 
Li ttleborough, Little Lever, Marple, Milnrow, Royton, 'Ibttington, 









) In rural district of Bucklow 
) 
Source: IDeal GovernIIEIlt Act, 1958, The IDeal Goverrment Ccmnission 
Regulations, 1958, South East Lancashire Special Review Area, 
Secretary HF Surrmars, DS064325/4/341M 5/62XL. 
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AppeIrlix 4.2 


















































Source: Air Transport Licensing Authority, Application of Railway Air 
Services Limited. to operate be~ London and Glasgow with 
intennediate landings. Proof of evidence of Mr HA Baerlein, 





Land owned by Manchester Corporation 
Land to be acquired 
Land owned by Jackson's Brickworks 
Prepared strip 
Originally reserved for future expansion 
Proposed diversion of A538 
.. {!} .. Temporary diversion of A538 along taxiway 
.··m··· Corporation proposal of A538 in tunnel 






RUNWAY EX'lnlSlOO AT ~TER AIRroRr 
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Table 4.6 
IAND AaJ)ISITIOO BY ..AGR:EEmNr F(R EX'l'ENSlCE OF 1WOiESl'ER 
1\IRRRI" S MAIN RUNNAY 'ill 9,000 FEEl' 
HOLDThG ACREAGE 
Oak Farm 217 
Clough Bank Farm 77 
Castle Mill Farm 131 
LIVFS'Ia:K 
78 Dairy Cattle 
21 Beef Cattle 
110 Sheep 
40 Dairy Cattle 
and Follc:w::rrs 
34 Beef Cattle 
150 Poultry 
45 Dairy Stock 




Source: Bellyse and Eric Smith, Solicitors, Nantwich, Cheshire, 24 
December 1964 Proposed extension of main runway and ancillary 
works and pennanent diversion of the Wilmslow to Altrincham 
Road (A538) and Mill lime, Manchester Airport (Ringway) for the 
Manchester City Council 
Table 4.7 
GIUmI OF NIGflr JRr ~ AT 1WDIESl'ER AIRPCRr 1966-78 
YEAR LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF NIGEfi' AIRCRAFr MOVEMENrS --
APRIL 'ID OC'IDBER 







1974 3,250 3,000 250 
1976 3,100 2,750 350 
1977 3,100 2,700 400 
1978 3,100 2,700 400 
Source: Canpiled fran Manchester Airport Carmi ttee and MIAA minutes 
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Apperrli.x 4.3 
MAl«lIESI'ER AIRPCRl' <XmULTATIVE ClHfiTrEE, 1969 
ORGANISATION NUMBER OF REPRFSENrATIVES 
Cheshire County Council 4 
Stockport CBC 1 
Bar,rlon DOC 1 
Cheadle and Gatley DOC 1 
Hale DOC 1 
Hazel Grove and Bramhall DOC 1 
Knutsfo:rd DOC 1 
Wilmslew DOC 1 
Bucklew ROC 1 
Macclesfield ROC 1 
Manchester Chamber of Carmarce 1 
CBI North Western Regional Council 1 
North West Econanic Planning Council 1 
Airline Operators' Ccmnittee - Manchester Airport 1 
Manchester and Salfo:rd Trades Council 1 
Cheshire Federation of Ratepayers 1 
ABTA 1 
Source: Manchester Airport, Annual Report, 1969. 
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1 Ministry of Health, IDeal Inquiry, 1934. Air Navigation .Act 
1920; Public WOrks Facilities Act 1930· Local Government .Act' 
19~3 Proposed Airport for Manchester Corporation at Ringway: 
Br~ef on behalf of Cheshire ComIty COllllcil the Urban District 
COllllcils. of Altrincham, Alderley Edge, Bowd~, Hale, Handforth, 
Sale, W~lmslew and Bucklew Rural District COllllcil (MA PIC 
Archive) . 
2 Manchester Guardian, 12 May, 1934, see also Evening Chronicle, 
27 Jlllle 1934. 
3 Evening Chronicle, 28 July, 1934. 
4 Manchester Evening News, 26 July, 1934. 
5 Ministry of Health Iocal Inquiry, 1934 Brief on behalf of 
Cheshire COllllty COllllcil, the Urban District Councils of 
Altrincham, Alderley Edge, Bowdon, Hale, Handforth, Sale, 
Wilmslew and Bucklew Rural District COllllcil, op cit. 
6 Objections were lodged with the Secretary of State on the 
following dates: 
North Cheshire Regional Planning Carmittee - 9 August 1934 
Alderley Edge DOC - 16 August 1934 
Bucklew ROC - 16 August 1934 
Hale DOC - 9 August 1934 
Ringway Parish COllllcil - 10 August 1934 
Wilmslew DOC - 10 August 1934 
~on DOC - 14 August 1934 
Cheshire COllllty COllllcil - 14 August 1934 
Sale DOC - 15 August 1934 
Handforth DOC - 16 August 1934 
7 This argumant figured prcminentl y in the objections lodged by 
the North Cheshire Regional Planning Carmittee, Alderley Edge 
DOC and Bucklew ROC situated in the COllllty of Cheshire and the 
Cheshire COllllty COllllcil itself. 
8 Alderley Edge DOC and Bucklow ROC questioned the role of the 
airport scheme in creating enployrrent at the tine, going 
against the implicit assmnption regarding airport developrer1t. 
Generally, throughout the period of developrEIlt of the civil 
air transport industry, airports have t~ded to be regarded. as 
rna jor sources of enployrrent and econam.c growth, a contention 
supported by central government and other policy naking 
339 
institutions. For example, in 1969 the Edwards Carmittee held 
that II inq;>roved air services are an essential elarent of the 
:p:>licies needed to increase the rate of econanic growth in the 
areas with which they are concerned. II In 1981 observers 
within the EEC reported that, lithe provision of new'services is 
an ilnportant aspect of employment generation in regional 
developIeTl.t." (European parliamant, Working Docurrent 1-
553/81, 5 October 1981). Analysis of the .impact of airport 
developrer1t on emplayrrent has suggested that jobs nay be 
created in construction, in airport operation, in airport 
associated acti vi ties and in stimulating the growth of existing 
and new industries within a locality. Different fonns of 
anplayrrent generation have been identified including direct, 
associated and indirect employment which nay be quantifiable 
and induced anplayrrent resulting fran an improved business 
climate consequent u:p:>n the expansion of air services which is 
largely unquantifiable. It should be stressed however, that 
conclusions have tended to be implicit with Ii ttle analysis 
having been undertaken regarding the role of individual UK 
airports in anplayrrent generation and Manchester AiIport is no 
exception to this general rule . Although, direct, associated 
and indirect anplayrrent nay be quantifiable in theory, in 
practice data sources tend to be inadequate. Tables la and lb 
provide very limited data regarding the place of residence of 
anployees for one year, 1956, and although no finn conclusions 
may be drawn fran this, data suggests that in respect of the 
Airport Depa.rtrrEnt itself, the labour force tended to be 
recruited fran the Manchester area. In this sense then, the 
contentions of Alderley Edge and Bucklew nay be supported. 
However, as far as anployment generation on the airport site is 
conce:med, a much wider catchmant area was involved suggesting 
that displaced agricultural workers may have found 
op:p:>rtunities for anployment on site. 
9 See corres:p:>ndence between W Cobbett, Clerk to Alderley Edge 
DOC, Cheshire, and the Secretary of State for Air, IDndon, 16 
August 1934; W C Jennings, Clerk to the Bucklew ROC, to the 
Secretary, Air Ministry, IDndon, 16 August 1934, and Geoffrey C 
Scringeour, Clerk to the County Council, Chester, to the 
Secretary, Air Ministry, IDndon SWl, 14 August 1934 (MA PIC 
Archive) . 
10 Ministry of Health IDeal Inquiry, 1934, op cit see also 




Manchester Guardian, 19 October 1934. 
Manchester Guardian, 10 October 1934. 
Manchester Guardian, 27 July 1934, see also 9 October 1934, op 
cit, see also, Manchester Evening News 26 July 1934. 
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14 Evening Chronicle, 8 August 1934. 
15 Extract fran the proceedings of the IDeal Inquiry held in the 
Town ~l, Manchester, 9 - 19 October 1934, in connection with 
the Cl ty of Manchester (Ringway Airport) Canpulsory Purchase 
Order, 1934, fifth day (MA PIC Archive) . 
16 ibid, sixth day. 
17 Manchester Corp:>ration Bill - Note on the Farly Extensions of 
the Boundary of the City (MA PIC Archive). 
18 Ministry of Health IDeal Inquiry, 1934, op cit, Transcript of 
shorthand notes of proceedings, see also Daily Dispatch, 10 
January 1935. 
19 Parliamentary debates, House of Camons, Vol 298 No 53. 
20 City of Manchester (Ringway Airport) Canpulsory Purchase OI:d.er, 
1934. In the High Court of Justice, Kings Bench Division, 
Brief for Manchester Corporation, May 1935 (MA PIC Archive). 
21 City of Manchester (Ringway Airport) Canpulsory Purchase OI:d.er, 
1934. Appeal against the Order confirnEd by the Secretary of 
State for Air on 8 February 1935. Brief on behalf of Cheshire 
County Council, the UDCs of Altrincham, Alderley Edge, Bawdon, 
Hale, Handforth, Sale, Wilroslaw, the ROC of Bucklaw and Mr 
Henry Phillips Greg. pp 5 - 8 (MA PIC Archive). 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid 
24 Parliamentary Debates, House of Cc:mrons, Vol 298, No 53, 5 
March 1935 (Col 2134 - 2136), see also the High Court. of 
Justice, Kings Bench Division, Royal Courts of Justlce, 
Manchester, 27 March 1935 before Mr Justice Branson, City of 
Manchester (Ringway Airport) Canpulsory Purchase Order, 1934. 
In the matter of an appeal against the City of Manchester 
(Ringway Airport) Canpulsory Purchase order, 1934 and in the 
matter of the Public Works Facilities Act, 1930, shorthand 
notes, judgE!IEI1t (MA PIC Archive) . 
25 Manchester Evening News, 9 February 1935; Stockport Advertiser, 
15 February 1935; Manchester Guardian, 6 June 1935. 
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26 C~ty of Manchestm:, Airport Ccmni.ttee, 3 June 1965. Manchester 
Airport - Extenslon of Main Runway Schema "F" Diversion of 
Wilmslew - Altrincham Road, A538. Bettennent contribution fran 
Cheshire County Council (MA PIC Archive). 
27 City of Manchester, Airport Ccmnittee 8 March 1956 Report 
fran the City Surveyor "Green Belt in' Cheshire", 16 February 
1956 (MA PIC Archive). 
28 City of Manchester, Airport Carmittee, 9 Septanber 1965, 
Manchester Airport - Collection of Refuse, Report fran the 
Airport Director, 2 Septanber 1965, see also Wythensha~ 
Express, 15 October 1958 and City Treasurer's Dep:rrt:m:mt 
Bucklew RDC and Manchester Corporation - Sewage .Agreenent 
(Drainage of Manchester Airport) (MA PIC Archive). 
29 Rating Assessrrents covered all properties at Manchester Airport 
in Manchester Corporation or their tenants' occup3.tion. Fran 
an examination of the Rating Assessrrents for Manchester Airport 
subnitted to the Airport Ccmnittee, it is clear that the 
Bucklew ROC and Wilmslew UOC accrued increased rate inCaTe fran 
developrB1t. For example, the rateable value of that portion 
of the Airport which was in Bucklow ROC was increased fran 
£17,750 to £18,350 in 1960/61 as a result of the use of the 
additional 1,100 feet of stopway. In the financial year 1961/2 
rateable value for the area falling wi thin Bucklow ROC was 
increased to £19,684 and rateable value for that part of the 
airport falling wi thin the jurisdiction of the Wilmslow UOC was 
increased fran £250 to £280 as a result of the granting of 
tenancies to occupy the tenninal building. 
30 Manchester Evening News, 28 June 1955 and 15 Novanber 1955, see 
also Manchester Guardian, 20 January 1956. 
31 Correspondence, PB Dingle, Tarm Clerk, Manchester Corporation 
to the Clerk, Cheshire County Council, Chester - Manchester 
(Ringway) Airport, 5 October 1955 (MA PIC Archive), see also 
Manchester Evening News, 12 July 1956. 
32 Manchester Evening News, 15 November 1955, see also Manchester 
Guardian, 16 November 1955 and 19 Novanber 1955. 
33 Altrincham, Hale and 13avrlon Guardian, 17 February 1956 and 20 
July 1956, see also Manchester Guardian, 19 January 1956. 
34 Evening Chronicle, 13 July 1956. 
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35 Manchester Evening News, 12 July 1956. 
36 Altrincham, Hale and BcM:ion Guardian, 18 May 1956. 
37 In. ParlianEI1.tary Session 1956, Manchester Co:rporation Bill, 
Brlef for the Praroters, Accanpanying documan.t 41 note on 
Manchester's over-spill prepared b¥ PB Dingle, ~ Clerk of 





42 IDeal Government Ccmnission for England, South East Lancashire 
Review Area, Statemant of Draft Proposals, DecEmber 1965 (MA 
PLC Archive), see also Robert Nicholls, Estates Depart.mant, 
Manchester Airport PIc oral evidence 6 January 1991. 
43 Hansard, 11 June 1969, Royal Ccmnission on IDeal Govermrent 
(Redcliffe-Maud Report) Col 1460 - 61, see also Communication, 
Airport Director, Manchester Airport to the TcMn Clerk, 
Manchester, Report of Royal Ccmnission on IDeal Governmant in 
England, 18 July 1969. 
44 Oral evidence, Robert Nicholls, Estates Departm:mt, Manchester 
Airport PIc, 6 Januru:y 1991. 
45 Correspondence, Clerk of the Council, Wilroslow UDC, to the Town 
Clerk, Manchester - IDeal GoveIl1IIEIlt Re-organisation, 17 May 
1971 (MA PLC Archive). 
46 Robinson, Brian R, "Aviation in Manchester, A Short History", 
op cit. 
47 Correspondence, John F IBeming to P M Heath, Esq., Town Clerk's 
Departmant, Manchester, 24 Januru:y 1928 (MA PI£ Archive). 
















Manchester Guantian, 28 January 1928. 
Correspondence, John F Ieeming, Lancashire Aero Club, to the 
lDrd Mayor, Manchester, 27 Februaxy 1928 (MA PIC Archive). 
Minutes of Manchester Corporation's Parliamentary Sub-
Ccmnittee, 14 March 1928 (MA PIC Archive). 
Manchester Corporation, Parliamentary Sub-Carmittee Report of 
Proceedings, 27 Septenber 1928 (MA PIC Archive) . 
Extract '''Ibe Aeroplane", 30 October 1929. 
Correspondence, Alan Gocx:lfellow to F E Warbreck-Howell, Town 
Clerk, Manchester, 17 Mary 1934 (MA PIC Archive). 
Airport Committee: Visit to Manchester Airport of 
Representatives of the Manchester Chamber of Camerce and the 
Fe:ieration of British Industries, 30 June 1958, short history 
of the Manchester Chamber of CcmrErce (MA PIC Archive). 
Correspondence, Secretary, Manchester Chamber of Cc::xrnerce, to 
the lDrd Mayor, Manchester, 17 April 1928 (MA PIC Archive). 
Extract "The Aeroplane", 30 October 1929. 
Correspondence, F E Warbreck-Howell, Town Clerk, Manchester, to 
the Secretary, Manchester Chamber of CcmrErce, 12 June 1929 (MA 
PIC Archive). 
Robinson, Brian R, "Aviation in Manchester", see also meeting 
between the President of the Manchester Chamber of CcmrErce and 
John F I.Bemi.ng, 2 December 1928. 
Robinson, Brian R, op cit. 
The Development of the Manchester (Ringway) Airport, A 
Mem:>randum on Policy drawn up by the Air Transport Carmittee of 

















Air Transport Licensing Authority, application of Railway Air 
~rvices. Limited . to operate between IDndon and GlasgCM with 
mternvadiate landings. Proof of Evidence of Mr H A Baerlein 
Manc~ester Chamber of Ccmrerce, HCNE/EH, 6 January 1939 (MA PIi:. 
Archive) . 
The Developrent of Manchester (Ringway) Airport, Manchester 
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5.1 INlR(J){CI'I(E 
The prllnary aim of Chapter Five is to examine the evolution of 
central government p:>licy regan:ling the planning, ownership and 
financing of UK airp:>rts. Dlphasis is placed upon the nature and 
direction of such p:>licy and its .iJnplications for Manchester Airport. 
This Chapter charts the historical developnent of central government 
policy with a view to detennining whether the airport was specifically 
singled out for special treatment within the broader UK netwurk. 
In Chapter Three it was argued that although municipal ownership 
structures could have constituted. a constraining factor in airport 
developnent, this appears not to have been the case at Manchester 
Airport. Whilst particular objectives may be set at the local level of 
ownership and management, as previously suggested., any ai1:pOrt operates 
within a canplex institutional framework canprising the civil air 
transp:>rt industry, which involves a degree of regulation generally not 
found elsewhere. The forces of central government are influential 
within this structure, although such influence may be exercised. either 
directly or at ann's length - depending up:>n the extent to which a 
laissez-faire or strictly regulated. and controlled approach is deemad 
rrore appropriate. 
This chapter is divided. into twu main sections reflecting the notion 
that whilst airport planning structures may have .iJnplications for 
ownership, the planning function does not necessarily influence either 
financial p:>licies or decisions as to whether airport operations should 
be subsidised in the fonn of central proviSion of particular services 
(such as air traffic control or by direct grant-aid). Indeed, because 
of the difficulties involved in executing developnent plans on a 
national scale within an industry which is canplex and subject to rapid 
change, the planning function may be relegated. to a p:>si tion of 
secondary importance. HCMeVer, this does not necessarily .iJnpl y the 
ab:lication of central government involvement and support in financial 
support. 
Generally, it is argued. that during the period of developnent of 
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airport facilities in Manchester, central government policy regarding 
the plarming and ownership of the network of UK airports has been 
equivocal and prevaricatory. Central government has been reluctant to 
play a leading role in detennining the structure of the UK airport 
systan, reflecting the inherent difficulties of the planning function 
(largely the outcane of the factors involved in airport operation 
highlighted earlier). However, whilst the central planning of airport 
facilities has had little implication for Manchester Airport within the 
broader UK network, the airport owner has derived sane advantage fran 
the receipt of grant-aid during a pericxi when the general tenor of 
central government policy incorporated the rejection of the principle 
of subsidised airport operation. It is surely significant that the 
initiative for such an arrangerrent canE fran the local authority owners 
thanselves; this reflects the ambition of the Manchester Co:rporation 
rather than any agent of central government operating within the 
industry. 
5.2 THE cncEPl' OF ~ P.LANNl}I; 
The national planning of ai:rport capacity is only one means of 
achieving a coherent overall ai:rport strategy, rroreover it is not 
always clear what is meant by a "national" airports plan or policy. 
The gist of the notion seems to be that the Government devises and 
executes a progranme of investment and assumes responsibility for the 
operation of the full range of civil air transport facilities, 
continuously bearing in mind the factors relevant to the workings of 
the complete national airports system. It may be argued that all 
decision :rmking illlplies planning of sane fonn or other, but where the 
forces involved are canplex and changeable as in the civil air 
transport industry, not only will the fonn of planning be influenced 
but also what it can realistically achieve. Planning structures set up 
to achieve national as well as local goals may vary considerably and 
each has different implications for the ownership, control and 
regulation of airports. (1) 
In fonnulating an airport strategy, planning may be based on a 
single comprehensive exercise which identifies an ideal network to 
serve the whole country's future, shCMing the location, scale and 
function of all airports. This type of "rigid" planning is difficult 
to develop into an ongoing plan of \\Urk which is practicable and 
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relevant to real policy issues. '!he level of precJ..sJ..on required by 
such a study may result in the project becaning overloaded with so much 
detail that by the time reccmnendations are fonnulated, circumstances 
may well have changed to the extent that conclusions are no longer 
valid. On a national scale, the number of options to be forecast and 
evaluated for different airport systems may in itself be daunting and 
thus there is the converse danger that studies may tend tCMards too 
much approximation and abstraction. ( 2) 
Sane national planning exercises nay be designed to ccmplement local 
and regional studies. Such "hybrid" planning systems offer advantages 
in solving the problem of the level of precision and degree of detail 
required for wide-ranging studies. A full examination of the merits of 
alternative airport developtE11ts can became the province of local 
studies leaving the wider study to focus on a relatively small number 
of problems which extend beyond regional boundaries. ( 3 ) 
In considering this type of planning, the Ccmnittee of Inquiry into 
Civil Air Transport, reporting in 1969, identified a number of wider 
objectives which a National Airports Plan could address providing a 
broad framework for airport developtE11t . Firstly, a plan could seek to 
achieve a distribution of airports which would meet the needs of both 
econanically viable and socially supported air services in every part 
of the country, whilst avoiding the waste of scarce resources. 
Secondly, it might be desirable to avoid the proliferation of airports 
serving the same traffic areas, thus strengthening the economies of 
airports themselves and providing the basis for a stronger network of 
air services than 'WOuld be possible if airlines served two or rrore 
airports where one 'WOuld suffice. A plan could also seek to achieve 
greater co-ordination between airport developtE11t and the provision of 
air services so that investlnent decisions in neither field would be 
made without the lmowledge of decisions in the other . Fourthly, a 
national airports plan could establish a mechanism for forward plans to 
meet future requirements especially those arising fran the rapidly 
changing operational characteristics of civil aircraft . Finally, the 
plan could fonn the basis for the co-ordination of airport developtE11t 
with the means of access to airports. (4) 
Whilst national planning may complement l~ level studies in this 
way, it may havever still be difficult to detennine which of the 
alternative airport plans emerging fran a local study is consistent 
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with the broader national objectives. Similarly, it nay be difficult 
to weigh the advantages of the alternative airport schemes offered. 
Thus, there is the danger that any large-scale national exercise will 
becare little rrore than an "expensive white elephant". The FdwaI:ds 
Ccmnittee recognised also that "Preparing paper plans is one thing, 
having the ~r to implement them is another". In other words, even 
if an "efficient" plan emerges from a national strategic effort, it 
does not follow that it will be capable of execution if opposition is 
met in the local arena. (5 ) 
National planning supported by a rra jor corrmi trrEnt on the part of 
central government implies the canplete ownership and control of all 
airports where civil air transport is conducted. It is an extreme 
nroel rrore characteristic of the fonner centrally planned, rather than 
the Western economies. Given the difficulties outlined earlier, 
Western efforts at planning have tended to deliberately avoid the 
canpilation of a single naster plan regarding the planning function as 
rrore of an on-going process. "Paper planning" has been conducted 
centrally in an attempt to provide a basis for the developnent of an 
integrated system of airports. The eIT!Phasis has been on controlling 
airport developnent at anus length and although the principle of 
plarming may in itself suggest state ownership this has not been 
regarded as an essential elerrent in achieving objectives. Again the 
Edwards Conmittee reported "Nothing we saw in the actual operation of 
airports suggested that central ownership of them all was necessary for 
efficient operation"; and " it seems to us desirable to fit the 
ownership and managerrent of airports to their function. " Generally, 
within the UK, this principle has tended to be the nonn with the 
ownership of na jor airports being vested in central goverrnnent agencies 
with control at other airports being exercised through regulation. ( 6 ) 
Difficulties may be encountered in any fonn of airport planning be 
it rigid or hybrid. Each has different implications for ownership 
structures and same can:nentators go so far as to suggest that the 
National Airports Policy approach in any fonn will not lead to an 
improvement in decision making, Whitbread maintains that any policy 
which is based on the results of sane extended systems analysis is an 
inferior substitute for atteIT!Pting to equate airport tariffs with the 
full opportunity costs of utilising airport capacity. 
It is argued that if airport planners and operators do not take into 
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account the full cost consequences of their decision to invest in and 
operate additional facilities, or do not relate the value of these 
resources to the regional benefit to be gained, then the results of 
transacting with passengers will not be "efficient". Thus a laissez-
faire approach to airport strategy involving the minimum of goverrment 
regulation, and the suggestion that the industry should be left to find 
its CM.rl level of growth through market forces, has been advocated as 
the nost effective means of overcaning the airport planning problems 
and the difficulties of estimating future national and regional 
requirenents. On the assumption that the avnership of airport capital 
is vested in private hands and that compensation for nuisance is paid 
by those creating it to those affected by it, it is argued that 
airports 'WOuld begin to operate like the classical finn applying 
discriminatory pricing to different types of traffic and to peak and 
off-peak period operations. (7) 
Whilst the laissez-faire approach is advocated on these grounds it 
has been argued that various operating conditions prevailing in the 
civil air transIXJrt industry tend to undennme the operation of free 
market forces, and evidence suggests that discriminatory pricing 
structures achieve little re-allocation of resources in practice. For 
example, as the larger UK airports in the South East have became 
increasingly congested, there has been same movement towards 
differentiation between peak and off-peak movements but this has had 
little .impact on the congestion problems. Airlines have tended to 
naintain that this is largely due to the fact that landing fees are 
only a sma.ll proIXJrtion of airline costs and, therefore, a rrassive 
increase in peak charges with a negative charge for off-peak operations 
'WOuld be necessary to achieve the desired effect. 
In reality, whatever the level of airport peak surcharges airline 
schedules may be inelastic to such price differentials for a number of 
reasons. An airline nnISt satisfy the needs of passengers and the rrost 
critical factor in scheduling is to operate at the nost IXJpular tllreS, 
maximising load factors. carrying rrore passengers on a peak service 
nay be nore critical than any adjustment that could be rrade in airport 
charges. Secondly, airlines seek to design schedules which despatch a 
high proportion of the fleet at the carm:mcement of the carrmercial day 
so as to maximise the efficiency of fleet utilisation. In particular, 
long haul services into the UK tend to be concentrated with arrivals 
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occurring between 06.00 and 10.00 and departures concentrating between 
10.00 and 14.00. These timings are dictated. by the reasonable arrival 
and departure t..ines at the hema and foreign airports. The long flight 
tine together with different time zones canbine to limit severely the 
carmerciall y acceptable tine bands. The problem of seasonal variations 
of traffic which are a fundamental element of large scale air services 
has not been significantly influenced. by winter discount of fares and 
airport pricing policy is similarly unlikely to significantly alter the 
surrmer/winter denand ratio. (8) 
Given the high proportion of capital costs involved in airport 
developner1t, it has been argued. that even under conditions of complete 
freedom from governm:mt planning, canpetition nay not prevail as 
narkets are not contestable. Monopoly or same fonn of oligopoly in the 
airport network will result, thus distorting the operation of free 
narket conditions. Even if limited. canpeti tion between airports within 
particularly close proximity exists with each aspiring to nm local 
airports, the likelihood is that such canpeti tion will in itself result 
in unco-ordinated effort and a waste of resources. Whi thread considers 
that either possibility will not detract from rational developnent as, 
on the one hand, IIDnopol y powers could be constrained by the mere 
possibility of entry of others into the industry or by government 
regulation and, on the other, local campeti tion only becomes wasteful 
if expectations are seriously out of line with the realisation of 
revenue. Nevertheless, it is suggested. that neither the rigid planning 
fo:rm of airport strategy not the canpeti ti ve pricing rrodel has a 
m::mopol y of advantages. (9) At one extreme, methodological problems 
are canpounded. by the lack of flexibility in responding to change and 
attempts to devolve responsibility to regional and local levels nay 
only prove to undermine the whole concept of planning to achieve 
national objectives. At the other end of the scale, canpeti ti ve 
pricing nay prove only to reinforce the tendency tCMards concentration 
which is implied by the economic characteristics of airport 
developnerlt, thereby detracting fran rational developnent and the 
efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
Sealy naintains that same element of planning is essential to the 
assessnent of national and regional needs and that a mix of public and 
private ownership could well ensure that local as v.Bll as national 
needs are met. He, therefore, supports an airport strategy based upon 
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sub-variants of the two fairly extrare rrodels. (10) 
In essence, UK airport strategies have fluctuated between the 
laissez-faire and the I1rigid plarming ll approach, although a flexibility 
of approach tending tCWcU'ds the 11 hybrid 11 has been the keynote of 
planning strategies. It is argued that under such a regime, attempts 
at the national plarming of airport capacity have not been a 
detennining factor in the evolution of change at Manchester Airport. 
In the absence of direction from above, local initiatives have assmned 
greater significance, maximising the advantages of a natural extended 
catchment area. 
(a) The Period up to 1945 
Towards the end of the First World War, in antiCipation of the start 
of civil aviation, some consideration was given to the question of 
civil aerodrome policy and the possible role of the State. The Civil 
Aerial Transport Ccmnittee, which addressed the issue in 1917-18 as 
part of a broad examination of the peace time shape of aviation, 
concluded that state ownership of aerodromes was unnecessary. The main 
concern was with regulatory matters and the need for protection fram 
possible in jury or abuse. Licencing powers in the hands of central 
government Yl7ere deemed sufficient for this purpose. Very little 
attention was given to the means of actually encouraging aerodrome 
provision, the implication being that a national policy was 
unnecessary. 
Whilst the Ccmnittee collectively concluded that the State should 
fulfill a purely regulatory function, there were dissenters wi thin its 
ranks. For example, Frank Pick, who was later to play an imp:>rtant 
role in the developneI1t of wndon transport, believed that state 
support for this "premising infant industry" was essential and, 
therefore, advocated that the state ownership of aerod.rcmes 11 should be 
extended liberally beyond bare war-like or strategic requirements. 11 
(11) 
Under the Air Navigation Regulations 1919, covering the control of 
civil flying in the UK, a number of aerodromes were appointed for civil 
use, while a second list designated aerodromes which could be used in 
an anergency. The Air Ministry's Dep:rrtment of Civil Aviation produced 
a plan showing an envisaged air route system radiating fran the newly 
designated customs airport at Hounslow, just east of the present lDndon 
Heathrow Airport. ( 12) As to the possible methods of control of 
362 
airports on the route network three were considera:i including direct 
government ownership, nnmicipal management or the use of a "chartered 
ccmpany" with a govemment voice supported by public funds. Frederick 
Sykes, the first Controller-General of Civil Aviation, personally 
favoured the second option on the grounds that the municipalities would 
become "alive to the fact that ultimately an aerodrome will be as 
necessary to a m:xiem town as a railway station"; they would have a 
greater regard for the public interest than private finns and they 
would be in a better position than the Ministry to make the aerodrcmes 
successful concerns. (13) 
Comprehensive proposals ~re passed to the Civil Aviation Advisory 
Carmittee which reported in favour of the idea justifying state 
ownership as a means of protecting the operation of .. sensitive 
govenrmental services" and preventing aviation canbines securing a 
nonopoly of national assets. The need for two national aerodromes was 
identified with eight others located in key positions. The Association 
of Municipal Corporations supported the concept of the invol vernent of 
agencies of the state in the provision of aerodromes suggesting that 
local authorities be given both powers "to own aerodromes and 
cClllpU.lsorily to acquire sites". (14) 
Ultilnately, Section 8 of the Air Navigation Act of 1920 embodied an 
inlportant point of principle that any local authority with the consent 
of the Air Council should have powers to establish and maintain 
aerodrcmes and to acquire land for this purpose by agreement. IDeal 
authorities desirous of establishing an aerodrome did not require the 
consent of the Minister of Health if land set aside was already in the 
possession of an authority. The Manchester Corporation utilised such 
powers in establishing the Barton Aerodrome in 1930 on land owned by 
the Cleansing Camnittee. H~r, the Act also stipulated that land 
acquired for aerodrome purposes did not necessarily have to fall within 
the area of the local authority and again this clause was important to 
the establishment of the Ringway Airport, which was in large part 
outside the City boundary. The Air Navigation Act laid the foundation 
for a fundamental departure fran established practice in Europe where 
the general rule was the for the State to own aerodrcmes directly. The 
only exceptions to this general rule ~ to be found in Gennany and in 
one or two cases in Switzerland which empc:Mered local authorities to 
establish and maintain aerodrcmes. However, there was sarne formidable 
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opposition ranged against the aerodrare scheme. For example, the 
Treasury made no objection to the sale of aerodrares to local 
authorities, but did 
"not understand on what ground it is considered that the ownership 
by local authorities rather than by private persons or companies 
would be advantageous to the general public or to the RAF." ( 15 ) 
With the apparent demise of the UK's first attempt at the national 
planning of airports, Frederick Sykes resigned in June 1922. Sefton 
Brancker, assuming official responsibility for civil aviation policy, 
again turned to the local authorities for support and in October 1928, 
the Town Clerks of all municipalities with populations of 10,000 or 
nore received a circular on the urgent need to establish aerodrares. A 
year later a national conference on the "Necessity of Municipal 
Airports" attracted 350 representatives of IDeal Governmant. In 1930, 
the Public Works Facilities Act extended compulsory purchase J?CM8rs to 
the local authorities for several purposes, including the provision of 
aerodrares, a PJW9r which had first been requested on behalf of the 
local authorities ten years earlier. (16) 
Whilst local authorities VJere errpJWered to provide aerodrares, still 
little attention was given to the means of actually encouraging their 
location at appropriate sites, and the early 1930s were characterised 
by continued efforts to urge the Ministry to undertake a systematic 
survey of aerodrare sites, on the grounds that air traffic could not be 
expected to build up until a network was completed. A report of the 
Superintendent of the Boa:rd of Railway Air Services published in 
October 1934, highlighted the haphazard selection of sites which fell 
short of a national policy: 
"The Air Ministry up to the present has assisted Municipalities only 
in advising them when requested, on details to which their attention 
has been directed. A lack of guidance on matters of general policy 
has resulted in same cases in aerodrcmes being constructed in key 
positions which are not capable of development, and in other cases 
first class aerodrcmes have been laid down in districts which are 
carmercially unsuitable for inclusion in any main airline route. It 
is subni. tted that the Gove:rnment or sane responsible 1:x:xiy should 
make surveys of the United Kingdom and main industrial areas, in 
conjunction with Railway Air Services and the railway organisation, 
with a view to indicating where with advantage, main line routes 
could be operated." ( 17 ) 
Despite the nounting pressure from within the industry that central 
government involvement should be stepped up, F C Ske1merdine, who took 
over as Director of Civil Aviation on Brancker's death, rarained highly 
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sceptical about the danand for internal air services and was cautious 
about the developrent of aerodromes. He took the view that the 
independence of local authorities should be respected that is, they 
should not be given the impression that sites would be selected against 
their wishes. The Minister was also concerned about the possibility of 
being open to criticism if the establishment of an aerocirarE was urged 
which might later prove to be of little use. The" ann's length" 
approach thus extended to the preliminary selection of sites, 
restricting Ministry activities to the licensing of aerodromes fran 
purely an aviation safety point of view. (18) 
Despite the Ministry attitudes, central government continued to 
display same concern about the developrent of civil aviation, as 
suggested by the appointm:mt in July 1935, of a carmittee to advise on 
"The Develo:p1EI1t of Civil Aviation in the United Kingdom" under the 
chai:r:rnanship of Brigadier-General Sir Henry Maybury • Specifically, the 
Maybury Committee was to consider and report upon measures which might 
be adopted by H M Government or by lDcal Authorities for assisting in 
the prarotion of civil aviation in the United Kingdom and their 
probable cost. The report presented on 9 Decanber 1936, came closest 
in its reasoning to a national master plan with a proposed "system of 
airports" based on a centrally located "junction airport". A lot of 
publicity was given to the Maybury junction scheme which was expected 
to be centred. on the new Manchester Airport which was being prepared at 
Ringway. Prior to the outbreak of war when proposals had to be 
postponed indefinitely evidence suggests that the Carmittee had to a 
limited degree influenced the Department of Civil Aviation's appraisal 
of schemes. Preston, for example, was advised in 1938, that in the 
light of Maybury reccmnendations there was no need for a large 
aerodrome in the location proposed. ( 19 ) 
In surmary then, the inter-war years generally recorded the defeat 
of a group of officials in Central Government who had wished to extend 
the domain of Government into this new area. Whilst the general lack 
of policy initiative reflected a tendency towards the laissez-faire 
approach to airport strategy, the novelty of civil aviation and its 
manifest needs as an infant industry suggested the need to go further 
in the direction of state intervention. Although a national plan had 
emerged which was shaped by loose notions of "key places" and "chains 
of routes", the responsibility for developing aerocirarEs was declined 
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by Central Government and pa.ssed down the line to local authorities and 
to private enterprise, as had been originally intended in 1918. '!he 
pattern of nrunicipal airport provision which was created between 1929 
and 1939, therefore, was the result of a rather fortuitous interaction 
be'bveen. a series of successful local ini tiati ves and the response of 
Central Govermnent. Basically, the Air Ministry had found no place for 
the clear , indicative planning of the airport system and atxiicated the 
responsibility for developnent of airport facilities on rational and 
economic lines. (20 ) 
With the outbreak of war , requisitioning plans for aerodromes \'\lere 
activated. Clearly, for some years pa.st local authorities had been 
urged by the GoverIlIIeIlt to provide aerodromes which were desirable 
partly to encourage civil aviation in peace time and p:rrtly because 
they would provide an asset to the Government in times of war. Section 
7 of the Air Navigation Act 1920 had provided that, in the event of war 
or of great national emergency, the Secretary of State could by Order, 
inter-alia, provide for taking possession of and using for the purposes 
of the naval, milita:ry or air forces any aerodrome or landing ground, 
with the further provision that any person who suffered any direct 
in jury or loss owing to the operation of such an O:I:der should be 
entitled to compensation fram the Secretary of State. Under these 
powers, nost of the rna jor pre-war provincial airports including the 
then Manchester Airport, Barton, along with airports in Liverpool, 
Glasgow, Bristol, Exeter, Weston-Super-Mare, Doncaster, and Binningham, 
for example, -were managed and operated by either the Air Ministry (RAE' 
Branch) or the Air Ministry, Department of Civil Aviation. 
'Ihroughout the war years, the Ringway Airport was the centre of a 
number of activities which in total made a significant contribution to 
the war effort. In fact, the origins of many of the war-time 
activities at Ringway lay in the years ilme::liatel y preceding the 
outbreak of war. For example, the provision of facilities for the 
assernbl y and testing of aircraft manufactured elsewhere had already 
been long established by 1939. '!he need for facilities had arisen 
because of the difficulty in meeting the requirem:mts of the Air Force 
Expansion Programne. Ini tiall y, the Fairey Aviation Co Lilni ted \'\lere 
accamodated at Ringway in two hangars erected on 4.33 acres of land 
but with the re-a.J:INmlEmt progranme increased production at the Fairey 
Heaton Chapel factory was required, involving nore assembly and test 
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facilities occupying a further 16.6 acres and 5.5 acres of land in 
separate locations. By the cessation of hostilities, Faireys ~ 
occupying six hangars at Ringway for the assembly of aircraft, four of 
which had been erected by the Ministry of Aircraft Prcxiuction under an 
agency agrement with the ccmpany. (21) 
Faireys was not the only finn to be involved in aircraft assembly 
and test at Ringway. A V Roe and Co Limited also made Ringway the 
centre of its Experlinental Department in the war years and given the 
number of aircraft pouring in from factories in the area and the need. 
for pilots to deliver them, Ringway also became a base for the Air 
Transport Auxiliary or "Ferry Pilots' Pool". This organisation had 
responsibility for the ferrying of aircraft on behalf of the Royal Navy 
and the RAF. The No 14 Ferry Pilot's Pool, as it became mown in July 
1941, was to become one of the largest in the country using a wide 
variety of aircraft, "Hudsons" being IIOSt predaninant. Other 
organisations based at Ringway at some point in tine in the war years 
included the Volunteer Reserve, No 613 (East lancashire [City of 
Manchester]) Auxiliary Air Force Squadron. Facilities 'Were also 
provided for the training of Britain's Airborne Forces. (22) 
Prior to the outbreak of war, provision for accorrnujating the needs 
of military aircraft manufacturers at both the Barton and Ringway 
Airports had been prirraril y the same, based on the principle of the Air 
Ministry entering into lease agreements with the Corporation. However, 
whilst the Barton Airport, along with other installations across the 
country, 'Were requisitioned, the Ringway Airport was not and the 
nnmicipality remained responsible for the general administration and 
operation of the facility throughout the duration of hostilities, with 
lease agreements being drawn up with the relevant government 
departments to cover the accorrnujation of land and premises. ( 23 ) 
In accounting for the institution of different arrangements at two 
airports in close proximity owned by the same local authority, records 
suggest that uncertainty surrounded the whole question of 
requisitioning. A carrmunication bebNeen. R H .Adcock, the Town Clerk, to 
Councillor L W Biggs, on 14 September 1939, refers to the recent 
assumption of Ministry control of the Barton Airport, but at the same 
time, suggests that infonnation as to whether Ringway was likely to be 
requisitioned was lacking. A further carmunication between the Airport 
Manager and the City Treasurer dated 5 October 1939, stated. that the 
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relationship be~ the Air Ministry and the Corporation regarding the 
war-time use of Ringway was "sanewhat obscure". ( 24 ) Evidence at least 
suggests that the Corporation was not convinced of the merits of 
requisitiOning at the time. On 6 November, the Airp:>rt Manager 
inforne:i the Town Clerk that to all intents and purposes Barton was 
being conducted as an Air Ministry aerodrome having been taken out of 
the existing organisation of the Airp:>rt Depart::mant. Thus all 
requirements ~ way of stores, materials, etc, for administration and 
maintenance had to be obtained or sanctioned through the machinery of a 
Government depart::mant, a system which resulted in "delays and 
additional expense". The Airp:>rt Manager urged that the Air Ministry 
should reconsider the position and allow the Corporation to co-operate 
in the administration and maintenance of the Airp:>rt. As late as 
Decanber 1939, the Town Clerk wrote to the Director of Harne Civil 
Aviation, 
"In viaN of the fact that this station has already been let by the 
Corporation to the Air Ministry I do not understand why it should be 
necessary to requisition it from the Corporation." ( 25 ) 
Despite the local rejection of the policy of requisitioning it does 
however seem likely that given the national emergency, had central 
government felt the requisitioning of Ringway to be .imperative it w:>uld 
have been difficult for the Manchester Corporation to resist. In fact, 
it seems quite plausible that when requisitioning plans ~re being laid 
in the mid 1930s, Barton - having been known as the Manchester Airp:>rt 
for some years - was ear-IMrked because little was then known of the 
superior facilities which ~re to be established at Ringway. 
In any event, Manchester Corporation's priority during war-time was 
to ensure that the provision of facilities w:>uld not linpinge upon the 
pr~ civil role of the airport after the cessation of hostilities 
and unlike experience elsewhere corporation nanagenent continued to 
influence decisions as to the siting of buildings and their 
professional skills were marshalled in both design and construction. 
Whereas there were instances of misuse by the Ministry of those parts 
of aerodromes which they had requisitioned - sometimes erecting 
buildings upon sites which were inconvenient or dangerous as in the 
case of Binningham where buildings were erected over a sewer - in 
maintaining control of its airport, the Manchester Corporation ensured 
that at every juncture of developnent full consideration was given to 
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the fact that at some point in time, hostilities would cease and the 
Airport should then be in a condition to resmne its pre-war role of 
providing facilities for civil air transport. ( 26 ) The unusual nature 
of arrangements at Manchester Airport was implied in a carmunication 
from the Air Ministry during the period which suggests "The 
circmnstances at Ringway are unique and there is not other case of a 
RAF station being built by a City Corporation." 
(b) The Post War Period 
Following the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the Governn'ent 
announced plans for the State ownership and operation of all aerodrarres 
to be used for scheduled air services in "British Air Services", Crnnd 
6712. Airports which had been requisitioned for war purposes were to 
remain under requisition, with pcMers being transferred fran the Air 
Ministry to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. As regards airports which 
for one reason or another had not been requisitioned, outright purchase 
fran the owners was to be arranged. (27) 
As a result of the nationalisation plans , it became necessary to 
consider a progranme of existing aerodromes which were likely to fit 
into the expected pattern of air services. The plan devised in 1947 
listing approximately 40 aerodrarres for acquisition came close to the 
"rigid plan" nodel although it contained certain ananalies. For 
example, four airports ~re ear-marked for acquisition in lancashire 
and Yorkshire; in the East Midlands two airports in close proximity 
~re proposed for takeover but in East Anglia no provision for 
scheduled service airports was nade at all. (28 ) 
In respect of Manchester's Ringway Airport, the fact that it had not 
been requisitioned in war-time was of significance when it came to 
implementing the Governn'ent' s plans for State acquisition. Although 
the airport could have been acquired under legislation existing at the 
time, the Director of Harne Civil Aviation deemed it nore prudent to 
await the passing of the new Civil Aviation Bill to the Statute Book 
before taking the necessary steps for acquisition. Thus, whilst other 
airports passed fran requisition to nationalisation with ease, for 
Ringway there was an intervening period when the aerodrome operated as 
a licensed aerodrane not officially under Ministry control. In coping 
with the intervening period, two alternatives presented themselves. 
Either the Ministl:y could have stepped in to manage the aerodrane on 
behalf of the CoIpJration, with the whole of the aerodrome being leased 
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as a temporary expedient, or the Corporation could continue to 
dischal:ge its full responsibilities. 'lhe Airport Cc:mni ttee expressed a 
preference to nanage the Airport in the interim, but 'Wel1t further in 
asserting that if the nationalisation bill becane law and Ringway 
becane an aercxirane officially ear-marked for State acquisition there 
should be same nechinery for delegating administration back to the 
MUnicipality. (29) 
From an examination of records of negotiations between 
representatives of the Corporation and of the Ministry, it seans that 
within the Ministry itself there were misgivings about the nanagerent 
of aerodranes by the agents of Central Government. For example, at a 
neeting between representatives of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 
Manchester Corporation and the Manchester Chamber of Ccmrerce, held in 
June 1945, prior to the issue of "British Air Services" lDrci Swinton, 
the then Minister, expressed significant doubts regarding the 
Government's plans. In his view, the Municipalities had done "fine 
pioneer work" in the past in developing airports "often at considerable 
expense" and he was supportive of the involvement of local authorities 
and local people in the detailed administration of airports. 'lhe 
Manchester Corporation held a similar view and at a conference between 
representatives of the Corporation and wrd Pekenham, the newly 
appointed Minister of Civil Aviation, held at the House of wrcis on 13 
June 1950, a scheme for the continued municipal ownership and control 
of Manchester Airport - the details of which were lmown to fever than 
six people in the Corporation - was put forward. In essence, the 
proposals involved the Corporation retaining ownership subject to 
certain capital works, already having been carried out at the expense 
of the State, being transferred to the local authority without charge; 
the cost of future capital works was to be borne by the Corporation 
with substantial grants from Central Government and finally the 
Corporation was to bear all recurrent expenditure including runway and 
other neintenance and to retain all incane accruing. ( 30) 
'lhese proposals were unique in the history of UK airports because at 
no prior time had arrangements been instituted whereby local agencies 
were left virtually free to m:mage and prorrote airport developre11t 
providing facilities deaned necessary to satisfy local demand , with the 
fornal ccmnittment from central govenunent to provide substantial 
financial assistance towa:rxis capital developneI1t, thereby easing the 
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burden of airport developrent carriOO by the local ccmmmity. In this 
sense, for Manchester Airport an analogy may be drawn with arrangE!IE11ts 
for the provision of roads where local expenditures were supported by 
grants made from the Road Fund. The Corporation was successful in 
convincing the Ministry 
"that the nnmicipality situatOO beside its awn aercx:lrane would take 
a very keen local interest in running the aercx:lrane and might do it 
more satisfactorily, and certainly better fram the public relations 
aspect, than the Governnent doing it more rerrotely." (31) 
With the general acceptance of the Manchester Corporation's 
proposals, the "rigid plan" envisagOO three years earlier had been 
effectively broken, and bebveen 1950 and 1955 the policy of 
centralisation was increasingly eroded in that although the Ministry of 
Transport and Civil Aviation acquired two additional airports it 
surrendered six. ( 32 ) '!he trend tawams de-centralisation was probably 
underpirmed by a number of factors, not least being a change in 
Government in 1952. '!he new Conservative Government, in policy 
statements regarding the participation of local authorities in the 
running of airports, suggested a willingness to consider such 
involvement. However, whilst central governnent may have been nore 
willing to relinquish responsibility for aerodrane provision, certain 
local authorities proved unwilling to accept this. For example, 
offers basOO on the Manchester principles ~re made to both the 
Liverpool and Binningham City Councils in the 1950s but they were 
tUD1ed down. At a meeting of the Liverpool City Council on 29 April 
1953 - the same day that the Manchester City Council had decided the 
fate of Ringway - three possible alternatives regarding the future of 
Speke Airport were presented. The Airport could be purchased by the 
Ministry of Civil Aviation at a cost of £250,000 (against a previous 
capital expenditure by the Corporation of £129,000); the airport could 
be taken back by the Corporation with assets being transferred free of 
charge and capital expenditure being shared by the Corporation and the 
Ministry, or finally the status quo could prevail whereby the Ministry 
of Civil Aviation could continued to run the Airport under its 
requisition IXJWers, paying its compensation rent to the Corporation. 
No finn recOllllEl1dation was made as to the most expeditious course of 
action, but the closing ~:r:ds of the report to the Council set the 
tenor of the debate, "'!he Ccmnittee will no doubt bear in mind that two 
attarq;>ts in the post-war period to operate a London service have proven 
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unsuccessful fran the Operator's point of view." This ilnplied that 
additional inccme fran new services would not significantly reduce the 
deficit on the rates because the public had not used services which had 
operated successfully in the pre-war period. At the end of the day, 
the Council decided for the status quo and the tenns for the retum of 
the airport to City control ~re declined. (33) 
The early post-war experience of traffic throughput at Speke may 
provide some justification for the Council's reluctance to assume 
control, although the decision may also have represented an opportunity 
missed engendered by a lack of municipal foresight . Certainly, 
developnents at Ringway had been indirectly affecting Speke for some 
time and by and large the airport had been taking the lion's share of 
the air traffic of the north. An article in the "Liverpool Post" 
published as early as May 1947, had referred to the by-passing of 
Liverpool by airlines like KIM, Air France and Aer Lingus. The writer 
referred to his attendance at the inauguration of the regular service 
by KIM between Amsterdam, Manchester and Dublin and cc:mnented that high 
officials had suggested a sympathy for Liverpool, but a preference for 
Manchester which was the nore desirable aiIp:)rt, being capable of 
expansion. In accounting for Liverpool' s relative decline, the writer 
looked towards central govermnent, maintaining that it was becaning 
increasingly evident that a "great dis-service" had been done when 
Speke was taken over as a State airfield. The writer speculated that 
if the airport had remained rmmicipally controlled the City Council and 
the Chamber of Ccmnerce would at least have been able to display civic 
enterprise in presenting its claims to continental canpanies: 
"Manchest~ unfettered by bureaucracy has taken its chance with both 
hands, and, under energetic rmmicipal leadership, is planning to 
wake Ringway even nore attractive to foreign companies. It now 
seems Liverpool must sit back and wait for the so far, meagre crumbs 
thrown out to it by British European Ail:ways, who can only promise a 
continental service in the "project stage." ( 34 ) 
In accounting for the Liverpool City Council's decision not to 
resume airport ownership, it is also important to note the significant 
influence of war-time arrangements. From the first suggestion of 
Ministry control at Manchester, the City had gained advantage fran the 
wealth of experience which had been built up during the period of 
continued municipal control in war-time. Officials and elected 
representatives of the City Council had played. an active and often a 
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leading part in the detennination of the airport's future. Any 
developrent project envisaged by Central Governmant during the War had 
been subjected to the closest scrutiny of the City and had often been 
executed by Corporation Deparbnents. In contrast officers like the 
City Engineer at Liverpool had quickly found their services superfluous 
as the Air MinistIy's Works Department executed projects or naninated 
civil contractors to act on their behalf. Having been divorced for so 
long fran the day to day running of the airport, by 1953, the Liverpool 
.Airp:>rt had probably becarE so rerrote from the Corporation that to 
resurrect municipal interest and pride in it was a virtual 
impossibility. 
In ENery respect, the agreement between the Corporation and the 
MinistIy finalised in 1955 was exhaustive. The newly named Manchester 
.Airp:>rt was to remain under the ownership of the Manchester Corporation 
which was to be responsible entirely for its developnent, manag€!lleI1t 
and operation. The Corporation had to undertake to use the assets 
transferred as an aerod:rane licensed for public use and activities 
ancillary to this purpose. Management could only be by the Corporation 
and not exercised through a third party; although land and buildings 
could be leased or let, the Corporation had to retain control. The 
airport was to be managed "efficiently, fairly and impartially" in the 
interest of all users, although policy was to be directed towaros 
facilitating the operation of scheduled air services. In addition, the 
Corporation was to be responsible for ensuring the provision of all 
services needed for the efficient operation of the airport for 
international air services, including fire, rescue, snow clearance and 
aerod:rane lighting services. For its part, the State was to provide, 
operate and maintain air traffic control, aviation, radio and 
telecarrmunications services and aids to navigation, meteorological and 
briefing services considered necess~ by the Minister. The 
Corporation were obliged to provide and maintain free of charge to the 
State, accarmodation required for discharging these services. ( 35 ) 
The agreement was to stand for a period of 21 years, but the 
MinistIy retained the option to purchase the airport at sane future 
date. Basically, the agreement could be ended by the mutual decision 
of the Ministry and the Corporation; by the unilateral action of the 
Minister if after reasonable notice the Corporation persisted in 
breaching any of the tenns and conditions which applied in the 
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agreemant and finally the agreerent could be tenninatEri by the 
Minister, giving six nonths notice if this were deemad "necessary in 
the public interest". 'Ihis last clause was to be rrost contentious as 
its ambiguity allowed for virtually any interpretation of the "public 
interest" . However, the Corporation protected its invest:m:mt through 
an exchange of correspondence in which it was finnly established that 
the fact that the ownership and operation of the airport was, or was 
likely to becane a profitable undertaking \\IOuld not be nagarded as a 
factor to be taken into account in determining the requirarEIlts of the 
public interest. Basically only two events could be contanplated by 
the clause, either a state of emergency or the Corporation failing in 
its obligations. (36) 
Having spent same five years in negotiation, the question of the 
future ownership of Ringway had been settled, whilst at many other 
provincial airports the state of limbo which was 
requisition/nationalisation continued into the next decade. On 31 
March 1955, F N Hillier, Secretary-General of the Air League of the 
British Empire, wrote to Philip Dingle, the Town Clerk referring to a 
statement made by the Minister of Civil Aviation, in reply to a 
question in the House of Camons the previous day that "Manchester 
Airport has established i ts position as one of the rrost ilrrfxJrtant 
aerodranes of this country". He also referred to the Town Clerk's 
"hard struggle" to get the aerodrome recognised at all and ccmnentEri "I 
could not forbear a smile, but you must be very happy to see your 
efforts cane to fruition". (37) In effect, confirmation of the 
validity of the decision to continue with municipal ownership was given 
in a Report of the Select Ccmnittee on Estimates, Session 1955-6 
entitled. "Civil Aerodromes and Ground Services". This Report carmanted 
on the fact that as a result of the efforts of the Corporation, the 
increase in traffic at Manchester Airport had been considerably greater 
than the increases at aerodromes CM'led by the Ministry. The Carrmi ttee 
also referred to the fact that in 1952, the Ministry had considered 
Ringway would only be used. by continental traffic but that the 
Corporation had thought otherwise and as a result of their initiative, 
the airport served. long haul inter-continental services as well. ( 38 ) 
Thus it is suggested. that continued. municipal ownership at 
Manchester Airport provided an impetus to g:rCMth and developrent which 
was lacking at other major provincial airfx:lrts which -were managed by 
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the Ministry in the early post-war years. Although receiving 
relatively equal handed treatment in the provision of new facilities, 
it is argued that Ministerial bureaucracy ensured that no new facility 
was provided until the need for it had been "deronstrated in 
triplicate" which had a stifling effect on innovation and developtEIlt. 
Equally stifling was the inability of civil servants charged with the 
day-to-day running of airports to becane involved in attracting new 
traffic, prarooting the use of existing facilities or publicising any 
airport in anything but the nost guarded terms, for fear of being seen 
to favour one airport or operation or service over another. (39) 
As the central responsibility for the running of aerodranes becarrE 
nore onerous, the general trend tCMards de-centralisation of ownership 
of provincial airports became enshrined in government policy. 
Following the publication of a White Paper in 1961, "Civil Aerodranes 
and Air Navigational Services", Onnd 1457, the Governm:mt took positive 
steps to sell its airports to local authorities in the hope of 
achieving a nore ccmnercial approach to their operation. This policy 
effectively set the pattem for the individual plarming of provincial 
airports with little regard for developtEIlt at neighbouring airports, 
however close. ( 40) As the plarming function becarrE de-centralised at 
the same time, the Governmant effectively rejected any suggestion of 
support. In handing airports back to local authority control in the 
1960s, the tenus offered were frequently less favourable than those 
which had been agreed with the Manchester Corporation in 1955. For 
example, in the case of Liverpool's Speke Airport, there was no 
suggestion of Ministry support for capital developrent. ( 41 ) 
Fundamental to the likely future developnent of the network of UK 
airports was the basic assmnption that whilst the comerstones of the 
developnent of provincial airports were to be de-centralisation of 
ownership and little or no co-ordination, those airports deemed to 
fulfill an intemational role, ( especially the IDndon group of airports 
and the intemational airport at Prestwick in Scotland) becarrE 
exceptions in the trend tCMards drift . Essentially, the "rigid plan" 
of the irrmadiate post-war years gave way to a hybrid where both 
centralisation and the laissez-faire approach existed side by side. 
The 1961 White Paper had stated "an Airport Authority should be set up 
to own and m:mage the main intemational airports now owned by the 
State" and to "plan, build and nanage any new airports eventually 
375 
required". The Select Ccmnittee on Estimates in its 5th Report in 1961 
had nade the case for putting the lDndon group of airports in the hands 
of an independent authority. British European Airways had been 
influential in this respect, suggesting that 
"an airport is potentially a keenly ccmnercial undertaking and for 
this reason should be run on ccmnercial business lines. A Civil 
Service approach is often quite inappropriate." (42) 
Introducing the Airports Authority bill in Navanber 1964, the 
Minister of Aviation, the Right Honourable Roy Jenkins, MP, suggested 
that the nain ben.efi ts of the transfer of ownership and management to 
an independent authority included the ability to reach and carry out 
decisions nore quickly, providing the nore efficient and econanical 
rnanagarent of airports, "the Authority would be able to deal in a nore 
flexible, adaptable and rapid manner with essentially ccmnercial 
problems and situations". It was also suggested that the four airports 
could be nore closely co-ordinated to meet the changing patterns of 
traffic. (43) 
In providing for the setting up of the British Airports Authority, 
th~ Government was recognising the advantages of carmon ownership for 
the nain UK airports only, whilst leaving the fate of other aerodrcmes 
in the hands of local government with the proviso that if local 
authorities were successful in their efforts to develop airports in 
their areas, ownership structures could be altered. at some future date. 
Sections 2 ( 3 ) and 2 ( 4 ) of the Airports Authority Act suggested this 
possibility in stating the functions of the Authority: 
"2 ( 3 ) The Authority shall have J?OW'9r to do anything which is 
calculated to facilitate the discharge of its duty under this Act. 
2(4) Without prejudice to the generality of the last foregoing sub-
section, the Authority nay provide, or acquire, or assUIl'E the 
managarent of any aerodrome in Great Britain in addition to those 
transferred to the Authority under this Act, but the Authority shall 
not exercise the pJWers described in this sub-section without the 
consent in writing of the Minister." ( 44 ) 
The carrmon ownership, under the public corporation of the BAA fran 1 
April 1966, of the state's principal international gateway airports at 
Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Prestwick reinforced the continued 
danination of IDndon in the British air transport system, which had 
been the outcome of a previously vacillating policy. The second group 
of regional airports including Aberdeen, Belfast, Blackpool, 
BoumaIOuth, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Glasgow which continued to be the 
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responsibility of local authorities was essentially relegated to a 
position of secondary importance. Therefore, the airport netYJOrk which 
emerged by the end of the 1960s tended towards a feeder/hub systan with 
traffic concentrating onto dc:mestic trunk services to and from Heathrow 
allowing airlines to justify acceptable frequencies at acceptable load 
factors and, therefore, at attractive fares to passengers. At the same 
time the hub airport had a near IIDnopoly of international air services 
pranoting a wider range of services than could have been justified by 
the airport's local traffic catchment area alone. This basic 
feeder/hub system had led to a very clearly defined spatial pattern. of 
airports. Within a radius of 75 miles fran lDndon, international 
travellers fran the provinces transferred to the lDndon airport system 
via surface transport. Thus the hub airport was effectively surrounded 
by a wide catchment area in which interlining traffic was sterilised. 
Beyond the 75 mile radius interlining became IIDre preferable. (45) 
Ananalies in the airport system both geographically and financially 
emerged and the distribution of UK airports in tenns of their size 
became increasingly lop-sided. In analysing this distribution 
Masefield adopted seven airport categories: 
( 1 ) Major international airports capable of handling the largest 
corrmercial aircraft on an all year round basis , with full 
customs, imnigration and catering services and at least two 
runways, one not less than 2,500 metres long for landing and 
the other not less than 3,750 metres for take-off; 
(2) As (1) above, but with. one runway not less than 3,050 
metres long; 
( 3 ) Airports handling medium and short-haul international and 
danestic services on an all year round basis, similar to ( 2) 
above but with one runway not less than 2,250 metres; 
( 4) Airports handling seasonal international charter and dc:mestic 
scheduled services with a runway not less than 2,250 metres; 
(5) Airports handling occasional charter services, business and 
training operations with a runway not less than 2,000 metres 
long; 
( 6) Airports handling short charter and danestic services and all 
aspects of general aviation with a runway of 1,600 metres; 
(7) General aviation and S'IOL (Short Take Off and Land) airports. 
By the end of the 1960s , only one airport in the UK fell into the 
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first category, tw:> in the second, seven in the categories three and 
four and 44 airp::>rts were canbined in categories five to seven. ( 46 ) 
As increasingly it was held that even the IXJlicy of the 1960s had 
implied no underlying strategy, pleas for a return to rrore closely 
defined planning were made. Professor Rigas Doganis, in a Fabian Tract 
in 1967, deplored the fact that so much airp::>rt planning had been 
conducted at a local level without much regard. for what had occurred, 
or was planned in adjacent areas. The author concluded that sare fonn 
of national plan was needed with an administration designerl to operate 
it efficiently. In tenns of the practical task of fonmliating a plan 
and carrying it out, Professor Doganis outlined the need to base the 
plan on a sound know'lerlge of roth the demand for and the supply of air 
transIXJrt services, together with the need to rationalise the results 
with other regional demands. Two suggestions for an administrative 
structure based upon the relative merits of the Federal Aviation 
Authority plan operated in the USA were put fo:rwaro. The first left 
virtually every vital issue in the hands of the authority, whilst the 
second made sane concessions to regional OOdies by granting them the 
administration of airp::>rts , albeit within guidelines laid dawn fran 
above. (47) The Joint Airport Committee of Local Authorities (which 
had been set up in 1966 by the Association of Municipal Corporations, 
the County Councils Association, the Urban District Councils 
Association and the Scottish Association of IDeal Authorities as a 
forum for the discussion of matters of civil aviation concerning local 
authorities owning and/or operating airp::>rts) suggested that despite 
the absence of any finn plan, many airp::>rts had grown as a result of 
the potential within their catchment areas. The Conmi ttee, therefore, 
also favoured the philosophy of a central lx:dy making a study of the 
existing pattern of airp::>rts, especially those situated in the 
conurbations, with a view' to ascertaining their future potential. 
JACOLA argued that it seaned nore sensible to encourage the developrent 
of certain existing airp::>rts rather than to continue the indiscriminate 
growth of new ones and the indetenninate developrent of others. (48) 
Continued concern for the future developrent of the industry as a 
whole led to the conmissioning of a Conmittee of Inquiry into Civil Air 
Transport under the Chainnanship of Professor Sir Ronald Edwards, KBE, 
which reported in 1969 in "British Air TransIXJrt in the Seventies II • 
Ostensibly, the Ccmnittee's tenns of reference ~ to 
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It inquire into the econanic and financial situation and prospects of 
the British civil air transport industry and into the methods of 
regulating canpetition and of licensing currently employed; and to 
propose, with due attention to other fonns of transport in this 
country, what changes may be desirable to enable the industry to 
nake its full contribution to the developnent of the econClI¥ and to 
the service and safety of the travelling public. It 
These tenns of reference did not specifically include consideration of 
the airport network; nonetheless it was held that Itno matter who awns, 
develops, plans and operates airports they are round up with the 
operator and the developnent of services II • Therefore, it was 
impossible to consider the prospects for the British civil air 
transport industry without taking at least peripheral account of 
infrastructure. ( 49 ) 
In its evidence to the Ccmnittee the BAA proposed that an authority 
responsible for airport planning should consider the designation of 
airports under four heads to provide adequately for the bringing of air 
services to the major centres of population; to advance the concept of 
regional plans; to rrake possible the developnent of a viable network of 
air services based upon the designated airports; and to ensure that 
airports were properly administered in an economic pattern to ben.efi t 
the UK's trade and commerce as a whole. (The four airport categories 
suggested were major international and dcmestic airports; airports for 
continental and dcmestic services; airports for scheduled domestic 
operations and seasonal international services and aercx:lrarres for non-
scheduled supplemental services and for general aviation). Under the 
BAA proposals major international airports 'WOuld have served IDndon, 
Manchester and Glasgow. (50) 
In considering the possibilities of airport planning, the Edwards 
Carrmi ttee concluded that no government had developed. a positive policy 
for developnent and that what policy there had been had alnost 
invariably been negative. It was suggested that rrore research on 
airport planning was required and that this research should be closely 
co-o:rdinated with other planning aspects of civil aviation. The 
Committee, therefore, advocated that a single lxxiy should be 
responsible for certain aspects of airline regulation and for research 
upon which airport plans could be based. As far as airport ownership 
is concerned it was held that planning initiative w:>uld not necessarily 
be under:mined by continued de-centralisation. However, the Ccmnittee 
referred also to the possibility that the pattern of ownership at 
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Manchester and Glasgow in particular, might be nodified by transfer to 
the British Airports Authority. (51 ) 
This very tentative suggestion called forth significant opposition 
especially in Manchester and arrong other JACOLA members. The City of 
Manchester accepted in principle that the diversion of traffic to 
Manchester fran Heathrow and Gatwick, which was justified on economic 
grounds alone, could perhaps be facilitated if all three airports were 
placed. under the same controlling authority. However, it was argued 
that outside the UK there was no evidence to support the suggestion of 
possible merit in all Ira jor international airports becoming the 
ul tima.te responsibility of the BAA. No precedent had been established 
in either the USA or Europe and the general pattern emerging had been 
for the states concerned to leave airports in the ownership and control 
of local carmi ttees. It was likely that interested parties in the 
North may have felt that they would be better served. by allowing 
Manchester Airport to continue under Corporation ownership, with 
airlines being persuaded at the local level that it would be in their 
best interests to transfer IIDre air services to Manchester. Continued 
municipal management was supported by a comparison of the financial 
results of Manchester and Gatwick for the year 1967-8. Whilst Gatwick 
had operated at a deficit of £537,000, Manchester had recorded a 
surplus of £373,000 and the contrast was reinforced when considered in 
the light of the wide disparity in air traffic statistics. (52) 
The Edwards Carmi ttee was criticised on the grounds that whilst 
naking this tentative suggestion, it had been stated at the same time: 
"we are not proposing to make any pronouncements on the actual 
operation of airports and air traffic control services. We have not 
studied the problems of either in any depth. This would have been a 
major assigmnent in itself." 
Given the references in paragraphs 905 and 907 of the Edwards Report, 
to the efficient operation of airports by local authorities, the City 
of Manchester speculated that the Carrmittee had been unduly influenced 
by the views of the BAA which had su1:mi tted nore detailed evidence 
regarding UK airport requirements than any other organisation 
representing civil airports. For example, no evidence had been 
su1::mi tted by the Aerodrome (Mners' Association. Whilst SOIlE merit was 
obviously seen in canm:>n ownership structures to assist national 
airport planning the local response to suggestions of BAA control 
dem::mstrated a fundamental conflict of interest between the national 
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and local levels of airport operation. ( 53 ) 
The establishment of the CAA under the Civil Aviation Act, 1971 
signalled the first major attanpt at rational plarming in the strategic 
sense. ( 54 ) Section 33 of the Civil Aviation Act stated that, 
"it shall be the duty of the Authority: 
(a) to consider what aerodromes are in its opinion likely to be 
required fran time to time in the United Kingdan in addition to or 
in place of or by way of alteration of existing aerodromes; and (b) 
to make reccmnendation to the Secretary of State arising out of its 
consideration of that matter." ( 55 ) 
The Authority's role regarding airports was further defined in a 
Statement of Policy placing on the Authority the responsibility to 
advise as to the provision and developnent of aerodromes to match the 
developnent of air services and general aviation. However, attempts to 
get a clear responsibility for airports written into the CAA's 
constitution were largely unsuccessful in that its juriSdiction was 
rnainl y advisory. (56 ) 
The CAA viewed the national airports problem as one of coping with 
the trends tCWcll'Cis both concentration and extension within the airport 
system. In particular, between the catchment areas of Scotland and 
Tyne-Tees to the North, the lDndon airports to the South and South East 
and Bristol and South Wales to the South West lay an area comprising 
Yorkshire, Lancashire, Lincolnshire and the Midlands where it was felt 
that inter-regional problems required special attention. The fact that 
half of the nation's civil air transport novements and 60% of total 
passengers passed through airports in the lDndon region also suggested 
the need to consider whether the demand for scheduled and charter 
services in the North could be best met by a nmnber of regional 
airports all aspiring to same degree of international status. (57) 
Essentially, the philosophy behind the argument for strengthening 
the role of the regional airports was based on two concepts . Firstly, 
there was the question of convenience and fuel economy involved in 
forcing passengers to suffer the inconvenience of interlining at 
Heathrow, adding perhaps as much as 200 miles to the journey and 
probably several hours. Secondly, the fact that every passenger routed 
through the lDndon airports unnecessarily to a foreign destination 
contributed four novements to the lDndon Airport statistics had to be 
considered. (58) 
On the one hand, it was accepted that the trend tCWcll'Cis 
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concentration TNOUld continue to be a :fund.anEntal characteristic of 
airport developIEIlt, that is irresp3Cti ve of how fully direct 
international services develope::l at the provinces, there would always 
be a sizeable number of destinations serva:i by Heathrow which could not 
be econanicall y serva:i by any other UK airport. HCMeVer, the eM also 
recognised that essentially by the early 1970s the feeder and. single 
hub system which had develope::l in the previous decade was already 
showing Signs of breaking up through the extension of the airport 
system. For example, at all provincial airports cross-country darestic 
services had been develope::l together with at least a nodest netw:Jrk of 
international services both scheduled and non-scheduled. '!he 
introduction of direct international air services fran provincial 
airports was regarded as a very significant developrrant, suggesting 
that, with all its virtues, the feeder/single hub system had provided 
the provincial traveller with a less than adequate service to 
continental destinations. The trend towards a larger proportion of 
direct international air services at the regional airports was regarded 
as a factor which could radically alter narket conditions through 
traffic diversion. It was postulated that a new direct international 
service frcm a regional airport diverted three different types of 
existing traffic - leaving aside the generation of new traffic. 
Passengers previously interlining at Heathrow could be expected to be 
diverted. Traffic which would have travelled to Heathrow by rail or 
road \\Olld similarly be diverted. Market conditions within the regions 
thE!IlSel ves were also expected to change as advantages in tiJre, cost and. 
convenience TNOUld appeal to travellers within the catchnEnt area of 
neighbouring feeder airports in close proximity. Therefore, when one 
airport offers direct international services not available at 
neighbouring airports the original boundaries between the catchIrEnt 
areas of feeder airports begin to be eroded, introducing an era of 
canpeti tion between neighbouring airports. (59 ) 
Although for the airlines, pairs of airports in close proximity 
canpeting with each other implied the need to set up several operation 
bases and the division of resources, the eM nonetheless vi~ the 
canpetitive relationship as offering a new and. possibly rrore stable 
equilibrium. rrhe feeder airport with the largest natural catchnEnt 
area was expected to be the first to introduce any new international 
service and where the sane destination was served by two or rrore 
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neighbouring airports, the larger catchIrent area .inplied a better 
frequency of service. Thus the coopetitive edge 'WOuld always be with 
the airport with the larger catchment area and irrespective of what air 
services were provided by smaller airports, the larger ones 'WOuld 
always do better. As regards international air services then, the 
.inpression given was one of a coopetitive struggle between. neighbouring 
airports, with severe pressure being placed on the 'Weaker ones . Given 
that fierce canpeti tion ensured the survival of the strongest, there 
appeared in the 1970s to be no possibility of uninterrupted growth for 
those airports which had served a useful purpose in the original 
feeder/single hub era. In the face of strong forces encouraging the 
concentration of international scheduled air services at a small nmnber 
of regional airports , it was argued that the smaller regional airports 
'WOuld inevi tabl y have to look rrore to the domestic, whole-plane charter 
and general aviation markets for their survival. ( 60) 
Given that the industry was in this state of transition wherein a 
small number of regional airports might offer a nebvork of air 
services, as regards the future function of planning, the CAA favoured 
sound policies, flexibly applied, rather than the rigid blue-print in 
which each airport would be allotted. a clearly specified. role in terms 
of air services or total traffic volume. (61) Any attempt to produce 
an ideal nebvork of UK airports was relegated. to a secondary position 
of importance because of the difficulty of accurately predicting air 
travellers demands in aggregate and the methcxiological problems 
involved in attempting to nodel an optimal airport system on a national 
scale. Thus, emphasis was placed. upon the need for regional studies to 
identify those airports appropriate for accelerated developnent. ( 62) 
The imnediate concern of the CAA was to deal with the inter-
regional problems of the North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, the West 
Midlands and the East Midlands regions. In the early 1970s the 
Authority carmissioned the Metra Consulting Group "To examine and 
advise on the desirable future structure of airport system" in these 
regions. The study was to be wide-ranging including an examination of 
the scope and costs of future developnent of existing airports, 
including physical and environmental factors and ccmnercial viability. 
In considering any new airport sites, the study was to identify areas 
of acceptable terrain, meteorological and environmental characteristics 
for a new airport of the required size. (63) However, publication of 
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the Metra report in July 1974 along with subsequent consultations and 
CAA assesSIlEl1t derronstrates a number of problems which were likely to 
occur in attempting to devise an "ideal" airport system even on a 
regional scale. 
Metra had selected 15 airport systems for detailed analysis and when 
assessed in tenus of aviation interests alone, the consultants found an 
ove:rwhelroing case in favour of concentrating air transport novements 
into Binningham and Manchester. This concentration was expected to 
bring substantial econanies to airlines, in stationing and aircraft 
operating costs resulting in lower fares and/or a rapid increase in 
frequency and range of air services available. Econanies were also 
expected in airport operation and capital expenditure. In total the 
benefits to aviation, in comparison with continuing with the existing 
six airport system were valued at £58 million at 1971 prices discounted 
to 1975; equivalent to an annual sum of £8 million. On the same basis, 
the second and third preferred systems involving canbinations of 
Manchester and the East Midlands and Manchester, East Midlands and 
Binningham showed benefits of £6.0 million to £6.5 million at 1975 
prices. However, in environmental tenns, concentration was seen to 
have significant drawbacks. The possibility of tv-1o IlE.jor airports at 
Binningham and Manchester was least attractive in regard to the 
exposure of residents to aircraft noise. Manchester and Binningham 
were estilnated to bring a total of 136,000 residents within the 35 NNI 
contour by 1990. Thus, the Consultants favoured sites in open country. 
Two different airport systems were favourably considered one canbining 
tv-1o nav sites, in North Cheshire and in the West Midlands, and another 
canbining the site in North Cheshire with the existing East Midlands 
Airport. As it was calculated that a general reduction of about 90% 
in the number of households exposed to noise above the 35 NNI level 
could be achieved at the cost of about 50% reduction in the benefits to 
aviation interests, it was recomnended that concentration should be 
supported but at two new rural airports rather than Manchester and 
Binningham. (64) 
These recommendations received little support from private 
individuals or environmental organisations in the areas concerned. 
Similarly, no strong support was forthcoming from national 
organisations which had in the past IlE.de their views known so clearly 
in respect of proposed developnent in the South East, for example, the 
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Maplin Airport project. (65) In accounting for this lack of support it 
is suggested that at the local level it was probably symptanatic of the 
lack of consideration given to the positive externalities arising from 
airport developnent, such as the creation of emplayrrent and the 
attraction of industry and corrmerce to areas where airports are 
located . Nationally, enviromnental groups had by this tine begun to 
focus on the ecological impact of airport develop:rent on green-field 
and coastal sites. 
In essence, the cool reception which was given to the Metra 
recommendations demonstrates one of the major difficulties in 
ilIlplementing the results of rational airport plarming by this tine. 
Even when planning involved the systaratic analysis of full costs and 
benefits it did not follow that the plan could be carried out. At a 
conference on regional airports in 1975, the Director of Manchester 
Airport went so far as to suggest that it might be too late to 
formulate a total plan for regional airports as rationalisation would 
be likely to meet with great opposition from large sections of the 
population within the respective airport areas. ( 66 ) 
The Metra study also derronstrates the difficulties of optimal 
airport planning even on a regional scale, resulting from the tine 
taken to carry out detailed cost benefit analysis in the context of an 
industry subject to rapid change. The study had originally been 
ccmnissioned in 1972 but same 18 rronths had lapsed before publication 
of the Consultants' report. Shortly before publication in March 1974, 
the Government had initiated a review of the Maplin Airport project, 
which had resulted in a decision not to proceed. with proposals to 
develop the new site. The main conclusions of the review had been that 
passenger handling capacity required to accormodate forecasts in air 
traffic up to about 1990 was not dependent upon the developnent of a 
new airport at Maplin; the cost of developnent at Maplin could be 
substantially greater than the cost of developnents necessary at 
existing lDndon airports to cater for the expected derran.d and with the 
intrcx:luction of larger and quieter aircraft, it was concluded that the 
forecasts of noise distribution at the lDndon area airports in 1990 
showed a significant ilIlprovement over the position anticipated in 1972. 
For the CAA the decision not to proceed with Maplin suggested that 
in the absence of maasures to divert traffic from the South Fast, rrore 
traffic from the provinces would be likely to be attracted to the 
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IDndon area. In addition, the oil crisis of 1973 and. its ilrp3.ct on the 
industry rreant that a nore pessimistic view about the future growth of 
air traffic had been taken since the consultants had drawn up their 
original traffic forecasts. Taken together, the results of the Maplin 
review and the effect of the downturn in traffic forecasts had a 
scaling down effect on aviation costs and benefits as originally 
assessed. Averaging across roth charter and scheduled operations, the 
eM assessed the benefits to airline profitability at 70% of the 
original estimates. (67) 
The methodological difficulties involved in airport planning were 
further derronstrated by a fundamental difference between the CAA and 
Metra regarding the time required to develop green-field sites. The 
Consultants believed that such a site could be operational within a 
period of five years. However, the eM asserted that whilst this time-
scale nay be appropriate to the developnent of a small airport, sare 10 
to 12 years would be required for the procedures involved in 
consultation, planning and developing a rrajor green-field airport site. 
Overall, this difference of opinion affected four elE!'lEIlts in Metra's 
analysis . Firstly, there was the consideration of a net increase in 
capital expenditure due to additional investrrEnt required at existing 
airports which \VOuld becare abortive when the new airport ( s ) opened. 
Increases in airline and airport operational expenditure could also be 
expected as a result of having to retain the "less efficient" airport 
system for a longer period. With respect to aircraft noise, 
postponement was very significant as the nuisance of aircraft noise 
around city airports \VOuld have to be endured for an additional ten 
years. Because of the time lapse it was likely that when relief 
finally came there vvould be a considerable reduction in the noise level 
of individual aircraft. Thus the ultimate benefit accruing would be 
much sma.ller than that which would have applied sare seven years 
earlier. 
Metra and. CAA also disagreed on the methodology adopted in attaching 
values to aircraft noise. Basically, the consultants' values were 
comparable to those used by the Roskill Carmission after changes in the 
value of lIDney and the date to which costs are diSCOilllted. The Roskill 
Camnission had assmned that the impact of aircraft noise at new 
airports would be comparable to that which existed around Gatwick at 
the time. For the eM the level of reckground noise was a significant 
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factor in noise assessment as aircraft noise tends to became a nuisance 
only in so far as it stands out over the background noise level. The 
Roskill Corrmission had found that the background. noise levels around 
Gatwick -were quieter than around Heathrow. The eM. maintained that any 
canparison bebNeen Manchester and Binningham and Gatwick would probably 
result in a difference greater than that identified by Roskill, as the 
surrounding area of both airports contained a much greater admixture of 
industry than that found in the western suburbs of lDndon. The 
disruptive effect of aircraft noise was thus not likely to be as 
serious in areas around Manchester and Birmingham as in 
rural/residential areas. On this assumption, the eM. estimated that 
the number of residents exposed to aircraft noise at any given level of 
NNI could be reduced by 50% of original estimates. (68) 
In sumnary, the m:xtifications made by the eM. affected conclusions 
in a variety of fundamental ways. In all airport systems the net 
benefits to aviation in comparison to the existing airport system 
continuing -were substantially reduced. In systems comprising existing 
airports, the benefits to aviation were reduced by about £10 million. 
In systems with one or rrore new airports the downward adjustment was in 
the region of £30 million, meaning that they compared unfavourably in 
aviation tenus with a continuation of the existing airport system. NeiN 
airports had to justify themselves in enviromnental tenus if they were 
to be regarded as an "efficient" solution. However, m:xtifications in 
respect of aircraft noise had the effect of reducing the relative 
advantages of systems incoIpJrating new airports. For the consultants 
these systems had attributed values of £50 million plus, in comparison 
with retaining the existing system, whilst in the revised analysis the 
value attributed to enviromnental advantages of new airports fell to 
only £15-20 million. On the total assessment after rrodifications, the 
systems cCIIf!Prising new airports came at the bottom of the rank order 
and of systems cCIIf!Prising a mix of existing and new airports only that 
envisaging the developnent of North Cheshire and East Midlands ranked 
in the first seven. In the final analysis the two systems preferred on 
aviation grounds alone, that is a combination of Manchester and. 
Birmingham or Manchester and East Midlands, turned out to be the rrost 
preferred systems overall. (69) 
Having m:xlified Metra's analysis to the extent that its major 
reccmnendations were virtually overturnErl the Consultants and the CAA 
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could only agree on two quite broad points of principle. Firstly, both 
concurred that support for a policy of concentration into a smaller 
number of airports offered substantial advantages in securing the wide 
range of objectives identified by the CAA. Secondly, views concurred 
regarding the appropriate nmnber of airports to be designated for the 
region, in that provision of a single airport for the whole region had 
been rejected on the grounds that although the ~ight of population and 
derrand pointed towards a site in the North West, such a site would be 
relatively unattractive to Midlands traffic, which could tend towards a 
greater diversion of traffic from the Midlands to the london airports. 
(70) 
In selecting the two major airports to serve the region the CAA took 
account of the existence of pairs of airports in close proximity to 
each other. In the North West, no serious claim was made to justify 
the selection of Liverpool as the major regional airport for the area 
but the North West Regional Economic Planning Council and the 
Merseyside Chamber of Ccmnerce and Industry suggested that the optinrum 
solution for the North West could be joint ownership of Liverpool and 
Manchester with traffic being allocated between the two. It was hoped 
that joint ownership could yield savings in airport capital 
expenditures; improvements in services provided at Liverpool without 
reducing standards at Manchester and better financial results in 
aggregate. (71 ) 
Detailed consideration was given to this suggestion and three 
different methods of traffic allocation ~re considered . Firstly, the 
possibility of dividing scheduled air services to each destination on a 
roughly equal ba.sis , giving Liverpool a degree of parity with 
Manchester in short-haul and meclimn-haul services was considered. The 
second option was the allocation of all scheduled flights to individual 
destinations to one or other airport possibly on a geographically 
sectorized ba.sis. The third possibility considered was that of simply 
allocating all scheduled and charter operations of British Airways' 
Regional Division and other scheduled operators to Manchester and 
allocating whole-plane charters to Liverpool. Havever, none of these 
options measured up convincingly to expectations. The first option was 
rejected on the grounds that it would be costly to the airlines in 
splitting operations and for the scheduled passenger parallel services 
\I\JOuld probably have resulted in a poorer frequency at either airport 
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than would otherwise have been offered at Manchester. This in turn 
could have led ultimately to greater reliance on international services 
at the IDndon airports and a lower combined growth than might be 
achieved at Manchester alone. The second option had fewer drawbacks 
than parallel operations and represented a fairly econanical solution 
for the airlines in not having to split operations, but it was rejected 
on the grounds of passenger access and inconvenience. The principle 
drawba.ck of the final option was that Liverpool business interests 
would sacrifice limited local scheduled services, although an enhanced 
range of services was likely at Manchester. (72) 
It was concluded that joint operations would not ilrq;>rove aggregate 
turn-out as any advantage accruing at Liverpool would tend to be at the 
expense of Manchester. Any material increase in traffic at Liverpool 
would have required considerable investment in tenninal and air traffic 
control facilities whilst at Manchester there was the danger that joint 
ownership would result in the under-utilisation of resources. It was, 
therefore, decided that concentration of international air services at 
Manchester was the preferred option with Liverpool's airport being 
designated for services to which it was naturally well suited 
geographically and econanicall y, that is, domestic and services to 
Ireland. (73) 
In selecting the major airport to serve the Midlands, Binningham 
Airport offered greater accessibility to the main centres of population 
and industry than the East Midlands Airport and although a serious 
disadvantage was the relatively high population density of the area to 
the North West, it was expected that with the introduction of quieter 
jets, noise contours would be extended beyond their existing limits. 
With Manchester and Binningham as major airports in the North and South 
of Central England, it was felt that the region would have a fairly 
well defined traffic catchment area with respect to short-haul 
scheduled traffic, in that both airports could develop an effective 
network of services. With respect to long-haul traffic at the tine 
there -were no direct long-haul scheduled services operating fran either 
Manchester or Binningham, but with a runway longer than 9,000 feet 
Manchester had the capability of operating these services. Whilst 
indirect long-haul services had already been established at Manchester, 
previous experience at BiDningham had been disappointing and there 
seemed to be no enthusiasm for repeating the experiment, therefore, the 
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CAA favoured concentration of long-haul services at Manchester. (74) 
As far as other airports in the region are concerned, those at 
Liverpool, !.Beds/Bradford and Blackpool were to continue to cater for 
domestic, short-haul and medium-haul whole-plane charters and 
international scheduled traffic to destinations for which traffic at 
Manchester had becarre adequately established. 'Ihe East Midlands 
Airport was to provide a similar canplarentary role to Binningham, with 
the proviso that joint services calling at East Midlands and Binningham 
should be encouraged until fully viable services could be operated fran 
roth separately. It was reccmnended that with respect to international 
scheduled service licenses, they should not nonnall y be granted until 
traffic levels at Manchester and Binningham had reached a level at 
which additional traffic would produce diminishing further economies. 
'Ihus a measure of protection of international services was proposed 
until such tines as they were sufficiently well established and 
profitable to withstand canpeti tion fran parallel services fran sma.ller 
airports. ( 75) 
In essence, the CAA reccmnendations were accepted by the Board of 
Trade although a greater emphasis was placed upon the benefits of a 
policy of concentration to assist in regional industrial policies, as 
reflected in revised policy guidance issued to the CAA. 'Ihe aim of 
regional developnent policy of successive governments had been to 
reduce economic and social disparities beb.\leen. different parts of the 
country by stimulating industrial developnent in assisted areas and by 
relieving pressures on resources in nore prosperous areas. It was 
argued that concentration engendering an improvement in the variety and 
frequency of air services from the regions could make the chosen 
airports nore attractive to air passengers thereby extending catchnent 
areas and ultimately encouraging airlines to initiate new direct 
intexnational services. 'Ihis general improvement in services could in 
tUD1 provide the basis of "drawback" to the regions of passengers 
travelling to the IDndon airports to connect with international 
services which could in the short tenn stimulate roth on and off 
airport employment in areas where unemployment rates were consistently 
above the national average and in the long tenn could function as an 
additional inducement to industrial developnent. ( 76) 
Having decided that a concentration policy was the nost efficient 
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solution to the future develop:ren.t of the UK airport systan, 
consideration was then given to the possible measures which might be 
used to achieve objectives. In order to assess the possible effects of 
a policy of regional diversion four rrodels were chosen for examination 
and measures studied included a charge on air passengers using the 
wndon airports; the use of the air transport licensing systan; 
provision of aid for scheduled services fram the regions and a 
passenger ceiling at the lDndon airports. However, the results of this 
analysis were generally inconclusive and none of the measures offered 
the possibility of encouraging substantial growth in the regions. (77 ) 
The White Paper, Airports Policy, Onnd 7048 issued in 1978 
recognised that there was a greater role for regional airports to 
fulfill. Paragraph 22 stated: 
"First the Government considered that the pursuit of a coherent 
airports policy should make a positive contribution to an overall 
increase in traffic fran the regions outside the South East. A 
proportion of those passengers presently using the wndon airports 
but with origins and destinations outside the South East would be 
prepared to use airports elsewhere if the right services, at the 
right time, and with the right frequency vvere available. Such 
services are rrore likely to be carnErciall y viable if they are 
operated fran a limited range of airports. The avoidance of 
wasteful canpeti tion between regional airports, if this can be 
assured, should provide some incentive to airlines to rrount services 
fran the rrore important regional airports." (78) 
However, the inference was that a policy of concentration 'iNOUld be rrore 
easily achieved if existing "natural growth factors" v.;ere assisted 
rather than imposing a solution which "might not be wholly consistent 
with market forces". (79) The Government stated clearly the rejection 
of the suggestion that the air transport industry should be subject to 
dama.ging restrictions as a result of the forced diversion of traffic to 
regional airports. The outcome of attE!IT!Pts at rational paper planning 
was, therefore, an airport strategy which involved the categorisation 
of airports broadly reflecting their already established roles in the 
early 1970s. Taking account of the catchment area potential in the 
Central England and Northern area, including the North West, and the 
major conurbations of Merseyside, Yorkshire and Binningham, Manchester 
Airport was designated a Category "A" international gateway airport and 
the principal airport outside the South East supporting a wide range 
and frequency of international and intercontinental air services; 
B.iDningham, East Midlands, leeds/Bradford. and Newcastle airports vvere 
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designated category "B" with important regional roles providing a 
network of European scheduled air services. Other airports v.Bre 
classified "C" and "D" denoting local and general aviation roles 
respectively. 
As far as Manchester Airport is concerned, this categorisation only 
reflected the status which had already been achieved by 1978, with a 
wide range of services to Europe and North Arrerica. However , it was 
expected that with gateway status the Airport could consolidate on its 
already ~ll established range of international services, extending 
traffic patterns to include an increased range of services to North 
Amarica and new routes into Africa , especially the 'Western part of the 
continent. At the time passengers fran Manchester bound for Africa or 
the Middle and Far Fast travelled via wndon or same other 1M jor 
European transit airport like Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Brussels, 
Frankfurt, Zurich or Paris. (80) 
The White Paper stressed that the categorisation was expected to be 
interpreted flexibly and accepted that categorisation alone could not 
succeed in establishing rational airport developnent; other air 
transport policies 'Were required to reinforce the strategy. ~r, 
no specific policies were identified; it was only suggested that the 
CAA was "expected to take account of airport strategy. . in 
considering applications for new services and renewal of existing 
services". Essentially then, categorisation had little practical use 
in tenns of controlling airport developner1t in the regions, i t merely 
recognised the effects of the operation of the free narket which had 
naturally tended towards a long tenn trend of greater concentration at 
certain airports. Outside lDndon larger regional airports had for a 
long time been increasing their narket share at the expense of srraller 
ones - a trend which reflected the econanics of airline operations 
whereby concentration at a srrall nmnber of larger airports, rraximising 
interlining opportunities betvJeen its CMIl services and with those of 
other airlines could achieve econanies of scale. (81) By the early 
1980s, the Manchester International Airport Authority was inclined to 
the view that, 
"despite the repeated assertion that there are positive policies to 
prarote the developrent of regional airports, this has in reality 
anounted to lip service." 
The role of the regional airports envisaged in the White Paper in 
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relieving the pressure of the IDndon airport system had not been 
achieved with the regional share of international traffic raraining 
broadly static at 20% since 1978. (82) 
It is argued that despite the existence of evidence to suggest that 
a strategy for the planned developnent of regional airports was being 
devised, the underlying principles rE!Il'Bined basically laissez-faire. 
Possibly the lack of any positive encouragement for the regions was 
founded on a belief that in reality they would offer little substantial 
relief to Heathrow. However, it is suggested that whilst to sane 
degree this may have been the case the overriding influence was the 
continued pressure for the establishment of a third london airport 
especially fran the BAA. (83) The Authority maintained that a third 
IDndon airport by about 1987 was essential to the UK maintaining a 
praninent position in international trade, ccmnerce and. tourism. In 
essence, the difficulty in tenns of airport strategy, therefore, became 
one of reconciling the priority given to the encouragement of the 
diversion of traffic away fran london to the regions with the pressure 
being exerted for the accelerated developnent of the london system. In 
this respect, the continued existence of both centralised and de-
centralised ownership structures operating side by side reinforced the 
battle between the london area airport system and the regional airport 
system which tended to detract fran the concept of airport planning on 
a national scale. 
The BAA's control over Heathrow and. Gatwick Airports gave it 
rronopol y powers over the airport system as a whole. To sane the BAA 
had claimed the national objective of securing as large a share of the 
civil aviation market as possible as its own and had used it to justify 
an incessant demand for a third london airport and its "imperial 
ambitions" to acquire other airports. What has been referred to as the 
BAA's persistent attempts to take over the major regional airports is 
interpreted as evidence to suggest that public control had created a 
major nonopoly operating at the expense of air travellers and 
exploiting the prospective shortage of capacity in the South East for 
its own aggrandisement. As BAA control of the london area airports for 
central goverrment had institutionalised the capital's domination of 
the share of British air traffic in practice, the developnent of a 
positive strategy for regional airports developnent rE!Il'Bined very low 
in the list of priorities. (84) 
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Arguably, any national strategy for airport developlBlt which sought 
to influence market forces might have implied the cClIIlIDn ownership of 
airports. As the basis of the proposed airport strategy of the 1970s 
was one of praroting concentration at certain regional airports, 
especially Manchester, cClIIlIDn ownership of at least the gateways for 
international air services might have offered the advantages of a nore 
unified system where investment policies would be !lOre consistent with 
national objectives and facilities could be planned on an incremental 
basis to deal with increases in demand . Possibly the overall planning 
of the airport system to accommodate growth involving central 
government and local planning authorities might have been less 
haphazard if ownership had not renained in a nmnber of different hands. 
(85) It is clear that whilst the laissez-faire approach applied to 
provincial airports in the 1960s coupled with centralisation of the 
major UK airports had contributed towards imbalance in the airport 
system, it is argued that carrm::>n ownership would not have necessarily 
been a panacea in redressing the balance. Indeed, the outcane of the 
Edwards Committee's suggestion that Manchester Airport might be 
transferred to the BAA derronstrated the fact that whilst national 
agencies might have regarded corrmJn ownership as essential to the 
planned development of airports on a national scale, such aspirations 
could be defeated by forces operating at the local level. 
It is suggested that local ownership of Manchester Airport had in 
the past enabled the airport to respond nore effectively to local needs 
and that in the absence of any clear direction from national agency, 
the element of local enterprise in the ownership and operation of a 
regional airport figured prominently in accounting for the 
international status which was recognised in the 1978 White Paper. 
Essentially, the dynamic growth of the Airport was achieved despite the 
very considerable influence of the British Airports Authority and the 
Government's and the Civil Aviation Authority's apparent predilection 
for developing the IDndon Airport system's danination of the South 
East. 
5.3 CENIRAL rovERNMENr IULICY 'IOWIDS mE ~ OF .AIRRR:r 
FACILITIES 
In general, it is argued that throughout the period of development 
of civil air transport in Britain, central government policy towards 
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the financing of airport facilities has been restrictive, anbodying a 
fundamantal rejection of subsidising developrEIlt even when the industry 
was in its infancy. However, as far as Manchester Airport is 
concerned, as a result of initiatives emanating fran the local 
authority owners, in contrast to other provincial airports, the 
developnent process in the IX>st war years has been underpinned by 
substantial capital grant, providing the financial backing essential to 
the developnent strategy envisaged by local interests. 
When in 1919 the first scheme for a network of UK aerodranes 
involving the cc:mni ttment of funds fran the public purse was put 
fo:rward, the reaction of the Treasury was one of "implacable 
hostility". (86) After the Second World War, the emphasis on m:Udng 
airports pay is exemplified by two statarents issued in 1948: 
"the cost of aerodromes and ground services rome by the State is 
heavy and at the prevailing level of landing fees represents a 
substantial subvention to air service operators. The aim should be 
. . . . that landing fees should in the long nm make a contribution 
sufficiently substantial to justify an expectation that the deficit 
at any rate at the busiest aerodranes can largely be made good by 
the proceeds of efficient and energetic developrent of amenities and 
other ancillary sources of revenue." 
and again in 1956: 
"The Ministry's IX>licy is aimed at deriving the maximum revenue that 
the rrarket will bear with a view to m:Udng aerodranes ultimately 
self-sufficient." (87) 
In later decades, even with the institution of price restraint for the 
econany as a whole, the objective of m:Udng airports self sufficient 
continued, as suggested by a statement made by the Secretary of State 
for the Environment in 1974 that local authority airports should equate 
revenues nore closely with expenditure by increasing charges. ( 88) 
Admittedly, at the early stage of developrent attitudes may have 
been influenced by perceptions of who the main benefactors of 
developnent would be. John IBeming for example, in voicing his support 
for a municipal aerodrane in Manchester, argued that the benefits fran 
this would fallon the surrounding carmnmity, therefore, "taxing 
districts which 'iIIlOuld not benefit 'iIIlOuld be unjust." (89) Hooever, in 
the late 1920s, the Manchester Corporation regarded central support as 
essential although an approach to the Air Ministry pranpted a negative 
response, 
"The Government will not give financial assistance to a local 
authority in connection with the establishment of an aerodrane 
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either by war ?f a capital grant or by way of an armual paymant to 
nest any defl.cl.ency as between debt charges arising out of capital 
outlay plus revenue expenditure in managanent and maintenance and 
income." (90) , 
In the light of this response, the Corporation looked to al te:mati ve 
possibilities of acquiring financial assistance indirectly. It was 
suggested that the airport scheme might reasonably be regarded as work 
of a "public utility" character, eligible for assistance under the 
Government proposed support scheme for the creation of jobs for 
unemployed labour. However, this was a difficult case to argue 
contradicting to sane degree the very notions of prosperity which 
fanned the foundation of the case for the establishment of an aerodrcma 
in the City and given the relatively law incidence of unemployment in 
Manchester, the Officer-in-Charge of the Unemployment Grants Carrmittee 
advised that the City vvould be unlikely to receive support. (91 ) 
'!he only positive contribution made by the Ministry to airport 
developnant in this period was the offer of advice regarding the 
selection of appropriate sites, including guidance with respect to such 
conditions as soil ccmposi tion, geography, and envirornnental conditions 
and support in the canpilation of estinates for schemes proposed. It 
seems likely that the lack of financial assistance would have 
influenced the Corporation in selecting the area at Chat Moss as an 
appropriate site for the Barton Aerodrome in the late 1920s. 
Generally, the rna jar cost involved in aerodrome provision in the period 
was the acquisition of land with buildings rarely anounting to a 
quarter of the cost of an entire scheme and as previously suggested, 
the site at Chat Moss was already in the possession of the City's 
Cleansing Committee. (92) Between 1928/9 and 1930/1, the cost involved 
in levelling the site and constructing roads was £16,402; the erection 
of buildings and hangarage cost £20,021 and the building of an airport 
hotel involved a capital expenditure of £5,413. In addition, £5,671 
was devoted to tenants' compensation and the purchase of fann stock. 
(93) In contrast, the provision of the new landing ground at Ringway 
between 1935/6 and 1937/8 involved the purchase of land at £59,940. 
DerrDli tion, levelling, fencing and drainage of the site involved a 
capital expenditure of £41,459 and site preparation and the provision 
of services for buildings anounted to £10,226. As suggested, due to 
the relative prosperity of Manchester, no Exchequer funds ~t into any 
of these developnents despite the general willingness on the part of 
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the Unenployment Grants Ccmnittee to assist in the preparation of 
landing grounds. (94 ) 
In 1932, sane concession had been made to aerodrane owners in that 
the Air Ministry decided to assist in the provision of wireless and 
meteorological facilities at aerodranes. Following negotiations with 
the Air Ministry, it was agreed that at the Barton Aerodrame the 
Ministry \'IiQuld bear both the initial and recurrent costs of equiprent 
(excluding buildings) and staff, on completion of the installation in 
May 1933 whilst the Corporation paid the swn of £250 per year to the 
Air Ministry and provided and maintained all buildings to house the 
facility free of charge. ( 95 ) However, such support tended to be 
regarded as a rnini.nal ccmnittrnent to aerodrome provision, as suggested . 
by Railway Air Services in 1934, 
"as the Municipal Authorities will be loath to incur further 
expenditure for the provision of additional land and facilities for 
safe operation. . It is sul:mitted that the Government should 
consider rendering financial assistance to the Civic Authorities 
when necessary for the constructing of airports in key positions." 
(96) 
With the onset of War, whilst no official policy of subsidising 
airports existed, the establishment of facilities to cater for war-time 
needs may be regarded as a fonn of indirect subsidy in that many of the 
buildings erected and ~rovements made to landing grounds provided 
suitable facilities for the conduct of civil air transport following 
the cessation of hostilities. Since Manchester's Airport at Ringway 
was not requisitioned during the Second World War, this allowed the 
Corporation to pursue a fundamental objective that expenditure incurred 
during war-tine use should be fully recovered. Achieving this 
objective involved extensive and often protracted negotiations. 
To accamodate the initial needs of the Fairey Aviation Company for 
aircraft assembly and test, the Company proposed a rent of £750 to 
£1,000 per annwn to cover both land lease and flying rights. In 
February 1937, following lengthy negotiations, the Corporation agreed 
to lease a plot of land south of Yew Tree Lane compriSing 4.33 acres 
upon which the Canpany subsequently erected two hangars. The lease 
which was to run for a tenn of 14 years, granted the right to use 
portions of the landing ground for the testing of the output of the 
Heaton Chapel \'IiQrks. However, the final rent agreed was £25 per annwn 
until such time as the landing ground received its certificate of 
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fitness, then £1,000 per annum for the first seven years of the lease, 
increasing to £1,250 thereafter. (97) 
With the need for nore facilities to accamodate the ~ts of 
the reannament programne, it was originally envisaged that the 
financial arrangenents pertaining to a lease to the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production of 16.6 acres of land north of Hale Road 1NOuld be 
based on the principles of that agreed with the Fairey Aviation Co 
Limited in 1937. It was proposed that an overall rental of £1,250 per 
annum \'\1Ould be charged for both the site where new buildings Y.1ere to be 
erected and the use of the landing area. This figure had been arrived 
at on the assumption that given the aircraft likely to be manufactu:ra:l 
by Faireys, a charge of £1 per landing wuuld be reasonable with testing 
in full production usually requiring on average tW'O landings per 
aircraft. (98) However, it was not until February 1942 that the 
Airport Manager was in a position to infonn Faireys that: 
"At long last the Agreement between the Corporation and the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production regarding the lease of the site of the 
buildings adjoining your buildings at Ringway has been canpleted and 
is dated 14 January 1942." 
An arrangement was made whereby the Ministry of Aircraft Production 
wuuld lease the necessary 16.6 acres fran the Corporation and erect the 
appropriate buildings. The final lease arrangements agreed between the 
Corporation and the Ministry of Aircraft Production \'\iere to run for a 
period of 21 years fran 29 September 1939; the financial arrangements 
involved a payment of £498 9s 7d to the Corporation for the rent of the 
land together with payment at the rate of 6s per 1,000 pounds of gross 
\'\ieight of aircraft tested on the landing ground. It was further agreed 
that, should the Corporation deem it necessary to provide concrete 
runways on the landing ground as a result of Air ministry use, the 
Ministry would contribute tCMards the cost of their provision. 
Ul tirnatel y, the Ministry of Aircraft Production erected three hangars 
on this plot of land to enable Faireys to carry on the assembly of 
aircraft as their agents. 
The final stage in acca:rm:xiating Fairey's acti vi ties at Ringway 
involved a lease agreed with the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 
October 1942. This related to the provision of 5.5 acres of land 
immediately east of Pinfold Lane, together with similar rights 
pertaining to the lease of January 1942. The lease of this land was 
for a tenn of 30 years fran 25 Decanber 1941 with an annual rent of 
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£165 payable to the Corporation. Again the agrearent involved an 
additional charge of 6s per 1,000 pounds gross weight of aircraft 
tested. The Ministry of Aircraft Production erected one hangar on this 
plot of land for Fairey's use. (99) By the cessation of hostilities 
then, Faireys were occupying six hangars at Ringway for the assembly of 
aircraft, four of which had been erected by the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production under an Agency Agreement with the Company. Between 1941 
and 1945, the Manchester Corporation received £14,523 for use of the 
Ringway landing area for flight testing. (100) 
In addition to the Fairey operation (as previously suggested) AV Roe 
and Co Limited made Ringway the centre of its experimental department 
in the war years. In May 1939, the Ccmpany occupied a small portion of 
the No 1 or Corporation hangar adjoining the control tCJtoVer for the 
purpose of assembling the prototype of a military aircraft later 
disclosed as the Manchester banber. By November 1941, a tenancy of the 
whole hangar was granted including the w:>rkshops which fonned an annex 
to the premises. It was agreed that the tenancy should be renewed 
annually subject to three IIDnths notice being given on either side at 
any time following the end of hostilities in Europe. (101) 
Whilst the Aerodrane CMners' Association scale of charges stipulated 
a pa.ynent of not less than 21/4d per week, a suggested basic rent of 6d 
was put fo:rward as a starting point in negotiations on the basis that a 
canpranise would probably be reached around 4~ which the Airport 
Manager considered to be a reasonable rent. In the event, little 
negotiation was involved as the Carpmy accepted the proposed rent of 
6d per square ya:rd per week without question. ( 102) In all, the rent 
of the hangar and w:>rkshops fran 16 May 1939 to 25 March 1946 brought 
an incane of £21,323 to the Corporation. The incane fran landing fees 
for aircraft assembled or repaired in the No1 hangar was £998. Against 
this was set a capital expenditure of £21,500 for the erection of the 
hangar including a fire station, decontamination station and suncb:y 
stores which were not occupied by the Canpany. (103) 
As was the case with the Fairey operation at Ringway, as the War 
progressed, the need for additional accarm:xiation had to be satisfied 
and on 21 January 1942, the Airport Carmittee approved arrangemants for 
the granting of a lease to the Ministry of Aircraft Production of land 
on the south side of the airport. Possession of this site was gi veIl to 
the Ministry of Aircraft Production on 25 March. As the total area 
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embracerl the site of tvvo temporary Bellm:m hangars previously erected 
on land leased to the Air Ministry fran 23 July 1940, the rent of £52 
per annum which had applied to this smaller plot of land ceased to be 
p:1yable and the two temporary Bellm:m hangars which had been built 
adjoining the Altrincham Road were rE!tOVed to make way for the neil 
assembly sheds and flight shed. The lease for the larger site to 
provide for the "Avro" ~rks involved the p:1yment of £690 per annmn in 
rent to the Corporation and the "factory" was erected by the Kelvin 
Construction Canpany under the direction of "Avros". ( 104 ) 
Further demands were placed on the Corporation with the suggestion 
in December 1937 that Ringway would be used as a base for an A1:n¥' Co-
operation Squadron. An area of 20 acres was allocated for hangars, 
technical buildings , administrative offices, photographic roans, 
arnoury, ~rkshops, stores, officers I mess and barracks to sleep 100 
men. (105) The Corporation sited and erected these buildings with the 
intention that they should be used for civil purposes at the 
tennination of Air Ministry use. The financial te:rms proposed involved 
the Air Ministry paying a rent equivalent to 8% of the total capital 
expenditure incurred by the Corporation in providing the necessary 
buildings and other works. If any of this construction work, for 
example, temporary buildings was found to be of no value to the 
Corporation on the tennination of the lease, the whole cost of such 
works was to be funded by the Government. ( 106 ) 
As regards the use of the landing area, it was proposed that the Air 
Ministry should p:1y a sum of £100 per annmn for each aircraft housed at 
the airport with a minimum p:1ymetlt of £3,000. The Air Ministry were 
also to pay the Corporation for all gas, water or electricity consUIIEd 
on the premises and to p:1y for any necessary heating. The 
responsibility for cleaning, internal repair and decoration of premises 
along with the responsibility for cleanliness for all approach roads, 
lands, gardens, etc, was to fall to the Air Ministry whilst the 
Corporation ~uld maintain the structure of the buildings, ancillary 
~rks and approach roads. Finally, the Air Ministry was to reimburse 
the Corporation for any rates, landlords property tax and other 
outgoings which related to the premises occupied . Basically, the 
Corporation was ensuring that the Air Ministry should cover the full 
costs of their occup:1tion and use of premises and the landing area. 
(107) 
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Clearly the tenns offered by the Corporation 'Were exhaustive fanning 
a comprehensive basis for negotiation. On 13 July 1938, 
representatives of the Corporation and the Air Ministry net in the Town 
Clerk's office to discuss the proposals. The nain criticism of the 
representatives of the Air Ministry was that the charge of £100 per 
aircraft, with a minimum payment of £3,000 was excessive - £2,000 would 
be ample payment and in fact was what the Ministry v.;ere paying at 
Birmingham. The Corporation justified its position on the grounds that 
the 250 acres of land canprising the landing area had been purchased at 
an average price of £100 per acre. The cost of levelling, draining, 
seeding and other 1NOrks on the landing area had anounted to £45,000 
bringing the total cost of the landing area to £70,000. A charge of 8% 
to cover interest and sinking fund charges was not unreasonable and 
applying this figure to the original cost of the landing area, the 
resulting annual cost of provision to the Corporation was £5,600, 
excluding naintenance which 1NOuld easily bring the figure up to £6,000. 
Use by 40 RAF aircraft of the landing area would constitute much rrore 
than 50% use of the landing area, so a minimum payment of £3,000 could 
be reasonably insisted upon. Corporation representatives stressed the 
general financial policy pertaining to war time use 
"The Corporation do not wish to profit out of war time use of 
Ringway by the Air Ministry, but they do not see why their incarre 
should not equal their expenditure when the airport is used to its 
maximum capacity." (108) 
As the Town Clerk could not accept the Ministry's position and the 
Ministry equally could not accept the Corporation's position, 
negotiations were terrp:>raril y deadlocked . Ultimately, something of a 
canpranise was reached in January 1939. For the use of the landing 
area by 16 machines attached to the Auxiliary Air Force, the Ministry 
agreed to pay a minimum of £1,750 per annum. In respect of the 
Volunteer Reserve, it was agreed that 29 aircraft should be based at 
Ringway. Up to 12 aircraft the Ministry 1NOuld pay 2s for each square 
yard. of average length of the four main runs for each aircraft; this 
1NOuld reduce to Is for between 12 and 24 aircraft and 6d thereafter. 
The minimum payment for any number of aircraft up to eight was to be 
£960. The Air Ministry 1NOuld also pay rent equal to 8% of the total 
capital expenditure incurred by the Corporation in providing and 
erecting buildings and other 1NOrks, plus the annual rental value of the 
20 acres of land to be occupied. In the event of the tenancy being 
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terminated before all capital expenditure had been discharged, 
provision was made for the Air Ministry to pay a proportion of any 
outstanding interest and sinking fund charges on buildings and works 
'Which could be used for civil purposes and the Air Ministry were to 
bear the whole cost of buildings which could not be used in this way. 
(109) 
Provisional est.ima.tes for the erection of buildings, the provision 
of fittings, services and site vvorks arrounted to £284,570 with an 
additional £6,500 being devoted to land acquisition. The RAF camp 
consisted of barracks, sergeants' quarters, sergeants' mess, NAAF 
Institute and Drill Hall arranged around a parade ground on the north 
side of Ringway Road with adjoining officers' mess and quarters and 
station headquarters, two large hangars with ancillary workshops and 
offices, buildings for parachute and technical purposes, sick quarters, 
notor transport block and machine gun butts. (110) Table 5.1 suggests 
that the establishment of facilities to cater for the Auxiliary Air 
Force and Volunteer Reserve (AAF and VR) was the single nost important 
developneI1t project undertaken at Ringway during the war years, 
constituting 95% of total capital expenditure. As this developrEllt was 
funded by the Corporation mainly from borrowing, debt charges incurred 
increased from approximately £4,000 in 1937/8 to £12,442 in 1939/40 and 
remained at between £24,000 and £26,000 for the subsequent 15 years (as 
shawn in Table 5.2). However, the burden of developrEIlt for the 
Corporation was substantially eased by the refund of loan charges 
incurred on the AAF and VR buildings 'Which between 1939/40 and 1951/52 
constituted 23 - 45% of total income from airport operation. 
Operationally, the war time use of Ringway involved demands which 
would not have been encountered under conditions of civil air 
transport. For example, the daily dispersal of aircraft around the 
boundaries of the landing area and the daily inspection and servicing 
of aircraft necessitated heavy traffic rrovement over the landing area 
including lorries, tractors, refuelling units, etc. This cut up the 
landing area, destroying the grass matt and fonning deep ruts which in 
the rainy seasons fonned mud holes not only around the perimeter of the 
landing area but well into the area itself. Maintenance was not only 
difficult but costly and during the adverse weather conditions of the 
winter of 1940/1, it was necessary to put the landing area out of 
service for short periods. ( 111 ) 
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The RAE' had been quick to recognise that the dispersal of aircraft 
around the landing area necessitated the construction of hard standings 
but the experience of the winter of 1940/1 suggested that, in addition, 
it could be necessary to join up the standings with sane sort of 
perimeter road if constant and excessive danage to the landing area was 
to be avoided. Similarly, it was suggested that, if Ringway was to 
ranain a serviceable aerodrane, steps would need to be taken to secure 
hard runways. At a meeting of the Airport Ccmnittee on 21 February 
1941, Councillor Tan Regan argued that there appeared to be "a very 
grave danger of the Corporation being left with an unserviceable 
aerodrane on the tennination of hostilities." To delay construction 
of concrete runways until after the War 
"would be to let slip a golden opportunity of being first in the 
field to meet the new and rapidly growing civil aviation which would 
be influenced in its choice of airport by the facilities provided." 
Sam Hill, the Airport Manager, supported this view, maintaining that 
whilst there was no imnediate imperative necessity to construct hard 
runways, if the War was to last another winter the airport would go out 
of service without concrete runways. ( 112) 
In the event, the needs of war superseded any other considerations 
and, in May 1941, the Air Council canmanded that the Corporation be 
asked to approve the construction of two hard runways at Ringway to 
enable flight testing and the delivery of aircraft to proceed without 
interruption during the caning winter. The runways were to be 
constructed by the Ministry of Aircraft Production. (113) As with so 
many other arrangements, the Ministry had felt that the construction of 
runways was an urgent matter and had, therefore, proceeded without 
conferring on the matter of cost. In this respect, reference was made 
to the agreement concluded with the Air Ministry in 1939 concerning the 
activities of Faireys, in which, considering the possibility of the 
need for hard runways, it had been agreed that the Corporation might 
construct them and the Air Ministry make a contribution towards the 
cost incurred. It was suggested that in view of this agreement, sane 
contribution ought to be made by the Corporation to the £125,000 cost 
involved in the construction of the runways and perimeter tracks . 
Ministry of Aircraft Prcxiuction representatives deemed. that 50% would 
be appropriate. However, the Town Clerk advised that as the Ministry 
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of Aircraft Production and the Air MinistJ:y v-;ere sole users of the 
landing area, the only acceptable arrangement was one whereby, if the 
nmways were thought to be of value to the Corporation at the end of 
the War, a contribution would be nade then, the value to be ascertained 
having regaro to the extent to which the Airport was being used for 
civil purposes. (114) 
The preceding paragraphs serve to dem:mstrate heM' during the Second 
World War the Ringway Airport was developed largely at the expense of 
either the Air MinistJ:y or the Ministry of Aircraft Production. As 
suggested, the fact that the aerodrome was not requisitioned enabled 
the Corporation to ensure that at every juncture costs incurred during 
the period were fully recovered. Data provided in Table 5.3 indicates 
to some extent the significance of the leasing arrangements applying at 
Ringway Airport. In essence, whilst najor building developnent on the 
part of the Corporation was supported by the refund of loan charges, 
once buildings were occupied by the agents of central gavernnent, the 
revenue earning capacity of the Airport increased as substantial incare 
accrued in the fonn of rents and re-chargeable i terns . 
In contrast, at aerodromes which were requisitioned, evidence 
suggests that in sare instances the methods adopted by the Ministry 
were unsystematic and "unjust", at least as viewed from the standpoint 
of the aerodrome owner. In the na jori ty of cases only part of an 
aerodrome was requisitioned, thereby confining compensation to the 
narrowest possible limits, leaving the owner to bear the burden of 
naintaining the rest of the aerodrome at a time when civil aviation had 
been curtailed. In other instances , only the landing ground was 
requisitioned, the rest of the aerodrcme, including buildings which nay 
have been costly to erect and rraintain, being excluded from the 
requisitioning order. Often the parts excluded were cCJIlll'erciall y 
useless when broken away from the renainder of the aerodrome. 
The provision for compensation to be plid to aerodrome owners which 
was embodied in the Compensation (Defence) Act, 1939 nay be deerred to 
have been inadequate in that the Act excluded for the purposes of 
canpensation the appreciation of values as a result of the emergency, 
but included depreciation. If anything, it was likely that as the War 
continued, there would be such an increase in Air Force personnel, with 
consequent danands for additional equipnent and accc:mrodation that 
there would be a shortage rather than a superfluity of suitable 
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aerodranes in the Country. This "WOuld have been a strong argum:mt for 
increasing the amount of compensation claimable b¥ virtue of 
requisitioning had the Act not expressly excluded the appreciation of 
values in wartime. ( 115 ) Whilst new buildings at the Ringway Airport 
were established to accarm:xiate war time needs and leasing arrangements 
provided an inoame of £133,199 between 1939/40 and 1946/7, as shown in 
Table 5.3, the scale of acti vi ty at the Manchester (Barton) Airport 
remained snaIl and under requisitioning arrangements, the total 
compensation paid for war time use was £18,400 (paid between 1939/40 
and 1952/3). 
Central government p::>licy regarding the planning and ownership of 
aerodranes underwent a sea-change in the inmediate p::>st-war years with 
the aim of ensuring "the orderly expansion of air transp::>rt". State 
ownership was advocated as the only means of providing the finance for 
the developnent of airports needed b¥ traffic requirerrEnts and aircraft 
technology. (116) '!he Civil Aviation Bill laid down the tenus of 
compensation which were to apply in the event of acquisition by the 
State. Basically, compensation was to be assessed under the 
Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Carnpensation) Act, 1919 which when 
applied to land, runways and buildings constructed as an aerodrarre did 
not ensure that the measure of carnpensation "WOuld reimburse local 
authorities for the capital expenditure which they had incurred. For 
example, the first principle embodied in the Act was that the value of 
assets arrived at should be the market value of land. (117) 
'!he Town Clerk at Manchester advised that for dwellings, ccmnercial 
buildings, factories, agricultural land, etc, this value was easy to 
ascertain as transactions involving such assets were a day-to-day 
phenomenon. Hawever, there were no ccmparable transactions in the open 
market in aerodromes like Ringway . Secondly, although special 
suitability or adaptability of land to be purchased could be taken into 
account, the Act stipulated that this provision did not apply if the 
purpose related to statutory powers, or if the purpose was one for 
which no market existed save the special needs of a particular 
purchaser or the requirements of any Goverrure1.t Dep:rrtrnent or IDeal 
Authority. In assessing the implications of this rule for Ringway, the 
Town Clerk concluded that the special suitability of Ringway as an 
aerodrare for air transp::>rt services could not be reflected in its 
nonetary value because when the Civil Aviation Bill became law there 
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would be no market for Ringway apart from the special needs of 
GoverrlnEnt. ( 118 ) 
Since 1945, the Ministry had incurred capital expenditure of 
£117,700 on Ringway and the Corporation had undertaken that in the 
event of the airport passing to the Ministry, it would not seek to 
increase its claim for canpensation as a result of this expenditure. 
Faced. with the very real possibility, that Ringway would be taken over 
by the State, the Town Clerk, the City Treasurer and City Surveyor 
considered the basis upon which the Corporation should open 
negotiations. Consideration was given not only to the arrount of 
canpensation which should be claimed, but also to the extent of lands 
which the Corporation could retain on the grounds that ownership by the 
Ministry of Civil Aviation was not essential to the operation of 
Ringway as a civil airport. (119) 
It was agreed that under the powers of ,the Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 
it was doubtful that the Ministry could acquire lands to the north of 
Ringway Road where the RAF buildings stood, although this was probably 
not the case in respect of the RAF Buildings or hangars which stood on 
the airfield proper. rrhus the Airport Carnmi ttee were recanmended to 
retain the freehold of land on the north side of Ringway Road and in 
respect of canpensation for other lands, etc, to press for the naxi:rnum 
possible, that is all capital costs of providing Ringway, with the 
exception of the land and buildings to be retained, together with all 
revenue losses incurred since the project was initiated. canpensation 
to be claimed up to 31 March 1949 was, therefore, calculated to be 
£389,154 in respect of capital expenditure and £100,734 being the total 
net expenditure chargeable to the General Rate Fund. (120) 
Whilst negotiations with the Lands Branch of the Ministry proceeded 
as previously suggested, the Corporation put proposals forward for the 
continued nrunicipal ownership of Ringway. rrhe support of the Ministry 
in making capital grants largely depended upon whether or not proposed 
works were regarded as part of a first stage of developnent. It was 
suggested that the first stage of works should include the construction 
of a new tenninal building and control tCMer, a new apron and the 
extension of the main runway to 7,000 feet, together with the 
strengthening of the runway and taxi-tracks to make them suitable for 
the operation of II Stratocruiser" aircraft which were the heaviest type 
being used on trans-Atlantic air services at that tine. ( 121 ) 
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The tenns offered involved a 75% capital grant towards the cost of 
the first stage capital works (with grant aid reducing to 50% 





New terminal building 
New apron 
New fire station 
£ 
Construction of a subsidicny runway OR 




plus overrun together with strengthening of 300,000 
the existing length of runway associated OR 
taxi-tracks and aprons 400,000 
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST: 1,030,000 
OR 
1,130,000 
In retaining control, it was also agreed that certain works carried out 
since the Ministry had contemplated State acquisition could be regarded 
as having been carried out subsequent to the agreement. The value of 
such works was set at £399,000 in respect of which the Corporation had 
to pay the Ministry £100,000 representing a 25% contribution. (122) 
In agreeing to continued municipal CMIlership, it is likely that the 
advantages to the Exchequer of grant aid rather than State control1N9re 
'Nell appreciated. Accounts of the Ministry of Civil Aviation published 
as early as 1948/9 had shown a loss of £4,210,551 on aerodrome 
operation and after deducting losses on the national airports of 
lDndon, Northolt and Prestwick, the loss on other airports, some 
requisitioned from the municipalities was £2,561,111. (123) Under the 
agreement with Manchester Corporation, the Exchequer could save on 
capital expenditure and any annual losses which might arise on the 
operation of the aerodrane, gaining financial advantage as canp:rred 
with the costs involved at other Ministry airfields. If anything the 
attitude of the local authority tavards developing air services in its 
region was likely to reduce the burden on public funds not on! y 
nationally, but locally too. At the same time, safeguards could be 
instituted to prevent excessive commitments falling upon the Exchequer 
and to ensure that the requisite standards of safety and service would 
be naintained. ( 124 ) 
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Table 5.4 provides details of the ma jor capital developnents at 
Manchester Airport which benefitted. fran central gavernm:mt grant under 
the tenns of the 1955 agreerrent, and Table 5.5 highlights the 
significant contribution made by grant aid to airpJrt developnent at 
least up to 1963/4. However, it is argued. that whilst willing to 
provide financial support to airport developnent, the prim:u:y objective 
of central government was not to positively prarote airport 
develop:nent, but to minimise any potential Exchequer losses. This is 
derronstrated by the attitude adopted by the Ministry to proposals for 
develop:nent fonnulated by the City Architect in the 1950s. The schene 
for tenninal building developnent sulmi. tted. to the Ministry in Decenber 
1954 had involved an estinated. capital expenditure of £2,772,310, a smn 
which the Ministry had deemed unjustified. in view of the anounts to be 
spend on Ministry airports at Glasgow, Prestwick and Edinburgh. An 
amended scheme was, therefore, put forward in February 1956, involving 
an estimated. cost of £2,159,716. Hav.7ever, the Ministry flatly refused 
to approve expenditure of nore than £1 million for 75% grant. At the 
end of the day, as plans vvere further nodified to cope with the traffic 
levels forecast for the early 1960s, the Corporation went ahead with a 
£2.8 million scheme despite the limit imposed on grant aid by the 
Ministry and the effects of this action are clearly indicated in Table 
5.5 fran which it may be noted that fran 1961/2 the proportion of 
capital outlay funded fran loans increased dramatically. ( 125 ) 
The State ownership of scheduled service airports in the UK was 
short-lived and by the early 1960s, the policy of returning then to 
their nrunicipal custodians was 'Well entrenched in an effort to make 
them self-supporting. Government assistance to airports was based on 
the 1961 White Paper, Civil Aerodrcmes and Air Navigational Services, 
which recognised that assistance should be made available where 
airports served a national as well as a local need. With the BAA 
established to take over the principal international airports and 
criteria for support applied strictly, financial assistance to local 
authority airports was limited. In the absence of a national airports 
strategy, there was uncertainty on the part of same airport authorities 
as to the likelihood of Government assistance for particular airport 
developments. (126) 
Consideration of applications for financial assistance was based on 
two criteria. Firstly, an aerodrane had to be regarded as one of a 
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limited number indispensable to the national transport system. 
Secondly, it had to be proven that the cost of running such an airport 
placed an unduly heavy burden on local resources. (127) In assessing 
indispensability account was taken of the location of other aercxh:arEs 
and facilities, the population served by the aerodrane; the existence 
and convenience of other means of travel; the likely grONth of traffic 
and the prospect of the aerodrane paying its way within a reasonable 
period. Regarding the rate burden incurred, a local authority had to 
denonstrate that financial loss would be greater than the local 
ccmnunity could be reasonably expected to bear. However, as pointed 
out in the previous section, at the sarre t:i.rre, the BAA took aver the 
nanagerrent of those airports which were expecterl to be principal 
gateways for nomal scheduled services. Therefore, prilna facie, it was 
these airports which were likely to be regarded as indispensable and it 
follONS that on the basis of the criteria established, Government aid 
to local authority owned airports was inevitably strictly limited. In 
the absence of a national airports strategy, this meant that 
consideration of applications dealt with questions of indispensability 
in an ad hoc way. Specifically, it was not possible to relate 
different proposals to an overall conception of the country's needs for 
airports. This led to uncertainty and misunderstanding on the part of 
sane airport authorities as to the likelihocxi of grants for particular 
developments. (129) 
In practice, aercxh:arEs to which financial assistance was provided 
may be grouped into five categories . Firstly, aerodranes in the 
Highlands and Islands which the 1961 White paper recognised would never 
be likely to pay their way but were essential to the economic and 
social welfare of the areas served were supported by grant aid. 
Secondly, some aercxh:arEs in the North of England in the early 1960s 
received limited financial assistance as part of a progranme for the 
industrial re-generation of the area. Thi1:d.ly, airports at Aberdeen, 
Inverness and Sumburgh received assistance as providing an essential 
part of the infrastructure for the North Sea oil industry which 
necessitated significant developnent to acccnm:x:late the rapid expansion 
of traffic . Fourthly, assistance was given to the BAA when it acquired 
Edinburgh Airport fran the State in 1971. Finally, Binningham and 
GlasgON' Airports received financial assistance under the tenns of 
agreements providing for their transfer fran the State to their 
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respective local authorities in 1960 and 1966. Up to 1976, grants 
totalling £1.9 million were paid to the Binningham Corporation towards 
the cost of extensions to the runway, apron and terminal building and 
at Glasgow the Government bore a cost of £3.5 million for initial 
developnent of the airport including 'IiI1Orks on the term:i.nal area, 
taxiways and nmways prior to the BAA take over of the Airport in 1975. 
(130) 
As suggested earlier, lIDst local authority airports registered 
losses in the early 1960s whilst Manchester's airport at Ringway 
reconded a surplus fram 1957/8. In the 1959/60 Parliamentary Session, 
the Public Accounts Conmittee investigated the expenditure of the 
Ministry and in its report drew attention to expenditure bo:me at 
Manchester in the provision of technical services. The Corrmittee 
highlighted the absence of any charge for these services and the fact 
that the Govermnent received no share in the Airport's profits. As 
traffic at Manchester had increased, inCCl'lE from landing fees increased 
the revenue accruing to the Airport, whilst the Ministry faced 
increased costs for technical services. ( 131 ) 
A review- of the 1955 agreement was proposed on the grounds that it 
was not equitable that taxpayers' resources should be devoted to an 
airport where receipts exceeded expenditure and it was suggested that 
unless arrangements were m:xtified to entitle the Government to a share 
of the airport's profits, the paynent of capital grants to the 
Corporation in the future could not be justified. At a rreeting of the 
Airport Ccmnittee on 22 November 1963, the conclusion was reached that 
it was in the best interests of the Corporation to forego future 
capital grants and reject the suggestion of profit sharing. ( 132) 
Having been supported by grant aid towards capital expenditure for a 
period of nine years, the 1955 agreement was tenninated on 1 April 
1964. Under new arrangements, the Ministry agreed to continue to give 
technical advice on aerodrCl'lE problans without charge. The balance of 
grants outstanding was to be settled and grants on itans not yet 
approved paid. A lump sum of £650,000 was to be paid towards costs 
related to the nain runway extension and road diversion referred to in 
Chapter Two, and finally, the Ministry agreed to support 50% of any net 
aggregate loss after tax incurred by the Corporation in respect of the 
operation of Manchester Airport for a period of ten years. Up to the 
cessation of Goverrmen.t liability in 1964, the Corporation had received 
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approximately £3 million in grant aid nainly tCMards the cost of the 
new tenninal building and extensions of the :rrain runway. ( 133 ) 
From this 'tine, the Airport was treated as any other local authority 
airport in tenns of the tests of eligibility for grant aid. However, 
it has been suggested in Chapter Two that by this till:e, Manchester 
Airport had already achieved a finn foothold in the industry whereby it 
was difficult for its municipal counterparts to compete on an equal 
basis. It is argued that non-requisitioning in war till:e succeeded by 
proposals put forward by the Manchester Corporation for continued 
municipal ownership in the early 1950s were determining factors in the 
future growth of the Airport. 
Extensive investment in buildings during the pericxi of hostilities 
provided the Corporation with facilities which YJere readily adaptable 
to passenger needs in the irrmediate post-war years and such facilities 
had effectively been provided at little cost to the local carrnrunity. 
In retaining ownership in subsequent years, the Corporation was in a 
position to set and execute a local agenda for developnent, whilst at 
the same time, the financial terms of the 1955 agree:nent ernbxlied the 
all important principle of Government assistance, albeit given 
reluctantly at the time. Basically, whilst other provincial airports 
carnpeted stiffly for the limited resources of Central Government, the 
1955 agreement at least offered Manchester a guarantee of some support 
from the State which may have in turn indirectly influenced airlines' 
oamrnercial decisions. 
5.4 cncrnslCES 
Sore fonn of airport planning is generally held to be essential for 
the developnent of a rational network of aerodranes on a national 
scale. In the early years of developnent of the Civil Air Transport 
industry, central government policy tended tCMards a laissez-faire 
approach with the initiative for airport developnent falling upon local 
governmant. The lack of planning was accompanied by a reluctance to 
give nore than the minimum of assistance to local authorities in 
supporting what was an infant industry. 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, however, central 
government was forced to take an active part in airport developnent 
providing funds to cater for the needs of the a:rmed forces. The future 
developnent of Manchester Airport was advanced by the central funding 
of investment in buildings and other remittances afforded during the 
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war years. H~r, it is argued that in contrast to other airports, 
non-requisition was a determining factor which allowed the Corporation 
to pursue its own financial objectives despite the needs of the 
national emergency. 
War-time experience engendered a sea-change in central govermtElt 
attitudes regarding the planning, ownership and finanCing of airports 
in that state ownership and direct state funding were regarded as 
essential to the provision of facilities to cater for grONth. and 
technological change. HCMeVer, the "rigid plarming" approach was a 
short-lived phase and essentially the Manchester Corporation set a 
pattern for the devolution of responsibility back to the local 
authorities , with local managerrent being supported by the ccmni bnent of 
central funds. Whilst other local authorities declined to assume this 
responsibility, having lost touch with their local airports under 
Ministry managerrent, the trend towa:rds de-centralisation was reinforced 
in the 1960s when many local authorities resmned airport operation 
under tenns less favourable than those offered to the Manchester 
Corporation sane years earlier. Indeed, as suggested elsewhere, the 
period of State ownership of provincial airports ended wi th IIDst of 
them supporting substantial deficits. 
As Central Government shed responsibility for all but the major UK 
airports, the dcmination of lDndon in the air transport system which 
had resulted from a vacillating policy in previous years, was 
reinforced to the detrilnent of IIDst provincial airports. The exception 
to the general rule of stagnation in the provinces was Manchester 
Airport which by the tennination of grant aid in 1964 had becare 
virtually self-supporting. 
In effect, the attempts at rational paper planning in the 1970s paid 
only lip-service to the problems being encountered in the regions and, 
in particular, the study concerning Central England may be regarded as 
the classic "white elephant II of attempts at airport planning on a wide 
scale. The system of categorisation of airports which emerged in the 
1978 White Paper again had little implication in tenus of guiding 
airport developnent as it was not backed by administrative measures to 
divert traffic to the regions . Essentially, the categorisation of 
Manchester Airport as a category "A" Gateway International Airport 
represented only the recognition of a status which the Airport had 
already achieved, the origins of which lay in continued nnmicipal 
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ownership and m:magemant of the Airport in the post-war years, 
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Source: City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts, General Rate Fund, 
capital Account Expenditure, 1939/40 to 1944/45. 
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i8ble 5.2 
HINISlRY <nlIR1:B(Jfi(H; m UlAN CHARGES - RDDiAY AIRlU{TE 1939/40 m 
1955/56 (CURRENT PRICES) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
YEAR 'IDI'AL LOAN MINISTRY REFUND OF '1UI'AL % (3) 
CHARGES £ LOAN CHARGES RE: AAF INCOm £ OF (4) 
& VR BUIIDnG) £ 
1939/40 12,442 3,343 14,582 23 
1940/1 24,685 20,743 53,327 39 
1941/2 28,248 21,105 50,095 42 
1942/3 27,321 21,854 53,147 41 
1943/4 27,145 23,087 54,570 42 
1944/5 27,056 22,625 56,944 40 
1945/6 26,730 22,626 60,927 37 
1946/7 26,704 22,626 49,813 45 
1947/8 26,537 22,626 62,948 36 
1948/9 26,240 22,626 84,523 27 
1949/50 26,013 22,626 76,288 30 
1950/1 24,329 22,626 82,050 28 
1951/2 24,500 22,626 88,566 26 
1952/3 24,358 19,010 122,198 16 
1953/4 24,163 13,814 141,199 10 
1954/5 25,735 16,412 178,043 9 
1955/6 30,537 16,412 213,943 8 
432,743 336,787 1,443,163 23 
Source : City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts, General Rate Fund 




1lIDIE J.iR(JI RENIS AND REDmRGFABLE !TEE AND U\NDItC FEES, RllUMY 
.A:IRRRr, 1939/40 ID 1946/7 (CDRREN.r PRICES) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
mE 'IOI'AL OPERATn:G RENl'S AND (3) AS % LANDn:G 
IN'CD1E £ RECHARGEA~I,ES OF (2) FEES £ 
£ 
1939/40 11,239 3,302 29 947 
1940/41 32,584 18,540 57 48 
1941/2 28,990 17,613 61 4,692 
1942/3 31,293 17,302 55 4,662 
1943/4 31,483 19,322 61 7,117 
1944/5 34,319 20,472 60 9,152 
1945/6 38,301 26,146 68 8,456 
1946/7 27,187 10,502 39 4,605 
235,396 133,199 57 39,679 
Source : City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts, General Rate Fund, 















CAPITAL ~ AT MAtOIESTER AIRlUfi', SUP.PCRl'ID BY CENIRAL ~ 
I:XJR]K; 'mE PERIOO 1954/5 m 1959/60 
DFSCRIPI'ION PERIOD CAPITAL MINIS'lRY 
EXPENDITURE £ CONrRIBurroN 
£ 
Main Runway 
Strengthening 1955/6-1957/8 87,334 65,500 
Extension 1957/8-1959/60 156,557 117,422 
Stop-way and DID-UP 
area (NE) 1959/60 24,013 18,013 
Profile improvement 1957/8-1958/9 20,370 15,278 
Load bearing tests 1957/8-1958/9 628 471 
Runway lighting 1957/8-1959/60 25,420 19,067 
Further extension 1959/60 501 
New Terminal Building 
General (including 
access roads) 1957/8 34,024 24,871 
Site preparation, 
structural steel"~Nork, 
access road, apron and 
diversion of YeN Tree 
Lane 1958/9 174,428 121,434 
Site preparation; 
Control TcJvvler and Danestic 
Flights wing - structural 
steelW)rk, erection and 
completion; International 
Block and Traffic Hall -
structural steelW)rk 1959/60 229,239 172,675 
New Tenn:inal .Area 1958/9-1959/60 12,612 9,122 
Terminal :812ron Extension 1953/4-1955/6 69,985 52,488 
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Table 5.4 CaIt.:i.nued 
DESCRIPl'ION PERIOD CAPITAL MINISIRY 
EXPENDITURE £ CONIRIBUrIOO' 
£. 
FuelFann 
Roads and Buildings 1956/7-1959/60 12,029 6,015 
Medium Ran9§ Radar Svstem 1957/8-1958/9 7,775 3,568 
NB: Accounts after 1960 do not break down Capital Expenditure to 
individual projects. 
Source: City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts, General Rate Fund, 
Capital Account, Net Expenditure, 1953/4 to 1959/60 
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Table 5.5 









































GOVERNMENr % REVENUE £ % 
GRAN!' £ 
18,525 67 1,529 6 
(a) 336,295 75 787 
14,378 75 213 1 
52,865 73 107 1 
128,753 73 308 1 
166,793 71 21 
214,292 73 459 
514,198 72 III 
622,389 46 
51,732 4 151 
140,256 50 
116,850 28 
59,890 40 15,660 10 
65,272 29 55,899 25 
520,236 47 29,459 3 
100,703 13 44,826 6 
167,602 22 185,996 23 



















Includes provisions relating to certain works carried out by 
Ministry since contemplating State acquisition. 
City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts, Schedule of land, 
Buildings, etc and particulars of Outlay 1953/4 to 1959/60; 
capital Expenditure and capital Outlay, 1960/1 to 1970/1. 
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Any study of the growth and developnent of an airport needs to 
consider the context within which the developnent of air services has 
taken place as primarily an airport's iIrmErliate customers are the 
airlines. In:especti ve of potential individual demand for air services 
fran a region, latent demand is only translated into effective demand 
if airlines are willing to develop the route net.\\Urk conmensurate with 
the catch:m:mt area. It has been suggested that in deciding to operate 
an air route an airline exercises ccmnercial judgement. However, 
ccmnercial judgement alone is not the detennining factor in route 
developnent as the civil air transport industry is subject to 
regulation and government intervention for a number of reasons, not 
least being safety. Chapter Five considered the role of government in 
detennining the developnent of the UK airport system and sought to 
assess the extent to which central government policy had contributed 
towards the growth and developnent of Manchester Airport. This chapter 
is complementary in examining the role of national agency in 
detennining the developnent of air services and the structure of the UK 
airline industry, which in tum, has implications for airport 
developnent. 
Civil air transport operates within a market which extends beyond 
national boundaries and any international route involves at least two 
nations. In the international field particularly, the industry has 
been subject to a system of regulation, the fonn of which is not found 
in any other transport undertaking. Therefore, the developnent of 
national policy takes place within a context of this international 
regulatory framework. In considering the role of national agency, this 
chapter has therefore been divided into two nain sections to reflect 
the co-existence of national policy regarding ownership and canpeti tion 
policy within the industry and international regulation. The first 
section dealing with regulation is further sub-divided into two 
separate parts. This traces the origins of the international 
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regulatory framework and differentiates between this and the 
developnent of regulatory authorities within the UK who have discharged 
the regulatory function within both international and darestic markets. 
Primarily emphasis is placed up::>n the scheduled air service sector as 
it is within this sphere that the fund.am:mtal origins of regulation nay 
be found and where regulation has impinged IIDSt markedly on the 
operation of the industry. 
In ccmron with Chapter Five, it is inevitable that in dealing with 
national agency the najor sources of reference constitute published 
primary naterial, although secondary sources, such as Wheatcroft 
( 1964 ), offer useful interpretations of the nature of the regulatory 
system and the evolving structure of the UK airline industry. It 
should be noted that as far as published primary sources are concerned, 
the rep::>rt of the Edwards Camnittee (1969) is drawn upon extensively as 
the IIDst canprehensi ve analysis of the civil air transp::>rt from its 
early origins. 
In examining the nature of UK ownership and competition policy and 
its implications for the structure of the UK airline industry, it is 
clear that the history of the flag carrier British AiIways nay be 
traced through its predecessors. It is felt that primary naterial 
relating to this history nay be available at the British AiIways 
Archive, based currently at Heathrow Airport, and fonnerly at Hendon. 
Ha.-vever, whilst an approach was nade to the Archive, access was not 
granted; it was suggested that sufficient understanding might be gained 
from researching the Edwards Carmi ttee report. Inevi tabl y then, the 
scope of this study has been lilni ted by this constraint. 
Generally it is argued that the international regulatory system has 
been dominated by national objectives with overriding emphasis upon the 
protection of the interests of national flag carriers. In terms of 
ownership and competition in the UK industry, this has in tUTIl 
detracted from the realisation of the :multi-airline concept. As far as 
Manchester Airport is concerned, the institutional framework cannot be 
regarded as having fostered growth and developnent in a positive way, 
particularly in the nationalised sector of the industry. In effect, 
Manchester Airport has capitalised upon the "loop-holes" which have 
existed in a regulatory system geared towanis the protection of the 
"national interest" rather than the interest of the consUIIErs of air 
services. 
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6.2 WE ~ J.i'RAME.WJU{ 
(a) The Origins of the International Regulatory FranEW:>rk 
The State has traditionally had an interest in all fo:rms of 
transp:::>rt arising out of the principle of "protection of the public 
interest". ( 1 ) This principle derives in part fran the fact that the 
national economic contribution of transp:::>rt lies largely in the 
external economies generated; even when a loss is registered on the 
operating accounts of a transp:::>rt undertaking, for the economy as a 
whole substantial econanic benefits may accrue. Thus govennnents may 
be reluctant to allow an apparent bankrupt undertaking to go into 
liquidation. ( 2) Certain! y the speed and convenience of air services 
and the supply of scarce hUlllC:lIl and physical resources made possible 
produce large indirect economic advantages. ( 3 ) The State may also be 
conscious of the need to co-ordinate different transport systems to 
achieve optimum. results and avoid the waste of scarce resources, in the 
public interest. For example, the Transport Act, 1947 laid down the 
principal duties of the British Transp:::>rt Commission thus: "to provide 
or secure, or prorrote the provision of an efficient, adequate, 
economical and properly integrated system of public inland transport." 
(4) The major theme of the Act was the desirability of achieving 
transp:::>rt co-ordination by centralised control. (5) In a general sense 
then "protection of the public interest" may underlie all regulatory 
systems operating in the transp:::>rt industry as a whole which by its 
very nature has p:::>litical, social and economic implications. 
The chief reason for Government regulation of the civil air 
transp:::>rt industry is to secure a safe standard of operation. Safety 
is an extensive and canplex problem for civil aviation, thus 
Governments in all countries have played a much greater part in shaping 
and controlling civil aviation than in any other transport sector. ( 6 ) 
Because of the p:::>tentially disastrous nature of even the smallest 
relaxation there is a high degree of regulation involving rigorous 
standards of aiIworthiness, maintenance, air crew qualifications, 
limitations on flying hours, etc. On an international scale, unanimity 
is achieved through the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAD) • 'Ib sane degree, safety regulation has led to economic 
regulation as conditions of all-out canpetition may not be condusive to 
the highest standards of airline safety . Basically, a carmercial free-
for-all could lead to the trinming of operating standards to save 
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costs. ( 7 ) However, all goverrments have extended regulation beyond 
this fundamental requiranent, regarding civil aviation policy as their 
responsibility because of its international and political character and 
because of the exceptional problems of developnent which have been 
discussed earlier. (8) 
In the international field the source of State control is the 
principle of national sovereignty over air space. Ha.vever, regulation 
at this level has been extended in orner to secure particular aims 
which nay differ fran country to country. (9) Air services are valued 
as a symbol of national prestige. In the post-war years, each newly 
emerging nation a.lnost invariably took steps to fonn a national 
airline, like possession of "the flag" and the exchange of ambassadors, 
the national airline has been rega:rded as an external indication that 
nationhood has been achieved. (10) Similarly, national airlines have 
been praroted on strategic grounds to ensure that the aircraft 
available to carry civilians in peace-time are available to carry 
military equipnent and personnel in times of war. 'Whilst a country may 
obtain cheaper air services by leaving them to the airlines of a 
foreign country, no nation wants to be dependent on another for the 
transport of people and goods across its national boundaries, 
especially when this dependence represents a penranent drain on foreign 
exchange resources. ( 11 ) 
Whilst airlines have a fleet of aircraft of great value to the 
military services as a reserve in war-time and as a means of 
econanicall y transporting people and goods at other times , possibly 
Irore importantly civil air transport constitutes a narket for new 
aeroplanes. Both the UK and US Governments have rega:rded the 
naintenance of a strong aircraft manufacturing industry as important 
and this is a prinary reason for the characteristically rapid rate of 
technological progress in civil aircraft design. Hov.;ever, prorrotion of 
rapid technological developnent is not necessarily for the direct 
benefit of the airlines and, in fact, nay be contrary to their best 
interests. (12) In 1959, the Chainnan of BEA asserted: 
"If a slower rate of progress in aircraft developnent takes effect 
in all countries simultaneously, it is unlikely to affect the 
developnent of air transport adversely. Indeed less frequent 
replacerrent of transport aircraft by new and Irore advanced designs 
is likely to help rather than hinder the healthy economic progress 
of the airlines." ( 13 ) 
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Arguably, governmental pressure to support the aircraft 
manufacturing industry has been behind the prarotion of nevv civil 
airliners rather than the demands of the airline industry itself. 
Certainly, the lack of enthusiasm for supersonic developnent in the 
1960s suggests this. (14) 
The natural economic characteristics of the airline industry 
similarly tend towards regulation. Airlines may be regarded as quasi-
public utili ties because although they do not display natural rronopol y 
characteristics they display the public utility characteristic of being 
of "real public importance". ( 15 ) The conditions of supply are 
naturally oligopolistic as no rrore than a small nmnber of airlines can 
serve air routes without congesting the skies. Although economies of 
scale do not act as a barrier to entry the possibilities of effective 
product differentiation are liroi ted. Scheduled air transport is not a 
harogeneous camodity but a different camodity on each route - each 
route is a separate market . Despite various prarotional acti vi ties, 
the airline service has very fevv characteristics which lead to the 
expectation that it wuuld be readily differentiable . Given this 
oligopoly condition a stable equilibrimn is only likely to occur if 
established firms have advantages protecting them from the 
possibilities of price canpetition. The effectiveness of limiting 
price canpetition in turn depends upon the ease of new entry into the 
industry and even though the minimum scale for efficient operations has 
increased with the introduction of larger aircraft, snaIl airlines are 
not at such a serious cost disadvantage in canparison with larger 
airlines, that size alone provides an automatic barrier to nevv entry. 
In the absence of barriers to entry it is unlikely that an unregulated 
air transport industry wuuld achieve the stable equilibrimn attained in 
other oligopolistic industries. Newcomers could offer lower fares 
precipitating rate wars because, without the protection of a clearly 
differentiated product, established operators might well retaliate. 
'Whilst the public wuuld realise temporary advantage from lower fares, 
in the long-nm services would probably be withdrawn. (16) Thus 
regulation may be justified on the grounds of achieving the stability 
and regularity of operation which in one sense qualifies an airline to 
be described as providing a service. ( 17 ) 
In sunmary then, there are a nmnber of factors which tend towards 
the regulation of civil air transport, sane of which collectively 
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derive fran the protection of the public interest and others arising 
out of the pursuit of particular set of national aims. Such aims may 
translate into a variety of objectives for the industry. The objective 
of a business under canpetitive conditions is often thought to be 
simply to maximise profits in the long tenn. However, this is not 
necessarily the case in civil air transport where the primary objective 
must be to achieve safe operations. Clearly support of the British 
aircraft industry may be a major objective leading to the intervention 
of Goverrment (within the limits of its international obligations) in 
the procurement policies of airlines. Improvement of the balance of 
payments is also a fundamental objective in the negotiation and 
exchange of international traffic rights. The maintenance of external 
strategic carmnmication may also figure in the strengthening of 
international air services beyond what is ccmnercially practicable for 
reasons of national defence, national pride and foreign trade. 
Finally, objectives may include the satisfaction of customer 
requirements at the minimum economic price and the creation of 
conditions in which a carmercial level of profits can be achieved by 
efficient airlines. (18) 
Regulatory action is directly justified by some of these objectives. 
However, all too often government objectives are not precisely 
enunciated and even when they are, definition fails to consider their 
conflicting nature. ( 19 ) One course in detennining public objectives 
for the civil air transport industry is to produce a list of desirable 
ends, like Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, 1958 and a 
"Declaration of Policy": 
"In the exercise and perfonnance of its powers and duties under this 
Act, the Boa.:r:d shall consider the following, arrong other things, as 
being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public 
convenience and necessity: 
(a) The encouragement and developnent of an air-transportation 
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the 
foreign and domestic ccmnerce of the United States, of the 
Postal Service, and of the national defense; 
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such nanner as to 
recognise and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the 
highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic 
condi tions in, such transportation, and to improve the 
relations between, and co-ordinate transportation by, air 
(c) 
carriers; 
The prarotion of adequate, economical and effic~ent serv~a; by 
air carriers at reasonable charges, wlthout In]Ust 





destructive canpetitive practices; 
C~tition to the extent necessary to assure the sound 
developnerlt of an air-transportation system properly adapted to 
the needs of the foreign and darEstic cc:mrerce of the United 
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; 
The prarotion of safety in air ccmnerce; and 
The promotion, encouragement, and developnent of civil 
aeronautics. II ( 20) 
However, such statE!lIEIlts can accorrm::rlate widely different meanings as 
to the way policy should be shaped in detail. Also little guidance is 
given as to where the decision should lie when particular objectives 
are in conflict. An alternative is to identify a single objective in 
general terms. Ha.vever, here the difficulty is that alnost anything 
can be regarded as within the constraints of such a policy if decision 
makers choose. A primary example of this kind of objective definition 
is that given by the "general duty II set for the Air Transport Licensing 
Board in Section I of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1960, of 
"exercising their functions under this Act in such a manner as to 
further the developnent of British Civil Aviation. II (21) 
Attempts have been made to define rrore closely objectives for the UK 
civil air transport industry as in, for example, the Government White 
Paper , Civil Aviation Policy (Crnnd 4213) published in 1969. In this 
document, the principal objective of the civil air transport industry 
was identified as the provision of air services by British carriers, in 
satisfaction of all substantial categories of public dem:md at the 
lowest levels of charges consistent with a high standard of safety, an 
econanical return on investment and stability and developnent of the 
industry. However, this objective was set in the context of the need 
to strengthen the balance of payments and contribute to the overall 
growth of the econCJII¥. ( 22) It is clear that even if objectives are 
rrore closely defined in such a way the means by which they are achieved 
may bring about contradictory outcarres. For example, whilst the 
satisfaction of public dem:md may be achieved by the invol vernent of 
rrore than one UK airline on a route, this in itself may be hannful to 
British interests in the international market in forcing an established 
operator to withdraw fran a route leaving the field open for foreign 
operators. Ultirratel y if the British share of the international market 
reduces as a result the balance of payments may be adversely affected. 
Whilst there is ccmocm ground aIrong different countries on certain 
points regarding air transport policy, there are areas where 
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goverrnnents tend to behave in similar ways because each has its awn 
national objective. Probably of all objectives the ilIlportance which 
each government attaches to naintaining a "national" airline and the 
intensity of political feeling generated by this objective has been 
IlDst influential in determining the form and detail of regulation of 
international air services, especially scheduled services. (23) 
The first recognition of the need to regulate international flying 
was as a consequence of the developner1t of airship construction and the 
wide radius of operation of such aircraft. ( 25 ) The Paris Conference 
of 1910 represented the first attanpt to reach international agreement 
on the problems of air navigation and especially the questions of 
sovereignty of the air and the rights of passage. HaveveL', the 
Conference was unable to complete a draft convention nainly owing to a 
conflict of opinion between British and Gernan delegations as to the 
right of each State to the exclusive sovereignty in the air space over 
its territories. (25) It was only on 13 October 1919 that 29 nations 
signed the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 
enshrining in international law the principle of sovereign rights in 
air space above state territory. (26) In the meantime, individual 
nations made their awn provisions for control. In the UK the Aerial 
Navigation Act, 1911 provided for "the protection of the public against 
dangers arising fran the navigation of aircraft." The Act merely made 
it an offence to navigate aircraft over areas prohibited by Order of 
the Secretary of State - being passed in a rush to guard against the 
dangers of reckless flying at the Coronation of King George V. In 1913 
Colonel Sealy, the Secretary of State for War, praroted another .Aerial 
Navigation Act under which powers were taken in the interests of 
defence to fire at or into any aircraft flying over prohibited areas. 
(27) 
Essentially, the multilateral exchange of oammercial rights in civil 
air transport was given little serious attention until after the Second 
World War. During the inter-war years chaos had prevailed where each 
country had sovereignty over its awn air space and foreign aircraft 
could be de-barred fran passage or landing except at the will of the 
country conce.m.ed. However, in 1944, representatives of 52 nations met 
in Chicago with the purpose of foIlIllllating policy for the post-war 
regulation of international air transport. At Chicago, the US and the 
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UK \'Vere found to hold canpletel y different views regarding the 
regulation of carmercial air traffic. AlTErican airlines \'Vere by this 
time well-equipped and experienced in trans-oceanic operations, 
therefore, the US upheld the principle of naxi.mum "freedom of the air". 
In contrast , British carmercial air transport was weak, so the British 
delegation supported detailed economic regulation by govenments 
involving the nomination of routes; the designation of airlines; 
control of the capacity provided by the airlines of each State; the 
determination of fares, etc. (28) 
Whilst it was hoped. that the Conference would establish the multi-
lateral exchange of carmercial rights the gulf between Britain and the 
US could not be bridged so individual nations reverted back to the 
sovereignty of air space for protection and sovereign rights originally 
established in the Paris Convention were reiterated in Article I of the 
Chicago Convention. ( 29 ) Under the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation which set up the International Civil Aviation Organisation, 
any country has the basic right to prohibit aircraft of any or every 
other country from using its air space. With respect to civil aircraft 
same measure of international agreement was reached on the exchange of 
certain rights of overflight and landing. However, many aspects, 
especially relating to scheduled carmercial operations, rem:rlned the 
subject of bilateral agreement. (30) 
The Chicago Convention stated the agreement of all signatories to 
allow overflight and technical landing on non-scheduled operations. 
The International Air Services Transit Agreement, signed by 21 nations 
at the Convention, concerned the exchange of rights of overflight and 
technical landing for aircraft engaged on scheduled operations, and 
other rights subject to bilateral agreement, collectively known as the 
"Five Freedoms". (31) 
The First Freedom establishes for the aircraft of "State A" the 
privilege of flying over the territory of "State B" without landing. 
The Second Freedom establishes the privilege of landing in the 
territory of "State B" for technical reasons only, such as re-fuelling. 
The Third Freedom enshrines the privilege of setting down in "State B", 
traffic picked up in "State A", whilst the Fourth allows for the 
picking up in "State B" traffic destined for "State A". The final 
Freedom of the air establishes the privilege of picking up or setting 
down in "State B" traffic which is destined for or has came from "State 
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C". In other woros, a UK airline operating a route between lDndon, 
Athens and Beirut can car.ry Third and Fourth Freed.an traffic between 
lDndon and Athens and lDndon and Beirut, and Fifth Freedan traffic 
betvam Athens and Beirut. ( 32) 
Canpetition in the international field is canplicated by limitations 
imposed by bilateral Air Service Agreements for the exchange of traffic 
rights. Negotiation of these agreements has a major bearing on the 
organisation and economics of the airline business since they detennine 
who can fly and subject to what conditions. ( 33 ) Inmediately following 
the Second World War, the UK advocated protectionist policies and a 
nmnber of bilateral agreements \'Vere based on the principle of "pre-
detenn:i.nism" . Pre-detenn:i.nism was underpinned by the mercantilist 
philosophy that the right to car.ry traffic between countries belongs 
equally and exclusively to the carriers of the two States involved. 
Periodically, the airlines of each State agreed the traffic potential 
of routes operated and the sharing of frequencies ensuring that each 
airline achieved an equal share of traffic at an economic load factor. 
Thus ccxrpetition was virtually eliminated and airlines were encouraged 
to rationalise their relationship through commercial pooling 
agreements. (34) 
However, in 1946 UK and US delegates net at Bennuda to negotiate the 
bilateral exchange of cc:mrercial rights and from this em:rrged the 
general philosophy underpinning the economic regulation of the industry 
internationally in the post-war years. The tenns of the "Bermuda 
Agreement" were relatively liberal. Firstly, the routes operated by 
airlines of two countries \'Vere to be agreed in negotiation and 
specified in an annex to the bilateral agreement. On route sectors 
directly linking the territories of two countries, no restrictions \'Vere 
to apply to the frequency or capacity which designated airlines could 
operate. For economical operations on long-haul routes, carriers \'Vere 
granted the right to carry traffic on inte.nTEdiate sectors; in other 
v-uros "Fifth Freedan" traffic was allowed provided that the total 
capacity operated was related to the "end-to-end" potential of the 
route. (35) 
The Berrm.lda Agreement did not prohibit the designation of rrore than 
one airline on any agreed route by either party to the Agreement. (36) 
However, to safeguard against the possibility of the airlines of either 
State operating excessive capacity, provision for the ex post facto 
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review of capacity was made in the event of one party feeling that its 
interests had been unduly affected by the capacity of airline(s) of the 
other. (37) 
The Benrruda Agreement also recognised the need to protect the public 
against airlines' abuse of their protected position under a system of 
controlled entry and to ensure the long tenn economic stability of the 
industry by preventing cut-throat price warfare. Most nations at 
Chicago had accepted the regulation of traffic except the US which 
later agreed to canpranise at Bemru.da. At the time, the Civil 
.Aeronautical Board controlled fares and rates on US darestic routes but 
did not have pcMers to detennine international air fares. ( 38 ) The US 
supported indirect control with tariff agreerrent ini tiall y being 
reached in the International Air Transport Association (lATA), thus 
lATA assmned an important role as a rate rraking lxrly in the 
international market. At Bemru.da it was agreed that fares and rates 
should be regulated by means of airline agreerrents arrived at through 
lATA Conferences, being subject to subsequent approval by the CAB in 
.A'm3rica and the Aeronautical Authority in Britain. Most other 
countries have since proved willing to delegate the rate-making 
function to the airlines and in effect the lATA machinery has been 
adopted by governments as an integral part of their own overall system 
of economic regulation. (39) 
Since the Bemru.da Agreement, the fo:rm of subsequent bilateral 
agreerrents has differed betvveen countries. In sane cases, countries 
have exchanged rights to operate from any point in the one country to 
any point in the other. Some bilateral agreements specify that any 
single route or group of routes shall be operated by only one airline 
of each country. Whilst others do not in so ma.ny WJrds limit the 
nmnber of airlines that may be used. ( 40) However, the general trend 
in the post-war years has been away fran the liberal Bennuda system to 
m::>re protectionist practices. Basically, the Bennuda arrangement has 
not WJrked well when the airline of one country is relatively weak: from 
the canpeti ti ve point of view. ( 41) Many countries with only one 
national airline have also been reluctant to allow operations by m::>re 
than one airline of another country. Similarly, the tendency towards 
"pre-deterntinism" has arisen fran the increasing desire of anerging 
nations to establish international airlines, thus in ma.ny instances not 
only have routes been agreed but frequency and saretimes aircraft type 
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and number of seats. (42) 
The interpretation of bilateral agreem:mts as they affect national 
airlines can be a stmnbling block in the introduction of new 
international air services, particularly fran UK regional airports such 
as Manchester. The British Gavernnent leads the negotiation of air 
traffic rights for UK airlines to fly to international destinations and 
for foreign airlines to fly to the UK. Increased access by foreign 
airlines has generally only been pennitted where it is balanced by 
parallel iroprovenents in access of equivalent value for UK airlines and 
international aviation on long-haul routes remains particularly highly 
regulated. (43) 
Although bilateral agreem:mts differ for each pair of countries, the 
principle of reciprocity tends to be embodied in all agreem:mts. The 
standard fonn of agreem:mt usually includes a clause as follows: 
"(i) There shall be fair and equal opportunity for airlines of 
both Contracting Parties to operate agreed services 
between their respective territories; 
(ii) In operating the agreed services, the airlines of each 
Contracting Party shall take into account the interests of 
the airlines of the other Contracting Party so as not to 
affect unduly the services which the latter provide on the 
whole as part of the same routes; 
(iii) The agreed services provided by the designated airlines of 
the Contracting Parties shall bear close relationship to 
the requirerrents of the public for transportation on the 
specific routes and shall have as their primary objective 
the provision, at a reasonable load factor, of capacity 
adequate to carry the current and reasonably anticipated 
requirements for the carriage of passengers and cargo 
including mail originating fran or destined for the 
territory of the Contracting Party which has designated 
the airline. Provision for the carriage of passengers and 
cargo including mail both taken on boaJ:d and discharged at 
points on the specified routes in the territories of the 
States other than that designating the airline shall be 
made in accordance with the general principles that 
capacity shall be related to: 
(a) traffic requirements to and fran the territory of the 
Contracting Party which has designated the airline 
(b) 
(c) 
traffic requirements of the area through which the 
agreed service passes, after taking account of other 
transport services established by airlines of the 
States canprising the area 
the requirements of through airline operation." ( 44 ) 
In the event of foreign operators wishing to operate fran a 
particular UK airport, same may not be able to do so because of the 
constraints of international regulation. Although provision for new 
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international services to additional UK airports may be includErl in 
bilateral agreem:mts and in theory such expansion need not be 
restrictErl in principle, the fonn of bilateral agreem:mt may in 
practice be restrictive. Under the clauses statErl aOOve, the inclusion 
of an airport as a "Gateway" may be over-ruled by the expression "fair 
and equal opportunity" and the effect on other services. ( 45) Many 
countries have interpretErl the "fair and equal opportunity" to carry 
traffic on routes coverErl by an agreem:mt as meaning unless national 
airlines are handling 50% of the traffic on the route conditions are 
not "fair and equal". Despite the early tendency towards liberal 
policies, even in the US facErl with a steadily declining share of 
traffic carriErl by US airlines on serna major routes in the post-war 
years, there was rrounting pressure for restrictions to be iroposErl upon 
foreign airlines, especially KIM and Scandinavian Air Services, who 
were held to be capturing an unduly large share of the American market. 
(46) 
Clearly then, the actual agreement itself is not the final 
detenninant of international air services, reciprocity being the key. 
Under this regima the inauguration of a new service then becomes a 
matter of "tit for tat" bargaining. In essence, Quantas, for example, 
may be able to fly into Heathrow rather than say Manchester purely 
because the British Government wants its awn national airline to be 
allowed to fly into the Australian capital, a favourite haunt for 
British tourists. On the other hand, Quantas may be allowed to operate 
to Manchester providErl services are transferred fram IDndon in return 
for the UK national airline being given access to Adelaide. (47) It 
has been arguErl that until this route-fixing cartel ends, market forces 
will never be able to redress the centripedal tendency of airports in 
each country. ( 48) 
In respect of the impact of international economic regulation on the 
developnent of Manchester Airport, the international operations of 
British airlines have tendErl to concentrate on the wndon airports with 
demand on international routes fram Manchester being satisfiErl by 
foreign carriers . Historically, the airport owner has been forcErl to 
argue the case of the foreign carrier in order to establish schErluled 
international air services. As previously suggestErl, many "firsts" at 
the airport have been by foreign carriers and it will be useful to 
briefly re-iterate then here. In 1938, KIM operatErl the first 
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international scheduled service to Amsterdam using OC2s; in 1946 Air 
France operated the first post-war scheduled service to Paris with 
OC3s; in 1949 KIM operated the first regular service with pressurised 
aircraft (Convair 240); in 1953 the first scheduled trans-Atlantic air 
service was operated by Sabena to New York with OC6Bs; the first 
scheduled service to canada was operated by a Lufthansa Constellation 
to MOntreal in 1956; 1958 reconded the first visit to Manchester of a 
pure jet aircraft, the French caravelle denonstrator; in 1960 the first 
scheduled jet service using a B707 was operated by Sabena to New York; 
1960 also registered the first European jet service with Air France 
operating caravelles to Paris; and in 1974 Wandair (canada) operated 
the first regular B747 air service. (49) 
Whilst on the one hand the aOOve nay be cited as evidence to prove 
that the operation of international scheduled air services fran 
Manchester has not been retanded by the international econcmic 
regulatory system, the recond suggests that developnent at Manchester 
Airport has taken place in spite of the impact of the regulatory system 
rather than the system providing an in¥?etus for developrETlt. 
Basically, the international regulatory system has been used 
fundanentally to support the interests of the najor UK national 
carriers. For exanple, whilst foreign operators established many new 
services fran Manchester in the inmediate post-war years, in the early 
1960s the fifth freedan schedules operated by Aer Lingus, Lufthansa and 
Sabena disappeared as a result of intensive lobbying by BEA and BOAC. 
(50) With particular reference to Sabena, this airline had inaugurated 
the New York service in 1953 using fifth freedcm rights. BEA began to 
operate on the service in 1954 and ten years later Sabena's fifth 
freedom rights \\'ere revoked leaving the UK national airline as the sole 
operator. The national airline operated a daily service until the 
Sumner of 1979, hCMever, within the ensuing rronths the service was 
progressively reduced until it was finally abandoned to Laker Airways 
in the Surmer of 1981. It nay be argued that British Airways stopped 
the route - leaving Manchester with no direct scheduled service to New 
York for the first time in 30 years - because it did not want to 
canpete with Laker. However, Laker operations did not carrmence until 
the Surmer of 1981 whilst SA had already decided to re:iuce the level of 
service in 1979. This nove was coincidental with the carrmencarent of 
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shuttle services on the Manchester - Heathrow route, leaving less 
resistance to transfer over lDndon. Silnilarly, the UK national 
airline and Swissair operated a route to Zurich until October 1982 when 
SA. withdrew fran the service. This was shortly followed. by the 
imposition of a capacity restriction on Swissair's Manchester 
operation . Finally, the UK national airline has also been accused of 
adopting "blocking tactics" delaying the of start services fran 
Manchester in recent years, by such operators as "Iberia" . Clearly, 
the major deter:minant of airline operations at the international level 
has been the canpetitive effect on existing services and in negotiation 
effectively the designated carrier has becane the practical detenninant 
of whether new services can be operated. (51) On this basis, it is 
argued that the international regulatory system (reflecting the 
overriding objective of protecting the interests of the national 
airline), and its implications for licensing policy failed to address 
the needs of Manchester Airport and rather supported the centripedal 
tendency of airports. 
Thus the owners of Manchester Airport have been forced to attempt to 
counter the influence of the UK national carriers and their tendency to 
concentrate operations on the lDndon hub, feeding passengers fran the 
regions via Heathrow to support marginal routes there and to achieve 
the advantages of the integration of route patterns and fleet 
utilisation. Rather than introduce new international scheduled air 
services fran Manchester, the national carriers have operated only the 
rrost mature and profitable regional air services, and even in this 
respect the fear of self-diversion away fran lDndon has lilnited the 
"pick-up" at Manchester. (52) 
By the 1970s the Manchester International Airport Authority was 
clailning that the structure of the airline business was hampering the 
developnent of scheduled air services from the Airport. Although 
foreign carriers had developed routes this had not secured adequate 
services to non-European destinations as foreign carriers had seldom 
been allONed to operate services under the restrictive tenns of 
bilateral agree:nents. (53) Despite Manchester Airport being designated 
as a national asset in the 1978 White Paper on Airports Policy, 
bilateral agreements did not make for easy access to the airport. (54) 
Increasingly calls were made for the greater involvement of the Airport 
Authority in licensing processes and in observering the international 
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negotiation of rights. It was argued. that fundamentally the basis of 
interpretation of bilateral agreements required. reconsideration 
allowing for the need.s of the northern market to be considered. 
separately fran the total UK market. (55 ) 
In adell tion, faced. with the tendency for the efforts of foreign 
carriers to be blocked. by the national UK carriers who ~re themselves 
reluctant to operate sched.uled. international air services fran regional 
aiIpJrts, the Manchester International Airp::>rt Authority praroted. the 
concept of "British Manchester AiIways", a Manchester based. airline 
operation, to ensure that the gateway market potential of the Airp::>rt 
could be satisfied. whilst still preserving the interests of British 
carriers. A canplete portfolio of both ma.ture and marginal routes 
which could fonn a viable network was proposed.. (56) However, it is 
argued. that such an arrangement, had it been established., would still 
have failed to overcame international restrictions. Whilst the 
designation of a second airline in bilateral agreements ma.y intrcxiuce 
the campeti tion necessary to satisfy regional derrand, the likelihcxx:i 
remains that even when dealing with the Irost liberal foreign government 
the extent to which the total British share of traffic is allowed to 
exceed 50% is very small. The increase in user benefits (including the 
choice of airport) would have had to be balanced against the risk that 
such benefits of competition between UK airlines would be muted because 
of the international constraint of enforced. capacity sharing. If the 
designation of a second airline on international routes was to be only 
at the expense of the first, then designation would not take place. In 
any event a second airline operating from an airport other than 
Heathrow with a lower frequency would be at a disadvantage. (57) 
Thus econanic and poli tical realities of international aviation 
policy have led. to the position whereby protection of the interests of 
national airlines is pursued. by all countries to a greater or lesser 
extent. The difference between "liberal" and "protectionist" policies 
in international air transport is only a ma.tter of degree. All nations 
desirous of developing their own airlines must be assured of a 
reasonable share of traffic on international sched.uled. routes, thus 
although "liberal" nations ma.y accept canpetition as the arbiter of 
market shares, this is within limits. Until the non-carrmercial 
advantages of air transport can be abandoned or satisfied. in other 
ways, the international regulatory system will continue to place the 
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interests of national airlines above any other objective. 
(b) The Developnent of Regulatory Agencies in the UK 
Prior to the First World War, the Heme Office had been the 
Department of State responsible for the regulation of such civil flying 
as existed. at the time; it was only after the War that civil aviation 
entered the field of public transport. (58) In anticipation of the 
ccmnencement of civil flying, central goverrnnent took the initiative of 
considering the question of the developneI1t and regulation of aviation 
for civil purposes from a demestic, .imperial and international 
standpoint with the setting up of the Civil Aerial Transport Ccmnittee 
in 1917. Generally, the Ccmni. ttee urged. the fonnulation of a scheme 
for the regulation of international flying and emphasised the need for 
danestic air legislation. It was reccmnended that all the pavers and 
duties of regulating air transport should be assigned to a Department 
of Civil Aviation as part of the Air Ministry which had been fonned in 
1917. (59) 
In assigning responsibility for civil air transport to the Air 
Ministry military considerations had been of overriding significance:-
"The proposal offers certain advantages in grouping in one 
Department officials and experts responsible for the issue and 
administration of regulations which in the present case must to a 
great extent be governed by Naval and Military considerations ... 
it is only necessary to refer to the close connection beUNeen. 
prescribed landing places for foreign aircraft and· prohibited. 
areas." (60) 
This arrangement continued. unchanged. for seme 20 years despite pressure 
in Parliament to separate the responsibility for civil flying fram that 
of military flying. The Carmittee on the Control of Private Flying and 
other Civil Aviation questions reporting in 1934, regarded the 
overriding influence of war-time experience wi th misgivings:-
"The ensuing struggle for military supremacy resulted. in the forced 
growth and abno:r:nal developnent of aircraft. The creation of a 
'Y.1eapon of war out of this new form of transport has caused. civil 
aviation often to be regaroed. in an entirely wrong perspective, 
namely as a potential instrument of destruction, instead of as a 
means of facilitating carrmunication between nations with consequent 
benefit to the cause of world peace." (61) 
and E C Gonion England and J1IC Moore-Brabazon ccmnented. that: 
"Considerations such as the establishing of National .Aerocb::"cIIEs, the 
internal and Empire routes bring in rratters of high policy in which 
general questions of trade, commerce, immigration, Empire 
settlement, Post Office nails, etc, are involved. At present only 
one voice with authority is to be heard in the Cabinet, namely, that 
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of the Air Minister, whose views on the job must autanatically be 
tinged . . . He carmot serve two masters. II (62 ) 
'nle emphasis on strategic military objectives was highlighted as 
late as April 1944 when British, Dominion and American representatives 
met prior to the UN Conference which was to discuss the international 
machinery which ~uld govern international civil aerial transport in 
the post-war era. At this meeting, Mr Berle, the USA's Assistant 
Secretary of State asserted that there was a vast difference of 
approach to aviation between the US and Britain. It was claimed that 
in the United States the aeroplane was regarded as a vehicle of trade 
whilst in Britain it seemed to be regarded as II an evil thing which must 
be controlled lest it spew out death and destruction." (63) 
In the inter-war years emphasis was placed on the mechanisms for 
controlling internal air services in the UK. Following a lengthy 
period when licences to operate services had been issued directly by 
the Department of Civil Aviation, an independent Air Transport 
Licensing Authority was set up with the purpose of rationalising UK 
darestic air services. 'nle Maybury Ccmnittee reporting in 1936 had 
reccmnended a junction aerodrare scheme as the rrost effective way of 
securing the greatest measure of advantage both in facilities to the 
travelling public and in economical operation. In order to secure the 
conditions necessary for the scheme, it was deemed essential that the 
operation of regular passenger services on these routes should be 
secured by means of a licence to a single cc:xrpany or to a combination 
of canpanies ~rking on the closest tenns of co-or:dination. In regard 
to other internal routes, the Carrmi ttee was of the opinion that a 
system of licensing all regular passenger services should be introduced 
with a view to ensuring the rrost effective service to the public whilst 
avoiding uneconomical overlapping. (64) On 23 June 1938, an Order in 
Council established under the Air Navigation Act, 1936 provided for the 
licensing of regular air services in the UK and established the Air 
Transport Licensing Authority to handle licence applications. ( 65 ) 
'nle Licensing Authority could grant, refuse, suspend or revoke any 
licence. In considering licence applications, the Authority had to 
look to the co-or:dination and developnent of air services generally, 
but in particular it had to consider the existence of other services in 
the area through which the proposed services ~ to be operated; the 
possibility of air transport in that area and the degree of efficiency 
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and regularity of the air services, if any, already provided. The 
applicant had to be able to derronstrate the potential for providing a 
satisfactory service in respect of continuity; regularity of operation; 
frequency; 
efficiency. 
punctuality; reasonableness of charges and general 
In addition, the Authority had to take account of the 
financial resources of the applicant and the type of aircraft proposed 
to be used on the service. The Licensing Authority was at liberty to 
attach a number of conditions to the granting of a licence, specifying 
route origins and destinations and intennediate landings, maximum fares 
to be charged to passengers and the suitability and capacity of the 
aircraft to be used. ( 66 ) 
The Air Navigation (Licensing of Public Transport) O:rder came into 
force in July 1938 and all operators were granted provisional licences 
until such time as applications had been considered. The O:rder 
established the right of any County Borough to object or rrake 
representations to the Licensing Authority and Manchester Corporation, 
in support of the Maybury scheme and Manchester's potential junction 
role, made extensive use of this facility when the Licensing Authority 
heard applications for licences to operate in the Summer of 1939. (67) 
However, the Maybury scheme failed to materialise and it is argued that 
this probably was in part the result of the contradictions of the 
regulatory system. In essence, although the Air Ministry was generally 
in support of the Carrmittee' s suggestion it was not in a position to 
influence airline operators to carry out the scheme "to the detriment 
of existing air services". Similarly, the Air Ministry deemed itself 
unable to "particularise as between one aerodrome and another or as 
between one service and another". In other worns, it would not take 
steps to indicate the routes over which air transport ccmpanies should 
operate. On the other hand, the Air Transport Licensing Authority 
could only make decisions rega:r:ding licence applications received by 
them with the possibility of suggesting further services. Thus they 
equally could' not force any airline to operate a service other than 
that for which it had applied. The Authority was not in a position to 
prarote civil aviation or pioneer this new venture, that work was the 
responsibility of the Air Ministry which in practice deferred to the 
Licensing Authority. (68) 
The need. to rationalise UK internal air service disappeared with the 
outbreak of war in 1939 and in the i.rma:tiate post-war period the need. 
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for a licensing authority was eliminated by the nationalisation of all 
scheduled air services. However, an Air Transport Advisory Council was 
established under provisions in Section 12 of the Civil Aviation Act 
1949 to consider representations fran "any person with respect to the 
adequacy of the facilities provided. by any of the Airways Corporations, 
or with respect to the charges for any such facilities" and to advise 
the Minister on any question which he might refer to the Council on 
"facilities for transport by air in any part of the world, or ... the 
charges for such facilities"; or any question which in the opinion of 
the Minister required. consideration "with a view to the iInprovernent of 
air transport services." ( 69 ) 
As the system of licensing air transport services was revised. after 
the Second World War; so too were Ministerial responsibilities. In 
1946, a new Ministry of Civil Aviation had been established although 
within seven years this Ministry had been amalgamated with the Ministry 
of Transport. At the time it was probably fel t that such an 
arrangement had certain advantages such as being able to deal in one 
Department wi th questions of competi tion between the Airways 
Corporations and the shipping canpanies and to consider the needs for 
iInproved surface corrmunications with a new aerodrome. However, despite 
the opportunities for co-ordination, for the rrost part, the Ministry 
operated as three separate Departments, or four if the ownership and 
operation of major civil aerodranes is regarded as a separate 
responsibility. The application of a broad set of principles equally 
to the administration of all forms of transport enccmpassing safety, 
freight rates, international competition and the prarotion of new 
services could not cater for each fonn of transport having its awn 
history and operational peculiarities, posing separate problems. ( 70 ) 
During the 1960s, the Board of Trade assumed regulatory 
responsibility for civil aviation, previously discharged by the 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. One division of the Board 
was conce:rned with the carmercial operations of British airlines and 
within this set up, one branch dealt with control of the Air 
Corporations including the fixing of targets and approval of investment 
progranmas; another branch held overall responsibility for the air 
transport licensing system having a general interest in the independent 
sector; general responsibility for the regulation of airline traffic 
and for the application of Prices and Incanes Policy to the air 
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transport industry. A second division of the Boal:d of Trade was 
responsible for the negotiation of traffic rights for UK operators 
under bilateral agreerrents and for the granting of pennits to foreign 
operators flying to the UK. (71) 
As far as the respansibili~ for issuing route licences is 
concerned, an Air Transport Licensing Board was set up under the Civil 
Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1960 and its associated regulations. 
Essentially any flight for ~ by aircraft registered in the UK or 
its colonies, if operating to the UK, needed to be covered by an Air 
Service Licence granted by the Licensing Boal:d. ( 72) The Board was 
required under Section 2 of the Act to consider a nmnber of specified 
criteria covering, inter-alia, canpetence and fitness to operate 
proposed services having regard to experience, financial resources, 
equiprent, organisation and staffing; insurance arrangements; any 
unfair advantage over other operators through conditions of employment 
of staff; the need for the proposed service and any likely duplication 
or diversion fram other licenced services and any objections or 
representations made by interested parties. The Board also had 
jurisdiction over danestic air fares and under Section 23 of the Prices 
and Incanes Act, 1966 had to take account of Government Prices and 
Incanes Policy. Under Section 2(3) of the 1960 Act, the Licensing 
Boal:d was obliged to consult the Boal:d of Trade about relations with 
other countries in orner to acquire infoDIlation rega:rding international 
traffic rights for guidance in exercising the licensing function. (73 ) 
Whilst the UK regulatory system was re-structured in the post-war 
years, it was nonetheless subject to substantial criticism both in 
tenus of the relationship between Ministerial responsibilities and 
licensing functions and the conduct of licensing procedures themselves. 
For example, the Select Carmi ttee on Nationalised Industries' report on 
BEA in the 1960s recarmended that the ATLB be wound up and its 
functions transferred to the Board of Trade on the grounds that both 
the fonnulation and implementation of policy was a matter for the Board 
of Trade. (74) On the other hand, institutions like the Joint Airports 
Carmi ttee of IDeal Authorities supported refo:r::m of the licensing system 
to increase the powers of the ATLB. At the tiIre, appeals against ATLB 
decisions lay with the Minister or the President of the Board of Trade, 
and this factor was singled out for particular criticism. The Board of 
Trade had the dual responsibili~ of ensuring that the best possible 
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services 1Nere provided for the public and of protecting and assisting 
the national corporations. The Board of Trade was also concern.ed to 
see that Government owned airports and airlines paid their way. JACOIA 
argued that given such dual responsibilities the decisions of the Boa1:d 
of Trade regarding the establishIrent of seIVices to and fran GovernIIEIlt 
owned airports and regarding licences to independent operators would be 
inevitably coloured. With respect to bilateral agreer£El1.ts, JACOIA 
argued that where State airlines 1Nere involved few problems were 
encountered. However, if another operator wanted to provide a seIVice 
to an airport in a country of which the State airline was not ready to 
develop a corresponding service, either clearance was refused or 
pennission to operate was granted with the proviso that if and when the 
State operator decided it wanted reciprocal facilities, it should have 
the right to ask its Government to "challenge" the status quo. JACOIA 
held that even if a licence was granted on appeal to the Minister, the 
prospects of the service operating remained slim since the same 
Minister in practice dealt with clearance under bilateral agreer£El1.ts. 
Whilst supporting an increase in the powers of the ATLB, JACOIA also 
proposed that the Board of Trade's tenns of reference should be amended 
so that its principal duty should became fostering the developnent of 
civil aviation in the public interest. (75) 
Evidence suhnitted to the Edwards Ccmnittee in 1969 was critical of 
the way in which the ATLB was not in a position to issue clear 
statements of policy. In addition the reasoning applied to individual 
cases had not developed into a fonn of case law on which to judge the 
likely treatn:Ent of future applications. Applications had been dealt 
with on an ad-hoc basis with no attempt to develop viable route 
structures, thus a patch\\iOrk of unconnected routes had emerged. It was 
argued that in considering new licence applications too much weight had 
been given to the arguments of established operators regarding 
"wasteful duplication" and "naterial diversion" and that insufficient 
attention had been paid to the problems of developing air services fran 
the regions. The Board was also criticised for paying insufficient 
attention to the difficulties of acquiring the necessary traffic rights 
in awarding international routes to airlines. (76) 
Having considered such evidence the Edwards Carrmittee also supported 
the refonn of regulatory procedures and proposed the establishIrent of a 
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single aviation authority to discharge all regulatory functions in the 
aviation field. The Civil Aviation Authority was thus expected to 
issue route licences and other air service licences and. to enforce 
adherence to their tenns; initiate route structure reviews to 
strengthen the overall econanic status of the industry; to investigate 
the financial health of civil air transport operators or travel agents 
associated in joint enterprises with airlines and regulate accounting 
procedures; to consult with and advise Govern:rren.t on regional aviation 
matters including air service subsidies; to review airline mergers and 
if necessary cancel, vary or confinn licences in the light of review; 
to ensure co-operation between the econanic and technical regulatory 
authorities so that safety standards would not be inp9.ired by financial 
or managerial ~ess; to collect, prepare and issue statistical and 
financial data for the UK civil air transport industry on a 
standaIdised basis; to rrake and publish econanic studies on important 
aspects of air transport; and to consider representations from 
consumars regarding air services. ( 77 ) 
Although the provisions above may be regarded as contributing 
towards a strengthening of the licensing authority's role, it is 
ilrportant to note that broad policy remained the responsibility of the 
Minister whilst implementation rerrained the responsibility of the 
Authority. (78) The establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority on the 
lines proposed involved a number of constitutional and administrative 
innovations and within the tenns of policy the Authority had 
substantial discretion, with the ability of the Boan:i of Trade to 
intervene in detailed decisions being limited. However, the Authority 
was by no means an independent lxxiy. (79) In particular, the 
Govern:rren.t held that there were difficulties in the recarrmandation that 
the courts, or a special judicial tribunal, should hear appeals on the 
issue of consistency of decisions with declared. policy. It was held 
that any fonnal policy statement, being concerned essentially with 
econanic criteria, was unlikely to be expressed in tenns lending 
themselves to judicial interpretation. In effect, consistency of the 
Authority's decisions with policy could best be judged by the Boan:i of 
Trade which would have drawn up the policy statement. ( 80) 
The pcMers ultimately granted to the CAA were rrore limited than 
those envisaged by the Carmi ttee in another very significant respect. 
The Edwards Report had proposed that the CAA should be responsible for 
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the main negotiation of international traffic rights for UK airlines 
and requests for reciprocal rights by foreign airlines, in association 
with the Foreign and Ccmronwealth Office. (81) HCMeVer, central 
governmant maintained. that international negotiations on civil aviation 
had to rerrain the responsibility of Ministers. In other wo:rds, it 
would not be appropriate or practicable to charge the CAA with the duty 
of conducting international discussions on traffic rights or other 
civil aviation matters like the acceptance and discharge of obligations 
under the Chicago Convention. Thus the Board of Trade retained. direct 
responsibility in matters involving wider considerations than the 
Authority would be "canpetent to decide" such as international matters. 
It was decided. that the Authority should have an advisory role in the 
negotiation of traffic rights and should, where appropriate, provide 
members of the UK delegation for international negotiations and 
meetings. (82) In subsequent years, the Civil Aviation Authority has 
itself pressed. for a strengthening of its powers and duties to promote 
the sound developnent of the industry. HCMeVer, Government has 
consistently maintained. that the statutory framework is sufficiently 
flexible and adaptable to alla.v the canpetitive developnent of airline 
services. ( 83 ) 
From the foregoing it is argued. that the frequent changes of 
Ministerial responsibility for civil aviation in the UK have been 
reflective of uncertainty regarding the appropriate statutory framework 
for achieving national objectives. Ministerial responsibilities have 
not grown up as the result of anything rerrotel y resembling a 
comprehensive and continuously evolving Government policy for 
transport. In the main, changes have been brought about rrore by the 
canpulsion of events; problems have posed. themselves and answers have 
had to be found in legislation and administration. The fundamental 
conflict between Ministerial responsibilities and those of the quasi-
independent licensing authorities has been the outcome of a conflict of 
interests between those who deem themselves the custodians of the UK's 
international interest and thereby seek to protect the interest of 
State airlines and those who regard themselves as being rrore directly 
concerned. with user interests. 
It is clear that regulation of the civil air transport industry is 
justifiable on the grounds of safety, which in itself implies an 
elaren.t of econanic regulation. Ha.vever, all Governments have to 
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pursue particular national objectives. Prior to the Second. World War, 
UK objectives 'Were primarily military and strategic as reflected in the 
arrangement of Ministerial responsibilities, whilst in the post-war era 
these objectives gave way to protection of the interests of national 
airlines with a view to maximising the industry's contribution to 
economic growth and the balance of paynents . Clearly, similar 
objectives have been pursued by other nations as reflected in the 
principle of recipIOCity in bilateral arrangements. The fundamental 
influence of the pursuit of national objectives within the regulatory 
fra:mev.urk has contributed towards the centripedial tendency of airports 
internationally and it is argued that inevitably the interest of 
regional air passengers and airports alike have been of secondary 
consideration. It is suggested that the growth experienced at 
Manchester Airport has been inspite of rather than supported by the 
international regulatory system and the pursuit of national objectives. 
Furthenrore, it is argued that grcwth ltvUuld not have been achieved 
without the incidence of continued pressure exerted at the local 
institutional level. 
6.3 CltiERSHIP .AND CIJn>EfI'fIGl RlLIcr 
In addressing the issue of ownership and competition policy within 
the airline business, it is interesting to note that with regard to 
transport in general, ~ broad principles have gove:med the approach 
adopted by the State in the UK. Firstly, successive Governments have 
thought that transport should, as far as possible, be financially self-
supporting and a source of strength to the econaT¥, rather than a 
burden. Secondly, the State has avoided becoming involved in the 
direct operation of transport except in war-tilne, where special needs 
apply. (84) 
As the State has to try to settle difficulties between providers of 
different fonns of transport and indeed betwgen providers of the same 
fonn of transport, from tilne to tilne the Gove.mment has had to regulate 
campeti tion. There is general agreement that unrestricted campeti tion 
in transport :nay react in the long-run to the disadvantage of both 
providers and users of the service. This has been the general 
conclusion of many investigations, for example, the Royal Carmission on 
Transport, 1928-31, and other carrmittees examining specifically the 
difficulties of civil aviation before the Second World War. '!he 
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Co~ssion of 1928-1931 found that unrestrained competition had 
resulted in uneven provision of service; lack of facilities for 
sparsely populated areas; badly naintained and possibly unsafe 
transport and the inability of canpanies or individuals to set aside 
sufficient smns for depreciation and developnen.t. (85) 
In many respects, these conclusions regarding the effect of 
canpetition in transport were reflected in the early years of 
developnen.t of the civil air transport industry following the end of 
the First World War when the industry was expected to "fly by itself". 
(86) Canpanies like Air Transport and Travel Limited, and Handley-Page 
Transport Limited began the first regular services fran lDndon to the 
Continent in the nonths following the cessation of hostilities. These 
canpanies ran without subsidy despite a recorrmandation by an Advisory 
Carmi ttee set up by Winston Churchill, that GovernrrEnt assistance to a 
rraximrnn of £250,000 should be given for the years 1920/1 and 1921/2. 
With inadequate finance and heavily subsidised canpetition from French 
airlines in 1920 British air transport canpanies faced liquidation - in 
February 1921, British air transport ceased altogether. (87) The 
international nature of the industry and the ferocity of canpetition, 
universally GoveD1lIEl1t supported, was to inevitably lead to the 
evolution of a policy of GovernrrEnt assistance in the UK and to the 
concentration of national effort into a limited nmnber of airlines as 
chosen instrmnents of GovernrrEnt policy to win the rraximrnn share of 
world trade. (88) 
After the collapse of private air services, a canmi ttee of inquiry 
was set up under IDrci IDndonderry in March 1921, which devised a 
temporary scheme involving subsidy for the first time. A subsidy of 
£75,000 in one year all(J{NS(j Handley-Page and Instone Air Line to re-
open the IDndon to Paris Service. (89) In April 1922, Daimler Hire 
Limited joined the two canpanies already operating the route. Each of 
the three canpanies were given subsidy agrearents, but despite this 
financial support it soon became apparent that canpeti tion between the 
airlines was uneconomical. Arrangenents"Were thus made whereby 
Handley-Page Limited took over the IDndon to Paris route, Instone Air 
Line ran fran IDndon to Brussels and Cologne and British Marine Air 
Navigation operated a service from Southampton to Cherbourg, I.e Havre 
and the Channel Islands, all with subsidy. (90) 
Manchester's aerodrarre benefitted fran the subsidy to a limited 
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Daimler Hire Limi" ted, the degree. parent company of Daimler Airways 
was allocated a maxinrum of £55,000 a year for services fran Manchester 
to lDndon and on to Amsterdam, Hamburg and Berlin. '!he Manchester to 
Inndon se:r.vice opened on 23 October 1922. However, the service was 
short-lived. Although canpanies strove to establish internal and 
continental air services success was limited in this infant industry 
characterised by a large nmnber of relatively small private operators 
whose future could not be assured. (91) Government policy supported 
this fragmanted industry and gave little encouragenent to look beyond 
largely localised and short-haul routes. In giving aid the State took 
no account of the needs of the British Empire of Nations - contrary to 
the recarmmdations of the 1919 Advisory Carmittee. (92) 
In January 1923, another Carmittee of Inquiry under the Chainranship 
of Sir Henry Rambling, investigated the position regarding Civil Air 
Transport Subsidies. '!he Carmi ttee was of the opinion that the 
principle of competition had effectively been breached under the 1922 
subsidy scheme, as definite routes had been allocated to each of the 
four participants. The Government accepted a reccmnendation that a 
single camnercial organisation with a privileged position with respect 
to subsidies was a IIDre viable structure for the industry as a whole. 
(93) The four operating canpanies (Handley-Page, Instone, Daimler and 
British Marine Air Navigation) which had been involved in the cross-
Channel subsidy and held assets worth £148,750, were merged at the end 
of 1923 with Imperial Airways Transport Limited, a tenporary company. 
By 31 March 1924, re-organisation was complete and the £1 million 
British flag carrier, Imperial Airways Limited, started its first 
services to Paris on 26 April. (94) 
Financial assistance was given with the object of enabling civil 
aviation to eventually becane self-supporting, thus only those routes 
which afforded the best prospect of econanical developrEIlt fran the 
point of view of passenger and nail traffic -were eligible. The first 
subsidy agreement bebNeen the Air Ministry and the new organisation was 
made in 1924 when a total of £1 million was made available over a ten 
year period, the subsidy payable in the first four years being £137,000 
per annum reducing to £32,000 in the tenth year. (95) By 1927 Imperial 
Airways \'\iere operating bebNeen Inndon and Paris, Bas Ie , Zurich, Os tend , 
Brussels and Cologne on the Continent. A 'Wgekl Y se:r.vice between 
Southampton and the Channel Islands was also in operation. (96) 
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However, the successful inauguration of a cairo-Basra route was 
sufficient to convince Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for 
Air, of the great importance of using civil aviation as a rreans of 
ccmnunication with the Empire. So the thrust of Government policy was 
redirected towa:rds the developnent of Imperial routes, especially fram 
England to India and South Africa whilst operations in Europe continued 
to be restricted to the nnst rerrrunerative routes. (97) On 1 April 1929 
new subsidy arrangements were invoked with £2.49 million being spread 
over ten years. However, nearly £2 million of this grant aid was to be 
made available in the first six years to meet increased 
responsibilities and the costs of route developnent and aircraft 
procurerrent. ( 98) 
Generally, the City of Manchester benefitted little fram these early 
subsidy schemes. In May 1930 Imperial Airways proposed to run a first-
class service between Liverpool, Manchester, Binningham and Paris or 
Cologne making connections with other parts of the Continent. '!he 
proposed route was not eligible for Government subsidy and so it was 
proposed that each of the three local authorities involved on this side 
of the Charmel should make a grant of £1,000 to Imperial Airways. 
Experience at this juncture proved that whilst central government was 
unwilling to subsidise regional air services, at the same time local 
authorities would not be in a favourable position themselves to support 
the development of civil air transport financially. During 
negotiations the Manchester contingent had expressed concern regarding 
the precedent that would be set by subsidising a company like Imperial 
Airways which already received financial aid for the establishment of 
new services. In particular it was stressed that stiff opposition 
would pro:bably emanate fram other transport interests. At the time 
Imperial Ai:r:ways was regarded as essentially the Southern Railway 
Canpany by another name and this company was in direct competition with 
the Northern railway canpanies. The railways and other transport 
authorities being large ratepayers in the City could legitimately 
object in the courts. At the end of the day, Manchester City agreed to 
pay the £1,000 subsidy but by October 1920, the IDndon, Midland and 
Scottish Railway Canpany had raised a fornal objection, as ratepayers, 
to being "saddled with the cost of subsidy to one particular fonn of 
transport", questioning the powers under which authority for payment to 
an independent air seIVice had been granted. (99 ) 
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As far as provision for internal air service is concerned, by the 
end of 1933 proposals were drawn up for a new airline jointly owned by 
the four mainline railway companies and Imperial Airways (the latter 
providing technical facilities and air crews). Railway Air Services 
was registered in March 1934 with the declared objective of operating 
regular and reliable internal air services. (100) However, a gap 
remained in the European narket because the resources and subsidy of 
Imperial Airways ~ not equal to the task of developing both Empire 
and European routes. Attempts to bridge the gap were made with the 
nanination of British Airways - an aggressive harne-based 
fomed in October 1935 by the merger of Hillnan Airways 
operator 
Limited , 
Spartan Air Lines Limited 
chosen instrument. (101 ) 
and United Airways Limited - as the second 
The Canpany's internal air services were 
allocated to unsubsidised companies when it assumed the operation of 
subsidised European routes fram london, ~lementing Imperial Ai1:ways' 
operation out of the capital. All other European routes were operated 
by unsubsidised companies who, in an effort to compete with the two 
chosen instruments, similarly centred activity on london. In essence 
then, the provincial airports in the UK had to vie for the limited 
internal air traffic handled by a large number of smaller companies 
which received no financial aid. (102) 
As suggested earlier the Maybury Carmittee had investigated the 
operation of internal air services in 1935/6. The Conmittee had 
regarded routes connecting the major trading and manufacturing centres 
as being those which would derrand speed and thereby create a sufficient 
volmne of traffic to provide a remunerative business for the airlines. 
To this end, the Ccmnittee recommended that developnent should be over 
selected routes and to overcame the uncertainty which characterised air 
operations at the time, the industry should concentrate on a few of the 
most promising routes. It was deemed essential that the operation of 
regular passenger services on these routes should be secured by means 
of a licence to a single canpany or to a ccmbination of companies 
working on the closest tenns of co-ordination. (103) In essence, the 
recarmendations of the Maybury Corrmittee were embraced by Govermnent 
and the Air Transport Licensing Authority was set up in 1938 to 
rationalise danestic air services. Ha.vever, in the same year, the 
cadman Ccmni ttee canmented on domestic air services as follows: 
"The Maybury Carrmittee on internal air transport reported just over 
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a year ago and, although some progress has been made towards the re-
organisation, which they envisaged, the picture as disclosed to us 
remains virtually a black as they then painted it." (104) , 
Whilst cc:mnenting on the state of internal air services, prinaril y 
the Cadman Carmi. ttee was concerned with the external operations of 
Inprrial Airways and British Airways. Under pressure of rrounting 
criticism in Parliament, the Committee recommended that British 
external air transport should be handled by a small number of well 
founded organisations ; British companies should not canpete on the same 
routes; Imperial Airways should concentrate on long distance services 
and there should be close working liaison between Inprrial Airways and 
Bri tish Airways. Whilst accepting these reccmnendations, the 
Government went further in deciding that nationalisation of the 
industry was the key to future developnent. (105) The British Overseas 
AiIways Act, 1939, effectively merged the interests of Imperial AiIways 
and British Airways into a single corporation, BOAC, which would not 
~rk for profit, but would receive subsidy to secure the fullest 
development consistent with economy of efficient overseas air 
transport. (106) It is interesting to note that in civil air transport 
such arrangements reflected the general pattern in other countries and 
ante-dated the post-war nationalisation of certain other important 
industries. (107) 
The frequent changes of ownership and competition policy in the 
inter-war years reflected a basic uncertainty in the minds of those in 
Government about the nost effective way of developing air transport. 
( 108) However, the general trend in policy was towards rejection of 
unfettered canpeti tion which had prcxiuced an unstable enviromnent in 
which fledgling airlines had found it impossible to gain sufficient 
profits to enable them to develop their route networks. The resulting 
financial instability and poor standards of safety were generally 
regarded as not being conducive to an industry which was at such an 
early stage of developnent. To eradicate the effects of what was 
perceived as too much canpetition, governments had initially introduced 
a system of route licensing in order to limit market access and, in 
certain instances, capacity. Effectively, the role of the Air 
Transport Licensing Authority in the UK was, for instance, mirrored by 
the Civil Aeronautics Board in the United States. However, at the end 
of the day, nationalisation had been rega:rded as the nost effective 
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:rrEaIlS of exercising control. ( 109 ) 
With the onset of war, at the request of the Air Transport Cc:nm:md, 
the newly created. BOAC began to operate a land-plan trans-Atlantic 
ferry service for banber pilots. At the cessation of hostilities, BOAC 
found itself in the dual position of being at the same time, an 
operational canpanyand a national institution, as the nation's "chosen 
instrument" for the prarotion of air transport overseas. However, the 
status of "chosen instnnnent" did not necessarily imply rronopol y , as 
suggested. by IDrd Knoll ys carmenting on behalf of BOAC m:maganent: 
"We in British Overseas Airways look upon ourselves as trustees, for 
the time being, for whoever nay be called upon to operate British 
air services abroad. We have no excessive ambitions to run all 
services ourselves or by ourselves. We do not yet know what part 
private enterprise or other transport interests such as shipping or 
railways will play in these overseas carmnmications." (110) 
In effect, the wider issues referred to by IDrd Knoll ys were for 
Government to decide and as the war years drew to a close, the general 
policy and structure of the civil air transport industry in Britain in 
the post-war era began to emerge with the publication of Government 
White p:ipers entitled British Air Transport (Cmnd 6605) in March 1945 
and British Air Services (Cmnd 6712) in December 1945. The industry 
was to be influenced by the belief of those in Government and those 
involved in land and sea transportation that the canpetition of air 
services "must be met in the air". ( 111 ) It was argued. that national 
and Camonwea.l th interests as well as the interests of older forms of 
transport could not be served. by attempting to retard or restrict new 
methods of carriage; indeed such interests would be best prom:::>ted by 
creating and fostering the rrost effective air transport system at hare 
and overseas. Towards this end, the criterion as to whether a 
particular route should be flown or not would not be purely corrmercial 
profi tabili ty. It was rraintained that there were services which were 
essential in the public interest, but which offered little or no 
prospect of a direct financial return. It was postulated that if 
unlimited. canpetition was to be the order of the day, canpeting 
services would be concentrated. on rermmerative services and the 
taxpayer would have to subsidise air services which were desirable for 
social or public reasons. On the other hand, it was held that if an 
air transport undertaking was assured the exclusive right to operate a 
sufficient proportion of rermmerati ve services and to develop these to 
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the full, they should accept the obligation to run unrenunerati ve 
services as part of the general air transp:>rt system. '!herefore, it 
was the GovernIrent' s general intention that undertakings granted the 
right to run air se:rvices within the UK and between the UK and other 
countries should p:>ssess rights on their allocated routes to the 
exclusion of other UK operators. '!hus in an attempt to foster civil 
air transport, an agreed schedule of European and internal UK routes 
was to be assigned to individual operators. ( 112) 
A fundamental principle embodied in "British Air Se:rvices" was the 
IrOVEm3I1t away fran the single chosen instrument philosophy because of 
the need for flexibility in meeting international ccmpetition and the 
necessity for encouraging different methcx:is of approach to techniques 
of airline operation. '!he Government also sought to create a p:x:>l of 
knowledge and experience to meet the needs of the rapid expansion of 
air travel which was expected. (113) '!he tentative plans which the 
GovernIrent laid in 1945 for the developnent of air transp:>rt se:rvices 
culminated in the presentation of the Civil Aviation Bill to Parliament 
in the following year. One of two principal objects in the Bill was to 
secure the developnent of air transp:>rt se:rvices by corporations 
operating under public control and, to this end, the existing BOAC and 
two new corporations, British European Airways and British South 
American Ai.:rways, were to "provide air transp:>rt services and to carry 
out all fonns of aerial \\1Ork", whether on charter tenus or othe:rwise, 
in any part of the \\1Orld. ( 114 ) Each of the three corporations \\Jere 
allocated specific spheres of operation. BOAC was to operate routes 
between the UK, the other countries of the Corrrron\\lealth and the Middle 
East; routes between the UK and the om ted states and routes bet\\leen 
the UK and the Far East. BEA was made resp:>nsible for routes bet\\leen 
the UK and the European Continent and routes within the UK. Finally, 
the British South American Airways Corporation was to operate bet\\leen 
the UK and South and Central America. (115) 
'!he Civil Aviation Act 1946 also established the power of the 
Minister to direct the Corporations to undertake or discontinue any 
activity. In respect of the Corporations' rights to borrow funds and 
update or issue stock, the Minister also had PJW9r to prescribe 
regulations to apply to the issue, transfer, redemption, etc of such 
stock. The borrCMing pc:M3r8 of the Corporations \\lere limited to £50 
million for BOAC, £20 million for BEAC, and £10 million for the British 
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South ArrErican Airways Corporation. With regard to the necessary 
losses which might be incurred by the Corporations, the Minister had 
power, with the consent of the Treasury, to relieve this financial 
bw:den by making annual Exchequer grants available. (116) Ministerial 
control extended into the realms of aircraft procure:rent policy, with 
the stipulation that British aircraft should be utilised - Ministerial 
influence aver the selection of aircraft being exercised through the 
Treasury's financial control of the capital expenditure of the 
Corporations. (117) 
The exceptionally close relationship between the Minister and the 
"chosen instruments" which was inevitable, was therefore made closer by 
public ownership imposing special responsibilities on the Minister. 
However, despite control, management like those of other nationalised 
industries had full discretion in corrmercial judgement. Planning 
routes and services; aircraft maintenance and other engineering 
arrangements; passenger and freight handling procedures, sales, 
advertising and labour relations were all matters in which it was felt 
that the Ministry had a positive responsibility not to interfere. (118) 
As far as Manchester's Airport Carmi ttee is concerned, it is clear 
that the Government's plans for the future developnent of the industry 
were vi9V.1Erl with some trepidation. The Camni ttee pressed the point 
that in agreeing schedules for European and internal UK routes 
provision should be made for direct services from Ringway to other 
centres of population and industry in the UK and on the Continent as 
soon as possible. Whilst it was difficult to discern fram the general 
tenor of the emerging policy what the Government's intention might be 
in respect of Ringway, it was decided at the early stages of policy 
fonnulation in 1945 that any suggestion that oceanic services should be 
based prinarily at IDndon and Prestwick Airports, with feeder lines 
operating from Manchester, should be resisted. It was suggested to 
Government that an imnediate decision regarding the location of inter-
continental and trans-continental airports was needed as construction 
would be a long-drawn out process. It was postulated that any 
uncertainty regarding the Government's plans \\Uuld only lead to 
arnbi tious developnent schemes which could not all be expected to care 
to fruition. (119) 
In attempting to foster the developnent of air services fran 
Manchester in the post-war years, the nost pressing concern of the 
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Manchester Corporation was that the State operators might not be 
prepared to operate through Ringway in the post-war period, tending to 
concentrate on operations from london. Whilst the three Corporations 
were required to prepare three-yearly progranmes of air services, no 
provision had been rrade to ensure that progranmes would be available to 
the public for scrutiny. In effect the rrachinery which had all~ for 
representations to be rrade regarding proposals for air services in the 
years prior to the war, involving the Air Transport Licensing 
Authority, was not to be resurrected . Representatives of the 
Manchester Corporation voiced these misgivings at a IrEeting with the 
Minister of Civil Aviation, lord Swinton, in June 1945 and in 
surrmarising the Gove:rnment' s intentions at that time, lord Swinton 
suggested that the primary basis for assigning air services to selected 
operators "WOuld be "taking the rough with the snooth". Private 
independent operators could apply to run a service which was not an 
assigned one and foreign operators could be granted permission to 
operate a service into and out of the UK so long as the designated 
Corporation could join the route as and when they wished to on a 50/50 
basis. (120) This suggestion implied that the field was open for the 
authorities in Manchester to take the necessary action to encourage the 
use of their airport by both foreign and independent operators if the 
State Corporations proved reluctant to operate services through Ringway 
- a factor which was to be crucial to the early post-war developnent of 
the Airport. 
As previously stated, provision had been rrade for the earned revenue 
of the Corporations to be supplemented by grants from public funds to 
meet the unavoidably heavy expenses of starting anew and developing 
after the war, and to enable them to run services required in the 
public interest which were not attractive ccmnercially. For the 
initial eight IIDnth period from 1 August 1946 to 31 March 1947, the 
total grant was not to exceed £10 million and a similar :rraximum figure 
was set for the year ending 31 March 1948. For each of the eight 
subsequent years, a sum not exceeding £8 million was authorised. '!he 
Civil Aviation Act provided that for the eight rronths 1 August 1946 to 
31 March 1947 losses - since they could not be adequatelyest.inated for 
this period - should be rrade good by a deficiency grant. For each 
Subsequent year, however, the COIpOrations were required to sul:mi t to 
the Minister a progranme of services which they proposed to operate 
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during the year, together with a financial estinate based on that 
prograITm3. After considering the prograrme and estinate, the Minister 
and the Treasury vvere to detennine whether a grant was required for the 
year and if so, on what basis it should be calculated. (121 ) 
'!he Coxp::>rations vvere obliged to subni t to the Minister an annual 
report and an audited statement of accounts in a fonn "confonning with 
the best carmercial standards". The reports and accounts of the three 





A deficit of £8,076,844 for the full year to 31 March 1947 
A deficit of £2,157,937 for the period 1 August 1946 to 31 
March 1947 
A surplus of £20,507 for the period 1 August 1946 to 31 
March 1947. (122) 
From 1 April 1946, internal air services continued to be operated by 
private companies as agents or associates of the British European 
Airways Coxp::>ration. The Associated Airways group of canpanies was 
taken over by BEA on 1 February 1947; Allied Airways (Gander fXJwer) 
Limited on 12 April and Channel Island AiIways on 1 April. During the 
period of 1 ~il 1946 to 31 Jan~ 1947, a deficit of £359,868 was 
incurred by these companies operating internal services, which was also 
shown on the BEA balance sheet. ( 123 ) 
In principle then, the Civil Aviation Act 1946 established a 
nonopoly of scheduled air services for the State Corporations supported 
by subsidy arrangerrents. However, it is clear that financial support 
for the industry was not regarded as a long tenn _prospect. Indeed 
evidence suggests a fundamental distaste of direct subsidisation even 
in the imnediate post-war years. In British Air Services (Crnnd 6712) 
atplasis had been placed upon the need for air services to became self-
supporting, paragraph 17 stated: 
"it is the view of His Majesty's Government that air services should 
be made self-supporting as soon as possible. '!hey will seek by 
international agreement to eliminate all fonus of subsidy. His 
Majesty's Government recognise, h~r, that if air tr~IX?rt is to 
fulfill its function of providing services in the public lllterest, 
same measure of State aid may be necessary to support essential but 
unremunerative services." ( 124 ) 
In 1956 the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation e<mnented in the 
Ccmrons: 
"I am glad to say that I see no inmediate reason, ~ch could 
necessitate the extension of the Exchequer Grant ProvlS10ns of the 
Air Coxp::>rations Act, 1949, when they expire on 31 March 1956. I am 
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delighted. that the air corporations can stand on their avn feet." 
(125) 
Whilst ini tiall y in receipt of subsidy the State Corporations, which 
had been reduced to two by the nerging of BSAA with mAC in 1949, had 
becane self-supporting before the end of the subsidy pericxi. (126) 
As far as the independent operators in the industry are concerned, 
in the inmediate post-war years they werre excluded fran the operation 
of scheduled air services and were expected to develop the charter 
narket. However, by 1948, a number of private canpanies w:rre operating 
successful charter services and pressed for pennission to operate 
scheduled. services at peak pericxis and on routes not operated by the 
Corporations. lord Douglas of Kirtleside was appointed by the Labour 
Governman.t to advise on the possibilities of allowing private canpanies 
to operate scheduled services complementary to those of the 
Corporations. The Douglas Report recarmended that operation of 
supplerrEIltary services should be pennitted under certain conditions. 
For example, services were not to overlap with the existing or planned 
services of the Corporations; the granting of Ministerial approval was 
essential along with the institution of associate agreements with the 
Air Corporations. ( 127 ) Section 24 of the Air Corporations Act, 1949 
thus reiterated the position of the two Corporations as the chosen 
instruments of British civil aviation policy but reserved to the 
Corporations and its associates the operation of all scheduled air 
services touching the UK. (128) Those canpanies which proposed to 
operate as associates were required to make application to the Air 
Transport Advisory Council which advised upon those services which 
should be penni tted. Associate agreements with the Corporations were 
concluded for a limited. pericxi of two years only. (129) 
Whilst initially the activities of independent operators were 
strictly related. to and tied. in with those of the State Corporations, 
the Berlin Airlift of 1949, which at its peak of operation had involved 
a fleet of 48 aircraft owned and operated by 23 private airlines, did 
much to change the status of private ccmpanies in the industry. Much 
operating experience had been accumulated; the Governman.t had becare 
convinced of the value of the private airlines as a military transport 
reserve and finally financial stability had been secured as a result of 
having been involved in a large scale transportation operation. In an 
effort to preserve the private airlines as a reserve fleet "trooping" 
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rrovem:mts becarre their prerogative as the Ministry of Civil Aviation 
acquired an undertaking fran the Corporations in 1951 that they would 
not acquire aircraft for charter work, but would only cany out ad-hoc 
charters with capacity left over fran the scherlulerl services. (130) In 
addition, the Conservative Goverrnnent sought to widen opportunities for 
the private airlines in other ways. Thus the tenns of reference for 
the Air Transport Advisory Corrmi ttee were m:xlifiEd. Private airlines 
could apply for pennission to operate any routes except those which 
were specifically reserved to the Corporations and the Council could 
:recarm=nd the Minister to accept operation so long as there was "no 
material diversion of traffic" from the Corporations. ( 131 ) 
The independent operations could - on equal tenns with the 
Corporations - develop new routes and types of service which would not 
conflict seriously with the Air Corporations' establishEd network. 
Under these informal licensing arrangarents various new types of 
service were developed, among them same new schEdulEd services 
especially on domestic routes; low fare services to the colonies; 
vehicle ferries and IIDst importantly inclusive tour services to the 
Continent. ( 132) In particular , private airlines were encouragEd to 
expand into the inclusive tour market in the 1950s, although even in 
this area operations remllnerl closely controllEd. The tour praooting 
agency and the airline together had to make application to the NrAC to 
operate a number of specifierl services to destinations. ATAC then 
reviewed the application, hearing the observations of all interestEd 
parties . Basically, the Council had to ensure that the total number of 
services approved was not excessive and that operation in parallel with 
normal services was only pennittEd "providEd that such services are not 
likely materially to divert traffic which could otherwise be carriEd by 
any operator already authoriserl for the route". More i.mportantl y, the 
rrain protection for scherlulerl services was given by the condition that 
the price of Inclusive Tours should not be less that the full 
applicable fare on normal flights. Indeed. the praootion of IT holidays 
was not left entirely to the private operators and IIDre Inclusive rrbur 
passengers in the 1950s were carriEd on BEA scherlulerl flights than on 
flights operaterl ~ all of the 30 private airlines together. (133) 
As far as the ilnpact of the early post-war canpeti tion policy on 
Manchester Airport is concernerl, it is arguEd that the involvement of 
private home operators and foreign airlines were IIDre significant in 
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prorroting grCMth through their daronstration effect than the exercise 
of quasi -rronopoly pavers by the State Corporations, supported by grant 
aid. An apparent reluctance on the part of BEA to serve the less 
popular darEstic routes was countered by the activities of several 
small resident airlines. Fran 1 April 1947 BEA assurred responsibility 
for the services fornerly operated by Railway Air Services and Isle of 
Man Air Sel:vices from Ringway. Plans for scheduled air services to 
operate in the Sumner did not contemplate the opening of any new 
services thus only routes to london, Belfast and the Isle of Man were 
envisaged. By December 1948 the Company was considering the withdrawal 
of the service to london which had only cannenced in Decenber of the 
previous year. It was claimad that the prevailing econanic conditions 
and a lack of public support were responsible. However, the Town Clerk 
criticised the Canpany for having decided to withdraw on the basis of 
experience at the 'WOrst time of the year. Foreign operators at the 
time ran services to the capitals of France, Belgium, Holland and Eire 
and the discontinuation of the service to the home capital was seen to 
be reflective of BEA's negative approach. In April of 1949 BEA also 
decided to withdraw its service to the Isle of Man. (134) The rrost 
substantial of the private operators to fill the gap left by BEA was 
Si vewright Airways who flew OC3s, DH Dragon Rapides and Miles Aerovans 
on sumner only routes to Jersey and Ronaldsway, until BEA re-possessed 
the licences in 1951. (135) Similarly, as highlighted previously, 
BOAC's disdain of Manchester as a trans-Atlantic tenninal was offset by 
the long-haul operations of several European flag-carriers. In 1951 
the Airport Carmi ttee at Manchester had accused the Corporation of 
showing no interest in operating from Ringway and it was rraintained 
that if BOAC did not "buck-up" it was certain that the Scandinavian 
airlines 'WOuld grasp the opportunity at Ringway and it v.uuld not be 
long before they \\ere operating trans-oceanic flights from the Airport. 
(136) 
Evidence suggest that in the early post-war years contrary to stated 
policy, the criterion as to whether a particular route should be 
operated or not by the Air Corporations was ccmrercial profitability to 
the virtual exclusion of the public interest - a condition which was 
reflective of the desire to minimise subsidies. Indeed, it is argued 
that even in applying this criterion rather than pioneering new routes 
which offered the prospect of reasonable financial return.s, the 
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Corporations preferred to allav other airlines to derronstrate their 
viability first , only embarking upon certain routes at that stage. 
particularly in the international field it is suggested that any 
preference on the part of the Corporations to operate out of Manchester 
was inducerl by the need. to counter the efforts of foreign operators to 
develop the market potential of Manchester's natural extensive 
catchnent area. 
It has been suggested that CMIlership and canpetition policy and the 
consequent system of route licensing established in the early post-war 
years was geared primarily towards the limitation of market access and 
saretimes capacity in order to prarote the developlE11.t of a route 
network in an industry where instability meant that fledgling canpanies 
could not realise sufficient profits to survive. By the 1960s however, 
the Bri tish civil air transport industry was reaching naturi ty, 
carriers had established substantial route networks and were largely 
financially secure. By this time, there was an increasing likelihood 
that the limitation of canpeti tion 'WOuld lead to high fares and 
inefficiency. (137) Whilst the activities of the independent sector 
had been circumscribed during the 1940s and 1950s, a degree of 
liberalisation was therefore introducerl with the Civil Aviation 
(Licensing) Act, 1960. 
In effect the 1960 Act ended ten years of licensing of scheduled 
services being authorised by the device of associate agreerrents and 
being operated through an advisory body. The Air Transport Licensing 
Board was set up with powers to licence scheduled air services and m::>re 
formal procedures for licensing were introduced. Basically, 
application by an airline for a licence to operate a new route or to 
change an existing route was followed by a public hearing of the 
application and objections. The ATLB judgerEl1t on the application 
could be the subject of appeal to the Minister, in which case a 
Ccmnissioner \YOuld be appointed, another hearing 'WOuld take place and 
the ultimate decision whether or not to accept the Ccmnissioner's 
decision 'WOuld rest with the Minister. (138) 
Another major change introduced by the 1960 Act was the repeal of 
Section 24 of the Air CorporatiOns Act which nade parallel operations 
by British airlines possible on all routes and gave private airlines 
equal legal status with the Corporations. During the period of 
associate agreements, there had always been a list of reserved routes 
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which were the exclusive province of the Corporations. Whilst repeal 
of Section 24 ended exclusive rights it should be explained, however, 
that reserved routes ranained a protected market covering the rrost 
important traffic flows to and fran the UK, liberalisation purely took 
the fonn of allowing private airlines to acquire a licence for p:rrallel 
operations. (139) 
Coincidentally, the m:x:lification of licensing arrangarents was 
acccmpanied by an increasing trend towards marger in the independent 
sector. In 1957 30 ccmpanies had operated in this sector but this had 
reduced to 20 six years later. AiIwork Limited, which had been founded 
in 1928, had acquired control of Hunting-Clan Transport Limited; 
Transair Limited; Air Charter Limited; Channel Airhridge Limited; 
Morton Air Services Limited; Silver City AiIways Limited; and other 
ccmpanies . Collectively these interests surrendered their independent 
identity to fonn British United AiIways, the largest company operating 
in the private sector. At the same time, shipping ccmpanies becam3 
involved in air transport. For example, the General Steam Ship Company 
purchased Eagle Ai1:ways in 1960 and fonre:i Cunard Eagle Ai1:ways as a 
wholly owned subsidiary, as a means of breaking into the North Atlantic 
air travel narket in the face of the relative decline of sea traffic. 
(140) In essence, Cunard Eagle and BllA represented the major 
challengers in the independent sector to the hold of State Corporations 
on scheduled air services. 
Evidence also suggests a tendency on the part of the State 
Corporations to acquire interests in the rrore successful independent 
companies. For example, Cambrian had represented a relatively 
successful Ca:rdiff based airline. As BEA sought to satisfy Welsh 
aspirations, 33% of canpany shares were acquired. In 1963 co-operation 
was further cemented when Cambrian assmnerl operation of the network of 
routes fran Manchester and Li verpcx:>l to Belfast and the Isle of Man 
previously operated by BEA. These routes had registered losses in 
1962-3 of £468,000 and it was hoped that the smaller ccmpany involving 
lower operating costs could successfully provide this kind of special 
snaIl-scale service. (141) Cambrian's Manchester network at the time 
thus served Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Li veI:pJOl, Ronaldsway and the 
Channel Islands and as these routes prospered, BEA was pranpted to 
increase its stake in the Company to 100%. (142) 
Clearly the independent and State sectors of the industry \\lere 
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attempting to consolidate their interests in prospect of fiercer 
canpeti tion. However, it is clear fran an examination of the early 
reports of the ATLB that the Board remained. conscious of the need to 
balance the encouragement of competition against the need to protect 
the public interest in a number of spheres: 
"th7 prospect. of greater efficiency in methcxis has to be weighed 
agamst the higher costs that nay result fran duplication, or under-
utilisation, of resources and facilities; ccmpetition nay lead to 
the neglect of less financially rewarding services; and ccmpetitive 
advertising does not in the long run always work to the benefit of 
the consumer or of the producer. Each case therefore must be judged 
on its merits and we would not be discharging our statutory duty if 
we licensed. competition on routes where the benefits would clearly 
be outweighed. by the wasteful provision of resources or the waste of 
facilities already being provided . . . the :rrain purpose of 
licensing is to prevent unregulated canpetition which in the long 
tenm is damaging both to the interests of airlines and the 
travelling public despite the obvious and superficial short tenn 
attractions." (143 ) 
Whilst protection of the public interest nay have assumed priority 
in theory it is argued. that given the tendency to base decisions upon 
evidence placed before it at hearing rather than conducting 
investigations, the ATLB assmned a passive role which IIEaIlt that the 
statutory nonopoly of the State Corporations was replaced by a fonm of 
licensed. danination administered by the Board. (144) 
Generally, in placing their arguments before the Board, the 
independent and State airlines fonned two diametrically opposed camps, 
interpreting the state of the industry in entirely different ways. In 
the international field the private sector argued that the potential of 
the air travel narket was greater than the volume developed by the 
State airlines and that if they were given a share of the scheduled 
operations, they could stimulate rrore rapid growth so that the State 
Corporations could still achieve their planned rate of growth. The 
State Corporations, on the other hand, generally argued that there was 
no need. or dem:md for the proposed services of the independent sector; 
that their awn routes were fully adequate and new services would 
involve naterial diversion from and the wasteful duplication of their 
services. In addition, it was argued. that the State airlines' position 
under inter-gavernmental air agreements and under ccmnercial agreements 
closely associated with them \\'Quld similarly be adversely affected. In 
essence, it was claimed that whatever the \\'Qrding of individual 
bilateral agree.rrents, foreign governments interpreted them in such a 
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way as to envisage an approximate 50-50 division of traffic between the 
airlines of the ~ countries involved. Whilst camercial pooling 
agrearents with IOC>st foreign airlines operating in parallel ensured 
that the Corporations achieved at least a 50% share of the traffic on 
routes operated, if a second British airline were licensed the net 
result would be the diversion of traffic away fran the Airways 
Corporations. (145) 
In the domestic sphere of operation, private airlines maintained 
that the case for a second British airline to be licensed on the main 
danestic routes was stronger than on international routes because given 
the absence of foreign operators , effectively BEA continued to exercise 
exclusive rights. BEA maintained that any traffic carried by a newly 
licensed airline would be the product of diversion and this in itself 
would negate planned investment decisions and constitute wasteful 
duplication. BEA further maintained that if ccmpetiti ve internal 
services were licensed on any substantial scale, the Corporation would 
have to reconsider the policy of providing unprofitable "social 
services", especially in Scotland. (146) 
Essentially, ATLB decisions in roth the international and danestic 
spheres followed a single formula, that is, if the absolute level of 
traffic carried by the State airlines on any route was expected to be 
affected and the forecast rate of growth involved an insufficient 
rrargin for the operations of a second carrier to be based entirely on 
growth, then licences for operation would not be granted. (147) As far 
as applications to operate international routes are concerned, in 
Novanber 1961, BUA was granted licenses for ten routes and CunaI:d Eagle 
four, all other applications for international services were rejected. 
(148) On domestic routes, licences were granted to CunaI:d Eagle for a 
once daily service on the trunk routes of london to Glasgow, to Belfast 
and to Edinburgh, but applications for london to Manchester and 
Liverpool were refused. (149) In addition, where licences were 
granted, the independent airlines were subjected to tight frequency 
limitations. For example, in the stmmer of 1968, on trunk routes fran 
IDndon to Belfast, Glasgow and Edinburgh, BEA offered 85, 55 and 61 
flights per week respectively, British Eagle and BUA collectively were 
restricted to 29 flights per week between london and Glasgow; 12 
be~ london and Belfast; and ten between london and Edinburgh. (150) 
In that year, the ATLB hean:l applications for BUA to increase the 
472 
rraximum frequency of their Glasgow service fran 12 to 17 journeys 
~y and that of the Belfast service fran seven to 12 weekly. British 
Eagle also applied for an increase in the max.inumt frequency of their 
Glasgow service fran 12 to 22 jOUDleys per week. All tlu:ee 
applications were strongly opposed by BEA. At the end of the day, both 
of BUA's applications were granted but that of British Eagle was 
refused largely on the grounds that an increase in frequency fran 
Heathrow searEd likely to involve nore diversion fran BEA' s services 
out of that airport than would greater frequency fran Gatwick at a tine 
when the growth of traffic on the Glasgow route had slowed down. (151) 
It may be assmned that the major problem confronting any licensing 
agency is how to judge the traffic volume necessary on any route to 
allow for the splitting of operations which will not give rise to a 
significant increase in the level of operating costs. (152) H~, 
protection of existing scheduled operations may in itself inhibit the 
developrent of air traffic. In addressing this issue, the Fdwanis 
Ccmnittee, reporting in 1969 emphasised the need to look closely at the 
circumstances which make it necessary to encourage and protect 
scheduled services, thereby adopting a much nore discriminatory policy 
between air services to different areas. The Carmittee held that in 
sane areas there could be virtually no case for protection and rraximum 
freedcm should be granted to develop whole aircraft load services of 
all kinds. Conversely, on some routes preservation of scheduled 
services could be of considerable ilrportance to the collective public 
danand. It was argued that in such cases, protection should be pursued 
unashanEdl y as a direct objective of policy. The Carmi ttee identified 
the need to distinguish between. those scheduled services which are 
essential and those which are desirable. In recognition of the fact 
that circumstances would change fran route to route and fram time to 
tine, it was reccmnended that a regulatory authority, which could keep 
the traffic requirements of all areas constantly under review and could 
IOOdify the degree of protection accorded to scheduled services as 
rrarket circumstances ~re seen to change, should be fornaL (153) The 
Civil Aviation Authority was the regulatory authority to assUIl'E this 
role. 
As far as canpeti tion on domestic routes is concerned, the Fdwanis 
Carmi ttee held that in the initial stages, the licensing authority 
should award licences to new and to established airlines in a rranner 
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which \\Uuld penni t the developrent of full and equal canpeti tion over a 
pre-detennined nmnber of years. 'rhus the licensing authority would 
control the frequency of both airlines in a way which would allow them 
to share, though not necessarily equally, the traffic growth. One of 
the IIDst far reaching recorrmendations of the Ccmnittee concerning the 
future structure of the UK airline industry and the nature of 
competition was the prarotion of a "second force" scheduled airline 
licensed to operate a viable structure of long haul and short haul 
routes. It was suggested that BUA and Caledonian in association 
represented a potentially effective but not exclusive canbination of 
operational experience; ccmnercial organisation and technical and 
financial resources for the second force. However, it was stressed 
that same concession of Corporation routes would be needed to make the 
airline a viable proposition. ( 154) Whilst accepting the "second 
force" in principle, Government rejected the view that fornation should 
be made conditional upon the transfer of a significant part of the Air 
Corporations' route networks. It was regarded as crucial to the future 
of the industry that the public sector airlines should be allowed to 
build on the positions of strength which they had achieved in the face 
of growing international competition and changes in the structure of 
their markets . Basically, the Government had no intention of imposing 
a pre-conceived re-allocation of routes on any airline which had borne 
the costs of developing the routes and was seen to serve them well. 
(155) 
At the end of the day the "second force" airline, British 
Caledonian, emerged from the acquisition by Caledonian of BUA in 1971 
and in the following year BOAC and BEA (and the latter's subsidiaries, 
cambrian and BKS/North East) merged to foD'll British Airways. (156) 
From this time, in an effort to foster competition, the Civil Aviation 
Authority adopted a consistent policy of, for example, refusing fare 
increases sought by BA to cover unreasonably high costs and withholding 
any measure of protection that it would not have given to any British 
operator. Hcmever, the structural imbalance in the industry remained. 
In essence, although from the 1950s onwards independent operators had 
been given progressively increased opportunities to set up and grow 
alongside the State Corporations, by 1970 State interests had still 
accounted for 69% of the total output (measured in available tonne 
kilaretres) of the UK airline industry and 93% of its output on 
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schErlulErl air services. Despite the CAA's efforts to further widen 
opportunities for other airlines by 1982, BA accountErl for 65% of total 
output and 81% of output on scheduled air services. 
BA had not only becane the only British airline allowed to operate 
international services fran Heathrow (British Caledonian was a Gatwick-
based operation), but also operated the bulk of all international 
schErlulErl services by British airlines fran Manchester. (157) However, 
although assuming a dominant position in Manchester, the rrerger of 
State interests proved to accentuate the nationalised sector's emphasis 
on Heathrow as a hub airport, and Manchester was severely affected by 
the new canpany's provincial cut-backs. Trans-Atlantic services were 
initially reduced drastically and then suspendErl ~letely in 1981, 
whilst many European services ware dropped along with the danestic 
schErlules to Fdinburgh and the Isle of Man. Most of these routes were 
subsequently pick:Erl up by independent operators: Laker AiI:ways (already 
a ma.jor trans-Atlantic charter operator frc:m Manchester) began a 
schErlule to New York; IDganair took the Edinburgh route; and the 
Ronaldsway service became the preserve of Air UK. As in the past, 
several new foreign airlines also sought to alleviate the effects of 
British Airways' entrenchment. ( 158) 
In accounting for the continuErl dominance of the industry by BA it 
is clear that this has not necessarily sterroed frc:m a record of 
superior perfo:r:mance in world markets. It is suggestErl that sane 
advantage will have accruErl from the status of predecessor corporations 
as statutory nonopolies and the incrnnbent carriers on the na jori ty of 
international routes in the post-war years which account for the najor 
part of the British industry's business. (159) However, given that 
successive governments have rejected the concept of the "single chosen 
instrurrEnt" , it is suggestErl that market dominance is also the product 
of initially, prefennent at the expense of the independent sector, and 
subsequently, a lack: of carmi:t:nEnt to the multi -airline concept. ( 160 ) 
It is clear that a single major airline policy has substantial 
disadvantages in the international field. Although it may be argued 
that canpeti tion with foreign airlines takes place on alrrost every 
international route served, direct canpetition is duopolistic. If a 
single national airline ca:npetes with its foreign counterparts within a 
highly regulatErl framework of bilateral agreemants, there nay be less 
incentive to develop markets or introduce new products, neglecting the 
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needs of ~uld-be passengers. The duopolistic natur:e of canpetition is 
reinforced by the pre-detennination of capacity on rrost international 
scheduled air services and the operation of cc:mtErcial agreements with 
reciprocal carriers. Similarly, pre-detennination and sharing of 
capacity; carn:nercial agreements; controls over international fares and 
restrictions on traffic types carried tend to muffle indirect 
canpeti tion from sixth freedcm and charter operators alike. A multi-
airline policy nay therefore be prarroted in the best interests of the 
consmner. However, this in itself is likely to involve costs in tenDs 
of bilateral agreements and ccmpetitive strength. (161) 
Basically, where other governments choose to favour State airlines 
by subsidy or restricting competition, international air services 
cannot be liberalised. This point nay be amplified by a brief 
consideration of the nechanisms by which canpeti tion nay be achieved. 
As previously suggested, the Edwards Carmittee report of 1969 supported 
direct route transfer as the key to fostering ccmpeti tion between UK 
airlines and addressing the structure imbalance which existed in the 
industry at the time. It is suggested that in rejecting this 
proposition government was wary of the possibility that any arbitrary 
reduction in the najor airline's ~rld route netw:>rk ~uld only benefit 
foreign competition by reducing market strength (particularly if the 
competitor taking routes over lacked the sales and marketing 
organisation necessary for developnen.t), which in turn could have 
precipitated a downwani spiral across the UK industry as a whole, 
affecting adversely the balance of payrrEIlts. It may be argued that 
appropriate route selection could avoid these effects. However, it is 
suggested that in an effort to minimise the effect of route transfer on 
market strength, it is likely that the rrost vulnerable and weakest 
links in the network ~uld be offered to other airlines culminating in 
increased market danination by the national airline as a result of the 
transfer of narginal routes. (162) 
It nay be argued that route transfer neither represents nor 
encourages competition but constitutes purely the substitution of one 
rronopoly for another. This has in fact been the position taken up by 
Manchester Airport in the face of dcmination of routes by the national 
carrier. It has been naintained in recent years that substitution of 
independent carriers for British Airways ~uld dawn-grade the ai.rfx:>rt 
to a regional role, as a new carrier entering the narket ~uld not be 
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able to canpete with BA offering services fran Heathror.v. (163) '!he 
airport CMIlers have argued that the nost effective way of satisfying 
user needs 'WOuld be to allor.v British Ail:ways or British Caledonian the 
first opportunity to operate direct international services fran the 
major regional airports - if they declined for whatever reason then the 
operation of any new or existing route should be left to the camercial 
judgement of other airlines who would be able to decide for thansel ves 
and, to some extent, between. thanselves, whether any particular route 
could be nade viable and at what frequency. (164) Other ways of 
increasing canpeti tion and reducing the structural imbalance of the 
industry in theory nay be identified. These include mul tiple 
designation, or allowing several airlines to operate out of Britain to 
foreign destinations. Another is the so called "Freedom of the Skies" 
which allows foreign airlines which go fran, for example, New York to 
Amsterdam to pick up passengers in Britain. The thiI:d rrethcxi is the 
de-regulation of fares, or allowing airlines which operate fran Britain 
to the same destination to charge the fare that they think appropriate, 
within the regulations that confonn to safety requirerrEnts. However, 
it is argued that all are not easy to achieve within the framawork of 
bilateral agreements. (165) 'lb quote Mr Julian Arrery, speaking to the 
Commons on 25 July 1984: 
"It takes two to tango in this game . . . I have had a gocxi deal of 
experience of negotiation with Ccmmmist Carrmissars, Byzantine 
bishops and oriental potentates, but never in my life have I found 
such tough bargaining as goes on over air traffic routes. It is far 
tougher than anything else that I have experienced." (166) 
In essence, multiple designation and "freedom of the skies" are 
likely to involve difficulties similar to the concept of direct route 
transfer given the widespread interpretation of bilateral agreements 
which suggests an equal 50/50 split of traffic between two nations and 
the fact that nany agreerents are often framed in a fonn which 
designates the carrier concerned - there is no certainty that any 
change \\1OUld be acceptable to the negotiating partner. (167) 
As far as the de-regulation of fares is concerned, recent US 
experience on domestic routes suggests that structural imbalance would 
remain as the pr.ilnary stumbling block to enhancing canpeti tion betwgen 
airlines. Initially de-regulation allowed new entrants to came into 
the Amarican market, some of which - the nost fanous being Peoples 
Express - offererl cheap travel. This de-regulation changed rrore than 
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the mnnber of passengers carried. When Arrerican airlines -were 
bureaucratically hamstrung, they flew routes for which they had 
licences. Their route naps tended to consist of a series of dispersed 
parallel lines. They flew aircraft as large as possible on as few 
trips along these allocated routes as they could achieve, minimising 
unit costs. However, under the new freedcm they grouperl their services 
into convenient "hubs" where they were headquartered and fran whence 
they flew along "spokes" to many nore cities than before. At the sane 
tine canpetition forced them to offer nore and nore frequent flights 
using snaller aircraft. The establishnent of "hub fortresses" gave 
carriers substantial advantages over new entrants as these were unable 
to match the level or range of services offered by the established 
firms. Meanwhile a rash of carmuter and regional airlines, sanetinEs 
with links to the major carriers rushed to fill in the gaps in the 
route ne~rk. So there was not simply nore people in the air but also 
disproportionately IOC>re aircraft carrying them contributing tawan:is 
increased congestion. (168) 
It has been claimed that in the first ten years of de-regulation 
fran 1978 the gain to consumers was roughly $100 billion. These 
savings delivered through lower prices contributed towards explosive 
growth in an industry which was supposedly mature. HCMeVer, beu.am 
Septe:nber 1988 and February 1989 the major airlines increased their 
fares four times. Sane argue that this was made possible because the 
biggest airlines created an oligopoly. The market share of the top 
eight fell from 80% in 1978 to 74% five years later, but by 1989 had 
climbed to 94%. The largest airlines adopted a number of mathcxls to 
survive de-regulation and achieve this re-concentration of the 
industry. For example, American Airlines used their cauputer 
reservation system to obtain up-to-date infonnation on how much 
travellers were willing to pay and where they wanted to go. A:rnEd with 
this infonnation, the airline was able to set a fare structure for the 
entire industry. Computing pc:mer coupled with financial muscle becama 
the key to the success of major airlines. A big airline could use its 
CRS to price seats that would otherwise have gone enpty at less than 
the cheapest a "no-frills" canpetitor could afford. This accounts for 
why, of 16 national airlines that lN9re started after 1978, only four 
still operated in 1989. (169) 
Essentially then it is argued that CMIlership and canpeti tion policy 
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for the UK airline industry has been largely dictated by the 
constraints of the regulato:ry system in the intemational field and 
this in itself has contributed tCMards a structural ilIIbalance which is 
likely to rem:lln whatever steps nay be taken to attempt sane fonn of 
liberalisation in licensing and pricing arrangemants. Evidence fran 
the US now shCMS that airlines when left to their awn devices are able 
to control and in sane instances daninate canpeti tion, thus it nay be 
argued that goverrment intervention is still necessa:ry. ( 170 ) 
After the First World War the UK strove for a free narket regime but 
international canpetition inevitably lead to a policy of a "single 
chosen instn.ment" supported by Govemment assistance. DeveloptEIlts in 
the inter-war years suggest uncertainty regarding the rrost effective 
IIEaIlS of developing the industry, hCMeVer, the clear direction of 
policy was tCMards the need to limit narket access and capacity. After 
the Second World War tight regulation and control gave way to wholesale 
nationalisation in an attempt to ensure that the industry acted in the 
public interest and used Government subsidies to provide essential 
services. HCMeVer, contra:ry to stated policy, the essential criterion 
detennining the operation of a route by the State Corporations was 
profitability. As the industry began to nature in the 1960s, 
Govemment became increasingly aware that the oveIWheJming protection 
of State interests could lead to inefficiency and escalating fares, 
thus liberalisation of licensing arrangements on a limited scale was 
praroted and essentially what emerged was not competition but licensErl 
danination by the State airlines. Whilst outwardly supporting the 
concept of the rrrulti-airline industry, in practice Governrrent has been 
reluctant to prarote increased competition for fear of repercussions in 
the fonn of reduced rrarket strength. This basic reluctance has been 
reflective of the fundarrEntal difficulties of achieving liberalisation 
in a highly regulated international market where national airlines 
daninate and protection of national interests assUllES first priority. 
As far as the impact of ownership and ccmpetition policy on the 
growth of Manchester Airport is concerned, it is argued that during the 
early years of developnant of the industry little advantage accruErl 
fran either the subsidisation of routes or the protection of State 
airlines which tended to concentrate their efforts on the capital. 
Similarly, in the early post-war years growth CMed much to the 
pioneering efforts of foreign airlines and independent operators who 
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were effectively disenfranchised. by the State Corporations once they 
had proven the viability of routes. By the 1970s State interests had 
assmrai a finn foothold at Manchester Airport. However, it is argua::i 
that the potential of the natural extensive catchmant area was not 
fully realised as a result of the priority given to the limiting of 
self-diversion. 
6.4 aHlllSICHi 
Within the civil air transport industry regulation nay be justifia::i 
on the grounds of achieving safe operations; this in itself implies 
SCIIE form of econanic regulation. However, the regulatory reginE which 
has emerged. has been dictata::i rrore by the pursuit of national 
objectives which are in themselves contradictory. The nea::i to protect 
the interests of national airlines for strategic reasons, and to 
maximise the contribution of the industry to the balance of payrmnts, 
is not necessarily complementary to the objective of providing air 
services to consumers at lowest cost and prarroting the developrer1t of a 
route network which satisfies all user demands. 
'!he study of the developnent of UK regulatory agencies suggests also 
that the priority given to different objectives has changed over tine, 
with military and strategic considerations partially giving way in the 
post war years to issues of user interests. However, it is argua::i 
that, effectively, protection of the "national interest" and the 
national airline has assmned priority despite outward protestations 
that the prarrotion of consumer interests were to assmne greater 
significance. The conflict of interests betv."een the rna jor providers of 
air services and the interests of the consmner has crystallisa::i in the 
UK into a confrontation betv."een Ministers who guard the interests of 
national airlines in international negotiations, and the quasi-
independent licensing authorities which have been rrore conscious of the 
nea::i to prarrote user interests. 
The difficulty of reconciling the pursuit of national interests with 
the needs of an international market has been manifesta::i by the failure 
of early attempts to achieve the multi-lateral exchange of air traffic 
rights. The bilateral system which has energa::i has tenda::i to underpin 
the centripedal tendency of airports which detracts fran the 
satisfaction of dem:md particularly in provincial areas. 
As far as ownership and canpetition policy for the UK airline 
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industry is concerned, it is argued that overwhelmingly this has also 
been influenced by the nature of the international canpetitive 
environment, whereby within the regulato:ry franework priority has been 
given to initially establishing national airlines supportErl by 
GovernrrEnt assistance, and then protecting their interests. It is 
arguErl that under such a regine, despite protestations to the contrary, 
no single country can unilaterally prarote liberalisation on any 
significant scale. Although the prarotion of a multi-airline industry 
has been e:nbraced in theo:ry, little has been done to encourage re-
structuring of the industry in practice in the UK. Whilst the 
interests of State operators in schErlulErl air traffic have been 
protected, it has been left to the independent sector to develop new 
markets which are not so highly regulatErl. 
It is argued that the growth of Manchester Airport was not 
posi ti vel y praroted wi thin the regulato:ry framework of schErlulErl air 
services , although obviously the grCMth of the Inclusive Tour market 
fran the 1960s must have its origins in the fact that traditionally 
regulation in this sphere of operation has tended to be rrore liberal. 
Further it is argued that the structure of the airline industry which 
has emerged fran the ownership and canpetition policy pursuErl in the UK 
has not tended ta.vards the pronotion of Manchester Airport. The 
nationalised sector of the industry has regardErl the developnent of air 
services fran the regions as a secondary consideration in their efforts 
to maximise gains fran a policy of concentration on the central hub. 
It is suggested that had it not been for the recognition of the market 
potential of Manchester on the part of independent and foreign 
operators, the Airport would probably not have realisErl the 
International Gateway status awarded in 1978, as the key to attracting 
the interest of the State Corporations was the derronstration effect 
given by the activities of other operators. 
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PART I I I 
IMP LIe A T ION S WIT H REF ERE NeE 
AND CON Due T 
R E L A T ION S 
THE PRO C E D U RES 




The aim of this Chapter is to provide an overview of the impact of 
ownership structures on the developrent of collective bargaining 
machineries to detennine the pay and conditions of employment at UK 
airports. This Chapter, therefore, fonns an essential preamble to 
Chapter Eight which considers the course of industrial relations at 
Manchester Airport under the impact of the various influences operating 
in the civil air transport industry as a whole. 
The thesis as a whole concerns the developrent of a nrunicipal 
airport. As a municipal undertaking the characteristics of local 
authorities as employers - as distinct from private sector or other 
public sector employers - can influence the developrent of collective 
bargaining. Municipal airport employees may be regarded as 
constituents of a broadly defined local government \IDrkforce and 
therefore may be integrated with others under the sarna tenns and 
conditions of service. However, a nrunicipal airport equally exists as 
an integral part of a specialised transport system, discharging 
specialist functions in carmon with other airports where different 
ownership structures may apply. This may be regarded as a 
countervailing influence in determining the way in which labour is 
viewed. 
The Chapter is divided into two sections to reflect these broad 
principles. The objectives of the first section are to identify and 
assess the importance of the characteristics of local authority 
employment which have influenced the developrent of collective 
bargaining in local government . Secondly, the section provides an 
overview of the historical developrent of collective bargaining in 
local government to fonn the fundamantal basis for consideration of the 
relative position of airport \IDrkers within the extended local 
authority context . Finally, an assessment is made of the extent to 
which "stable" industrial relations have been prcnoted in the local 
government sector. 
Section Two extends beyond the bounds of local governmant to 
494 
consider the nature of collective bargaining in the civil air transport 
sector. Here the emphasis is on the interaction of different 
bargaining arrangements within airlines and airports which are subject 
to different ownership structures. It is argued that taking the 
airport authority as representing the finn in the industry, the 
detennination of pay and conditions of employment, whilst based on 
supply and demand factors, has been influenced by the employers and 
workers identifying with conditions pertaining in their percei va:i 
sector of employment as well as within civil air transport as a whole. 
Secondly, the course of industrial relations in the civil air transport 
industry today has been influenced by a set of traditions and 
perceptions within different sectors which have detennined pay and 
conditions of service and have generally been slow to respond to the 
needs of changed circmnstances. 
Secondary literature dealing with industrial relations concentrates 
on the nature of darestic/national collective bargaining arrangements 
in general, pointing out the shortcomings and advantages of each to the 
finn. Little investigation of the application of such arrangements in 
particular industries has been undertaken and in respect of civil air 
transport the literature available tends to be very limited. 
Similarly, much emphasis is placed on the nature of "public sector" 
bargaining, a generic tenn which it is felt is inapplicable to civil 
air transport as the role of public corporations, local authorities and 
central government in the industry is unique and the distinctive 
characteristics of each detracts from any unified concept of the 
"public sector". 
In the civil aviation literature a preoccupation with the airlines 
as opposed to airports is apparent and even in this context, the 
overriding emphasis is on the role of technological change. Very 
little specific consideration is given to the framework of industrial 
relations. 
7.2 IOCAL OOVERNMENI' ~ 
IDeal authorities must of first necessity recruit and retain enough 
staff to enable them to discharge their statutory obligations. In 
carmon with any other organisation, in recruitment the availability of 
labour is a detenn:ining factor. However, the characteristics of the 
employment enviromnent within which local authorities operate, dictate 
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that the prevailing level of rerrruneration in canparable work will be of 
significance. (1) 
IDeal authority employnent can be distinguished fran other types of 
anployment by the character of its employers and the nature of the 
goods and services provided. Hcmever, it is not a discrete field of 
anployment. ( 2) Sane employees may possess qualifications and skills 
required in industry and other public services and local authorities 
may employ only a snaIl proportion of a particular kind of labour. For 
exa:rrple, electricians and engineering craftsmen consti tute only a snaIl 
proportion of the local authority labour force and their work is 
indistinguishable fran that perfonned in other sectors of the econ~, 
therefore, if adequate numbers are to be recruited, levels of 
rermmeration nrust reflect nationally negotiated rates of pa.y in the 
private sector. (3) 
Few industries let alone individual ccmpanies have to provide as 
wide a range of jobs as local government as a whole or as individual 
authorities. Within an individual authority, a work force of say 5,000 
may well include between 300 to 500 types of job. (4) The several 
hundred types of employment in a local authority include a wide range 
of white collar professions such as architects, accountants, engineers 
of nost disciplines , quantity and land surveyors, valuers, plarmers, 
solicitors and administrators. These IDeal GovernrrEnt Officers may in 
fact regard thernsel ves as primarily professionals working to standards 
of expertise and conduct defined by their professional institutions and 
only incidentally as public employees. The pre-erninence of established 
professions in local government reflects its history and raison d' etre 
as a provider of services. Most senior officers have typically been 
professionals ccmpetent to supervise the provision of services which 
call for their particular professional skills. (5) 
'!he emphasis on professionalism may detract fran any concept of the 
local Government Service as a single entity. As early as 1934, the 
Hadow Ccmnittee which was concerned with the quality of manpower 
resources in local government, highlighted the all-pervading role of 
the professional associations of officers as the main instruments for 
raising staff standards whilst individual authori ties with their uneven 
recrui trnent standards, haphazard recrui brEnt mathods, recruitment 
systems which were not matched to the education systan and. unsysterratic 
training mathods had done little. ( 6 ) 
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Although individual authorities may have been justifiably cri ticisErl 
for failing to raise staff standards, the nature of the professional 
base of the service detractErl frcm any singular identity in lIDre direct 
ways. Inevitably, the field of employment for m:my senior officers is 
potentially wide and not tiErl specifically to local government 
administration. The Mallaby Comnittee of 1967 which investigatErl the 
nature of staff shortages in Local Government, notErl that the lIDst 
markErl shortages occurred in areas where Il1E!Obers enjoyed employment 
opportunities beyond the service whereas the lowest wastage rates 
occurred where employment opportuni ties were mainly in local 
government. Clearly the employment opportunities for say Erlucation or 
social services officers are lIDre restrictErl than for architects or 
surveyors. The Mallaby Report advocatErl the lIDre econanical use of 
professionally qualified staff (with greater support being providErl by 
technicians and lay administrators) and the use of private 
practitioners, for exanple, architects, for specialist services where 
fluctuations in the demand for labour occurred. (7) Clearly such 
expedients nay suffice in the short tenn, however, if demand for a 
particular professional skill extends over the longer tenn, it is 
likely that tenus of employnen.t will be lIDre nearly equatErl with those 
prevailing in the profession generally if sufficient staff are to be 
recruitErl and retained. 
Local government employnen.t is also characterised by a wide 
geographical scatter of employing establishments. Manual 'WOrkers in 
particular, though a significant proportion of the labour force in 
tenus of absolute nmnbers (around 50% of a total work force of 2.2 
million in 1972) tend to be employed in snaIl groups in a large number 
of different locations. Thus the tensions and solidarities of large 
scale factory employment where 10,000 workers may be employed on one 
site do not necessarily occur in local governm::mt despite the labour-
intensive nature of mmy acti vi ties. In lIDst authorities, the largest 
single identifiable concentration of workers tends to be the white-
collar group, fonning the central establishment of the Town, City or 
County Hall. Havever , it should be noted that at Manchester Airport 
manual workers have tended to constitute a large proportion of the 
local authority workforce as a result of the airport owner assmning 
responsibility for baggage and freight handling. 
The wide variety and disparate nature of jobs in local government 
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and the tradition of professionalism which are essential 
characteristics of the service nay impinge upon bargaining arrangem:mts 
in two fillldamental ways. '!he absence of the cohesive and co-operati ve 
attitudes between different work groups often found in industry nay 
alter the balance of power between employers and employerl in local 
government . Additionally, other factors dictate that matters of 
remuneration and tenns of service cannot be deal t with as an 
independent operation. (8) 
Other ambiguities exist about the constitution of the local 
governnent service. A penumbra of posts exists which are closely 
associated with local governnent but arguably operate on its peripherry 
as appointmants are not made illlder the auspices of the IDeal Goven1man.t 
Acts. (9) '!he b\1o lllifonned services of the Fire Brigades and Police 
Forces for example, have their awn idiosyncratic styles and traditions 
and organisation structures are largely determined by HOllE Office 
regulation. ( 10) Indeed the unifonned services based at nrunicipal 
airports may be regarded as a separate discrete grouping. 
Clearly the nature of the employment environnent within which local 
governnent operates dictates that a number of external influences will 
determine the way in which labour is recruited, organised and managed. 
However, other characteristics internal to the organisation and 
operating conditions of the Local Government Service equally 
differentiate it fran industry in tenns of the nature of employment and 
the relationship between employer and employed. The election of 
employers is an important issue and member involvement in employment 
natters is illlparalleled elsewhere, in no other large scale employment 
sector do elected representatives· of the public at large, working 
volillltarily, part-time, illlpaid and with no fornal training or expertise 
in the specific role of "managing employer" have substantial influence 
in staff selection. The influence of the Airport Canmi ttee in 
Manchester is apparent in the next chapter which considers in part the 
grading of staff posts. With CC!llllK)n carrmunity interests and a strong 
sense of local identity and pride, elected members may develop a 
paternalistic attitude towards their employees which has strong 
parallels in the attitudes of owner managers of snaIl businesses. In 
fact owners and managers of snaIl finns, fanners and professional IIEIl 
have tradi tionall y held a disproportionate nmnber of coilllcillor 
positions. COilllcillors with Trade Union backgroilllds have also been 
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influential along with other members who perceive their najor purpose 
as praroting social welfare and social justice. The personal 
carmi ttment to and strong sense of responsibility for fellow citizens 
may penneate attitudes towards the wurk force engendering an assessmant 
of the effectiveness of employment policies in tenns of the extent to 
which individual employees express a sense of dissatisfaction or 
grievance with their work. (11) 
Counterbalancing the tendency towards paternalism in employment 
policy, strong influences em:mate from the nature and effect of 
financial pressures given the "service" ethic, which differ 
fundanEntall y fran private concerns. A private canpany exists to make 
profit and the typical finn will tend to be competitive, expansionary 
and. aggressive in the narket sense in order to be successful in 
financial teons. The availability and quality of labour directly 
affects financial results; if labour is scarce the private finn is 
likely to attempt to improve the quality of labour by increasing the 
attractiveness of employment conditions. The volmne of expenditure 
involved is alnost irrelevant so long as it is topped by incc:xre from 
narketing. The financial pressures under which local govenment 
operates nay, on the other hand, have a negative effect on employment 
conditions. Ul tinatel y , survival is still the prime noti vator but for 
the elected menber success is measured in political tenns and the 
danger of over-expenditure nay be of paramJunt significance given that 
alnost any increase in expenditure nay be electoral I y unpopular. SorrE 
elected menbers nay see their primary role as reducing the rate burden 
and limiting expenditure. In this sense a shortage of labour nay be 
regarded as a saving in the short tenn outweighing any long tenn 
deterioration of service. Thus the incentive for an authority to embark 
upon a recruitment drive or to increase the general level of earnings 
nay be limited. (12) 
The effects of the financial pressures may be observed in the 
developlEIlt of the personnel function in local govermnent. Again 
referring to the HadCM Canmittee of 1934, whilst highlighting the 
inadequacies of recruitment and training in the service, it was 
reccmnended that menber control of all staff appointments should be 
exercised through a single canmittee. (13) EstablishrrEnt canmittees 
were to concern themselves prilnarily with the control function vetting 
deparbnents' bids for extra staff. Similarly, the Mallaby Report of 
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1967, the tenns of reference of which were directly related to the 
qualitative aspects of the local government manpower, advocated keeping 
a check on staff numbers and gradings, adopting a broad viaN of an 
authority's staffing needs and planning for future require.mants. 
Although sorre authorities faced with labour shortages raised their 
standard of staff advertising and recruitnent, the general trend at 
local authority level between 1930 and 1970 in staffing policies, 
continued along the lines of establishrrEnt control. ( 14 ) '!he Bllns 
Report in 1971, described "EstablishrrEnt man" as discharging two main 
functions, that is the day-to-day administration of rules about the 
conditions of service and acting as a Council's watchdog in respect of 
ccmni ttees' and departments' demands for staff. '!he Bains Carmi ttee 
recamended dropping the establishrrEnt label, relegating the control 
function to individual departments. However, the local goverrment 
service retained a special need for the establishrrEnt control function 
in the absence of the profit rroti ve which in the private sector 
provides a measure against which staffing numbers can be assessed. ( 15 ) 
In the following chapter the invol verrEIlt of the EstablishrrEnt Carmi ttee 
in assessing the Airport Ccmnittee's demands for staffing is 
highlighted. 
'!he way in which financial pressures nay be perceived in local 
political tenns and the consequent emphasis on control in staffing has 
been reinforced by nost of the studies of employIIEIlt in the IDeal 
Government Service since the 1930s. However, in rrore recent years 
attitudes at the local level have been reinforced by the nature of the 
relationship between local and central governmant. Between 1945 and 
the early 60s, the degree of state intervention in employIIEIlt natters 
generally was declining and the 1950s witnessed the "full flower of 
free collective bargaining". Direct state intervention in the form of 
naN legislation requiring employers to provide better safety and 
working conditions, nore job security, better training and equal 
opportunities had little impact on local government employIIEIlt policies 
which had tended to provide at least a :rnini.rrn.mt provision in such 
respects. Of greater significance to employrrent policy in local 
government was the impact of central governmant pa.y policy and the way 
in which it was implemented via the canplex relationship which existed 
between Government Ministers and individual local authorities and their 
political associations. (16) Since the 1960s Goven1rrEnt requests to 
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curb public expenditure have influenced. decisions as to whether 
appointJrents should be made by individual authorities. ( 17 ) Selwyn 
Lloyd's policy of 1961 signalled the start of a goverrment pay p::>licy 
which, coupled with calls for public expenditure cuts, was to reinforce 
the establishIrEnt function by detennining the criteria for the grading 
of existing posts and emphasising the need to justify each indi. vidual 
subnission to EstablishIrEnt Ccmnittees. (18) It has been suggestErl 
that the reaction of local authority employers to goverrments' attempts 
to use public sector pay restraint to dampen inflation and influence 
the general cli:rrate of wage negotiations has been one of canpliance out 
of choice, the benefits of which -would be likely to assist in achieving 
the ulti:rrate goal of political success at the cost of disadvantaging 
local authority 'WOrkers in canparison with other public and private 
sector employees. Sane analysts go so far as to suggest that the 
rigidity with which local government interprets pay p::>licy exceErls that 
of central governm:mt itself and that councils "hide behind pay 
p::>licy". (19) 
Industrial relations in local goverrment has been characterisErl by 
the fundamental distinction between "officer" and "servant" which was 
first coined by the Hadow Carmittee in 1934 and was subsequently 
adopted in the IDeal Government Superannuation Act, 1937 which appliErl 
to the fonner, that is administrative, professional and clerical 
-workers but not the latter, manual -workers. This early distinction has 
been reinforced by the carments of the various carrmittees which have 
examined the organisational health of local authorities. Even the 
Bains Report of 1971 which was one of the IIDSt canprehensive studies of 
local authority organisation is notable for the a.11rost total absence of 
any carment about the anployment position of manual -workers in local 
govemmant. ( 20) 
The contrast between the position in local government where concern 
for the white-collar worker and not problans in the manual field has 
been the primary noti vation, and industry where manual -workers have 
tended to set the pace of industrial relations - may reflect, in part, 
the fact that the manual field in local governm:mt has been dominated 
by a large l:xx:ly of part-time female labour. (See Figures 7.1 and 7.2) 
H~, it is argued that the anphasis of the white-collar -worker 
reflects the impact of a number of influences which have set the 
pattern in industry but have been absent in local governm:mt. In 
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industry, the concern for the manual workers has arisen out of 
considerations of factory welfare, the need to ilnprove prcrlucti vity, 
safety and much of the early employnent legislation which was conce:ma::l 
with the position of manual workers. 
During the Second World War especially the welfare function in 
industry expanda::l to include the study and prcm::>tion of high mJrale 
arrong manual workers as prcrluction techniques beca:rrE increasingly 
scientific. The influx of neil labour to industry resul ta::l in the need 
for nore training whilst the growth of the Labour Party ensured a Trade 
Union partnership in the war effort. As a result Joint Prcrluction 
Carmi ttees began to emerge in factories. IDeal Govermnent rerraina::l 
lll1toucha::l by such developnents and, if anything, was draina::l of 
manpower during the period. In contrast to industry, the war years for 
Local Government represented a period of survival rather than 
expansion. After the war, economic growth contributa::l to the emergence 
of a new regime in industry, with labour becoming relatively scarce and 
expensive. The solution to the scarcity of labour was seen to be the 
developnent of prcrlucti vity bargaining and payment systems which it was 
thought had little application in local gaverrment which was not 
subjected to "production pressures". ( 21 ) 
Industrial relations in local government differs flll1d.anentally fran 
industry because of the absence of the concentration of powerful manual 
worker Trade Unions which have stimulata::l change elsewhere. The 
earliest stable Trade Unions in Britain were along craft lines 
protecting the interests of skilla::l workers. They were follONed by the 
growth of industrial unions covering skilla::l and unskilla::l workers 
alike in separate industries. Havever, from the 1890s, general labour 
llllions set out to organise work people in any industry who were not 
nenbers of a union and represented the lowest paid people in the 
COlll1try. By the early 1950s, the Transport and General Workers' Union 
had alJrost 1,200,000 menbers consisting of labourers and semi-skilla::l 
machine tenders in many industries. This represented a fourfold 
increase in less than 30 years and the Union had beccme increasingly 
regarda::l as an "octopus" by leaders of sma.ll unions which had 
experienced its encroachments and its attempts to destroy them or to 
persuade or coerce them into amalgamation. (22) By 1968, rranbership 
had increased to 1,476,000 representing 16.4% of a total TUC menbership 
of nine million. By this time, the 'IGWU had care to approximate 
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closely to an industrial union in SCil'e industries such as oil where all 
drivers, process workers and vehicle maintenance workers were 
organiserl. A similar grip had been attained in the 'bus industry and 
in the gas industry where a sizeable rnenbership had been achieved arrong 
production \\1Orkers. In other industries for example, food manufacture, 
chemicals and rubber manufacture, the Union organised all the 
production workers and in the engineering industry in particular, the 
transfonnation fran a labourers' union to a production workers' 
industry had a long history. ( 23 ) 
Whereas the growth of white-collar trade unionism is a relatively 
new phenomenon in the private sector, local government is characterised 
b¥ a long history of strong white-collar unionism. Associations of 
Officers engaged in local government emerged in the late nineteenth 
century, including the Institution of Municipal Engineers 1873, the 
Sanitary Inspectors' Association 1883 and the Institute of Municipa.l 
Treasurers and Accountants 1885. The National Association of IDeal 
Govermnent Officers emerged in 1905 and until about the end of the 
First World War spoke for senior officers of the service. Since the 
adoption of Trade Union status in 1920 rnenbership of the Association 
has been swellerl from the lower ranks of staff in the service. In 
1923, rnenbership was 33,000, b¥ 1933 membership had nore than doubled 
to 68,000, ten years later rnenbership had increased to 121,000 and 
bet:t-Jeen. 1953 and 1973 the Association increased its representation fram 
222,000 to 518,000. (24) Bain has suggested that the process has not 
been entirely the result of the growth of public service and maintains 
that the high concentration of white-collar employment has been a 
detennining factor. (25) As suggested earlier, the white-collar group 
in local goverrment probably represents the largest concentrated group 
of workers in nost authorities whilst for manual workers the nature and 
organisation of their \\1Ork tends tav,;rards fragmentation. Manual workers 
in local authority non-trading services have traditionally been 
represented by the National Union of Public E'lrployees whose membership 
gnew fran 10,000 in 1933 to about a quarter of a million in the early 
1970s. However, whereas NAI.GO has achieved something of a nonopolyof 
representation of staff employees, Trade Unions like the 'lGWU and the 
General and Municipal Workers' Union have canpeted with NUPE in the 
organisation of manual staffs. ( 26 ) In effect, the tendency towards 
fragmentation of representation of work in the manual field of local 
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gove:rnrrent has been accanpanied by a tendency towa:rds fragmantation of 
representation, a factor which has reinforced the traditional 
distinction between manual and staff worker in local governnent and 
increasingly relegated the status of the m:mual worker to that of 
" servant" . However, it should be noted that generally such 
fragnentation has not existed. at Manchester .Ai.rfort where the 'lGWU has 
historically rraintained a finn foothold in organising m:mual workers. 
In essence, all of the characteristics of local goverrment 
employment highlighted alx>ve, that is, the wide field of enployrrent; 
the wide range of jobs including a relatively large body of 
professions; the wide geographical scatter of rranual occupations; the 
invel vement of elected nanbers in employment rratters coupled. with the 
effect of financial pressures fran within and fran central goverrment 
which have contributed towa:rds the evolution of the control function, 
and the distinction between "officer" and "servant" which has been 
reinforced by the nature of local government and employee 
representation have significantly influenced. the historical developrent 
of collective bargaining in local governnEl1t. In charting this 
developnen.t, it will be useful to analyse the process initially in 
tenns of local government staffs proceeding to the Consideration of 
mcmual workers at a later stage. 
(a) Staff 
Prior to the First World War collective bargaining in local 
governnEl1t was limited, local authorities tended. to make their awn 
contracts with employees, though in same cases negotiations took place 
with Trade Unions where membership was substantial. ( 27) Whilst 
independence of action rather than collective agreement tended. to be 
the norm in detennining terms and conditions of service, the 
establishment function at local level controlling staff grades and 
conditions of service was reinforced. In rrany of the larger local 
authorities, the establishment function pre-dated the Hadow 
recarmendation of 1934. In Manchester, for exarrple, as early as 1905 a 
special carmittee was appointed by the Corporation to "consider and 
report upon the terms and conditions on which it is desirable that 
officials in the Corporation should hold offices". ( 28) Two years 
later the carmittee presented a package of reccmnendations to the 
effect that to qualify for entry to the service candidates should be 
subjected to preliminary open canpetitive examination; minimum and 
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rraxinn.nn salaries should be fixed in relation to different positions in 
the service; a scheme should provide for increases of salary which 
would be given by scale and after certain periods of satisfactory 
service ; finally a retirem:mt age should be fixed and allowances 
established. In order that a canplete scheme could be framed, the 
enploying carmi ttees were asked to furnish details of the number of 
officers under their control with a description of offices held and 
salaries paid to assess the :rni.nimum and max.iroum values to the offices 
held and to consider the scale and periods of revision appropriate for 
progression fran :minimum to max.iroum salaries. (29) Clearly it was 
recognised at an early stage that in recruiting and retaining staff 
local authorities were in canpetition with other sectors of the 
econc:tqy, and as a result, efforts were made to provide a career 
structure for IDeal Governm:mt Officers. In effect, although fornal 
collective bargaining machineries were not being developed, the 
consideration of career structures was a camon factor arrong the larger 
local authorities, tending tCMards a degree of confonni ty . At the 
ti.ma, the nnmicipali ties which had applied all or a proportion of the 
recc:mrendations noted above included the wndon County Council, 
Binningham, Glasgow, Liverpool, Oldham, St Helens and Salford. (30) 
Moves tCMards joint action were strengthened by the Government's 
acceptance in 1918 of the recarrmendations of the Ccmnittee on the 
Relations between Employers and Employed (the Whitley Ccmnittee) for 
the formation of Joint Industrial Councils. (31) It was the 
Ccmnittee's considered opinion that 
"an essential condition of securing a peIIffiIlent impI'OVE!IEllt in the 
relations of enployers and enployed is that there should be adequate 
Organisation on the part of both enployers and YfOrk people." (32) 
Joint Industrial Councils were to consist of representatives of 
enployers and enployees. They were to consider tenns and conditions of 
enployment and other matters of mutual interest and to settle disputes. 
The normal pattern became that of a National Council for an industry or 
trade together with subsidiary Provincial or Regional Councils for 
appropriate local areas with the membership drawn fran enployers , 
associations and trade unions. (33) However, the Whitley Ccmnittee 
equally recognised that 
"there are many questions closely affecting the daily life and 
canfort in and the success of the business and affecting in no small 
degree efficiency of \\Urking, which are peculiar to the individual 
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workshop and factory." ( 34 ) 
'!he carmittee, therefore, concluded that works carmittees should be 
fonned "to establish and rraintain a system of co-operation in all these 
workshop matters", but not to interfere with "questions such as rates 
of wages and hours of work, which should be settled by District or 
National agreement." ( 35 ) 
'!he "Whitley system" of industrial relations represents what the 
Donovan Commission later identified as the "fonnal" system of 
industrial relations in Britain which by the 1960s was being undennined 
by the "infonnal " characterised by autonarous rranagan:mt in canpanies 
and powerful industrial work groups where the difference between joint 
consultation and collective bargaining was becaning blurred. (36) 
The Whitley Camnittee considered that the proposals were likely to 
be beneficial in the field of public employment as in industry and in 
1920 an attempt was made to establish Whitley machinery for local 
authority staffs. (37) A National Council for IDeal Authorities' 
Administrative, Technical and Clerical Services was set up in that 
year. The Employers' side consisted of the Association of Municipal 
Corporations, the County Councils Association, the wndon County 
Council, the Urban District Councils Association and the Rural District 
Councils Association. The staff side included NAIill; the National 
Amalgamated Workers Union and the National Union of Clerks. In 
considering the framing of salary scales, this Whitley Council had two 
ITa jor objectives . Firstly, the largest measure of joint action between 
employers and employed was to be secured for the developnent of IDeal 
Govermnent administration and the improvement of conditions of service 
for all engaged in such administration. Secondly, machinery for the 
regular consideration of rermmeration, hours and conditions of service, 
including superannuation, tenure of office and other matters affecting 
the service was to be provided. (Details of Scales recamended are 
given in Appendix 7.1) The scales initially recarmended did not 
necessarily include Chief Officers and professional, technical and 
sectional officers which were to be provided for later. However, 
arrangements were to be made throughout for equality of opportunity for 
p:rarotion to higher posts which v.;ere to be, where practicable, filled 
fran within. ( 38 ) 
This represented the first attempt to provide national salary scales 
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for IDeal GovernrrEnt Officers but its success was short-lived, the 
National Council broke down within the year because the IDeal Authority 
Associations would not join bodies whose policy was the fonnulation of 
national scales. Many local authorities refused to join their 
associations or to be represented on the Provincial Councils and so did 
not consider themselves round, even by consent, to accept the decisions 
of the negotiating lx:dy. Even where agreenen.ts were made, sane local 
authorities refused to pay the negotiated rates whilst others 
considered themselves free to pay abJve them. (39) The Whitley Report 
did not lead to any extensive system of centralised bargaining for 
IDeal GovernrrEnt as it did for Central Govermrent. SaTE progress was 
made between the wars, although national groupings failed, regionally 
based Provincial Councils continued in some authorities in Lancashire, 
Cheshire, Northumberland, Durham, the West Midlands and london. ( 40 ) 
However, many authorities similarly retained their independence of 
action. The Manchester Corporation devised its awn scheme of 
conditions of service for its officers in consultation with a IDeal 
Joint Carmi ttee consisting of 11 members of the Council and 11 
representatives of staff effective fran 1 January 1923. (Definitions 
of Staff Covered and Grading System are given in Appendix 7.2) The 
scheme was designed for the mutual benefit of the Corporation and its 
Officials and aimed. to raise the standard. of official and secure for 
the Corporation a "thoroughly efficient service". 'Ib secure these 
aims , it was intended that anomalies should be renoveci, stability 
secured and progressive advancement provided for by the grading and 
classification of professional, technical, administrative and clerical 
staffs. The main principles included many which had been identified 
earlier, such as canpeti ti ve examination for entry into the service, a 
probatioruny period with pro.rrotion by rneri t with satisfactory service 
and minimum and naximum salaries for various positions. Provision was 
also made for dealing with cases of exceptional rneri t and for 
considering grievances. ( 41 ) 
The adoption of a canprehensive scheme of conditions of service at 
the local level inevitably strengthened the establislmEnt function and 
reinforced the already defined roles of e.nploying and establislmEnt 
carmi ttees . A fixed number of officials was to be assigned to each 
anploying carrmi ttee of the Corporation involving each carmi ttee in 
analysing the duties of staff required for the perfonnance of y.urk 
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assigned by the Council and. rraking a valuation of the duties of each 
office and occupant, the resp:msibilities incurred and qualifications 
necessary. The results of the analysis of the arploying ccmni ttee were 
to be fOl:warded to the Establishment Ccmnittee which would make 
recamendations to the Council for the assigmnent to the employing 
carmi ttee of a number of officials in various grades, classifications 
and sections. In principle, follCMing upon a reccmrendation nade by 
the Finance Ccmnittee, the fixed establishment was not to be varied 
"except for urgent and necessary reasons". Advancement through a 
particular grade was to be autanatic unless an official had been 
adversely reported upon. The scheme also specified conditions for 
prarotion to higher grades. At the age of 22, " juniors" were to be 
admitted to the General and Clerical Grade. Other officials arriving at 
the maximum of their class were to remain at this level until a vacancy 
occurred in the next higher class. When such a vacancy arose, the Head 
of Deprrtment was to make recammendations to the arploying ccmnittee to 
the effect that the duties of an official and the m:mner in which they 
had been perfonned justified pranotion to the higher class. In 
general, vacancies for higher positions were to be filled by prarotion 
fran the irrmadiate lower grade on recorrmendation of the Head of 
Deprrtment, but prarotion was to be by nerit and not seniority alone. 
'!he specification for admission to the Professional, Technical and 
.Adrninistrati ve Division was rrore exhaustive. In this case, the report 
su1:mi tted by the Head of Deprrtment had to encompass consideration of 
"Jmowledge of the deprrtment or branch, educational qualifications, 
personality and force of character, judgement, power of taking 
responsibility, ini tiati ve, accuracy, address and tact, zeal and 
official record." (42) 
If the candidate was found to be satisfactory on all counts, admission 
to the Division could take place when a vacancy occurred. Although on 
the face of it this system of pranotion seems laborious , involving what 
might be called "waiting for dead men's shoes", provision was made to 
accelerate the rate of pranotion in cases of exceptional rrerit or on 
passing of the Intermediate or Final Examination of the appropriate 
Professional or otherwise Institute. Two other important principles 
were embodied in the scheme which could again provide for advancement. 
Firstly, if new duties were devolved upon the COIpOration or the 
existing duties of a post were expanded or readjusted, the employing 
ccmnittee affected could make reccmnendations to the Establishment 
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Ccmnittee for an alteration in assigIlIIEl1t. Secondly, the overall 
requirem:mts of staff were to be reviewed. from tine to tine by each 
Dnploying Carmittee and the Establishment Carmittee. ( 43 ) 
Given that the grade and salary of the occupant of a PJst was 
detennined by the Head of Department, the employing carmi ttee and the 
Establishment Carmi ttee often acting in concert, but saretines acting 
in conflict, sane provision had to be built into the schema to allow 
the employee a facility to appeal against decisions and this was 
provided in 1924. Appeals could be Irade against the carm:mcing salary, 
but not necessarily the grade in which the official had been placed or 
against the grading of a PJst where the appellant claiIra:i to be 
perfonning duties carrmensurate with a higher grade. A special sub-
carmittee was constituted to investigate and rePJrt on appeals. Before 
hearing appeals, the Chair of each employing carmi ttee with the Head of 
Department was to consider claims made and with the concurrence of the 
anploying carmi ttee rePJrt to the sub-ccmni ttee hearing appeals. In 
principle, where the reports of the employing ccmnittee were found to 
be favourable, claims were to be met. ( 44 ) 
Clearly, this kind of schema of conditions of service went sane way 
towards securing one of the original aims of the National Council, that 
is the improvement of conditions of sexvice for Local Government 
Officers. However, having been devised by the Corporation, it was not 
representative of a nove towards greater joint action on the part of 
the Local Government Service as a whole. NAIill, the primary staff 
trade union, had made the achievement of a consistent national standard 
of employment, rewanis and security, a major plank in its campaign to 
establish itself as a national union and COIlITEIlted adversely on the 
alnost canplete lack of unifonni ty and consistency of entry standards, 
:rrethods of selection and conditions of service alleging that the "ad-
hoc, unplanned, unco-ordinated methods of staff managemant both locally 
and nationally were wholly inadequate" to meet the neerls of the sexvice 
in the latter part of the decade. ( 45) A national system of tenns of 
service was seen by NAI.ill as the only way of rerroving the injustices 
and inequali ties of piecaneal bargaining and securing adequate 
ranuneration for its members. Standard conditions -were also needed to 
reflect many officers' views of being part of one service carrying out 
duties that might vary little from one part of the country to another. 
(46) 
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As many local authorities continued to regard any :rroves towards 
collective bargaining as curtailing their freedcm of action in staffing 
throughout the inter war pericxi bargaining remained piecareal and wide 
discrepancies in the remuneration of IDeal Goverrnnent Officers across 
the country persisted. ( 47) Trade Unions played. one authority off 
against another and the level of salaries and wages varied with the 
political colour of the employer. In effect, it was the Second World 
War which led to change as local authorities ~re faced with the 
increasing problem of the scarcity of labour. A graring trend emerged 
anong some of the larger authorities to organise in Provincial Councils 
on the Whitley basis because of the difficulty of deciding reasonable 
rates except in consultation with other employers and because of a 
growing preference for regular consultation rather than the 
confidential approach of one authority to another. (48) As enployers 
came to realise the need for a regular system of consultation to render 
unnecessary the individual handling of cOIrlIDn problans regarding 
conditions of service, so too it was realised that it was not in their 
mutual interest to compete for scarce labour, local authority enployers 
increasingly felt the need to defend thansel ves collectively against 
the clailns of the Unions. ( 49 ) 
Coincidental with such trends in the IDeal Goverrnnent Service, 
Central Goverrnnent perceived the need to be able to co-o.rdinate the 
country's work force as a whole and indirectly this influenced the 
developnent of the present system of local authority bargaining. The 
National Arbitration Order 1305 of 1940 which introduced canpulsory 
arbitration and allowed the National Arbitration Tribunal to require 
all employers to honour any agreement covering a substantial proportion 
of an industry becane an instrurrEnt for furthering collective 
bargaining in IDeal Govemment. The applicability of this legislation 
was tested by Bolton Corporation who claimed that it did not apply to 
local gover.nment . Bolton Y1lOn its case in the Court but the judgemant 
was overturned after NAIGO appealed to the House of lDrds in June 1942. 
(50) The decision by the court that the Conditions of Employment and 
National Arbitration Order, 1940 (SR and 0 No 1305) did apply to local 
authority anployees and as a corollary tenns and conditions provided 
for them had to be equal to those agreed in the district, was the 
fundamental force for change although the fact that tenns and 
conditions could be enforced by canpulsory arbitration, equally rrade 
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local authorities much nore willing to negotiate. If a local authority 
could be made to pay the same rate as other authorities 1Nere paying, 
then it becane increasingly irrportant that it should playa part in 
detennining the prevailing level of pay. (51) With the active 
encouragem:mt of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health, the 
IDC for IDeal Authorities Administrative, Professional, Technical and 
Clerical Services (APrC) was reconstituted in 1944. In subsequent 
years, a Joint Negotiating Carmi ttee for Chief Officers was also fonned 
publishing reccmnended conditions of service for Clerks and other Chief 
Officers along with job descriptions. The fact that the Chief 
Officers' salaries tended to be linked to levels of population 
influenced the negotiation of salary levels further dCMIl local 
authority structures and so in collective negotiations a balance 
inevitably had to be struck between different sized authorities. (52) 
In 1946, the IDC for APr and C Staffs devised a scherre of 
classification for staff falling within its purview which provided five 
divisions (general; clerical; higher clerical; miscellaneous and 
administrative; and professional and technical) each with its awn 
salary scale and general specification of duties. The \VOrk of the NJC, 
hor..vever, extended beyond the fonnulation of grading structures for 
staff fran the outset agreeing such tenns as nonnal hours of work and 
making specific provision for officers whose duties involved regular 
evening attendance in connection with council meetings and cormti ttees . 
(53) The scope of the scherre of conditions of service which has 
devolved is canprehensive but clearly defined in tenns of its purpose 
and its relationship wi th individual local authorities. Many of the 
principles embodied in the Scherre reflect the long standing priorities 
which were embraced by larger authorities in earlier years. The 
preamble to the Scheme states a clear objective: 
"The Scheme of Conditions of Service is to enable employing 
authorities to deal with their staff on a basis intended to mark the 
IDeal Government Service as offering a career likely to attract 
entrants of the type required to meet the future needs of IDeal 
Government. II 
at the same time the scherre enshrines basic traditions 
"It is desirable that questions affecting the recruitment, 
qualifications training and prcm::>tion of officers should be 
assigned by ea~h employing authority to an Establishm:mt Ccmni ttee. " 
(54) 
'!he Scheme has been developerl to encanpass all aspects of tenns and 
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conditions of employnent including appoint:nEnt and prarotion, post-
entIy training, salary and grading provisions, annual leave, sickness 
payments and maternity leave, travelling and subsistence allowances, 
official conduct, appeals against salaxy grading and grievance 
procedures. (55) 
In relation to grading structures, it is clear that IlUlch of the 
earlier work carried out by individual local authorities had provided a 
finn foundation which could be readily adopted by the national 
structure. The only fundamental change occurred in 1967 when the 
practice of rerrrunerating administrative, professional and technical 
officers on the same scales was rrodified (following on from the 
implications of the MalIaby' Report) to provide a separate salary 
structure for technicians, thereby encouraging local authorities to 
restrict professional staff to their proper level of work. The new 
technical division covered officers doing work which required special 
training or expertise bela.v the full professional level such as 
draughtsnen, clerks of works, etc. No qualification requirenents were 
attached to these technical grades but higher grades were intended to 
include those posts for which recognised training schemes and/or 
qualifications existed, for example architectural and engineering 
technicians. (56) 
The general philosophy of the grading scheme remained one of 
collective equity and it was hoped that consistency and unifonni ty 
would inprove the image of IDeal Government as a recognised career, 
thereby inproving recrui t:nEnt, ( especially of qualified professionals) 
and facilitating the transfer of staff between authorities. (57) The 
nationally negotiated tenns of service basically constituted an ascent 
up a progression of delicately constructed and canplex salaxy scales 
and laid down in minute detail the starting points and conditions of 
progression through the service allowing staff to predict career 
prospects. (58) White collar staff in IDeal Government came to 
consider as no:r::mal the incremental salary progression with a job and 
steady rise in salary and status although all might not have viewed it 
in a positive light. Dr Hilda Kahn has suggested that the long pay 
scales, characteristic of IDeal Government, tends to be looked upon as 
deferring payment of the full rate rather than as an addition 
canpensating for nounting outlay; instead of welcaning the extra 
increm:mts, staff maintain that not reaching the IMXimum until their 
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thirties is "anti-social" and prevents the undertaking of family 
responsibility. ( 59 ) 
In considering the extent to which the national scheme of conditions 
and national pay settlements constrained independence of action of 
individual authorities it should be stressed that, in practice, 
considerable flexibility was built into the scheme relieving tensions 
for both employee and employer. The legal position retrained that each 
local authority as a corporate entity was free to pay reasonable 
remuneration and establish conditions as they pleased. The scheme 
recognised this position in allowing authorities to exercise discretion 
in deciding on which scale an employee should be placed. (60) 'lb quote 
again the Scheme itself, 
"The establishIrEnt of each deparbnent of an employing authority 
shall be detennined by allocating a definite number of posts to the 
sui table grades included in the scale of salaries, the allocation 
being detennined by reference to the duties and responsibilities 
attaching to each post. The establishment shall be reviewed at 
regular intervals." (61) 
Flexibility wi thin the grading structure allCMed. local authorities 
to apply grades in relation to local circumstances enabling similar 
authorities to evaluate the seIVices of canparable staff in different 
ways. The corollary however, is that an authority in a high cost area 
needing quickly to recruit a particular professional group to staff a 
new seIVice, could find itself under strong pressure to grade new posts 
at a higher level than elsewhere to attract applicants; neighbouring 
authorities could in turn came under pressure to increase levels of 
pay, thus the need to confonn alone could bid up salary levels. (62) 
For the employee, while national salary awards became the na jor 
rrethod by which the pay of IDeal GovernIIl3l1t Officers was increased, 
nany could embrace hopes or expectations of prarotion or regrading 
based upon the principles of "Paragraph 80" of the Scheme: 
"The particular duties and responsibilities attached to posts are of 
necessity in nany cases sanewhat difficult of detailed definition, 
and may vary fran time to time without changing the general 
character of the duties or the level of responsibility entailed. 
Such variations are a ccmron occurrence and cannot of thensel ves 
justify reconsideration of the grading. In cases, hCMeVer, where 
there has been a substantial change in the duties and 
responsibilities of the post going beyond variations of the kind 
referred to then if the grading is not altered or the officer 
concerned i; dissatisfied with the decision as to the grading taken 
by the authority he has a right of appeal to the Provincial Council 
under this paragraph. II (63) 
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Given relatively nodest yearly increases in IDeal Govemment pay the 
applicant for re-grading could usually achieve an increase in pay fran 
10% upNards and could also succeed in rroving onto a new pay ladder. 
Although no figures are available for nmnbers re-graded yearly and, 
therefore, it is difficult to separate pay due to re-grading fran pay 
increases which are given after negotiation, it is clear that NAIill 
regards re-grading as an important maans of increasing pay and 
emphasises it in its Union literature, 
"the individual officer who thinks he is not getting a square deal 
in pay and conditions of service has certain rights of appeal under 
the Whitley machinery and NAIill will help him, if he is a rrenber, to 
prepare and present his appeal. Half of the appeals carmi ttee which 
will hear his case will be of staff representatives." (64) 
For many years, the canplex structure of nationally negotiated tenns 
and conditions of service for IDeal Goverrnnent Officers coupled with 
local variation, gave stability to industrial relations in local 
govermnent. However, central government's attempts to control inccmas 
from the mid 1960s represented a major threat to this stability 
straining employers' payment systems and employee relations. NAIill had 
initially welcomed the National Incomes Ccmnission whose aim they saw 
as being "to protect people with less effective bargaining power, 
swamped. by the crude application of a general average." 
The Union had not wanted a yearly scramble for higher pay in which 
they had less effective bargaining power than their mutual counterparts 
in industry, thus a three year agreanent signed in 1963 which meant a 
3% pay increase annually, as giving them tinE for a thorough salary 
review had been. accepted. ( 65 ) 
However, local government salaries declined in 1964-5 in real tenns. 
Gross salary increases between August 1964 and August 1965 ranged fran 
2.8% to 3.2% for APT and C grades and 2.6% to 2. 7% for clerical grades. 
NAIill, therefore, becaIre suspicious of incomes policy and increasingly 
came to regard it as an instrument of discrimination against the public 
sector. (66) It has been. argued by Thomson and Beaurront that "findings 
cannot be conclusive on the point, but they are strongly indicative 
that serious discrimination against the public sector on an overall 
basis has not happened." (67) Nevertheless, public workers have felt 
that they had a genuine grievance, and that perception has shaped their 
attitudes and actions. 
514 
The General Secretary of NAI.GO surrmed up the position of the Union's 
manbers over a 20 year period, 1948-67, 
IlBeb.7een 1948 and 1952 the purchasing ~ of nost local goveTIlIIEIlt 
officers fell by 10% or nore. It remained at that low pitch until 
around 1960, when a little of the lost ground was recovered. Today, 
in tenns of what this noney will buy, the incanes of the lower ranks 
are broadly the same as they ~re 20 years ago, whilst that of their 
seniors are - excluding promotion - still some way below the 1947 
levels. In the same period, the purchasing power of industrial 
~rkers has increased by around 50%." (68) 
The position had been exacerbated by the freezing of a sala:ry 
increase in July 1966 which had been strongly resented by NALGO and a 
report of the Union's Executive to the 1967 Conference 
Union's attitude to the prices and income standstill. 
that canparability and cost of living m:wements had to 
sumned up the 
It was argued 
be recognised 
for sala:ry increases and that, at the same time, it was important to 
maintain the differentials for skills and responsibilities. (69) 
Traditionally, in presenting cases for re-grading, the main argument 
used by NALGO had been the rate in comparable jobs in other local 
authorities. In the face of pay policy, it was also argued that the 
provisions of "Paragraph 80" ~re in line with the relevant paragraph 
in the White Paper, IIIncomes and Prices Standstill II , Qnnd 3073, which 
allowed "increases in pay genuinely resulting from pramotion to \>JOrk at 
a higher level, whether with the same or a different employer." (70) 
In effect widespread re-grading could have been used as a method by 
which local authorities could observe restraints on national rates 
whilst increasing the pay of some staff by m:wing them up or above 
their existing grade. The Government was wholly aware of this 
possibility and nentioned it in a post-July 1966 circular to local 
authorities. The NJC warned local authorities that re-grading nru.st not 
be used as a ~pon to defeat the standstill on incanes. Thus the 
majority of Councils beb.7een 1966 and 1969 indulged their aversion to 
raising local rates. IDeal authorities pleading that they were under 
goverrnnent orders to limit the nmnbers re-graded, ~re buttressed by 
cuts in public expenditure in 1968/9. (71) 
Faced with the interpretation of pay policy in its strictest tenns 
NAIill's pay claim for April 1969 pressed inter-alia the issue of 
canparabili ty . Whilst central government had allONed the principle of 
co.rrprrability to apply in the Civil Service it had been rejected as an 
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argurent in local government and it was maintained that the salary gap 
between the bvo services had widened in favour of the Civil Service 
officers ( see Figure 7.3). NAIGO also maintained that whilst wage 
rates had increased by over 5% fran February 1968 to February 1969 and 
anployee earnings had increased by 8.3% over the year ending Janucu:y 
1969, local government staff had received only a 3~% increase over the 
year. (72) 
Apart fran reducing salary levels in local government relative to 
other sectors, the sequence of freeze, nann, freeze, Stage II, Stage 
III, etc changed relativities in an arbitrary and unco-o:rdinated 
fashion. The principle of equal pay for all with exceptions only in 
individual cases where significant increases of responsibility could be 
dem:mstrated meant that pressure fran small groups of local government 
officers for grading changes, which on the basis of canparisons with 
other groups might have been justified, were resisted in an effort to 
meet pay policy criteria. (73) 
Whilst local government anployers might have adhered strictly to 
government policy partly out of choice in the 1960s, in the 1970s a 
greater element of compulsion was introduced by central government. 
IDeal Government Statistics for England and Wales published by the 
Depa.rt:Jrent of the Envirornnent (fonnerl y the Ministry for Housing and 
IDeal Government) show the local government salary and wage bill rising 
fran £827.7 million in 1958/9 to nore than £4,386 million in 1973/4. 
Salaries and wages in the same year accounted for 45% of current local 
authority expenditure. Central government concern regarding the size 
of the salary and wage bill led the Secretary of State for the 
Envirornnent, in a report on the Rate Support Grant (No2) Order, 1974, 
to call upon authorities not to expand their staff nmnbers except where 
necessary to meet inescapable conmibnents. More significantly, a 
Depa.rt:Jrent of the Envirornnent circular 171/74, announced the intention 
of government "to institute a system of watching local authority staff 
numbers." ( 7 4 ) This signalled a trend tCMaIds sarre loss of freedan of 
individual authorities on establishment matters. The institution of 
cash limits on local government expenditure in 1976 meant that the 
question of local authority pay led directly into that of local 
authority expenditure as a whole and the negotiation of the Rate 
Support Grant. Effectively, the cash limit served as a substitute for 
an incarres policy which was nore effective in carmitting authorities to 
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public sector pay restraint as pay deals had to be backed by cash 
limits and the Rate Support Grant. ( 75 ) 
The intervention of central goverrment in local authority pay 
bargaining and the consequent restriction upon local freedan within the 
bargaining structure has inevitably led to the centralisation of 
bargaining, increasing the p::Mer of central institutions. Thus the 
balance which previously existed between national and local structures 
has been undennined. Increasing conflict between centre and periphery 
has emarged anongst employers and Trade Unions alike. Havever, this 
conflict was rrore marked on the Trade Union side where the rank and 
file of NALGO became increaSingly dissatisfied with centralised 
ba:r:gainin.g and the Trade Union nationally. Faced with increasing 
pressure for grass roots control and negotiation, NAI.GO equivocally 
rroved towards the devolution of power within the Union. (76) 
Having considered the historical development of collective 
bargaining arrangements for local authority staffs, it is clear that 
particularly the larger local authorities denonstrated an early 
awareness of the need to ccmpete with other sectors of the econC!I¥ in 
o:r:der to acquire and retain a professional workforce. This is 
manifested by the independent action on the part of certain 
authorities, such as the Manchester Corporation, to provide clearly 
defined career structures in the inter-war years. However, it is 
argued that the rrost significant detennining factor in the developIETlt 
of collective bargaining arrangements has been financial pressure at 
the local level reinforced by the relationship beb\een. local and 
central government. This is reflected in the early reluctance to fonn 
national negotiating bodies, coupled with prinary emphasis at the local 
level, on the establishment function. 
Although in the post-war period national collective bargaining 
arrangements were instituted encouraging the collective equity, 
unifonnity and consistency across the Service which had been demanded 
by employee representatives, flexibility at the local level ranained 
the key note. Employers exercised local autoncmy in assigning grades 
to take account of local circumstances and for the employee the system 
of re-grading and appeals offered the real prospect of advancement. 
For mmy years this arrangement underpinned the stability of industrial 
relations between enployers and staff of the I.ocal Governrrent Service. 
However, the institution of pay policy in the 1960s threatened this 
517 
stability by providing employers with ample justification to resist re-
grading claims which had provided a source of increased re:nuneration in 
previous years. Although strict adherence to gove:rnment pay policy had 
initially been by choice, in the 1970s a greater elem:m.t of canpulsion 
was intrcxiuced with the institution of cash limits. Central GoveTIlTIE11.t 
intervention in pay detennination not only affected the position of 
IDeal Government Officers relative to comparable positions within other 
sectors of the econarw, but also upset the relativities which had been 
established within .the Service. Ultimately, local autonarw diminished 
as greater emphasis was placed on the role of central institutions in 
negotiation. This change in the balance between local and central 
structures was reganied as being detrimental by employers and employees 
alike ultimately straining industrial relations. 
(b) Manual Employees 
Having discussed the evolution of collective bargaining for local 
gove:rnment officers and the Ira jor factors which have shaped the long 
tenn developnent of the system, it is necessary to consider the 
position of the nanual 'WOrker within the scheme of things. For the 
m:mual worker in local government, the history of collective bargaining 
dates back to the First World War when the awaIds of the Ccmnittee on 
Production helped to extend Trade Union recognition and collective 
bargaining agreerrents. (77) A number of local authorities in 
Lancashire and Cheshire (including Manchester and Chester), fonned an 
association to deal with war-time pay increases. After the First World 
War, the prinCiple of collective bargaining for wage earners was 
accepted elsewhere. Increasingly, pay was settled by Provincial 
Councils whose employers sides were directly representative of 
individual authorities in a region. In 1919, the Minister of Labour 
called conferences which led to the fonnation of the National Joint 
Industrial Council for IDeal Authorities' Non-trading Services (Manual 
Workers) to detennine the pay and conditions of non-craft nanual 
workers. In contrast to the early attempts to establish a national 
negotiating structure in the Whitley rrould for local government staffs, 
this NJIC endured to becane the forerunner of the NJC for IDeal 
Authorities' Manual Workers which exists today. (78) 
Although collective bargaining arrangem:m.ts for nanual workers ~re 
established., certain groups of employers still denonstrated a 
reluctance to take part fully in the rrachine:r:y. For example, the 
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County Councils' Association repudiated collective bargaining, 
withdrawing fran the manual \-,1()rkers' NJIC together with the Rural 
District Councils' Association. The reluctance on the part of 
employers was ma.tched by an inability on the part of the industrial 
Trade Unions to recruit nanbers in large numbers in the non-
industrialised rural areas. (79) However, the political affiliation of 
elected members also played a part in detennining the nature of 
bargaining arrangements and what tenus could be obtained. For nany 
years, the Northern Provincial Council of the Non-trading JIC agreed 
the highest rates of any district, despite high unemployment in the 
area "and the only explanation can be the predominance of labour on the 
local authorities of Durham and Northumberland." (80) 
Basically then even when local authorities bargained collectively, 
the degree of local autonarw- allowed by the ma.chinery maant that there 
was still much variation in the level of wages paid to workers doing 
the sane kind of \-,1()rk across the country. In 1938, for example, when 
for pay purposes six different zones were applied, there was 17 
shillings a week difference between zones one and six. (81) In the 
early stages of developnent, the NJIC primarily concerned itself with 
rates of pay. In respect of other conditions of service, like the 
provision for sick pay allowances, no unifo:rmity of treatment existed 
even within a local authority. It was left to each individual 
department to dete.nnine sick pay allowances, judging each case on its 
merits. (82) 
Within each individual local authority, structures were developed at 
an early stage to ccmplete the fr~rk for collective bargaining. In 
Manchester, for example, a Workmans' Special Corrmittee was fomed in 
1919 and five years later a labour Officer and Secretary were appointed 
to deal with 
" (i) ma.tters relating to the regulation of wages of all nanual 
workers of the Corporation other than those whose wages and 
conditions are regulated by the various Industrial Councils, and 
(ii) co-ordination of all ma.tters deal t with by the Industrial 
Councils for Public Utility Services." (83) 
It is \-,1()rth noting here that, as suggested by the designated role of 
the labour Officer, certain special groups of workers remained on the 
periphery of the NJIC for manual workers. For example, transport 
workers employed by the Manchester Corporation perforrred duties of a 
specialist nature which allied them more closely with their 
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counterparts covered by the lancashire and Cheshire Road Transrort 
Council. In determining the wages of transrort ~rkers in the employ 
of the Corporation, the Iabour Officer would enquire with other finns 
in the area as to the prevailing level of wages paid to their transrort 
workers. ( 84 ) 
Collective bargaining for nanual VolOrkers in local gaverrment was 
reinforced in the rost war era with the developnent of Joint 
Negotiating Carmittees to deal with skilled ~rkers. The fornation of 
a Joint Negotiating Carmittee for Building and Civil Engineering 
Craftsmen in 1951 was followed a year later by the establishment of a 
Joint Negotiating Committee for Local Authorities' Services 
(Engineering Craftsmen). .Appendix 7 . 3 lists the wide range of 
occupations which were covered by the JNC although its scope was 
limited to exclude certain ~rkers in specialist areas. Those in 
waterworks and rrnmicipal transrort undertakings 'VV'ere excluded along 
with craftsmen in local authority controlled dock undertakings and 
craftsmen already covered by the NJC for County Council Roadmen. 
Employees were represented by the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions, whilst the Employers' Side included representatives 
of the IDeal Authority Associations, the London County Council and the 
Employers' Side of the NJlC for Local Authorities' Services (Manual 
WOrkers) . In line with other manual workers, rates of pay 'VV'ere zoned, 
with zoning arrangements being those of the appropriate Provincial 
Councils. In agreeing rates of pay, the Employers' Side was to take 
account of rates of pay applied to similar craftsman in the gas, 
electricity and water industries and 
engineering industry . Thus whereas 
craftsmen in local authorities 
wage increases conceded in the 
the wage rates of engineering 
had been previously regulated 
exclusively by reference to agreements in the appropriate trade or 
industry, the adoption of an agreement covering local authorities was 
to provide a cc:mron rate of pay for all classes of engineering 
craftsmen. ( 85 ) 
As new Joint Negotiating Corrmittees 'VV'ere established in the rost-war 
era, new authorities were affiliated to the structure and this was 
accompanied by an increasing transfer of real pcmer from provincial to 
national level in the detennination of wage rates and conditions of 
employment. The manual workers' NJC in canpany with sarre 40 or rrore 
joint councils or carmi ttees in local govemment by 1960, eval ved to 
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fom a cc:mprehensi ve structure for negotiation and consultation in the 
"Whitley" nould (see Figure 7.4). By the 1970s, the IDC for IDeal 
Authorities' Services (Manual Workers) had grown to encanpass by far 
the largest single group of local gavernmant workers, around 900,000 in 
all, (Figure 7. 5 gives a silnplifiErl version of the structure which has 
emergErl) . Employers fo:r:m a joint bloc made up of representatives of 
the provincial councils which are depictErl in Figure 7.6 and the IDeal 
Authority Associations. Trade Unions with membership in the sector-
the General and Municipal Workers' Union, the Transport and General 
Workers' Union and the National Union of Public Employees - similarly 
fom a joint bloc. Issues are decidErl by agrearent between the two 
sides, each acting as a corporate1:x:xiy . The IDC agrees and applies 
standard wage rates for each occupation. As Section I of the national 
agreement specifies 
"The maintenance of a unifom rate of pay for each occupation is 
inherent in the Joint Council system of wage regulation." 
As Whitley envisagErl, negotiating and consultative acti vi ty is not 
the exclusive province of the IDC itself. The Provincial Councils in 
England and Wales have a role to play along with nlIIl'EIOUS subsidiary 
carmittees at national and provincial level. These carmittees deal 
either with particular issues, such as disputes on Erlucation and 
training, or at national level, with particular groups of employees 
such as school caretakers. ( 86) 
Basically the IDC has eval ved a wage system for manual "VoiQrkers in 
local authorities which is broadly basErl on the classification of jobs 
into a number of grades covering the least skillErl to the highest 
skillErl (with Building, Engineering and Electrical CraftSllEIl having 
their own separate agreement). ( 87 ) As with any manual worker wage 
system, a variety of additional fonus of payrrent have been devisErl 
which l:xJost total earnings. These include service supplenents; plus 
payments for qualifications or particular features of work; proficiency 
payments for special qualifications; shift payrrents, etc. ~, 
nationally negotiatErl rates of pay principally mean that manual workers 
in local authorities receive a fixErl rate for the job and they may stay 
in the same position all their "VoiQrking lives. In contrast to the 
condi tions of service applying to administrative, professional, 
technical and clerical staffs in local governm:mt, there is no 
fonnalised system of staff appraisal. (88) 
521 
Whilst noting that f:r:cm the 1930s the trend in industry had been 
towards a decline in the extent to which industry-wide agreemants 
detennined actual pay, the Donovan Ccmnission highlighted the "unusual 
importance" of industry-wide agreements in determining the earnings of 
mmual workers in local goverrnnent. For example, in October 1966, the 
average basic rate of male manual workers in local goverrnnent was 
£12.13.0. and average earnings were £15.18.10 most of the difference 
being overtime. (89) With the excessive reliance upon national wage 
settlements, manual workers in local goverrnnent did not gain fran the 
tendency towards wage drift resulting from incentive earnings, factory 
additions to basic and high levels of overtime which were most rrarked 
between 1962 and 1967. A report of the National Board for Prices and 
Incares in 1967 concluded that local authority manual workers were 
lowly paid in ccmparison with their counterparts in industry. Despite 
national pay rates that comp:rrecl favourably with those negotiated 
elsewhere the average week! yearnings of manual workers in local 
govermrEI1t were far belaN the average for all industries. In fact, in 
none of the 129 industries covered by the Ministry of labour's list 
were earnings lower than in local govermrEI1t. In accounting for the 
difference, the Board also suggested that it could in part reflect the 
fact that local govermrEI1t has "a lower proportion of skilled labour 
than is found in industry generally." The Board however noted that on 
the credit side other conditions such as holiday entitlements, sick pay 
provisions and pension schemes were as good as, if not better than, 
industry in general. ( 90) 
In effect the problem of lOW' pay arrong local govermrEI1t manual 
workers was exacerbated by the institution of incCl£les policy. In the 
first 14 nonths of inCCl£les policy from April 1965 to the middle of the 
following year, local authority manual \\Urkers all received. increases 
around the "nonn" of 3 - 3~% whilst in industry, wage increases 
frequently exceeded this limit. (91) As a result, the Trade Union Side 
presented a lengthy argmnent for a 9.5% pay increase based on the fact 
that whilst the "all industries index of earnings" showed. increases in 
the last 20 years of 243%, that of local governrrent workers had on! y 
rose by 225%. In contrast to the view held by the NBPI it was held 
that " IaN rates, short overtine hours and feN incentive schemes 
together explain the low earnings in local governmant" ( 9 2 ) 
For the Trade Union Side it is important to note that mmy of the 
522 
Unions representing local authority manual workers had their origins, 
priorities and interests in other sectors , especially industry. For 
example, the general unions like the 'lGWU nay have established local 
governmant sections whilst the craft unions nay not have had any 
organisation dealing specifically with local govermnent. Given the 
bias towan::is industry, it is likely that such Unions would display less 
patience with local govermnent systans which were seen to restrict 
their manbers earnings and v,;ould accept the differences between local 
government and industry with less readiness than those unions which 
-were based upon local government principles. (93 ) 
The Trade Union dissatisfaction with a national collective 
bargaining nachinery which left little scope for local variation except 
in respect of bonusing, was adequately derronstrated by their reaction 
to the report of the National Board for Prices and Inccrnes which 
recc:mrended that the on! y release fran the "straight jacket" of inccrnes 
policy was greater prcx:lucti vi ty. In response to the report, the Unions 
supported the extension of incentive bonus schemes as a means of 
achieving higher pay and greater prcx:lucti vi ty without raising rates or 
taxes. I£>rd Cooper, the General Secretary of the GMWU, went further in 
calling for nore flexibility between grades and changes in the spread 
of hours and manning levels. ( 94 ) 
Whilst the CBl had maintained that plant bargaining: 
" if widely resorted to, nakes illlpossible any national planning with 
regard to incomes; that in conditions of full employIlEl1t it cannot 
be other than inflationary; that it encourages instability in the 
labour force (through bidding up for labour to which i t gives rise); 
that it increases the scope for unofficial strikes and other forms 
of industrial action; and that it is calculated to weaken the 
organisation of Trade Unions and employers' associations to the 
ultimate detrilnen.t of both v,;orkers and nanagements and of the 
econany." (95) 
Suggestions for greater freedom in local negotiations based on 
prcx:lucti vity were canpletel y in line with the tenor of the Donovan 
Ccmnission. However, in practice, the developrent of prcx:lucti vi ty 
bargaining in local government was likely to encounter a number of 
obstacles . Essentially, prcx:lucti vity is difficult to measure in any 
service and in IDeal Govennnent given the canpreh.ensive system of 
national negotiations built up over the years, there was likely to be a 
basic resistance to paying higher rates locally. 
As far as the use of work measure:nent techniques are concerned the 
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emphasis in industry has always tended to be on productivity, in other 
words, on output. In local government the use of work rreasu.rerent 
techniques has however, centred around the developrent of incentive 
paynent schemes as a :rreans of achieving savings in nanpower. (96) The 
distinction between an incentive scheme and productivity bargaining is 
significant here. A productivity bargaining agreement may be defined 
as: 
"One in which workers agree to make a change or a number of changes 
in work practices that will lead in itself . . . . to rrore 
econanical working; and in return the employer agrees to a higher 
level of pay and other ben.efi ts." ( 97 ) 
An incentive scheme hcmever, merely speeds up the work done under 
existing systems and nethods. An emphasis on productivity bargaining 
thus poses an inevitable and fun.d.amantal threat to any system of 
national negotiations as agreements on pay cannot be divorced fran 
arrangemants for working practices. Negotiations at local level assUllE 
overriding importance in the drive for the rrore efficient utilisation 
of labour and plant. (98) 
Given this fun.d.amantal difference between productivity bargaining 
and incentive schemes, it is not surprising that the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes' call for greater productivity in local government 
caused confusion amongst those Who failed to appreciate that 
productivity bargaining dem:mded a new approach to the "total work 
problem". In essence, the Board recognised the difficulties to be 
encountered and estimated that progress would be slCM and the full 
implemantation of a progranme to raise productivity and thereby wages, 
would take several years. As a stoIHJap the Board suggested the wider 
application of incentive bonus schemes. However, a IDeal Governrrent 
Work Study Group suggested that even this objective would be difficult 
to achieve, the chief barrier being the attitude of local authorities. 
The cautious approach of local authorities explains Why after two 
years, less than one fifth of local authorities had m::wed to neet the 
canplaints of low pay and lCM productivity noted by the NBPI. (99) 
Where bonus schemes were applied they 1N9re rE!CJarded as alrrost the sole 
means of boosting national basic wage rates on a local basis and were 
often accepted on this basis alone, leaving an underlying resent:mant 
about the mechanistic philosophy of labour relations which the Whole 
system implied. ( 100) 
As other industries and groups of workers continued to outstrip 
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local authority manual workers and the whole pay situation was 
exacerbated by the goverrment backed nonn of 3~% increases in September 
1969, (follCMing the earlier freeze of 1966, and the period of 
"cautious moderation"), industrial relations were increasingly 
strained culminating in the "dirty jobs" strike of 1969/70. The arulUal 
round of pay negotiations in 1969 had included a re-evaluation of all 
manual worker occupations to produce a new pay structure. Hcmever on 
22 September 1969, one IDndon Borough ignored all agreed procedures for 
the re-evaluation and took imnediate strike action in support of a 
claim for a £20 per w=ek basic wage. Although the strike highlighted 
low pay, which was to becare an issue dominating later wage 
negotiations, especially in 1974 and 1978/9, the strike was as much a 
reaction at local level against the rem::>teness, complexity and duration 
of national negotiations. The stoppage, which was unofficial, was 
similarly as much a revolt of the rank and file against their awn Trade 
Union hierarchy as it was an attack on the employers. ( 101 ) A highly 
publicised unofficial strike of dustcart drivers in Glasgow and 
Liverpool was another example of the extrerrEly heavy pressure which was 
being put on individual local authorities by local, unofficial action, 
to break national agreements or to ignore fornal disputes and 
negotiating procedures. HCMeVer, the dispute also highlighted another 
aspect of the changing industrial relations scene in local gover:nrrent. 
The dispute had developed fran a private sector settlement for heavy 
goods vehicle drivers, an occupation ccmron to local gover:nrrent and 
private industry and signalled the start of increasing difficulties for 
local goverrment in pay ccmparisons , especially where other employers 
were less punctilious in observing national incares policy. ( 102) 
The dissatisfaction of employees was accompanied by a growing sense 
of dissatisfaction with the whole national collective bargaining system 
wi thin individual authorities and in the three IDeal Authority 
Associations. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities suggested 
that responsibility for pay bargaining should be placed finn! y on 
itself and the Association of County Councils. The Association of 
County Councils was concerned about the extent to which the membership 
of the Froployers' sides of the Provincial Councils and the ruCs did not 
reflect the different proportions of the labour force employed by the 
rretropolitan, county and district authorities. (103) 
General dissatisfaction was not ameliorated by the impact of 
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"canparability studies" on the size and timing of pay settlarents in 
1979 and 1980. Except for the Fire and Police Forces, all local 
governm:mt pay groups within the settlarent dates Novenber 1978 to July 
1979 concluded interim agreements and referred final conclusions to the 
outcama of external pay canparisons. The manual \\Urkers' position was 
referred to the Standing Carmission on Pay Carp:rrabili ty which was set 
up as a way of resolving the wave of public sector disputes. With a 
variety of settlement dates, differing Union pressures , little tinE to 
establish principles and the many different approaches to the fonn 
which canparisons should take the result was a tangle of different 
levels of settlement ( even for similar groups) and different staged 
settlarent dates. (104) 
The use of external canparisons thus gave rise to a whole new set of 
internal relativity problems and created a variety of precedents about 
the use of canparati ve pay data which were based on a series of largely 
unco-ordinated responses to inmediate pay pressures. The prinCiple of 
basing local govennnent pay wholly on fair comparison with the pay of 
\\Urkers outside the service represented the biggest single change in 
pay detennination in the history of the NJCs. Although in the past 
corrprrability had figured to some degree in pay detennination, 
reference to the Standing Ccmnission implied that the traditional 
questions about the going rate of annual pay settlerrents, or argmnents 
about rroverrents in the RPI or even about the employers ' ability to pay 
\\Uuld be neglected. Pay levels \\Uuld be exclusively set by reference 
to external canparators aver whose pay local government employers \\Uuld 
have no control or influence. ( 105 ) 
Clearly then in contrast to experience regarding the "officers" of 
IDeal Government, the principle of collective bargaining for wage 
earners employed by local authorities was readily accepted in the 
inter-war years, although during that period national arrangements did 
accamodate a significant degree of local autonany. 
With the developnent of the Joint National Councils in the post-war 
era, a trend towards the transfer of power fran the provincial to the 
national bargaining level set in, culminating in the developnent of 
national standard wage rates within the IDeal Governmant Service. 
Whilst this in itself may be regarded as camon practice for manual 
\\Urkers employed in other sectors of the econany, the widespread 
adherence to industry-wide agreements coupled with the lack of 
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variation at the local level was a factor peculiar to local Government 
tending towards relatively low average earnings. It is argued. that 
whilst the industrial origins of Trade Union representation contributed. 
towards resentment of a IDeal Government system which restrictEri 
rranbers earnings relative to those in other sectors, this was probably 
exacerbated. by the distinctions made between "officer" and "servant". 
Whilst it may be held that Trade Unions whose origins lay within the 
Service would be :rrore likely to exercise restraint, it should be bo:me 
in mind that negotiating arrangements for the Il1E!llbers of such Unions 
had historically embraced. the principle of local autonany and local 
variation offering in tu:m the possibility of substantial gain fran the 
process of staff appraisal. 
For the manual worker in IDeal Government subject to the strict 
confines of nationally negotiated agreements, the only prospect of 
boosting earnings lay in the application of proclucti vity agreements. 
However, application of these agreements within a service sector would 
inevitably involve difficulties of measurement and particularly in 
IDeal Government where traditionally national wage rates had dominatEri, 
particular resistance to local variation was likely to be encountered. 
As industrial relations in the Service becaIre strainEri, the 
unofficial action of the 1960s representEri a reaction against an 
increasingly renote national bargaining structure. The attempt to 
resolve the situation by reference to exte:mal canparators may be 
regarded. as a manifestation of the inability of collective bargaining 
structures to cope with manual worker conditions in IDeal Government. 
The following chapter, which considers industrial relations at 
Manchester Airport, provides evidence to suggest that initially Trade 
Unions, and eventually airport management, increasingly rejectEri 
national negotiating structures as being incapable of responding to the 
needs of airport operation. 
7.3 CDTlH ~1'IVE ~ IN WE CIVIL AIR rrnANSRRl' INDUS'IRY 
Prior to the Second World War when the civil air transport industry 
was characterised by a relatively large number of snaIl private 
airlines and a few larger companies there was very little state 
interference in collective bargaining and industrial relations. 
However, provisions for the establishmant of the British Overseas 
AiI:ways Corporation emlxxiied in an Act of Parliament in 1939 suggested 
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that central goverrment was prepare:i to regard the question of 
industrial relations in British civil aviation as an area for special 
interest in the post war years. Section 37 of the British Overseas 
Airways Act, 1939 stated that in detennining wages and conditions of 
employment the Corporation: 
"shall take into account representations made to them by any body or 
organisation, the mambership of which ccmprises a substantial 
proportion of the class or classes of employrrent conceDled." ( 106 ) 
This did not in itself provide for joint consultative machinery as 
such, but it made listening to and taking account of Union 
representations a statutory obligation on the Corporation. 
As far as British airports are concerned, arrangnents for the 
determination of wages and conditions of employrrent reflected ownership 
structures. Employees at airports owned by rmmicipalities v.;ere covered 
by existing machineries for the negotiation of pay and conditions in 
local govermnent. In line with the system outlined in Section 7.2 the 
pay and conditions of staff members v.;ere detennined by individual local 
authorities although, as suggested, many of the larger authorities v.;ere 
operating grading systems and schemes of conditions of service which 
provided a measure of unifonnity across the service. In the absence of 
any appropriate Joint Industrial Council for manual staffs at airports, 
individual local authorities dete:r:mined wages and working conditions, 
although generally they were related to those prescribed. by the Whitley 
Council for manual workers employed in the non-trading services of 
local authorities. (107) 
At airports owned by the Ministry, Civil Service nonns tended to 
apply. In ccmron with local government the Whitley Carrmittee Report of 
1917/18 was influential in the setting up of machinery for the 
negotiation of pay and \'\iOrking conditions in the Civil Service. As 
NAIGO had been supportive of the Whitley principle in local govermnent 
so the Civil Service Unions demanded that the Governmant grant to them 
the same machinery for negotiation as recarmanded for private industry. 
The principle was established for Governmant industrial employees 
initially, although in the rest of the Civil Service the new Whitley 
Councils were constrained in their action being allaNed no rrore than 
"consideration of the general principles" which should govern pay and 
conditions of service. Under continued Union pressure for collective 
bargaining a National Whitley Council was eventually instituted to deal 
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with the pay of general classes of civil servants employa:i in a number 
of departments. (108) 
In contrast to both private industry and to a lesser degree ~ocal 
governnent, the official side of the collective bargaining rrachinery 
was conscious of the fact that the ability to neet claims for higher 
pay was limited only by the goverrnnent' s capacity to raise taxes and 
sane criterion other than the ability to pay was needed. to detenni.ne 
their offers as a defence against the accusation that the nation's 
resources were being squandered by over-paying civil servants. At the 
sane time, the Government could have been open to the charge of 
niggardliness, encouraging others to be "good" employers whilst dealing 
harshly with its CMI1 'V.1Ork force. To defend themselves against 
accusations on both counts Ministers before 1914 had emphasised. the 
need. for ccmparability with occupations outside the service and in 1931 
the Tanlin Comni ttee raised the concept of camparabili ty to a general 
principle by stating that "broad general canpa.risons bebNeen classes in 
the Service and outside occupations are possible and should be rrade." 
(109) 
In 1946, the dilerrma. of "economical spending versus fair treatment" 
was also dealt with in the Fair Wages Resolution which adequately 
stated. the government's general position, although it specifically 
related. to government contracts. In requiring contractors to pay work 
people fair wages and to apply fair conditions of employment, the 
concept of fairness was defined. as 
"rates of wages . . . hours and conditions of labour, not less 
favourable than those established. in the relevant collective 
agreerIEI1.t for the trade or industry in the district." (110) 
The principles of fairness and canpa.rability were to becane crucial 
features of collective bargaining in the Civil Service with the 
publication of the report of the Priestley Ccmnission in 1955. The 
Priestley Carmission established the fonnula of "an efficient Civil 
Service fairly rem.merated" and reccmnended that: 
"the prim:rry principle for detennining the pay of ~ivil servm:ts 
should be fair comparison with the current rerrnmeration of outslde 
staffs employed. on broadly comparable work, taking account of other 
differences in conditions of service." (111) 
The Civil Service Pay Research Unit was the outcane of the Priestley 
recammendations and its task was to discover staffs engaged. in 
canparable 'V.1Ork and to conduct periodic investigations into the 
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remuneration and \VOrk of outside analogues for each class of non-
industrial civil servant. The results of its fact finding exercises 
were to be evaluated by negotiation with reference to the Civil Service 
Arbitration Tribunal, if agreement could not be reached. (112) As the 
civil servants employed at Ministry Airports were regarded as being 
indistinct fran civil servants employed by any other goverrment 
department, the detennination of their pay and conditions of employnent 
could proceed along similar lines, and the significance of the early 
establishnent of the Civil Service Pay Research Unit is adequately 
highlighted by Balfour who maintains that in a later period under the 
constraints of the government's prices and incanes policy clerical and 
other related groups in the Civil Service kept their position in the 
wages and salaries race fairly well largely as a result of the work of 
the Unit in ccmparing jobs in the Civil Service with those in industry, 
commerce and the public services. (113) 
As far as manual, including craft workers at Ministry airports are 
conce:med, they were regarded as industrial civil servants for the 
purposes of detennining pay and conditions of employ.rrent and in the 
main, were paid rates in accordance with the average moverrents of rates 
outside the Civil Service. Up to 1940, district averages were used for 
each separate establishnent but in that year, it was agreed that rates 
should be settled nationally by am:mgst others, the Miscellaneous 
Trades Joint Council for Government Industrial Establishnents. The 
craft rates, one for IDndon and the other for the provinces, 'Were fixed 
by averaging the minimum time-work craft rates paid in 22 industries 
and two "M" rates for labourers were similarly settled by averaging the 
rates paid in 34 outside industries. These four rates were to be 
ad justed every six rronths. 
Effectively, the principle of ccmparability which applied to non-
industrial civil servants was to apply to the industrial Civil Service. 
However, one fundamental difference emerged in practice. The Civil 
Service Pay Research Unit investigated reruneration and not rrerely 
minimum rates, so the process of "fair canparison" provided the non-
industrial civil servant with much the same inCCXIE as the outside 
analogue. The position of the manual worker was canplicated by various 
systems of payment by results, plus rates and overtime which could 
increase the earnings of manual workers to a level far above minimum 
time rates. So the pay of industrial civil servants based on a 
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canparison of mininrum t.iroe rates could only have equated with the level 
of earnings of ccmparators in other sectors if the average additional 
payments to each group came to the same figure. (114) Obviously, this 
would be difficult to achieve. The report of the Ibnovan Ccmnission in 
1968 which addressed the problems of industrial relations in British 
industry highlighted the way in which the volume of overtine had 
fluctuated with an increasing trend throughout the 1950s and 19605, not 
as the result of labour shortage but as a means of increasing earnings 
to an acceptable level. The standard working \\1eek which had been 47 or 
48 hours in 1938 had been reduced to 40 hours, but average \\1eekly hours 
actually worked had dropped by only one and a half hours between 1938 
and 1967. The average anount of overtine worked in different 
industries differed considerably across the boaI:d as it was governed by 
the principle of "managerial prerogative" and, therefore, could not be 
included in any fonnal industry-wide agreements. ( 115 ) CraftsrrEn in 
the Civil Service were paid supplementary rates according to skill and 
experience and nost of the remainder of industrial civil servants 
represented semi-skilled workers who received "lead" payments in 
addition to the basic "M" rate. Many worked overtine and by the mid 
1960s, about 15% of the total labour force received some fonn of 
payment by results. (116) The National Board for Prices and Incomes 
found that earnings were generally lower in the industrial civil 
service: 
"although the present system is designed to give industrial civil 
servants pay comparable with that of their counterparts in private 
industry , it often fails to do so." ( 117 ) 
Thus for all classes of employee whether based at Ministry or local 
authority controlled airports, the detennination of pay and conditions 
of service proceeded along the lines of the principles governing each 
sector in the early post war years. However, nationalisation of the 
civil air transport industry after the Second World War which had an 
imnediate and direct impact on the framework for industrial relations 
in UK airlines, had a long tenn effect on attitudes on both the newly 
nationalised scheduled service airports and local authority controlled 
airports in subsequent years. 
Initially , it will be useful to identify the rna jor factors which 
determine the framework of industrial relations in nationalised 
industries as distinct fran private undertakings. Richardson maintains 
531 
that fran the workers' point of view, the similarities between w:>rking 
conditions and industrial relations in a nationalised industry and 
those in private industry are greater than the differences. Hours of 
work and wages will, in the long run, keep approximately in line with 
those in private industry as nationalised industries will experience 
the effects of changes in demand for their products and services 
whether due to the canpeti tion of other goods and services, to foreign 
canpetition, or to variations in the general level of prosperity. The 
negotiation of changes in the level of wages will involve all the 
possibilities for disagreement which are present in private industry. 
(118) 
Fran the employers' point of view, significant differences of 
attitude emerge. In principle 1II1Orkers in nationalised industries have 
no claim to preferential treatment and the State, whilst endeavouring 
to be a "good" employer, will tend to adopt standards which correspond 
with those of "good" employers in the private sector. However, in the 
event of a dispute or clash of interests in a nationalised industry, 
the government can no longer "hold the ring" it is in the ring as a 
contestant, and therefore, cannot be judge in its awn cause as is the 
case with disputes arising in private industry. The government must, 
therefore, be especially vigilant to prevent serious clashes and where 
they arise, it must make every effort to secure a fair and reasonable 
settlement. At the same time, government must be mindful of its 
responsibility to other nationalised industries and private industries 
- it 1II1Ould be open to criticism if it used its resources to accede to 
dem:mds which involved favouring one industry which would be unfair to 
others. ( 119 ) 
The fact that a nationalised industry is controlled by one single 
authority ilnplies that wages and 1II1Orking conditions will tend to becarre 
nore standardised throughout the industry and that an industry-wide 
system of industrial relations will be established. The industry as a 
unified undertaking, unlike the separate finns in private industry 
which differ fran one another in their capacity to pay, will tend to 
treat all its work people in accordance with the same general 
principles. 
As the controlling authority strives to apply the same general 
prinCiples to all its work force, so-called "scientific" wage 
structures will be devised and progressively applied. Thus the wage 
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ananalies inherited by a recently nationalised industry, mmy of which 
are the result of historical factors including wage differences due to 
no other cause than that they had been paid by separate finns, should 
be limited. (120) In general then, the fraITEWOrk for the conduct of 
industrial relations within a nationalised industry should tend towards 
the provision of measures designed to minimise the potential for 
conflict; improved. industrial relations and a measure of unifonnity 
across the industry as a whole. 
The Nationalisation Acts of the post-war era reflected such general 
principles in embodying the public policy that jOint negotiation and 
joint consultation were to be detennined with a view to improving the 
tone of relationships in the newly created public corporations. (121) 
Primarily, the Airways Corporations established by the Labour 
administration of 1945 had inherited labour problems similar to nost 
other public corporations . For example, mmual workers had been 
strongly organised in Trade unions for decades and collective 
bargaining had long been established. ( 122) However , it is worth 
noting that the nature of the operating conditions in the civil air 
transport industry served to underline the need to provide a nore 
stable fr~rk for the conduct of industrial relations. 
The highly integrated nature of airline service operations where, 
for example, maintenance work had to be done and aeroplanes could not 
fly without fitters and engineers as well as mechanics and others to 
refuel and service aircraft, meant that action whether in snall or 
large groups could render the entire service unusable. The high degree 
of unionisation within the airline sector ovve:i much to this effect as 
employees discovered negotiating power as a tightly knit group. (123) 
Second! y, the provision of good conditions of service and employIIEl1t 
were especially important in the British Civil aviation industry as it 
constituted a transport industry where reliability of operations is a 
vital quality feature of the product. A strike could affect an airline 
.inmadiatel y as its services for passengers are highly perishable. 
While SOfIE flights which are cancelled may find the SaIIE passengers a 
few days or even a week or two later, the rna. jori ty of passengers would 
transfer to other airlines. The revenue lost to a strike-bound airline 
would, therefore, be largely irrecoverable. ( 124 ) 
The Edwards Cc:mnittee report published in 1969 underlined the 
importance of good industrial relations in the airline industry 
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anphasising the high cost of failure and citing evidence suhnitted by 
OOAC to the effect that "the restriction of pilot co-operation" and an 
eventual strike betwaen 16 June 1968 and 3 July 1968 together caused 
the Corporation an estimated loss of approximately £8 million as 
against group profits of £8.2 million for the half year under 
consideration. (125) However, it should be noted that in addition to 
the ilrmadiate high cost of failure, in an earlier era, the whole future 
of the industry could have been undermined by industrial action which 
could have been construed as inpairing safety standards at a time when 
Government was trying to convince the public to be "air-minded". 
In addition to the nature of the operating conditions in the 
industry, there are other rrore broadly based but equally powerful 
reasons why goverrment should have been particularly interested in the 
course of industrial relations in the newly created airways 
corporations. Hans Heymann, an American econanist, in an address to 
rATA's 6th Public Relations Conference at Washington OC in November 
1962, drew attention to the fact that even at that time, by which the 
industry had experienced substantial growth 
"By the conventional measures used by econanists - GNP and total 
employm:mt - the contribution of international air transport can be 
dismissed in one v.1O:r:d: " trivial" . " 
However, govermnents have other special national interests in 
airlines. In the international field air services have always 
constituted a symbol of international prestige and national status. In 
the post war era, each newly emerging nation has alrrost invariably 
taken steps to form its awn national airline. Like possession of the 
flag and the exchange of ambassadors, it has been rega:r:ded as an 
external sign that nationhood has been achieved. ( 126 ) Secondly, 
although in tenns of GNP and employment, the civil air transport 
industry may have been snaIl in 1945, its importance to high ranking 
executives in industry and corrmerce and politicians should not be 
under-valued. The speed and convenience of air services and the saving 
of scarce human and physical resources could produce large indirect 
econanic advantages. (127) 
Bearing such considerations in mind, there was a particular need in 
the civil air transport industry to create a sense of professionalism 
at all levels of employment. "Hire and fire" was no longer percei va:i as 
the solution to industrial disputes and given the potential pc:Mer of 
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organised groups of workers within the industry, the essential 
prerequisite of avoiding the disruption of air services arising fran 
industrial disputes was seen to be the developnant of a sense of 
responsibility in each individual for the job perfoIllEd. (128) 
In order to fully appreciate the significance of such conditions 
which related to the civil air transport industry as distinct fran 
other industries which were included in the nationalisation prograIIlIE 
of the Labour administration, it is useful to cite instances where the 
course of events in respect of civil air transport did not necessarily 
adhere to the general principles laid down for nationalisation. 
Firstly, evidence is provided by the deliberations of the Carmi ttee on 
Public utility Corporations which concerned i tself with the salaries of 
senior staffs of the Boards. The Carmittee drew attention to the 
potential problems which could be encountered if the boards WBre left 
completely free to determine such salaries. The Carmittee recognised 
that, if in the carnrmmi ty as a whole, similar standards of ability, 
technical knowledge and responsibility WBre remunerated on widely 
differing lines, econanic and social grievances and inequalities could 
arise which would compel government action in the long run. The 
Carmi ttee suggested that it could be regarded as a goverrnrent 
responsibility to prevent the emergence of such anomalies in fields 
over which it exercised control and had accepted a general measure of 
responsibility. Similarly, if the newly created public corporations 
WBre left free to pay what they liked, this could lead to undesirable 
campeti tion for recruitment wi thin the government service proper and an 
undesirable tendency for people to be tempted out of the service of 
governrrent and into the service of a corporation by the offer of 
rrarkedly higher pay. (129) The Carrmittee also put the argument for 
discretion, suggesting that the public corporations WBre nore likely to 
be in competition wi th private industry and not the GoverntrEl1t service. 
On balance , it was concluded that the question was only a real one in 
the canparati vel y small group of higher paid staffs since industrial 
wages and, to an increasing extent, clerical and other salaries WBre 
being regulated by industrial agreements and arbitration awards; in 
consequence discretion was favoured.. ( 130 ) 
With respect to the Ail:ways Corporations' discussions between the 
Trea.sw:y and Pe:r:nanent Secretary of the Ministry of Civil Aviation 
confinned that there was little concern aOOut the possibility that at 
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lower administrative and clerical levels salaries would be bad! Y out of 
line with the Civil Service. However, in relation to teclmical staffs, 
the AiI:ways Corporations in c~tition with each other and foreign 
canpanies, v.;ere proposing to offer salaries 30-50% higher than those 
offered by the Ministry of Civil Aviation. (131) The Minister of Civil 
Aviation had envisaged the Civil Aviation Bill including provisions 
about the remuneration and conditions of service in the three Airways 
COrpJrations, to the effect that they would have power to detennine 
rates "in confonni ty with ordina:ry ccmnercial standards", but in order 
to avoid conflict with the public interest the Minster 
"shall require the Corporations to consult him about salaries and 
conditions of individual principal executives and the general 
standards of other classes of employees." 
However, the granting of specific powers to the Minister to 
intervene in matters of remuneration and conditions was regarded as 
"objectionable" by the President of the Board of Trade, and it was 
agreed to leave such matters for infornal discussion between the 
Minister and the Chainnen of the COrpJrations. ( 132) 
In April 1946, it was agreed that the £1,000 per annum paid to part-
time Governors of the BBC should be cut to £600. However, the payment 
of £1,500 to part-time members of the three ail:ways corporations 
(£1,000 if not undertaking executive duties) was agreed by the 
Treasury. (133) The evidence cited may suggest that despite the need 
for Government not to be seen to be favouring one nationalised industry 
over another, there were forces within the Goverrrrrent which felt that 
the special needs of the civil air transport industry justifiably 
warranted different treatment especially at senior level. 
In respect of the statutory provisions which were made for dealing 
with the remuneration and conditions of other staffs in the AiI:ways 
Corporations, again treatment differed fran other nationalised 
industries. Proposals of the Minister of Civil Aviation considered in 
January 1946 dealt with the subject in a comprehensive way. The 
Corporations were to be required to establish joint consul tati ve 
machinery, consisting of nanagement and staff representatives "for the 
discussion of rates of remuneration, conditions of service and welfare 
arrangarvants. " Other Ministers agreed expressing the hope that the 
Corporations would do so without the need for regulations. So, whilst 
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for example, the Minister of Fuel and Power was telling the House of 
Camons that statutory provision was unnecessary in the coal industry, 
senior Ministers ~re agreeing that it was necessary in the case of 
civil aviation. (134) 
Principally, the Minister of Civil Aviation's proposals had nothing 
to do with current or war-time views and experience or the pranpting of 
the Minister of Labour and National Service but was a reflection of the 
British Overseas .Ai:r:ways Act 1939, IIEl1tioned earlier. Whereas this 
legislation had urged BOAC to take account of Union representations, 
the Civil Aviation Bill 1946 took matters a step further by making 
joint consultation a statutory obligation. Evidence may be cited to 
highlight the need for the change of emphasis with particular reference 
to BOAC. For example, although workers in the engineering departments 
of the coIpOration had for same time been organised by such Trade 
Unions as the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Amalgamated Society of 
~rkers, the Electrical Trades Union, the National Union of General 
and Municipal Workers, the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers and 
Braziers and the Transport and General Workers' Union, it was 1943 
before the cOIpOration had shown willing to enter into an industrial 
agreem:mt with the Trade Unions. According to the AEU "the task was 
not easy" and the employers had viewed the approaches of the Trade 
Union "with suspicion." The national agreem:mt operative from 4 April 
1943, which was restricted to the engineering departments, had 
represented an improvement on that which had operated in any of the 
corporation's depots or establishments previously and covered hours of 
work, rates of pay, proficiency payments, shift allarmnces, holiday 
entitlement and provisions for local representation. (135) 
Section 19 of the Civil Aviation Act, 1946 required the airways 
corporations - British Overseas AiIways Corporation, British European 
AiI:ways and British South American AiIways - to make arrangements for 
joint consultation and negotiation with the organisations the 
corporations deemed to represent the staff. The machinery was to be 
established and maintained for (a) the settlement by negotiation of 
terms and conditions of employment of persons employed by the 
corporation, with provision for reference to arbitration in default of 
such settlement in such cases as may be determined by or under such 
agreem:mts; and (b) the discussion of matters affecting the safety, 
health and ~lfare of persons employed by the corp:>ration and of 
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matters of mutual interest to the corporation and such persons, 
including efficiency in the operation of the corporation's services. 
( 136) The Act nade a distinction between the areas which should be 
dealt with by negotiation, which included tenns and conditions of 
anployrrent (pay, pensions, working hours, pericxi of notice, etc) and 
those which should be dealt with by consultation including "matters of 
mutual interest" (safety, health, welfare, efficiency). It should be 
stressed that primarily the Act applied to all British airlines, but 
Section 19 was only binding on the corporations. (137) The position of 
the independent operator was however, clarified in Section 15 ( 1 ) of 
the Civil Aviation Act, 1949 which required that the tenns and 
conditions of employrrent for employees of the independent operators 
should not be less favourable than those observed by the corporations 
· "in the case of persons engaged in comparable work. " Section 15 (2) of 
the Act provided for reference to the Industrial Court in the event of 
a dispute as to whether tenns and conditions ought to canply with the 
requirem:mts of Section 15 (1). 
Although the \\1Ording of the Civil Aviation Act did not require the 
corporations to act together in setting up the machinery for 
negotiation and consultation, they decided that collective action was 
the IIDst appropriate means of ensuring that their statutory obligations 
were fulfilled. Thus the National Joint Council for Civil Air 
Transport (NJCCAT) was set up in 1946 with the declared object of 
securing the largest possible measure of joint action between enployers 
and enplayed in the establishment of machinery for the regulation of 
tenns and conditions of employrrent; the discussion of matters affecting 
the safety, health and welfare of enployees and other matters of mutual 
interest, and the establishment of procedures for the settlement of 
differences. (138) At its inception, the enployers' side constituted 
the three corporations but provision was made for the independent 
operators to became members of the Council as well. The original Trade 
Union membership of the Council represented the wide spectrum of 
employrrent offered by the corporations. The Unions included were the 
British Airline Pilots' Association, the Association of Supervisory 
Staffs , Executives and Technicians, the Association of Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, the Radio Officers' Union, the AEU, the RIU, 
the Analgama.ted Society of Woodworkers, the National Union of Sheet 
Metal Workers and Braziers, the National Union of General and Municipal 
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Workers, the rrGWU and the Navigators and Engineer Officers' Union. No 
Trade Union or employer could be adderl to the list without the consent 
of the Council. (139) 
The nachinery createrl by the NJC was to include the NJC itself as 
the final consultative and negotiating body at national level wi thin 
the industry; the NJC acting as the sponsor of any other carmi ttees 
which might be createrl to 
negotiation and consultation. 
nachinery which emergerl. 
form a ccmprehensi ve structure for 
( 140) Figure 7 . 7 depicts the NJC 
The first na jor question which the NJC had to deal with was the 
means by which wages and conditions of employm:mt for the wide 
variation of different groups \\Quld be dealt with and primarily this 
had to remain a matter for the particular Trade Unions concerned. A 
system of National Sectional Panels (NSPs) was therefore devised to 
negotiate tenns and conditions of employm:mt on an industry-wide basis 
for particular groups of employees. This provision was laid dawn in 
the constitution of the NJC which states: 
"The Council shall form Sectional Joint Panels for such groups of 
employees of the employers as the Council shall decide. 1he 
Constitution of each of the Sectional Panels so fornai and the 
nanner of appointment of the :rrenbers shall be dete:rmined by the 
Council. Each of the Sectional Panels shall be given plenary powers 
to negotiate and settle tenns and conditions of anployrrent of 
particular interest to the groups of anployees covered by the 
Sectional Panel." ( 141 ) 
In deciding how employees should be grouped for the panels, it was 
.irrq;:ortant to appreciate that too many \\Quld be wasteful of tine and 
effort and create problems of liaison. On the other hand, too fav 
y,uuld IIEan that employees who might have very little in camon \\Quld 
find themselves l~ together discussing each others' business 
creating difficulties in the resolution of particular problems. (142) 
In essence, there have always been 10 or 11 Sectional Panels under the 
NJC although their constitution and scope have been flexible. For 
example, as early as 1948, attention was given to the original 
allocation of various grades to panels set up under the negotiating 
procedure and the scope of the Engineering and Maintenance Panel was 
extenderl to include all hourly-rated engineering staffs, enbracing 
engineering labourers, engineering process workers, engineering 
tradesmen, engineering plant maintenance \\Qrkers, building maintenance 
y,urkers, stores labourers, stores assistants, storekeepers, stores 
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section leaders and workshop progress men. (143) Similarly, in 1954, 
the Supervisory and Technical National Sectional Panel was 
reconstituted allowing the AEU and ETU to have direct representation on 
the panel, thereby providing the means by which these Trade Unions 
could fully represent any member who was pranoted to supervisory or 
technical grades. (144) 
For the purpose of consultation on matters of local concern or of 
concern to a particular corporation, the NJC set up local carmittees at 
establishrcents in the UK having not less than 30 employees falling 
wi thin the scope of the Sectional Panels. These local ccmnittees were 
to fall into two categories. Firsti y , local panel carmi ttees 
represented mambers of the same (or similar) occupational group working 
at the same location. The occupational groupings used for these 
ccmnittees corresponded with the groupings used for the NSPs. The 
general function of the local panels was to prcarote consultation 
between local managerrent and staff representatives on matters relating 
to working conditions and production. IDeal panels could not :reach 
decisions contrary to national agrearents on trade questions such as 
wages, nor could they decide on wider questions of policy going beyond 
their location or occupational grouping. H~er, local panels could 
discuss such matters and refer them to their NSP or to the NJC itself. 
In essence then, the local panels \V\9re bound by national agreements and 
\'¥ere ~ to consider and decide matters of local concern within 
the frantlSWOrk of agrearents :recorded by their appropriate NSP but they 
did not have any power to alter such agreements or to take local 
decisions at variance with them. The local structure was supplenE11ted 
by local joint panel carmi ttees representing rrenbers of a nmnber of 
occupational groups working at the same location. Their function was 
to discuss matters of cammon concern to all employees at a particular 
base or station, or to m:::>re than one local panel ccmnittee. ( 145 ) 
Although the comprehensive machinery for negotiation and 
consultation at both national and local level devised by the NJC 
appeared quite systematic and capable of efficient operation, within a 
feN years :roodifications \V\9re required. Within two years of its 
foundation it was found that given the extent to which "failure to 
agree" had been recorded at the local level sarre IIEChanism had to be 
provided to speed up settiE!IEIlts and, to this end, the NJC set up a 
joint standing carmi ttee canposErl of representatives of each side of 
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the Council with power to give decisions. (146) Nevertheless, 
canplaints persisted. that the nachinery set up under the NJCCAT which 
was probably rrore canprehensi ve than that provided. in any other 
industry "was not being used. as it should be" and that there was a 
"lack of prior consultation". ( 147) As rrore issues becane incapillle of 
resolution at the local level and references to the national nachine:ry 
negated. the possibility of early settlanant, industrial relations ~ 
strained. not only between employers and Trade Unions but differences 
also began to emerge between lay representatives and the official Trade 
Union side. (148) 
The whole panel nachinery and consultative arranganants ~ 
constantly held up for review, however, disputes rerrained. unsettled and 
the nachine:ry was ultimately seen to fail in its inability to prevent a 
najor conflict between the engineering staffs of BOAC and the employers 
in 1958. A disputed pay claim and overtime ban escalated into a long 
confrontation in which BOAC was accused of nanipulating workers into 
strike action in order "to arbitrarily rid itself of certain people, in 
order to coerce the rest into su1:mission." (149) 
The reaction to claims of victimisation of shop stewards on the part 
of the Trade Union side was ambivalent. George Scott, the National 
Officer of the EIT'U, was supportive, whilst Jim Matthews, the Secretary 
of the NJCCAT and National Officer of the GMWU, suggested the existence 
of a "carmunist plot" at lDndon Airport. ( 150 ) For the employers, the 
origins of the dispute lay beyond the originally disputed pay claim. 
Basil Srrallpiece, the Managing Director of BOAC stated, 
"Of course this present case is not an isolated one; it is the 
culmination of a trend over the last six years or rrore towards rrore 
and rrore unauthorised and unconstitutional interference with nomal 
working. BEA took their stand against this trend SarE four years 
ago in an issue that has CarE to be known as the Peters Case, since 
when their relations with their staff have been much better. It' s 
now our turn." (151) 
The Shop Stewards at lDndon surrmed up their view: 
" the Trade unions are not an extension of the Personnel Depa.rt.m:mt 
of the Corporation. It is not the function of the Trade Unions, or 
of the Trade union Officers, to issue instructions to their menbers 
on behalf of the employers. . . Trade Unionism is a defensive 
instrument for naintaining or ilnproving labour standards." 
The dispute which continued for rronths could only be settled by the 
intervention of the Industrial Court in Novenber. ( 152 ) 
With the growth of carmercial aviation in the 1960s and the 
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:introduction of productivity bargaining , largely as a resfXJnse to 
goverrment prices and incar:res fXJlicy, greater strains were placed on 
the negotiating and consultative machinery and the :invol vem:mt of the 
local level increasErl. Subjects covera:i by joint consultation in the 
airline industry had included vvelfare, physical working conditions, 
efficiency and adrninistrati ve matters but not pay. Pay had to be 
negotiatErl nationally and local grievances were not considera:i a 
desirable subject for discussion by consultative ccmnittees. With 
prices and incomes fXJlicy, the questions of efficiency, productivity 
and remuneration vvere inextricably linkErl. (153) The two tier 
productivity and payagreerrents in the 1960s recognised that success in 
negotiating productivity improvem:mts depends on agreement at local 
level. The "Tier I" agreement of August 1967 gave wage and salary 
increases over a three year period of 4%, 4~% and another 4~% in return 
for the acceptance by all staffs of changes :in working practices 
designErl to increase productivity. Whilst Tier I was negotiated by the 
National Sectional Panels, Tier II provided for additional productivity 
IIEasures affecting the specific acti vi ties of groups of staff, gi v:ing 
the opportunity for more pay by additional contributions to 
producti vi ty. ( 154 ) 
Whilst the local machinery beca:rre nore heavily involved in pay, the 
IDC found it increasingly difficult to cope with the volUIIE of work 
because rranbers vvere not full tinE and meetings could not be speedily 
arranged. Although the NSPs vvere able to handle negotiations for their 
respective occupational groups, it was recognised that another 
ccmnittee was needed to assist the IDC in matters relating to all 
anployees in air transfXJrt. Consequently, in May 1967, the IDC 
established a General Purpose Carrmi ttee (GPC). The constitution of the 
GPC lists its function as: 
" (a) to detennine conditions of employment ccmron to employees 
covera:i by nore than one National Sectional Panel, which will, becxma 
obligatory on the National Sectional Panels concerned subJect to 
confinnation by the Council , ' , 
(b) to act on behalf of, and with full authorlty of the Councll ill 
any matters of concern to the full. Council which ~ quick 
action (c) to negotiate generally ill regard to productl Vl ty and 
pay in respect of all grades of staff, with the pennission of the 
Council." (155) 
In short, where negotiations cut across the boundaries of the Sectional 
Panels, and where they apply to all nanbers of staff, they are 
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conducted at GPC level. 
Although the negotiating and consultative rrachinery set up by the 
NJC has evel ved and efforts have been rrade to acccmrodate change, the 
preference to avoid long winded procedures for the settling of 
differences, short circuiting the system by going to dispute has 
remained, along with the pressure fran lay representatives for a 
greater say in negotiation. (156) In 1974, the AEU took a policy 
decision which envisaged the elimination of the panel rrachinery to 
speed the resolution of differences supporting the total detennination 
of pay and conditions locally. The implementation of this resolution 
was, hONeVer, resisted by both the Employers' Side and the Trade Union 
Side of the IDC. Fran the enployers' point of view , probably the 
overriding priority was to restrict the role of Shop Stewards. On the 
Trade Union Side the general consensus was that the negotiation of pay 
and conditions on a danestic basis would inevitably lead to a 
deterioration of conditions in certain areas of the industry and 
undennine the leading position of civil aviation workers in the pay and 
conditions league tables. (157) In an address to the 1977 AUE.W 
(Engineering Section) National Carmi ttee, the President of the Union 
sUlIlTEd up the position in relation to joint negotiation, 
"For consecutive years you as a ccmni.ttee have re-affirnEd a 
resolution adopted in the '60s or early '70s saying that we must 
secure certain things wi thin civil air transport and if we could 
not, then we must cane out. It is impossible to operate that 
resolution, as it means that members would be unrepresented, because 
not only would we be fighting rranagement, but other Unions too if 
the management had the temerity to meet us in separate 
negotiations." 
The President urged that the Union's :members should not be brought out 
of the joint arrangements affecting civil air transport. ( 158) 
Clearly, despite the original intention to provide a stable 
fraIIlEM:>rk for the conduct of industrial relations in the airways 
corporations, the canprehensi ve system which ererged has been subject 
to various strains fran within, which generally it has survived. 
Overlaying the internal strain emanating fran the nature of the 
machinery itself has been the difficulty of embracing finns which 
constitute the independent sector of the airline industry. Similarly, 
the course of industrial relations has been canplicated by differing 
views as to the constitution of the civil air transport industry per 
se. It is suggested that the very origins and developrent of the 
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IDCCAT reflects a preoccupation with airlines and a view that they 
exclusively constitute the civil air transport industry. However, in 
particular areas of 'WOrk such as ground handling, labour of airlines, 
airports and other agents interface in providing a similar contribution 
towards the ult.inate objective of the speedy Il'kJVE!lEnt of passengers and 
freight be~ two points. 
In considering the quasi-private sector of the industry, it should 
be noted. that fran the outset the IDCCAT anbodied. provisions to allow 
for membership by the UK independent operators. In 1948, the 
Enployers' Side sponso~ an application by the Air Charter Association 
for membership. For the Trade Union Side, the nee:i to obtain knowledge 
of the wages and. working conditions applying in the various charter 
ccmpanies was seen to be the prerequisite to ensuring that they were 
brought into line with those applying in the three state corporations. 
(159) In effect this objective had been already legitimise:! by the 
provisions of the Civil Aviation Act 1949 cite:! earlier and was 
reinforced in 1952 when the Conservative governrren.t gave new 
opportunities for the private airlines to operate sche:!ule:! air 
services as associates of the corporations. The tenns of reference 
given to the Air Transport Advisory Council made clear that private 
airlines should not undennine IDC standards of employment. Ministerial 
approval to any associate agreement was subject to his being satisfie:! 
that: 
" (a) The tenns and conditions of service of persons employed by the 
applicant contained in any agreement for the tine being in force 
between the applicant and organisations representative of the 
persons employed, are not less favourable than those contained in 
agreements negotiated through the machinery of the National Joint 
Council for Civil Air Transport for persons employed in canparable 
'WOrk. 
(b) Except in so far as the tenus and conditions of employment of 
persons employed by the applicant are in accordance with any such 
agreemant aforesaid, such tenus and conditions are not less 
favourable than the terms and conditions observed by the 
Corporations in the case of persons engaged. in canparable 'WOrk." 
(160) 
The concept of canparability and interpretation of the scope of 
statutory obligations has been a stumbling block in industrial 
relations. Even where national agreements could be reached between the 
Trade Union and the Employers' Sides of the state corporations which 
were then accepted. by the Association of Charter Canpanies or its 
successor, the Independent Airlines Association, claims for parity have 
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not always been met by individual operators. Not all independent 
airlines have felt the need to participate in the NJC machinery, but 
even those who have bargained collectively as members of the NJC have 
claimed fran time to time, that they did not have to observe any 
agrearents reached through the machinery. (161) In sul::rnitting evidence 
to the Edwards Ccmnittee in 1969, the Trade Unions considered the 
requirarents of canparabili ty in civil aviation legislation had not 
resulted in the independent operators agreeing to conditions of service 
similar to those in the corporations. The Trade Unions also cited the 
way in which sane independent operators had set up subsidiaries not 
specifically "constituted for the purpose of providing air transport 
services or of carrying out other fonns of aerial transport work", in 
other words, for maintenance, etc, thereby placing employees of those 
companies outside the protection afforded ~ legislation. (162) 
In effect, the problem of co.rrparabili ty and the scope of legislative 
protection has extended beyond the airlines themselves with respect to 
employees engaged in ground operations. Whilst the state corporations 
have tended towards a preference for carrying out their ground handling 
themselves, by necessity independent operators have tended to use the 
services of an agent. "Necessity" derives fram the fact that if every 
independent operator, of which there could be 30 or 40 operating out of 
a busy airport, vvere responsible for their own ground handling, the 
efficiency of ground operations \\1Ould be undennined wi thout excessive 
co-ordination and co-operation. Similarly, for the small airline, 
heavy expense may be involved if capacity for ground handling has to be 
provided at the end of every route flown. So the general tendency is 
for only large airlines to provide ground handling capacity at their 
base airports. Fran the labour point of view, however, different 
ownership structures may be regarded as superfluous in determining pay 
and conditions and similarity of tasks may result in claims for parity. 
These ccmplexi ties are adequately daronstrated by an examination of 
industrial relations in a praninent handling agent, Servisair Limited, 
which was fonned in 1967 and has provided services at a number of UK 
airports since April 1954, trading initially as Manchester Airport 
Agencies. As a handling agent, the canpany's position with respect to 
civil air transport is anana.lous. It could be argued that there is a 
broad family resenblance between the jobs of groundstaff employed by 
the public corporations who fall within the scope of statutory 
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provl.S~ons relating to industrial relations in the industry and the 
jobs of those employed by handling agents on ground operations. ( 163 ) 
As far as Servisair is concerned, there is a history of claiJns made 
by the Unions for parity with the public corporations. In 1967 the 
'IGWU lodged a claim on behalf of its nenbers under Section 8 of the 
Tenns and Conditions of Employment Act 1959. The claim was heard by 
the Industrial Court on 28 November 1967, but failed on the grounds 
that: 
"The ~loyers are not engaged in the industry (civil air transport) 
to which the . . . Tenus of Reference relate. The claim has 
therefore not been established." ( 164 ) 
In 1977, the 'IGWU lodged a claim on behalf of "Airport Manual 
WOrkers (Apron Services and Cargo Handlers) employed by Servisair 
Limited claiming that the employer was observing tenus and conditions 
of employment less favourable than the recognised tenus and conditions 
as defined in paragraph 2 (a) of Part I of Schedule II of the Employrrent 
Protection Act 1975. The Central Arbitration Carrmittee concluded that 
Servisair Limited was not engaged in civil air transport and that the 
claim was not ~ll founded. (165) 
A further claim for parity with British Ai1:ways was made by APEX on 
behalf of its nenbers employed by Servisair in clerical grades. This 
claim made under Schedule II of the Employment Protection Act 1975, 
p:rragraph 2(b) alleged that the employer was observing tenus and 
conditions of employment that were less favourable than the general 
level of tenus and conditions, but again the camn.ittee found that the 
claim was not ~ll founded. 
In essence, both Unions had continually claimad that their :rrembers 
were entitled to parity with the state corporations. Each had pursued 
the same point of pari ty , though each under different legal 
circumstances. Each tine the same ccmparators were advanced, that is, 
anployers paying the highest rerrnmerational levels in the civil air 
transport industry. The employers argued that the contention that its 
anployees ~re in the same geographical spot doing the same work as 
British Airways was totally unsound and that: 
"it would be utterly wrong to tie the canpany to any pay scales 
other than those related to its v.Jell being. The vast and nurrerous 
disparities of size and resources between Servisair and British 
Airways • • • ~uld mean that a decision in favour o~ ~i ~ \\GUld 
be a decision for the tennination of the Canpany' s activ~ties (166) 
The ananal y of the NJCCAT dete:r:mi.ning the pay and conditions of 
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employnent of groundstaff employed by airlines, whilst others employed 
at airports who by the similarity of work could be regarded as 
contributing tCMards the final product of the civil air transport 
industry are differentiated by the structure of ownership, extends to 
groundstaff employed directly by airport authorities. As previously 
suggested, after the Second World War, employees at Ministry airports 
tended to be regarded as an integral part of the Civil Service 
indistinct fran any other group of workers . Given the long established 
principle of canparabili ty, the establishmant of the NJCCAT influenced 
the detennination of the wage rates for manual staffs at Ministry 
airports. Equality of earnings with outside analogues was facilitated 
by coopll'ison with employees who worked under similar conditions, 
including requirements for shift operations, etc, at airports and had 
similar payment systems. Particular groups of groundstaff employed by 
the Ministry \'VOrked. alongside employees of the aiIways corporations and 
under pressure from the 'IGWU and the Union for General and Municipal 
Workers which represented staffs in both areas the basis of pay, 
overtime rates and allCMaIlces for shift working were brought into line 
with the NJCCAT with effect from 1 October 1957. (167) '!he 
inextricable identity with the State Corporations would also have been 
reinforced. when the specific tasks of baggage handling and aircraft 
loading transferred to the airlines at Heathrow and Gatwick airports in 
1961 and 1963 respectively. (168) 
For almost a decade, the majority of industrial staffs employed at 
Ministry airports en joyed parity with BEA employees whilst the 
remainder continued to be rerrrunerated on Civil Service grades. (169) 
However, the fornation of the British Airports Authority in 1966 
offered. the opportunity to review negotiating procedures for staffs at 
the larger UK airports. Whilst assuming control of HeathrCM, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Prestwick airports on vesting Day, 1 April 1966, the 
Authority assumed responsibility for a staff of 3,128 of which 2,969 
were on seconcirrEnt fran the Ministries of Aviation, Public Buildings 
and Works and Defence. '!he BAA represented the largest grouping of 
airports in the UK, handling 60.4% of passengers in 1966/7 with 
nnmicipal airports accounting for 28.5%, the Board of Trade 9% and 
private UK airports 2.1%. Heathrow dominated the group handling 12 
million passengers whilst Gatwick handled 1.6 million, Prestwick 0.5 
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million and Stansted 11,000. In te:r:ms of employrrent, again Heathrow 
daninated accounting for 1,973 of a total \\Urk force of 3,128 on 1 
April 1966. Although part of the total ground handling function had 
transferra:i to the airlines, these airports still employed substantial 
numbers of industrial staff accounting for nore than 50% of the total 
work forces. (170) 
The BAA inherited eight different pay structures covering 80 
different grades of industrial \\Urkers. Pay structures for the 
rrajority were related to BEA rates, whilst the remainder were on 
industrial civil se:rvants rates or their pay was related to other 
agrearents covering specific industries, for example, electrical 
contracting. Whilst six of the pay structures had invol ved a 
differential for staff at Heathrow, the other two structures covering 
the rrajority of industrial staff were based on BEA's practice and did 
not differentiate between Heathrow and other airports. In 
consolidating the new pay structures, the BAA standardised on the basis 
of rates in force for the greater number of workers. (171) In effect, 
the existence of the huge airport at Heathrow meant that staff could 
exert pressure to llEke continual upNard adjustments in pay which would 
autcxraticall y apply at other airports in the group. 
The Authority was conscious of the need to retain the rra jori ty of 
seconded civil se:rvants which represented the largest collective body 
of expertise in airport plarming and administration. The Authority 
detennined to develop a professional structure which \\Uuld appeal to 
their talents. In order to reinforce the existing expertise of the 
seconded civil service staffs, the BAA undertook a drive for the highly 
selective recruitment of specialist staffs outside the Civil Service, 
and within a year, the strength of the Authority had been inc:reased to 
3,389 of wham 729 had been directly recruited. The Civil Service class 
and grade systen was deemed inappropriate and un\\Urkable in the new 
cc:mrercial frarrEWOrk which prevailed. Seconded staffs had been drawn 
fran nore than 160 different Civil Service grades and classes, rrost of 
then with different rates of pay and conditions of employnent. The 
need for simplification and integration into a unifonn structure that 
would p.rovide equitable conditions for staff :recruited from external 
sectors whilst ensuring that they would be at least as attractive as 
those to which civil servants were accustcm3Ci was the rra jor priority. 
In principle, the Authority also aime:l to rarove the kind of 
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distinction between white-collar and industrial staffs which 
traditional to the Civil Service. ( 172) 
was 
On 25 August 1966, the Authority entered. into an agreemant with 
Staff Associations and Trade Unions including the Civil Service 
Clerical Association, Civil Service Union, Institution of Professional 
Civil Servants, Society of Civil Servants, the AEU, the GMWU, the 
National Fed.eration of Building Trades Operatives and the 'IGWU. The 
agreatEl1.t established. a machinery for joint negotiation of wages and 
working conditions and the full range of issues affecting the working 
envirormEIlt and arq;>loyee relations (See Figure 7.8). Separate standing 
ccmnittees were established. for industrial and non-industrial staff and 
agreatEl1.t was reached. on one pa.y structure for all non-industrial 
staff, whilst two closely allied structures were devised for skilled 
workers and other manual staffs. (173) 
IDeal joint carmittees were set up at each airp:>rt with the object 
of providing a recognised TIEaIlS of consultation between management and 
anployees at each airp:>rt, of securing the fullest maasure of co-
operation in the efficient working of each airp:>rt, of enabling 
anployees to have a wider interest in and greater responsibility for 
the conditions under which their work was perfonned, to ensure that 
central agreements were put into effect and to prevent friction and 
misunderstanding. The local joint ccmni ttees also fonned an integral 
part of a procedure for dealing with grievances and avoiding disputes. 
Paragraph 15 of the constitutions of these ccmni ttees stated: 
"There shall be no withdrawal of labour, stoppages of work or 
closure whilst discussions under the constituted procedure are 
proceeding or pending." ( 174 ) 
As previously suggested., the basic rates of pay for all BAA. 
groundstaff were carrm:m to all BAA airp:>rts, with the exception of 
firemen at Heathrow who received rrore per annum than their counterparts 
elsewhere. The grading structure for groundstaffs was limited to five 
levels with separate structures being provided for firemen (who aspired 
to a status approaching non-industrial staff) and craftsmen, the rrost 
important being electricians, general fitters and rrotor transport 
fitters. In 1969, just over half of the BAA's non-craft manual workers 
~ arq;>layed on the ICMest grade "A" although significant differences 
occurred at individual airp:>rts. At Prestwick for example, the greater 
proportion of manual workers were employed on higher grades, reflecting 
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the wide range of duties where the airport authority discharges rrost of 
the services to airlines. ( 175) 
In settling pay, one of the main principles which the BAA applied 
was the justification of increases through prcxiucti vi ty agrearents. 
Industrial staff ~re expected to continue to co-operate with 
management in the introduction of new IIEthcx:is of working designed to 
p:rcxrote efficiency. Full flexibility of staff utilisation was to be 
achieved, giving the authority the right to detennine the nmnber of 
staff required for any particular task and to deploy staff as and when 
IaJUired. between tasks and work areas. Many restrictive practices were 
to be rerroved with, for example , drivers being IaJUired. to perfonn all 
duties incidental to the use of their vehicles such as washing and 
cleaning, routine daily inspections and assistance with loading and 
unloading. When not ~loyed on their normal duties, firanen could be 
employed on general airport duties including driving. ( 176 ) 
On the face of it, the BAA was establishing its own independent 
franework for the conduct of industrial relations, strengthening the 
invol verrEIlt of the local carrmi ttees, and establishing a finn link 
between danestic levels of pay and work perfollIECl. However, a second 
principle in settling pay re-introduced the long standing relationship 
with the NJCCAT and BEA. In general, the BAA's policy with respect to 
the pay and conditions of its ~loyees was that they "should be 
settled wi thin the context of BAA requireJ:rents" but "should continue to 
be no worse overall than those of the State airlines." (177) 
In effect, the BAA. was prepared to continue to adhere closely to the 
settlanents in the NJCCAT thereby ensuring that staff would continue to 
be equated with the highest paid ~loyees in the industry. 
The adherence to NJCCAT agrearents is derronstrated by a review of 
pay settlanents in the early years of operation. Increases of 5-7% 
paid to BAA staffs fran 1 July 1967 paralleled a first instaJ.nent under 
BEA's 1965 three year agreement. Six nonths later, BAA staff receiVErl 
a 4~% increase and on 1 January 1969, another 4% under the tenus of a 
three year prcxiuctivity deal signed in 1968 - the final instaJ.nent of 
4~% being paid on 1 January 1970. The timing of this productivity 
agreement coincided abrost exactly with the framework of a "Tier I" 
productivity agreement covering all anployees of the NJCCAT under which 
similar increases were agreed. A further settlement applying to BAA 
550 
manual workers granted increases of 7% with a InllU.II1UlTl 30 shillings 
extra per week with improved shift allowances and holiday enti tlE!TEI1.ts 
fran 1 October 1969. Unlike the 1968 three year agreem:mt, however, 
this new deal was not based on quantifiable provisions related to 
improvem:mts of productivity, but on a general contribution of BAA 
workers to overall efficiency in the past. '!his agreem:mt followai 
closely on one within the IDCCAT' s Engineering and Maintenance Panel, a 
"Tier II" agreem:mt giving BEA and BOAC workers an increase of 30 
shillings per ~ fran 1 September and improved shift allowances. 
(178) In effect, whilst the BAA naintained independent negotiating 
structures, it was constantly mindful of agreements reached in the 
State Corporations even to the extent of ensuring that productivity 
deals 'Were canparable. 
Whilst settlements in the Ministry, and later the BAA airports, 'Were 
increasingly influenced by settlements in the NJCCAT, ground staffs at 
local authority airports became increasingly integrated into the 
negotiating machinery of the IDC for IDeal Authorities Services (Manual 
Workers) by the caning together of these airports to detennine jointly 
the pay and conditions of certain classes of employees. Prilnaril y, the 
NJC detennined the pay and conditions of the hundreds of thousands of 
local authority manual workers of whom less than 2,000 'Were employed at 
airports. Joint negotiation was catered for by the setting up of a 
Municipal Airports Panel under the auspices of the NJC, and a scheme 
for the grading of employees at rrrunicipal airports was agreed in April 
1960. The new structure encompassed four specialist grades for 
covering airport hands, marshallers, duty crew and crash crew 
attenciants/firerrEn. Other employees including general labourers, car 
park attendants, cleaners, gardeners, transport drivers, etc, 'Were 
graded in accordance with the schedule of wages for General Classes 
issued by the National Joint Council. However, the scope of the 
Municipal Airports Panel was extended later to embrace security guards, 
car park attendants/labourers and semi-skilled engineers. The 
designation of "airport hand" represented a departure fran past 
practice and the duties of the new designation 'Were defined as 
labouring, loading, baggage handling, marshalling, left luggage, 
indicator boards, flare path, conducting airport tours, etc. The 
designation duty crew covered all these tasks but additionally invol VEri 
re-fuelling and standing-by for crash crew and fire duties. At IIDSt of 
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the smaller airports, firarenl crash crew attendants were therefore not 
enployerl solely on fire duties . Similarly fEM airports enploye1 
rrarshallers as such with marshalling duties being undertaken by airport 
hands. In order to allow for the differing nature of work with scale 
of operation local authority airports vvere classified into four groups 
for pay purposes. The classification was based on published statistics 
of terminal passengers handled which could be re-assessed with future 
developnen.t or the falling off of traffic. Within the scope of the 
Municipal Airports Panel provision was made for supplerrentary payments 
at Provincial Councilor individual local authority levels. (179) 
A National Board for Prices and Inccmas report, which examined the 
pay of groundstaffs at airports in 1969, highlighted the anomalous 
position of these staffs enployed under different ownership structures. 
In general, the rep::>rt found that similar tasks were carried out by 
workers of different status at different airports. The range of tasks 
carried out by a particular grade varied fran airport to airport even 
within the same airport owner group, although there were distinct 
similarities across the board. Equally, the similarity between the 
jobs of airport and airline groundstaff was highlighted as an 
inevitability since at any given time airport staff at same airports 
will carry out the tasks which at other airports with a different 
division of functions will be perfornai by airline staff. (180) 
As far as pay and conditions of service are concerned the basic 
grade in local authorities eg:uivalent to the BAA's grade "A" was 
identified as airport hand. H~, any similarity of pay and. 
conditions ended here. The Board found that largely as a result of 
different productivity agreemants substantial differences in the basic 
pay of carp:rrable groundstaff occurred at airports both within the sane 
owner groups and between them. Allowances given for shift and ~end 
or night working differed betvveen different owner groups because they 
were detennined in different ways. At BAA airports varying lump sum 
payments vvere made depending on the actual shifts worked whilst local 
authority airports made hourly paynents for alternating or rotating 
shifts plus premium paynents for Saturday afternoon and Sunday working 
which vvere related to basic rates. The different systems gave widely 
differing results for shift working with BAA staffs generally receiving 
higher payments for nost canbinations of hours than their local 
authority counterparts. Similarly rates for avertilre working differed; 
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the rate for Sunday working being time and two thirds at BAA ai.:rports 
and double tine at local authority ai.:rports. (181) 
'!he Board similarly fOlllld that on balance the total earnings of 
ai.:rport staff employed at BAA airports were greater than their local 
authority COllllterpartS, the difference being rrost narked in the case of 
firemen and craftsmen. The only way in which the earnings of local 
authority staffs could be brought close to their BAA colleagues was by 
working rrore hours. Rostered overtine was highest at local authority 
ai.:rports averaging 3.9 to 5.7 hours per week for different classes as 
canpared with less than one hour at BAA ai.:rports. Unscheduled overtine 
was ha.vever, higher for the BAA ( 6 . 8 hours as opposed to 4.4 hours). 
(182) 
Other evidence suggests that the basic rates of pay for ai.:rport 
workers in the local authorities continued to be relatively lOW' with 
earnings being brought near to the national average only by excessive 
overtime working, throughout the next decade. In 1977, the top basic 
rate at rrost municipal ai.:rports was £41.52; the national average weekly 
earnings for male manual workers at the same tine was £73.12. Tables 
7.1 and 7.2 highlight the incidence of overtime working at rrost local 
authority ai.:rports which provided the means of increasing earnings to 
approximate to the national average. 
'!he anollllt of overtime working at municipal ai.:rports which averaged 
just above 11 hours per week was far in excess of the national average 
for male manual workers in 1977 which was 5.8 hours per week. (183) 
The question of law- pay anong local authority ai.:rport manual workers 
in canparison to their airline and other ai.:rport cOlllltexparts was taken 
up by a special joint carrmittee of the Municipal Airport Panel in 1978. 
In considering rates of pay, the tenns of reference of the carrmi ttee 
were to consider: "developrrants with regard to the BAA and British 
Ai:rways pay and grading restructuring exercises and self financing 
productivity arrangements. " 
The working party fOlllld that although the BAA employed firemen and 
(at ai.:rports in scotland), apron staff who carried out duties sllnilar 
to those employed at municipal ai.:rports there were great differences in 
rates of pay between BAA and British Airways employees on the one hand 
and Municipal Airport Panel employees on the other. Of overriding 
significance was the way in which earnings had diverged during the 
period of government pay policy. Evidence already existed to suggest 
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that during the period of pay restraint in the 1960s despite the co-
ordination of negotiations even when different ~es and 
occupational groups had been involved the increases paid to BEA, BOAC 
and BAA ~loyees had been at least twice the "nonn" of 3~% and higher 
for some groups. IDeal authorities which had interpreted government 
pay policy in the strictest terms had, havever, paid their airport 
workers in camon with others, 3~% in 1968. Similarly during the 
period of pay policy operating from July 1975, rrnmicipal airport 
anployees had received the wage increases pennissible under each 
stage (£6.00 per week supplement in January 1976, 5% supplement in 
January 1977 and 10% increase in January 1978). During the same period 
both BAA and BA ~loyees received increases beyond the limits set by 
pay policy , receiving government approval on the basis that the 
increases in rates of pay could be net from savings achieved by 
productivity schemes. Producti vi ty schemes based on the "value adderl" 
concept were introduced giving all ~loyees a bonus of 10%. In 
addition, the BAA carried out a pay and grading review giving operative 
grades increases of up to £12 per week from 1 November 1978. 
Similarly , British Airways reviewed the grading structures of its apron 
anployees from 1 January 1979 which gave increases in basic rates of up 
to £15 per week with substantial increases in shift pay and the 
introduction of a 5% productivity scheme. (184) 
As far as the Trade Union side of the Municipal AiI:ports Panel is 
concerned the problem of the local authority carrmitment to pay :pJlicy 
could have been adequately dealt with by the employers joining them in 
an approach to government for municipal airport ~loyees to be treated 
as a special case within pay policy on the grounds of canparability of 
earnings with BAA and BA. The employers however, rejected the 
:pJssibility of an approach to government but recognised that existing 
arrangements failed to reflect the widely differing duties and scale of 
operations at the 19 municipal airports falling within the purview of 
the Municipal AiI:ports Panel, and that rates - particularly at the 
larger airports - had fallen seriously out of line with BAA and British 
Airways. (185) Both sides of the Panel could, therefore, accept the 
reccmnendations of the working party that the relevant canparator for 
airport hands ~loyed at nrunicipal airports should be EA. ground 
se:r:vices grades one to four; airport hands should be divided. into four 
grades matching grades one to four in EA.; the relevant canparator for 
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security guards should be BAA and the relevant ccmparator for full time 
firanen employed at the larger nnmicipal airports should be BAA. ( 186 ) 
In determining rates of pay, the employers' rra jor conceDl was for the 
srraller airports supporting financial losses which might not be able to 
meet the cost of large increases. This becarre a lxme of contention 
between the two sides of the Panel, the employers ProfOsin9 that the 
classification of airports be revised to three groups, whilst the Trade 
Union Side supported a two group classification with nost airports 
falling wi thin the higher category. 
In seeking parity with BA, the employers suggested that a 20% 
allowance for productivity/efficiency be rrade. This profOsal was 
designed to ensure that any increases in rates of pay could be achieved 
with the :minimum additional cost and ~uld, therefore, be nore likely 
to receive gove:rnment approval; that nnmicipal airports could .i.rrplem:mt 
as a condition of the revised wages structure, .i.rrpravenents in ~rking 
arrangements that could result in savings and that productivity 
payments ~uld provide a means of reducing earnings in the event of 
future industrial disputes. (187) 
Whilst the principle of comparability could be agreed by both sides 
the rneans by which it should be achieved remained a fOint of contention 
in the late 1970s. The institution of the Standing Ccmnission on Pay 
Camparabili ty offered the fOssibili ty of agreement. In the face of a 
wave of public sector disputes the government had wanted to encourage 
negotiators to consider comparability exercises throughout the public 
services in general. 
established to examine 
The Standing Commission was, therefore, 
the tenns and conditions of employment of 
workers in the public services and to refOrt on the fOssibility of 
establishing acceptable bases of comparison, including comparison with 
tenns and conditions for comparable ~rk and of rraintaining appropriate 
inteDlaI relativities . Primarily the investigations of the Carrmission 
were to be directed towards assessing the appropriate form of 
canparison with tenns and conditions in other sectors of the econc.my, 
identifying relevant comparators, making suggestions on how camparisons 
should be carried out and indicating how camparisons should be rrade 
available to relevant negotiators. (188) 
As part of the Municipal Airports Panel pay settlement of January 
1979 it was agreed that a reference be rrade to the Standing Camrnission 
on Pay Canparabili ty . The reference covered 1,550 rranual workers at 
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municipal airports and. included alxmt 750 airport hands, 400 duty 
crew/fireren and 400 security guards. (189) In subnissions to the 
Carmission, the errployers registered their concern that if basic rates 
were adjusted in line with canparators, in some cases shift payments 
and overtine earnings could bring total earnings to a higher level than 
that which obtained in both British Airways and the BAA. In principle, 
they were also conscious of a need to ensure that if basic rates were 
adjusted the work obtained for that should be no less than that 
obtained for the basic rate in organisations with which canparisons 
were nade. In essence, it was argued that greater flexibility should 
be achieved by the rem:wal of a nmnber of restrictive practices which 
existed at nnmicipal airports. (190) 
As a basis for their investigations, the Standing Ccmnission 
ini tiall y assessed the work of the Municipal .Airp:::>rts Panel Working 
Party. The Carmission naintained that the proposals for canparison as 
devised by this body could not be endorsed as they stood. With the 
exception of security guards, the jobs had been canpared with stan.da:r:d 
job descriptions obtained from BA and the BAA rather than a study of 
actual jobs on the ground. Although the Panel had reached general 
agreement on the introduction of British Airways structures, no precise 
job descriptions had been agreed, therefore, it was not knaNn. to which 
grade each errployee would eventually be associated. The Corrmission 
accordingly asked the Pay Research unit to undertake a fresh 
canparabili ty study. As far as the Unit's established canparisons are 
concerned they agreed with the Municipal .Airp:::>rts Panel that the duties 
of regular full time fireren were broadly canparable to those of 
firemen at BAA airports. HCMeVer, because of the wide range of duties 
of airport hands which were all covered by one grade in local authority 
airports no direct canparison could be nade with the five grades 
pertaining in British AiI:ways and the six grades applying at BAA 
airports. The only yaxdstick for comparison was where duties involved 
the use of specialist equipnent for the handling of wide-bodied jets. 
The Unit concluded that in this case, valid canparison could be nade 
with the higher grades - four and five - operating at British Airways. 
Similarly where the duties of nnmicipal airport security guards 
included searching passengers and baggage a valid ccmparison could be 
rrade with BAA security guards (paid as Grade Three operatives). The 
Pay Research unit, at the request of the Ccmnission, also considered 
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the possibility of establishing carparators outside the industry and 
these investigations confinred the specialist nature of airport 
operations. It was concluded that fire fighting and rescue services 
had no direct parallel outside the airport industry and the canparison 
of airport security services with outside services was a doubtful 
proposition whilst no ccmparator outside the air transport sector 
included the full range of duties undertaken by airport hands at 
municipal airports. (191) 
Clearly, the \\1Ork of the Pay Research unit finnly established the 
boundaries of comparison for basic rates of pay. 
Clegg Ccmnission made specific reccm:rendations 
On this basis, the 
for change. In 
principle, the appropriate basic pay scale for fi1:anen was deemad to be 
that of BAA firemen, the scale being adjusted to allow for the 
difference in the nomal working week. For airport hands BA grades one 
to five \\1ere recorrroended as appropriate according to the nature of 
particular jobs at different municipal airports. Security guards were 
to be equated with BA grade two where search duties ~re not involved 
and BAA grade three, including search duties. The position of duty 
CrfM was nore complex since their duties \\1ere partly those of airport 
hand they had no equivalent in either BA or BAA. However, the 
situation was resolved by all parties agreeing that a rate midway 
be~ the rates for those two jobs would be appropriate. ( 192) 
In this way, comparability of basic rates of pay could be achieved. 
bebveen municipal airports, BAA airports and British Ail::ways. However, 
the problem of shift payments continued to cause difficulties in 
achieving canparability of total earnings. The Clegg Ccmnission had 
noted that average earnings from shift pay in municipal airports ~re 
rather lower than for operative staff in BA and substantially l~r 
than for firemen in the BAA. The :rrtE3thod of calculating shift pay at 
municipal airports continued to differ fram other employers. In 
addition to specific pa.yments for working alternating or rotating 
shifts, supplements for Saturday and Sunday working were paid on the 
basis of basic rates, therefore, any increase in basic rates 1NOUld 
automatically increase shift earnings. (193) 
The ccmnission addressed the problem and suggested five alternative 
neans to ensure that total earnings did not exceed those of canparators 
but each method involved problems of implementation . Firstly, it was 
suggested that the basic rate for BA/BAA canparators could be reduced 
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to take account of differences in shift earnings, but this would have 
been disadvantageous to the small nmnber of Municipal Airport Panel 
anployees who did not VVDrk shifts. Secondly, a rate of p3.y which was 
lower than the basic could be adopted for the calculation of weekend 
enhancements but ap3.rt fran being administratively canplex, this option 
was seen to imply the possibility that ananalies would arise with staff 
being p3.id different rates for working the sarna shift. The third 
possibility of reducing existing local authority pranimn rates for 
Saturday and Sunday \\1Orking to say tine plus one third and two thi:rds 
respectively was likely to meet with stalwart opposition from the 
Unions. The suggestion that the Panel should change from local 
authority shift/weekend p3.yments to BA/BAA p3.yments was seen to involve 
the Municipal Airports Panel losing substantial control over the 
negotiation process. The final option of prep:tring a canpletel y new 
rrethod of naking shift p3.yments which would result in carparabili ty of 
"take hare" p3.y did allow the employers to retain control over the 
nature of shift p3.yments for Municip3.1 Panel employees. However, there 
was also the possibility that the hundreds of thousands of manual 
workers for wham the NJC for IDeal Authorities' Services (Manual 
Workers) negotiated shift allowances would be affected. ( 194 ) 
In essence, the reccmnendations of the Clegg Canmission failed to 
provide the long term solution to the long standing problem of the 
effect of different CMIlership structures on the negotiation of pay and 
conditions of employment for groups of employees who carried out 
similar jobs for different employers at UK airports. In the short 
tenn, the Clegg award had the effect of increasing gross earnings to a 
level exceeding that of \\1Orkers in other p:trts of the air transport 
sector. For example, the effect on the p3.y of an airport hand grade 
one at :rraxinn.nn rates applying on 1 January 1979 nay be illustrated as 
shown in Table 7.3. 
The underlying problem in p3.y negotiation ranained fun.d.arren.tall y the 
sarna as nore than a decade earlier when the NBPI had suggested that 
airport authorities and Trade Unions should set up sep:trate negotiating 
rrachinery to cover all airport staff. In response to this suggestion, 
the BAA had naintained that its own negotiating nachine:ry enabled it to 
detennine p3.y and conditions with primary reference to its awn 
circumstances. It was also argued that as a single management the BAA 
could negotiate flexibly and very quickly if necessary, advantages 
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which would be lost if negotiations were undertaken collectively with 
other authorities. As far as the Trade Unions representing BAA staffs 
v.sre concerned the 'IGWU and. other manual worker unions which regarded 
civil aviation as a unified industry, 'Were prepared to accept a single 
unified negotiating machinery, so long as the levels of pay at airports 
kept in line with the airlines. However, the non-manual trade Unions 
which had their origins in the Civil Service veharently opposed the 
idea of pay of their rranbers being rarotely linked to local authority 
non-manual 'tf.Urkers. For the local authorities, the unified negotiating 
machinery was rejected for fear of the impact it could have on other 
local authority workers. ( 195 ) 
In essence then, prior to the nationalisation of the civil air 
transport industry, the detennination of pay and conditions of service 
at British airports proceeded along the lines of the principles 
governing each sector of ownership. However, nationalisation and the 
fornation of the NJCCAT had a long tenn influence on bargaining 
arrangarents both at nationalised and local authority owned airports in 
the post-war period. The following chapter highlights the significance 
of the fonnation of the NJCCAT for the developrent of bargaining 
arrangarents at Manchester Airport. At Ministry airports steps 'Were 
taken to equate pay and. conditions for manual workers with those 
detennined by the NJCCAT and this principle of relating pay to that of 
the highest paid workers in the industry employed. by the State 
Co:r::porations continued despite the institution of new' negotiating 
arrangarents with the fonnation of the BAA. At the same time, the 
trend at local authority airports has been towards increasing 
integration with negotiating arrangements within the IDeal GovernnEnt 
Service as a whole. The consequent divergence in rates of pay was 
exacerbated during the period of incarres policy when local authorities 
interpreted guidelines in the strictest sense. Essentially, 
arrangements for collective bargaining within the civil air transport 
industry remained anomalous in particular respect to groundstaff where 
arrangements have been differentiated by ownership structures. In the 
following chapter evidence suggests that this factor has been of 
overridding significance in detennining the course of industrial 
relations at Manchester Airport. 
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7.4 a:HllJSlcm 
IDeal authority employment involves a number of characteristics 
which have traditionally and fundarrentall y differentiated it fran any 
other type of employment. The IIOst significant influences have been 
the nature of external financial pressures, the extent of white-collar 
unionism and the distinction made behveen officer and servant. These 
influences have penneated the developnent of collective b:rrgaining for 
local authority airport workers who have tended to be reganied as an 
integral part of the IDeal Government Service indistinct fran any other 
group of local authority workers rather than constituents of the civil 
air transport labour market. 
For IDeal Government staffs, the system of nationally negotiated 
conditions with local variation regarding grading gave stability to 
industrial relations. This stability was unsettled by the strict 
interpretation of Prices and Incomes Policy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Calls for greater devolution of paver to the local level under the 
impact of incomes policy were more marked in the rranual field where 
less flexibility in local variation tended to be the nonn and the 
relatively IaN' pay which resulted from industry-wide agreem:m.ts was 
exacerbated firstly by the institution of incomes policy and then by 
the inability of local authorities as errployers to fully embrace the 
concept of productivity bargaining. 
Within the civil air transport industry, the fonnation of the NJCCAT 
in fulfilnEnt of statutory obligations was fundamental not only to the 
course of industrial relations in the aiJ:ways corporations for which 
and by whom it had been devised, but it increasingly influenced trends 
in other finns in the industry. The need to pIOVide a stable framework 
for industrial relations in the airlines, which was a fundamental 
objective in the government 's nationalisation plans of 1945, dictated 
that the NJCCAT would became a pace-setter for pay and conditions . 
Once the NJCCAT had been formed, the major consideration in the course 
of industrial relations at UK airports became their relative position 
in relation to terms and conditions set by this body rather than any 
internal considerations. 
Whilst at Ministry and later BAA airports where the influence of 
Civil Service structures neant that the principle of canparability with 
outside occupations had been traditional to the detennination of pay 
and conditions, agreenents tended to fall in line with the NJCCAT, at 
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local authority airports a process of increasing integration with other 
local authority workers engendered. a tendency towards relatively law 
pay . Similarly, anong the BAA group of airports, the existence of the 
huge airport at Heathrow influenced pay structures at other airports 
within the group which were much operated at a much smaller scale. 
'!his influence did not penneate the local authority airports to the 
same extent. 
With the institution of incomes policy, the nationalised airlines 
and airports interpreted constraints in a liberal fashion and used the 
"loop hole" of productivity agreements to increase rates of pay and 
avoid industrial unrest. IDeal authority enployers, hCMeVer, facing 
different financial pressures interpreted incomes policy in the 
strictest tenns. 
The fragmented negotiating structures arising out of different 
ownership structures and the inability to arrive at a satisfactory 
definition of the civil air transport industry which recognises the 
inextricable link between airports and airlines has resulted in 
different levels of pay and different conditions of enployrrent in 
broadly canparable activities which do not alone reflect differing 
levels of productivity. 
Whilst it may have been nore appropriate for airport authorities to 
negotiate collectively in a single unified structure, the influence of 
traditional practices within local government, central government and 
the nationalised industries were all-pervading and detracted fran the 
influence of corrm.Jn interests within the air transport sector which 
surpassed the fragmentation of ownership structure. 
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Figure 7.1 
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Source: Derived from Local Government Training Board Report for 
year ended 31 March 1974 
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Figure 7.3 
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'!UrAL ID1RS AND OVERTIME lD1RS lOU<ED BY :MANlW.. Em1IDYEES AT 
:MUNICIPAL .AIRRRrS 1977 
Designation Grade 'Ibtal Hours Overtime Hours 
Airport hand 1 53.39 13.39 
Duty Crefl/Firerran 2 52.73 12.68 
Security Guard 3 45.64 5.48 
Car Park Attendant/ 
Lalx>urer 4 49.66 9.66 
Semi-skilled Engineer 5 49.48 9.48 
labourer/Cleaner 6 48.03 8.64 
Other Grades 7 51.05 11.20 
Source: IDeal Authority Airport Workers, Wages and Conditions Claim, 
1977, Presented by Mick Martin, Acting Secretary, Trade Union 
Side, local Authority Airports Panel 
Table 7.2 
'lDrAL ~ AND OVERTIME ~ OF MANUAL lDU<ERS AT :MUNICIPAL 
.AIRRRlS 1977 
Grade 'Ibtal Pay Overtime Pay % Overtirre to 'Ibtal 
(f) (f) 
1 85.79 22.92 26.72 
2 81.96 19.45 23.74 
3 69.00 8.48 12.29 
4 71.53 13.82 19.32 
5 79.67 13.38 16.80 
6 64.10 11.76 18.34 
7 65.14 15.91 24.43 
Source: IDeal Authority Airport Workers, Wages and Conditions Cl~, 
1977, Presented by Mick Martin, Acting Secretary, Trade Union 
Side I IDeal Authority Airports Panel 
569 
Table 7.3 
EFFECr OF CLEm ~<m <E RATES OF PAY J.i'(R AIRPCRI' HANr.6 AT 
UK AIRFCRI'S 



















Source: MIAA Staffing Sub-Ccmniteee, Minutes, 14 July 1980 
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.APPEH)IX 7 .1 
NATIcmL JOINr <IXlI£IL FCR :unu. N11HJUTIES' ADflNIS'IRATIVE, 






16 - 20 years old 5 Points Basic salary + Civil 
Service & War Bonus 
21 - 27 years old 7 Points Basic salary + Civil 















* Basic scale for clerical ~rkers, although salaries in Grades A and 
B 'W8I'e also adopted as general m.in.imurn for all full-time local 
Government Officers 
Source: Manchester Corporation, Special Ccmnittee, Officials' 
Conditions of Services, minutes 3 September 1920. 
Correspondence fran NJC for local Authorities ' Administrative, 




CITY OF ~ SCEIDm FCR CL..l\SSIFICATICE OF OFFICIAIS, 0PmATIVE 






Officials with legal, madical, scientific, 
accountancy, secretarial or any other 
qualification covered by a Professional 
Chartered Institute. 
Civil or Mechanical Engineers, Sw:veyors, 
Architects, etc. 
Duties appropriate to this class are those 
concerned with the fornation of policy, 
improvement of organisation, general 
administration of instructions of the Council 
and control of departments; higher work in 
legal, technical, accountancy and other 
departments; also subordinate officers engaged 
on professional or technical work of a minor 
nature. 
This division will include officials engaged in 
duties dealing with particular rratters in 
accordance with well defined instructions and 
regulations. 




8 salary levels covering ages 14 - 21 years 
GENERAL AND CLERICAL 
STAFFS 
4 salary levels 
I 
MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES 
(Minimum) Section A: 3 salary levels 
Section B: 3 salary levels 
Section C: 3 salary levels 
PROFESSIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: 
SECOND CLASS ASSISTANrS 
5 Salary levels 
FIRST CLASS ASSISTANrS 
Section A: 4 salary levels 
Section B: 4 salary levels 
SENIOR ASSISTANTS: 4 salary levels 
PRINCIPAL ASSISTANrS 
Minimum salary £400 pa, suggested 
advances to be presented to the 
Council through the Establishment 
Carmittee 
CLERICAL DIVISION 
Section A: 3 salary levels 
Section B: 4 salary levels 
Source: City of Manchester, Classification of Officials (Condit~ons of 
Service) Special Canmittee, 29 June 1922, approved by Clty 
Council 5 July 1922. 
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~IX 7.3 
EN;INE:ER.IK; CRAFrSMEN AFFECI'ED BY '!HE FrnMATICti OF '!HE JlC FeR liD\L 
AIJnDUTIES' SERVICES (F.H;INE.ERDG CRAFrSMEN ~ 1.3.52 




Engineering £7.0.6 Blacksmith, fitter (engineering), 
fitter (electrical street lighting), 
turner, millwright, rrotor mechanic, 
pa.tteIll maker, \\1elder, clock repairer 
(street lighting), tinsmith, sheet 
metal \\Urker. 
Electrical Contracting Electrician, wireman 
£ 7 .10 . 4 (contracting \\Urk) . 
Vehicle Building £7.6. 8 Blacksmith, coach bcrlymaker, coach 
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The Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (later knCMIl as 
APEX) has been organising staff of UK and other airports 
employed in such areas as passenger sections (check-in, etc), 
ticket desks, aircraft despatch (~ight and balance, etc of 
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Sections and first line supervisors, since the early 1950s. A 
survey of reports on Trade MovarEnts and Negotiations sul:mitta:i 
to the North West Area. Council suggests the kind of issue which 
may be taken up at the local level, defered. to the national 
level and in sare instances referra:i back. Fran tima to tima, 
differences rega:r:ding avertima working and rostering have been 
referred to the national machinery particularly if a revision 
of establishment is likely to be involved. Clainls for revision 
of grading have been referred up.van:is, saretimas becoming 
subject to the Grading Appeals Machinery which further extends 
the process. Consideration of the te:rms for the intrcxiuction of 
new technology at individual stations often becare a topic to 
be dealt with at national level and may ultimately be referred 
back, and differences rega:r:ding the interpretation of national 
agreements carmot always be settled. at the local level. 
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8.1 :rJillR(JXCI'I(W 
Part II of the thesis examined the institutional fra:navork within 
which Manchester Airport had grCMll and developa:i. The study 
concentrated on both the local and national levels of policy 
detennination and decision naking. It was argued that the process of 
growth and developrEIlt - which, as shown in Part I, contrasted with 
experience at other provincial airports established in the 1930s - awed 
much to uninterrupted nrunicipal ownership. IDeal authority decision 
making processes had allCMed the harnessing of local enterprise, 
initiative and knowledge praroting growth and developnent through the 
setting of a local agenda responsive to local needs. 
In effect, in avoiding the nationalisation plans of the post-war 
era, the course of developrEIlt at Manchester Airport had not been 
subjected to the same degree of centralised intervention in detennining 
objectives as its counterparts. Neither had the developnent process 
suffered. to the same degree fran competition with airports situated in 
the capital. In the absence of any centralised national plan for the 
developrEIlt of the UK airport network and under the impact of limited 
capital funds, the developrEIlt process at other airports had been 
retanied. 
In essence then, Manchester Airport had developa:i as a hybrid in 
ownership tenns. On the one hand, the process of rapid growth and 
developnent meant that in tenus of the scale of activity and the 
canplexi ty of operations, the airport manifested the characteristics of 
the larger state-owned airports. On the other, in tenus of conllon 
ownership structures a finner identity was IPaintained with other 
municipal airports which ware returned to local authority control in 
the 1960s. 
This dichotaI¥ has had implications for the conduct of industrial 
relations and the m:mner in which wages and working conditions of 
arq;>loyees at the Airport have been detennined. In Chapter Seven it was 
pointed out that different negotiating structures have applied to 
airports in different ownership groups , largely as the resul t of 
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different perceptions and traditions E!TIaIlating from the Civil Service, 
nationalised industries and local goverrnrent. For example , given the 
rmmicipal ownership of Manchester Airport, ~loyers would probably be 
influenced by traditionally held VieNS within the Service which tend 
towa:rds the prarrotion of national, service-wide collective bargaining 
structures irrespective of the particular needs of an airport as an 
entity. There nay be a tendency to regard nanual workers in particular 
as an undifferentiated, cohesive group displaying similar work 
characteristics and perfonning broadly similar tasks as other nanual 
workers ~loyed. in the Service. Even if the tasks perfonned at an 
airport are regarded as specialist in nature , given national collective 
bargaining arrangerrents, there may be a reluctance to fully reflect 
this in practice for fear of repercussions rippling through other local 
government establishments . Finally, if separate arrangerrents for the 
negotiation of wages and working conditions for rmmicipal airport 
workers are brought into force, the process of integration can be 
thwarted by differences in scale of acti vi ty and different patterns of 
division of labour. 
In Part II, when examining the local institutional fra:rne.rork of 
growth and develop:nent, it was suggested that the process had been 
accompanied by the distancing of the airport fram strict local 
authority control with greater financial independence and the errergence 
of semi-autonarous nanagement structures which exercised increasing 
influence in detennining objectives independent of any other local 
authority priorities. This factor may in turn influence the course of 
industrial relations with a growing awareness of the need. to canpete 
with other airports and the questioning of the ability of local 
authority negotiating structures to respond to the needs of a 
corrmercial trading organisation. 
The study of the develop:nent of collective bargaining arrangements 
in local government which fonned part of Chapter Seven highlighted. the 
significance of the distinction made between "officer" and "servant" 
and "professionalism" which had under-pinned. the historical develop:nent 
of the national determination of wages and working conditions. 
Frophasis was also placed. on the contrast between negotiating structures 
applying to nanual workers and staff graded. posts within the IDeal 
Government Service, with local flexibility being the keynote in the 
negotiation of wages and working conditions for staff, whilst 
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centralization and unifonnity were the fundanEntal principles applied 
to manual workers. 
Clearly, staff graded posts wi thin such fields of endeavour as 
administration and accounting may perfonn tasks at an airport similar 
to those perfonned in other branches of the IDeal Government Service. 
However, manual workers may perfonn tasks under conditions which differ 
fran their counterparts elseNhere in having to, for ~le, provide 
"round the clock" cover and be organised in such a way as to cope with 
the daily, weekly and seasonal peaks and troughs inherent in airport 
operation. In this sense, it is necessary to examine the extent to 
which Local Government bargaining arrangements, which have 
traditionally applied across the Service, have been responsive to the 
special needs of labour organisations at Manchester Airport. In 
conducting this study, it will be useful to divide the work into two 
main sections, one dealing with manual workers including specialist 
groups such as engineering craftsmen and the other examining staff 
graded posts, although it will be appreciated that there is a 
significant interface between the two main groups of workers at the 
supervisory level. 
Generally, it is argued that national collective bargaining 
arrangements under nnmicipal ownership have failed to respond to the 
needs of the process of growth and developnent at Manchester Airport as 
far as manual workers are concerned. Although negotiating structures 
evel ved, ultiJ:natel y the need for locally based bargaining arrangements 
was pressed by both Trade Unions and management. In contrast, as far 
as staff-graded posts are concerned, the flexibility inherent in IDeal 
Government arrangements, reflecting the tradition of "professionalism" 
across the Service, proved to be a positive factor in the course of 
industrial relations, as emphasis was placed on the continuing need to 
recruit and retain staff of the highest calibre to achieve the 
objectives of the employing cammi ttee. 
8.2 :MUNICIPAL (llfl.FCI'IVE BARGAINJR; ~ AND MANUAL kRKER 
DISPlJI'ES 
'Ihe structure of the labour force employed at Manchester's Ringway 
Airport has tended to differ fram that encountered in lIDst other 
muniCipal establishments in that there has always been a preponderance 
of manual workers employed on one site. 'Ihis feature is reflected in 
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Tables 8.1 and 8.2 which distinguish between the salary and wage bill 
of the Airport Ccmnittee and the nmnbers of nanual - as opposed to 
staff - posts which have existed at Manchester Airport in the early 
post war years. This preponderance of nanual \\Urkers, in part, 
reflects the labour intensive nature of the maintenance of airport 
facilities, but it is also the result of the particular division of 
functions at Manchester Airport whereby as early as 1949 the Manchester 
Corporation took over the responsibility fran BEA for apron handling, 
providing both the staff and equipnent for the loading and unloading of 
aircraft, including freight and passengers' baggage. Table 8 .3 
highlights the predaninance of portering staff within the Authority in 
the 1970s and Table 8.4 highlights the significance of operational 
functions like portering, maintenance, Fire, Police and Security 
Services in expenditure on employees. It will be noted fran Table 8.4 
that expenditure on employees is conditioned by regulation and by the 
division of functions. For example, under the Protection of Aircraft 
.Act, 1973, and the Policing of Airports Act, 1974, airport management 
assmned responsibility for maintaining security to Government standards 
and, as a result, in 1976 a new- Security Section was established 
canprising 215 employees on nanual grades. ( 1 ) The direct employrrent 
of car park attendants fran 1966 reflected the transfer of this 
function from concessionaire to airport managanent, whilst the 
curtailment of expenditure on Police was the result of central 
government funding this expenditure at UK airports from the late 1970s. 
Prior to 1948, the wages and \\Urking conditions of non-craft manual 
\\Urkers at Manchester's Ringway and Barton Airports were determined by 
the Manchester Corporation in the absence of any appropriate Joint 
Industrial Council governing airport staffs. ( 2) In principle, the 
Corporation related the wages and \\Urking conditions of its manual 
ElIrI>loyees at airports to those prescribed by the North Western Whitley 
Council for Manual Workers employed in the non-trading services of 
local authorities. HCMeVer, in 1948, a major consideration became the 
possible future transfer of the Ringway Airport to Ministry of Civil 
Aviation control. The wages and working conditions of manual \\Urkers 
under Ministry control were regulated by - arrongst others - the 
Miscellaneous Trades Joint Council for Government Industrial 
Establishments . Given the possibility of Ministry take over it was 
deaned appropriate from 8 November 1948, to fall into line with 
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Ministry practice. The application of wages and. -working conditions 
similar to those prevailing at Ministry airports was adoptOO as a 
IIEasure to facilitate the transfer of Corporation employees. However , 
such a nove was also ccmnendOO to the Corporation because the wages and 
-working conditions prescribErl by the Miscellaneous Trades Joint Council 
were broadly in line with similar grades for Corporation employees and 
it was advantageous to follow jointly negotiatOO rates for airport 
employees. (3) 
For the Trade Unions invol vOO the reccmnendation was acceptable so 
long as the rates of pay existing at Manchester's airports were not to 
be reduce:i where the new schOOulOO rate to apply was lower and providOO 
that any difficulties in classifying employees within the listed 
categories of duties \\1eI'e to be decidOO by mutual agreement. The rates 
of pay to be appliOO to different designations at Manchester's airports 
fran 8 November 1948 are illustratOO in Appendices 8.1 and 8.2. The 
overall effect of the application of these new rates was to increase 
the pay of t-wo Chargehand Firemen by 2s 8d and. 3s 2d per week 
respectively, the pay of 12 firemen was increased by 5s 8d per week and 
that of 15 airport hands increased by 4s 3d per week representing an 
estilnatOO addition of £300 per annum to a total wage bill for airport 
maintenance which stood at same £20,000 per annum in 1948/9. (4) 
Although the Manchester Corporation retained control of Ringway 
Airport in 1953, the application of rates of pay and conditions of 
employ.m=n.t basOO on recarrmendations of the Miscellaneous Trades Joint 
Council was continued as an arrangement which had worked 
satisfactorily. However, a difference errerged between the Transport 
and General Workers' Union representing porters, marshallers, 
chargehands and firemen at Manchester Airport. The difference arose 
out of the action of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation 
(under pressure fran the Transport and General Workers' Union and the 
National Union of General and Municipal Workers) which brought the 
wages and conditions of employ.m=n.t of manual workers at the larger 
airports under their control, into line with those adopted by the 
National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport fran 1 October 1957. As 
previously statOO, this body had within its purview employees in 
establishments of BOAC and BEA and other undertakings constituted for 
the purpose of providing air transport services or of carrying out 
other fonns of aerial -work. 
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In December 1957, the Transport and General Workers' Union argued 
that the Manchester Corporation should follow Ministry action on the 
grounds that this had been the recently accepted practice. However, a 
najor concern of the Corporation was that there was no local governm:mt 
representation on this Council and it did not govern the wages of 
employees in local goverIlIIEIlt who were not involved in the provision of 
air transport services. Certain conditions in the Civil Air Transport 
Agreement were at variance with local government practice the IIDSt 
significant being provisions for shift working. It was feared that if 
payments for shift work, in particular, were adopted this might have 
serious repercussions in other Corporation departments. It was also 
argued that the agreement in 1948 to base the wages and working 
conditions of airport manual workers on agreements nade by the 
Miscellaneous Trades Joint Council had been strongly influenced by the 
expectation of the Ministry assuming control. In essence, the Ministry 
decision to follow agreements nade by the NJCCAT was regarded as a 
fundamental change of policy which -if adopted by the Corporation-
would intrcxiuce the requirement to keep pace with industrial and profit 
earning organisations - a principle which ran contrary to the 
Corporation's general policy of keeping in line with wage rrovements in 
local government. ( 5 ) 
On examination of the Union's claim, it was found that the revised 
rates adopted by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation provided 
for considerable increases over the rates paid by the Corporation. 
Whereas during the previous nine years the level of rermmeration 
adopted by the Miscellaneous Trades Joint Council had continued to keep 
reasonably in balance with local government, if the Union claim were 
acceded to the increased cost in respect of manual workers would have 
been £18,720 per annum representing a 21% increase on employee costs 
involved in the provision of portering and fire services, which in 
itself represented about 60% of total expenditure on employees in 
1957/8. If the burden of increased costs was not to fallon the rate, 
baggage and freight handling charges would have needed to be increased 
and even after a 27% increase in these charges, the Corporation would 
still have had to find a balance of about £2,000 per annum. In 
addition to the general concern about departing from accepted local 
government practice, these financial considerations were also 
significant in reinforcing the employers' reluctance to adopt Ministry 
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standards • ( 6 ) 
In view of the Corporation's continued control of Manchester Airport 
and the Trade Union's desire to abandon the 1948 agreemmt in favour of 
agreerrents made by the NJCCAT - which provided for wages and working 
conditions out of step with local goverrment practice - the 'IGWU was 
inforned that whilst the Corporation was not prepared to adopt the new 
agreerrent made by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, it was 
prepared to negotiate an entirely new agreemmt on the basis of tenns 
of employment operating in the non-trading depart:nents of local 
authorities. Appendix 8.2 provides a canparison of Manchester 
Corporation's p:roposals for new rates of pay with those applying at 
airports controlled by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. 
Whilst this offer was originally rejected by Union officials who argued 
that the agreemmt made by the Ministry was the only agreemmt to cover 
their members - as negotiations progressed the IDeal Organiser of the 
'IGWU agreed that whilst falling short of the rates provided in the 
Ministry agreement, 
reasonable. 
the Corpora tion ' s proposed increases v.Bre 
whilst full time officials envisaged the 
possibility of agreemmt negotiations v.Bre interrupted by the threat of 
unofficial strike action on 14 February 1958 and at a mass :rooeting the 
following day, the 'IGWU members at Manchester Airport unanim:msl y 
decided that the Corporation's proposals could not be accepted on the 
grounds that rates of pay applicable in local authority non-trading 
services could not be applied to an airport which represented a 
profitable trading concern. (7 ) 
Faced with the prospect of industrial unrest the Airport Ccmnittee 
resolved that the new rates of pay adopted by the Ministry of Transport 
and Civil Aviation would have to be applied to porters, marshallers, 
chargehands and firemen fran 1 January 1958, whilst unskilled workers 
like groundsmen, workshop labourers, car park attendants and cleaners 
continued with the status quo. However, it should be noted that in 
respect of additional payments for shift working, overtime, Sunday 
working etc, agreemmts arrived at in the North Western Whitley Council 
for IDeal Authority Trading Services were to fonn the basis of payment 
rather than ag:reerents reached in the NJCCAT, so essentially, the 
fundanental link with general local governIlEIlt practice was preserved. 
(8) 
In the long tenn, the Ministry's change of p:>licy and the Union's 
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desire to abandon the 1948 agreem:mt was viewed by the anployers as an 
ideal opportunity for the Corporation to take steps to secure the 
establishment of a local Whitley Council to deal with the wages and 
working conditions of manual workers at the airport ensuring that 
agreements in the future would be nore in keeping with local goveDlIlEIlt 
practice. Manchester Corporation prcm>ted the fonnulation of a scherre 
for grading anployees at nnmicipal airports under the NJC for IDeal 
Authorities' Services (Manual Workers). As suggested already, the 
scherre involved the classification of airports based for pay purposes 
on official statistics of tenninal passengers handled. Appendix 8.4 
provides details of the Initial Classification and rates of pay to be 
applied at nnmicipal airports from 4 April 1960. Whilst the initial 
classification of airports accounted for differences in scale of 
activity, this was counter-balanced by higher rates of pay applying to 
duty CrEM as opposed to airport hands. Duty creN at smaller airports 
discharged a wider range of duties and at smaller airports the majority 
of groundstaff fell into this category. The lower rates applicable to 
airport hands and marshallers reflected a wider division of labour 
particularly at larger airports. (9) From an examination of Appendix 
8.4, it is apparent that only certain designated posts were included in 
the schE!llE. No specific provision was made for general labourers, car 
park attendants, cleaners, gardeners, transport drivers, etc, who 
continued to be graded in accordance with the schedule of wages for 
general classes of employees issued by the NJC and thus received the 
same treatment as their counterparts in other local authority 
establishments. 
Whilst the new' grading schE!llE was ostensibly to apply to all of the 
nrunicipal airports which had joined the Municipal Airports Panel, from 
the outset special provisions had to be made because of the particular 
local circmnstances pertaining at Manchester Airport. For example, 
existing basic rates for marshallers, airport hands and firemen had to 
continue to apply in place of those in the original agreem:mt along 
with existing shift and overtime rates and provision for payment for 
Sunday \\Urk until the parallel provisions of the local authority 
agrearent were equivalent or better as a whole. IDeal plus rates 
established for marshallers and hands for driving had to continue and 
the existing provisiOns for holiday entitlerents similarly had to apply 
in order to preserve conditions which were better than those provided 
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in the new agreement. ( 10 ) At the tine of assimilation the lead rates 
for supervisors and assistant supervisors in the portering section and 
for leading firEm:m and senior firEm:m were also retained at the sarre 
level as those laid down by the NJCCAT. Ini tiall y then, whilst the 
Manchester Corporation had succeeded in establishing a Whitley Council 
to negotiate tenns and conditions for IIffilual workers at rrnmicipal 
airports its position within the overall structure was ancmaJ.ous • 
However, within two years the last tie with the NJCCAT was severed when 
the assistant supeIVi.sors in the portering section raised the rratter of 
revised supervisory lead rates arguing that lead payrrents failed to 
reflect additional responsibilities and the requirarent to drive on the 
apron. (11) 
The manual v"urkers' conditions allowed for lead rates to be agreed 
locally, usually based upon a mininrum lead of 6d per hour for foreren 
and 3d per hour for chargehands and the opportunity was taken to bring 
lead paynents rrade to all first line supeIVi.sors at Manchester Airport 
into line with those applying to similar staffs in other local 
authority departments. The new lead payments covered all duties 
including driving fork-lift trucks, etc, when required, details are 
given in Appendix 8.9. ( 12) 
Al though the rra jori ty of IIffilual workers and their .irrm:rliate 
supervisors at Manchester Airport were wi thin the purview of the 
Municipal Airports Panel (MAP), as suggested, a minority of manual 
staff were graded in accordance with the general classes of manual 
workers, whilst the tenns and conditions of craft workers were 
detennined by the JNC for I.Dca.1 Authorities' Services (Engineering 
CraftSlTEIl) . Following the establishmant of the MAP and the agree:rent 
reached by this 1:xxiy, industrial relations in the early 1960s at 
Manchester Airport tended to be daninated by the need to rraintain 
internal relativities between these different groups of staff. For 
exanple, in 1962, the Establishmant Ccmnittee had approved payment of a 
"lieu-rate" of 6d per hour for engineering craftsmen and later a "lieu-
rate" of 5d per hour for all semi-skilled employees who worked with the 
engineering craftsmen was approved. All labourers at Manchester 
Airport working in the maintenance section were regarded. as semi-
skilled. engineering employees and were, therefore, included. in the 
provisions. However, representations were rrade by groun.dsne:n who 
wanted a similar lieu-rate. As these workers came under the general 
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classes of employees in the Manual Workers' Agrearent a lieu-rate could 
not be paid and so a revised scheme for grading of employees in the 
maintenance section was recommended allowing groundsmen to be 
designated semi-skilled engineering workers. Details of this new 
grading scheme are provided in Appendix 8.6. ( 13 ) Another group of 
workers for whan special provisions had to be made were car park 
attendants who were similarly paid rates in accordance with ruc for 
IDeal Authorities' Services (General Classes) (Manual Workers) Group 
Two, that is £12 13s 4d for a 40 hour week in line with other car park 
attendants employed at municipal car parks. In 1968 a claim was lcxiged 
by the 'IGWU to the effect that the duties of car park attendants 
anployed at Manchester Airport were greater than those perfonned at 
nnmicipal car parks. For example, nore cash was handled, attendants 
were required to drive vehicles, to wash soiled cars and to work night 
shifts unsupervised. In recognition of these duties a lead payrrent of 
2d per hour was established. (14) 
During the pericxi, other groups of workers sought ~ity of 
trea1::nEnt with airport hands. In 1960 long service increrrents had been 
established at national level providing payments of 3/8 per week for 
narshallers and 7/4 per week for airport hands, after four years 
service. Increments had been revised u~s in the following year but 
in May 1962, the 'IGWU asked for an increase in the marshallers' lead to 
confonn with airport hands. The detennination of long service 
increrrents (unlike lead rates) was subject to national agrearent and, 
therefore, could not be resolved locally. This case in particular 
serves to demonstrate the slowness of achieving agrearent in national 
negotiations. Following referral to the Employers' Side of the NJC, it 
was over a year before agreement to increase the naxinnmt rate for 
narshallers at Group I airports was reached in June 1963. (15) 
Generally, throughout the 1960s, measures were taken to ensure that 
the application of different tenns and conditions of employm:mt to 
different groups of industrial employees at Manchester Airport did not 
impact adversely upon industrial relations. Relativities were 
maintained and although agreement at national level could be 
protracted, it appeared that manual workers at the airport had been 
successfully integrated into the camron txxiy of local authority manual 
workers, whilst at the same time the tenns and conditions agreed 
adequately reflected the specialised nature of many of the tasks 
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perfo:r:ne:i . 
Generally, no further references were made to the tenns and 
conditions applied to manual workers at airports elsewhere in the UK. 
H~r, an examination of the first major stoppage of work at 
Manchester Airport which involved portering and marshalling staff in 
1960 and concerned purely domestic working COnditions, is instructive 
in daronstrating two factors which would be significant in the future 
conduct of industrial relations. Firstly, the lack of any provision to 
cater for local differences between rnanagem:mt and employees is 
highlighted. Secondly, this case daronstrates the difficulties 
encountered by management in any local authority enterprise where 
elected members are involved in industrial relations. 
On the :nn:ming of 31 July 1960, a porter refused to car.ry out his 
supervisor's instructions to attend as driver to a "Stal:ways" aircraft. 
'ilie porter was suspended from duty and strike action was threatened 
unless the suspension was lifted. On Monday, 1 August the Shop Steward 
representing the portering staff issued an ultilnatmn to the Airport 
Director to attend a meeting with the Branch Steward and SecretaI:y, 
otherwise strike action would ensue. Work ceased at 16:15 hours so the 
Airport Director attended to discuss the men's complaints. On the face 
of it, the dispute centred around relatively minor issues - no toilet 
facilities had been provided at the Wilmslow Road traffic control 
points and it was maintained that the men could not sufficiently 
relieve themselves; over a period of -weeks, meal breaks had been late 
and the cooking stove in the Porters' Hut was unserviceable and 
unsuitable. The Airport Director agreed. that the canplaints were 
reasonable and undertook to investigate the situation and take any 
necessaIy action. However, as a secondary point a canplaint was made 
about the manner of the men's supervisor and on 4 August, the men 
refused to work unless the supervisor was suspended imnErliatel y . 
Following a meeting between the Airport Director and the 'IGWU Union 
Organiser, the men were told that they had no case for taking strike 
action and that if they failed to return to work, they would be 
dismissed. Dismissal notices were issued for 68 regular porters, 63 
tarp:>raIy porters, 11 marshallers and one supervisor. On Saturday, 6 
August, the Trade Union Organiser info:rned mmagement that the men were 
prepared. to return. to work provided that all those dismissed were re-
instated. However, steps had already been taken to engage other staff. 
600 
By Monday, 8 August, aver 370 applications for emplaym:mt as aiI'fnrt 
hands had been received, 76 from fOrnEr regular employees and 59 fran 
fonrEI' temporary employees engaged for the SUIIIrEr only. Following 
interviews, 31 ex-pennanent staff and 21 ex-temporary staff were 
offered inmediate engagements which were accepted. 33 of the portering 
staff who had been sick or on leave at the time of the strike remained 
in ~loyment and the full carplement of the port.ering section was nade 
up by the recruitment of 60 new temporary ~loyees to fill existing 
vacancies. ( 16) 
Having acted unilaterally to maintain services in the face of 
unofficial strike action without the involvement of elected manbers, a 
sub-ccmnittee of the Chair and Deputy Chair of the Airport Ccmni ttee 
was appointed to discuss the question of the stoppage of work with 
representatives of the 'IGWU and to report to a special meeting of the 
Ccmnittee on 19 August 1960. At this special meeting a notion was 
nade: 
11 (i) That this carrmittee strongly deprecate the action of those 
n:anbers of the portering staff who engaged in unofficial strike 
action on 5 August, (ii) That this Carrmittee desire to CCIlIlE11.d the 
Airport Director for maintaining the services of the aiI'fnrt in full 
operation during the strike, (iii) That this Canmi ttee regrets the 
sending of written notices tenninating the services of the portering 
staff without corrmi ttee approval and that in view of representations 
nade by the Trade Union concerned, of assurances from Trade Union 
representatives and in the interests of good relations, those 
porters not so far re-engaged be re-instated authorising the 
tennination of employment of t~rary employees recruited during 
the strike. 11 
In this thin:i clause of the notion, aiI'fnrt nanagement was effectively 
being reprimanded for having acted independently and having taken 
decisions to ensure that aiI'fnrt services would be maintained - they 
were overruled by elected members. Although an amendment was noved to 
the effect that the action of the Chair and Airport Director in keeping 
the aiI'fnrt open be carmended, this amendment was defeated by four 
votes to nine. ( 17 ) In this dispute, the balance of power had been 
tested and it was clear that so long as the Trade Unions could appeal 
directly to elected members any negotiations with airport nanagement 
could be rendered inconsequential. Whilst the larour force was free to 
take unofficial action not sanctioned by the Trade Union and as a 
consequence could achieve inmediate disruption of airport services, 
nanagement was unable to act quickly to tr:y to resolve any disputes, 
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any action having to be sanctionerl by ccmnittee. '!he dispute also 
deronstraterl that in the absence of any fonnn for nanagerrent and unions 
to discuss local issues any difference could rapidly escalate to a 
major dispute without any fomal mechanism to achieve an early 
settlerrent. 
As suggesterl, following the 1960 dispute there was little industrial 
unrest at Manchester Airport for much of the decade. However, in 1968 
another major dispute took place. Although this dispute was prirrarily 
sparkerl by local issues concerning pay it also highlighted what, in the 
interim, had became a general dissatisfaction with the wages and 
working condi tions detennined by the Municipal Airports Panel, 
governing members of the portering section. The dispute also marked 
the revival of a desire to equate manual employees at Manchester 
Airport with manual staff of the BAA employed at the IDndon airports 
and Prestwick Airport in Scotland. As highlighterl earlier, new tenns 
and conditions had been instituterl under a separate agreatalt between 
the 'IGWU and the BAA when the nev corporation had been fornai. ( 18 ) 
Prilnarily, the 'IGWU at Manchester Airport raised three issues for 
local consideration . Firstly, the Union argued that local lead rates 
for supervisory staff in the portering section needed to be improved on 
the basis of a decrease in their real value since they were last 
reviewed. in 1964 and in viev of extra responsibilities assmned in 
recent years. As far as drivers of fork-lifts, internal canbustion 
engine vehicles and electric tugs were concerned, an increase in the 
actual rates paid was claimed and the Union also requested that the 
lead be paid at all times to all licenserl drivers authorised by the 
Airport DepartrrEnt to drive. At the time driving leads were paid on! Y 
to those who were designated drivers for the week or who were asked to 
drive for rrore than 50% of their shift. At their discretion, 
supervisors could detail drivers to carry out this duty for less than 
50% of any shift, thereby depriving them of the lead rate - a practice 
which the Trade union deened to be unfair. A second but related issue 
was provision for the payment of lead rates for relief marshalling 
duties . Finally, the Trade Union was concemerl about the employrrent of 
temporary porters in the surrmer peak period and its inp:lct on the 
potential earnings of its pennanent menbers. ( 19 ) 
As far as lead rates forsuperviso:ry staff are concemerl, there were 
tJu:ee nain grades of supervisor employed. in the portering section. 
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Crew or Assistant Supervisors, employed on rranual grades, were in 
charge of a small group of 1IEl1 working on an aircraft or in one section 
of the tenninal building. Full Supervisors otherwise designated Pier 
supervisors or Building Staff Supervisors were responsible 
respectively, for aircraft loading operations on one of the piers or 
for control of all staff wi thin the tenninal building. The third 
supervisory grade paid on miscellaneous rates was the Apron Supervisor 
which was the next senior grade below Airport Duty Officer. ( 20 ) The 
'IGWU naintained that on a number of occasions , especially when dealing 
with freight and mail aircraft, Crew Supervisors were required to 
supervise one CreN plus four standby 1IEl1, naking a total of eight men 
including two lifting vehicle drivers, a responsibility which was not 
adequately reflected in the payment of a lead of 4d per hour. An 
additional responsibility had been the recording of loading and off-
loading times in order to ensure that when enquiries were made 
regarding delays in general loading acti vi ties, it would be possible to 
shOlil whether or not any delay had been attributable to the Airport 
Depa.rtrrEnt. It was argued that Pier Supervisors or Full Supervisors 
similarly had assmned extra responsibilities in the fonn of keeping 
baggage and freight records, supervising standby crews , driving a 
Thames van with radio, driving fork lift trucks and Hi-IDS, handling 
small aircraft and overall responsibility for the Disposal Point on the 
International Pier. (21) 
In principle, the employers agreed the extra duties of Crew 
Supervisors but strongly contested the case put foJ:Ward for Full 
SUpervisors on every count. The keeping of baggage and freight records 
purely constituted entering a tick on a "bay allocation sheet II 
indicating whether baggage or freight had been handled and entering any 
load changes. The supervision of standby crews was not regarded as a 
new duty at all and in respect of driving, it was argued that lead 
rates for portering supervisors operating fran January 1964 had been 
deliberately formulated to recognise that supervisors who could drive a 
full range of vehicles v.;ere more useful than those who could not and 
thus took account of a range of duties including driving, where 
qualified. (22) As far as the driving of fork lift trucks and Hi-IDs 
was concerned, it was argued that during discussions, in Novenber 1963, 
it had been stressed that a fork lift could include any vehicle 
incorporating hydraulic lifting, such as the Freightrraster and a Hi-1.o 
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owned by BFA had been operatoo by Corporation staff in 1963. The 
handling of small aircraft and the shepherding of crew and passengers 
was seen to be an additional duty, but no other duties were carried out 
at the SallE tine . Finally , responsibility for the disposal point in 
the International Pier purely involved checking that the refuse was 
collected from the pier at the appropriate time. (23) 
Whilst airport nanagement generally denioo extra duties and 
responsibilities, consideration of the claim was also influencerl by the 
likely effect which increasing lead rates to Crew or Full Supervisors 
would have on differentials between these and their ilrrratiate 
supervisors on Miscellaneous Grades. Moreover, nanagemant were also 
conscious of the fact that to concede would have established a 
precerlent that any extra duty which a supervisor might be called upon 
to perfonn would becane the subject of a claim. As a result, the Chair 
and Deputy of the Airport Corrmi ttee reccmnended no action in respect of 
the claim for supervisors. As far as the Union's claim for increased 
leads to drivers of fork-lifts, IC engines and electric tugs was 
concernoo, the Airport Director advised that a question of principle 
was involved in maintaining the status quo and any rrodification, if 
granted, should be on the grounds of goodwill - as a gesture to signify 
the Corporation's desire to maintain good relations with staff at the 
airport. ( 24 ) 
The question of lead payments for relief marshalling duties had 
represented a difficulty for sane time. Up to 1 January 1966, 
marshallers had worked a regular 48 hour week. A cover of two rren on 
day shift and one on night shift had been required totalling 280 hours 
per week. Six men employed on 48 hours had producerl 288 hours per 
week, providing a slight surplus. When the official working week was 
reducerl to 40 hours, a five day week had been introducerl. However, it 
had also been agreed that in order to raise the level of "take heme" 
pay, the working week would be rostered. on a 44 hour basis. As far as 
the portering staff were concerned, this new reg.inE had operated 
satisfactorily. However, a problem had ererged in respect of 
marshalling cover. Six men on a 44 hour week would only provide cover 
for 264 hours (16 too few), whereas seven worked 308 hours, (28 too 
:many) . Two options were available to secure a 44 hour week with 
• Ei' ther a seven nan roster could operate with econc:my J.n nanpawer. 
spare hours being occupied by general IX>rtering duties, or a six nan 
604 
roster could be adopted with gaps being filled by relief marshallers 
paid on the basis of actual shifts 'NOrked. The errployees opted for the 
second alternative. In the smrmer of 1967 h~r, the position has 
been canplicated by the staff operating a 40 hour week with an overtime 
ban in support of general pay claims. As a result, seven marshallers 
~ employed full-time to cover .requirerrents, all receiving full pay 
for the whole week. After discussions, agreement had been reached for 
a return to a 44 hour week and for marshallers to return. to a six lTBIl 
roster. The staff requested that the seventh nan who had been drawing 
a full time lead payment should be all~ to continue to do so and 
this was agreed on condition that as soon as a vacancy occurred in the 
Marshalling Section, the system 'NOuld revert to one in which any 
reserves 'NOuld be paid for actual shifts worked. When such a vacancy 
did arise, the men ra:;IUested that the new "first reserve" marshaller 
should also be paid on a full time basis even though only one or two 
shifts would be \\Urked per week. The Airp::>rt Director could not accept 
this proposal on the grounds that if seven men were paid on a full-tine 
basis, the Corporation had the right to expect the benefits of a seven 
man as opposed to a six nan roster. At the end of the day, two shifts 
each week had operated with a deficiency of one marshaller for sane 
tine, as the "reserves" had refused to carry out this duty until their 
derrands had been met. The Airp::>rt Director again advised that any 
nodification should be as a gesture of goodwill and it was agreed with 
the Airp::>rt Carmittee that the Union's demands should be acceded to. A 
six man roster was to operate with relief marshallers filling the gaps 
and being paid marshallers rates for the whole week even though they 
perfonred marshalling duties only once or twice a week. ( 25 ) 
As far as the employment of temporary porters is concerned, the 'IGWU 
requested that the nmnber of temporary porters employed during the 
surmer peak period should be kept to a minirmnn to enable their rrenbers 
• :a~in on this on the pennanent staff to work additional overtJ..Ine. ~~~ 
issue the Corporation was prepared to give way, recc:mrending the 
Airport Director to restrict the recruitment of temporary labJur to the 
absolute min.irm.nn to allow porters to work rrore "day off overtine", on 
condition that the existing staff gave a written undertaking to carry 
out any necessary extra duties and comply with the detailed 
mquirem:mts of the Airp::>rt Director. ( 26 ) 
Following two short unofficial stoppages of work on 24 and 25 May, 
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the Airport Ccmnittee agreed that with effect fran 30 May 1968 all 
authorised drivers of fork-lifts, internal canbustion engine vehicles 
and electric tugs , irrespective of the nmnber of hours \\Qrked and. 
whether or not designated as "drivers for week" should be paid the 
appropriate lead rates at all times including holidays and sickness. 
It was also agreed fran the same date that a six man roster should 
apply to narshalling duties with gaps being filled by a naninated 
relief marshaller, paid on the marshallers rate for the week. 'lhe 
Camtittee also decided that the employrrent of temporary porters should 
be restricted. However, the Trade Group Secretary of the 'IGWU was 
infonned that in respect of the claim for iIrproved lead rates for 
supervisors, any claim based upon a decline in the value of leads in 
real m:mey tenus would be contrary to the criteria set out in the 
GoveInrrEnt' s White Paper on Prices and InCCil'ES Policy, as extra duties 
and responsibilities could not be fully justified. ( 27 ) 
Whilst the issue of improved lead payments for supervisors in the 
portering section remained in question, it is unlikely that this issue 
in itself \\Quld have contributed to an escalation of industrial unrest. 
However, it was linked to other nore fundamental claims rrade by the 
TGWU, one of which could not be settled at the local negotiating level 
anyway and another which threatened to undermine the whole framework of 
the national negotiation of pay and conditions at municipal airports 
which had been established in 1960. Firstly, the Union locally clairred 
that shift payments under the national agreement were inadequate, but 
this was a question which could only be considered by the NJC and at 
the time, it was considering a national claim for a substantial 
increase in rates of pay for all employees within its scope. Also 
under consideration was a report from a group of consultants on the 
Prices and InCCil'Es' Board's suggestion for interim productivity 
payments. ( 28) The national Trade Union Side's claim also suggested 
inprovemants in enhancarvants paid for shift \\Qrking, night \\Qrk rates 
and other allowances. This aspect of the claim had been referred to 
the Joint Secretaries for examination and report. In essence then, 
whatever the local 'IGWU claim for improved shift payrrents, the outCCil'E 
was dependent upon the conduct of national negotiations. ( 29 ) 
Whilst these claims for improvements in the pay of rranual \\Qrkers at 
Manchester Airport v.-ere significant, fonning the basis of continued 
industrial action, . the major stmnbling block in maintaining good 
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relations was the call for alternative negotiating arrangemants. '!he 
'IGWU locally pressed the Corporation to enter into a separate agreE!tEnt 
regarding nanbers employerl at Manchester Airport, adopting wages and 
working conditions not less favourable than those applying to manual 
workers employerl by the BAA. In response to this claim the Airport 
Carmi ttee argued that the withdrawal from the national agreE!tEnt ran 
contrary to the City Council's declared policy. In principle, such a 
course could have opened up the doors to all other manual workers 
governed by national agrearents who might similarly be encouraged to 
seek local agrearents. In practice, the Airport Ccmni ttee was also 
concerned that the application of BAA rates of pay to portering staff 
could seriously disturb the established differentials beUoveen different 
categories of staff which had underpinned the settlement of rates of 
pay for administrative and manual staffs for sare years. ( 30) 
'!he outright refusal on the part of the Airport Ccmni ttee to 
entertain a local agreement coupled with the refusal to ilTIprove 
supervisors' lead rates locally, led to an escalation of industrial 
action. On 6 June 1968, the Trade Group Secretary of the 'IGWU 
responded to the decision of the Airport Corrmittee: 
"The decisions of the Airport Ccmnittee have caused bitter 
resentment at what our members feel is a canplete lack of 
understanding of the situation at Ringway by the Employing 
Ccmni ttee. The present acti vi ty will continue and could escalate. 
We deplore your attitude to our claim for an improvement in lead 
rates and improved shift allowances . . . Even within the franework 
of Prices and Incomes Policy " Productivity, Prices and Incares 
Policy in 1968/9" Onnd 3590, Paragraph 34, Criteria for Incares 
Policy, Clause 4, when the wages of members at Ringway are canpared 
to those being paid by the BAA for doing similar work, the question 
of negotiation is not precluded." (31) 
As regards the question of opting out of the NJC machinery is 
concerned, it was suggested that this was : 
"not without precedent as you are aware, the Manchester Corporation 
Transport Departmenf have a separate agreement with this 
organisation." ( 32) 
A series of stoppages of work by the portering staff which had 
camenced on 24 May 1968 were supported by other operational sections 
and continued into the next IIDnth. Details of the tUning and effect of 
this action are pIOVided in Appendix 8. 7 . At a mass :rreeting on 5 June, 
it had been decided to continue sporadic withdrawals of labour until an 
Emargency meeting between Union officials and the Airport Ccmnittee was 
arranged to reconsider the porters' claim. FirEm3Il at the airport had 
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also agreed to support the stoppages which would by their action 
require the airport to be closed and the dispute developed to involve 
340 groundstaff at the Airport who were rrembers of the 'IGWU. ( 33 ) 
Faced with escalating unrest it was decided by the Airport Carmi ttee to 
invoke the nachinery provided wi thin the constitution of the NJC for 
preventing disputes. An early meeting of the Disputes Carmi ttee of the 
NJC and the Joint Secretaries of the Employees Side was requested 
whilst the Town Clerk prepared the Corporation's statE!lIBlt of case for 
exchange with the Union. At the same time, the Employers' Secretary 
was investigating ways and means of improving the wages structure 
wi thin the framework of the National Agreement for Employees at 
Municipal Airports with a view to subnitting proposals to the Disputes 
Ccmnittee. The 'IGWU h~, intinated that they and the employees 
concerned were not willing to attend before the Disputes Carmi ttee. By 
the end of the rronth, details of finn proposals for improving the wages 
structure within the national agreement had been sul:mitted to the Trade 
Union representatives and agreement had been reached at Joint Secretary 
level covering shift pay and basic wage rates for both porters and 
firerrEn. (34) 
However, whilst agreement had been reached at national level the 
employees involved in the dispute at Manchester Airport refused to 
accept the recarrmendation of their national Union officials. 
A meeting of the City Council on 3 July 1968, resolved: 
"That having regard (a) to the rren's refusal to accept the 
reccmnendations for improved pay by the Joint Secretaries of the 
National Joint Council and (b) to the fact that the 20 unofficial 
strikes have not on! y caused severe hardship to nany thousands of 
passengers, but have actually placed passengers' lives in peril by 
withdrawal of the fire services, the Airport Ccmni ttee must in 
future dismiss from their employment any nan who takes part in 
unofficial stoppages." (35) 
The dispute was on! y resolved by discussions under the Chairm:mship of 
the Deputy Conciliation Officer of the Depa.rt:nEnt of Fmplaynent and 
ProdUctivity, involving representatives of the Manchester Corporation, 
the 'IGWU and the Joint Secretaries of the NJC. (36) Details of the 
tenns recarmended for adoption in settlement of the difference between 
the parties are provided in Appendix 8.8. Appendix 8.9 surrrrarises the 
effects of the agreement on existing wage rates at Manchester Airport 
and carp:rres revised wage rates with those prevailing at BAA airports. 
Basically, an airport hand or qualified fireman in the first year of 
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service at Manchester Airport could enjoy a basic salary higher than 
their counterparts employed by the BAA, but in serna instances earnings 
did not canpare favourably when the rostered week and long service 
allowances were taken into account. The cost of settiem:mt to 
Manchester Airport was estimated at £24,600 for portering and £4,800 
for fire service manual staffs in 1968/9 with additional costs expected 
to rise to £35,800 and £6,400 respectively in the future. (37) 
A feature of the dispute which is worth noting is that in financial 
tenns the airport was unaffected because given the short sporadic 
nature of industrial action, its najor effect was to cause delays to 
air services and only a limited m.nnber of diversions. In fact, the 
airport administration nade a saving of serna £2,300 in non-payment of 
wages. It was the airlines operating out of Manchester which bore the 
cost of the dispute . Representatives of KIM estilnateci that a flight 
diversion to london involved £250 in bringing passengers to Manchester. 
The Sales Manager of BEA also pointed out that because of relatively 
high fuel costs, if a jet had to circle above Manchester Airport for 
only a short time, the cost involved could be greater than a diversion. 
At the end of the strike BEA represented the airline IIDst severely 
affected with costs of the dispute being estilnated at about £15,000. 
(38) It nay be argued on this basis that although the airport suffered 
no imnerliate cost in the dispute, long tenn consequences could be 
severe if airlines chose to withdraw air services into and out of 
Manchester. 
At the end of the day, the direct costs of settling the dispute 
increased staffing costs in other areas as a consequence of rraintaining 
internal relativities. The NJC for IDeal Authorities Services 
(Engineering Craftsmen) which governed the pay and conditions of all 
local authority engineering craftsmen nade no separate provision for 
craftsmen employed at nnmicipal airports and following the settlarent 
with porters, the .AEU, EIU and National Society of Metal Mechanics 
representing about 40 engineering craftsmen at municipal airports 
registered concern regarding the i.:rr'!J?act of the settiarent on 
differentials. As a result the "airport classification payrrent" rrade 
to porters was applied to this group of workers at Manchester Airport. 
(39) Similarly, once agreement had been reached regarding increased 
paynents to porters and firemen, the 'lGWU claimed similar increases for 
the remaining employees falling wi thin the scope of the rue which 
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included two main groups of workers 45 semi-skilled engineering 
~rkers who since 1962 had been graded in accordance with the we 
Scheme for Semi-Skilled Engineering Employees (the majority of 
labourers were €!IT!Ployed. on the second grade of the four grade schema) 
and a small number of car park attendants. 
1he Union's claim in respect of semi-skilled engineering EIIq?loyees 
involved first! y designating them "airport hands". Under existing 
conditions of service , only the highest Grade Four carried the same 
rate as the national rate for airport hands. In addition, the Union 
clained same fonn of shift payment for staggered day wurking and the 
payment of driving leads. HChleVer, because of the diversity of ~rk in 
the maintenance section, the Airport DepartIrEnt argued that the 
designation "airport hand" wuuld be inappropriate because any 
flexibility as a result would be one way. In other wuros, the lxxiy of 
airport hands at the airport could not do the wurk of semi-skilled 
~rkers in the maintenance section. Corporation representatives 
however, suggested that the airport classification payn:ent be made to 
this group of staff along with an extra 2~ per hour on account of the 
national settlement. 1he claim for shift payments was not acceded to 
on the grounds that staggered day wurking was not canparable to shift 
working and similarly the payment of driving leads was rejected as the 
grading scheme for semi -skilled wurkers in the maintenance section 
already involved a requirement for these wurkers to be drivers capible 
of using tools. Any concession in this regard wuuld, therefore, have 
been contrm:y to the general practice in other Corporation depart:nents. 
As far as car park attendants were concerned, again the designation of 
"airport hand" was refused although lead rates VwBre increased along 
with shift allowances and 2~ was offered on account of the national 
settlE!lIEIlt. (40) 
Although the 1968 settlement for airport hands and firerren at 
Manchester Airport and the adjustment of rates for other manual workers 
secured industrial peace, this was on! y tenporary as the settlerrent had 
failed to address the fundamental grievance that differences in pay 
structures between airports in different ownership groups persisted. 
As pointed out earlier, this question had been addressed by the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes, but no lasting solution had been 
found. In April 1970, further disruption of operations occurred at 
Manchester Airport with employees in the apron services and fire 
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service sections, car park attendants and semi-skilled workers in the 
maintenance section clOSing the airport for a continuous 24 hour 
period, with short lightning strikes on two other occasions. ( 41 ) 
Since the pay settlement of 1968, the Employees Side of the NJC had 
continually made reference to BAA rates of pay whilst the Employers' 
Side had emphasised that the BAA agreement had two elements - a IDndon 
reighting of 30s per week and a productivity payment of about 40s per 
reek which had to be taken into account in canparing rates of pay. At 
Manchester Airport, steps had been taken to conclude a productivity 
deal with the portering and fire staffs, guaranteeing for 12 rronths a 
minimum bonus payment of £2 per week for 40 hours. A net increase of 
30s had been proposed after absorbing the lOs oonus granted under the 
1968 settlement. Whilst the productivity deal as such was acceptable 
to the Union, they \V8re unwilling to finalise an agreement until a 
satisfactory settlement regarding rates of pay at national level could 
be concluded. In effect, the 24 hour stoppage at Manchester was in 
support of colleagues at Glasgow Airport who \V8re involved in action to 
pressurise the employers into conceding BAA rates. Workers at 
Manchester whose levels of pay had been increased in 1968 to ITDre 
adequately reflect the similar scale of operations with BAA airports 
were, therefore, not in dispute with the Corporation regan:ling parity 
claims but maintained that the employers ' representatives on the NJC 
were taking too long deliberating the questions of parity for all 
rranual workers at municipal airports. ( 42) In o:rder to prevent further 
disruption, the Municipal Airports Panel canprcmised on the basis that 
all future wage increases detennined for BAA manual workers would apply 
to all municipal airports in place of local authority pay increases, 
whilst local authority basic rates and shift enhancements would 
continue to apply. In principle, in accepting the application of BAA 
pay increases, the National Joint Council was also accepting that all 
local authority airport manual workers should be brought up to the 
level of Manchester Airport for pay purposes. However, a secondary 
consideration was the maintenance of the differential between employees 
at Manchester and those at other nnmicipal airports. So at the sane 
time, the original four group classification of airports for pay 
purposes which accOlmted for differences in size, scope and workload 
was replaced by a two airport classification with Manchester Airport 
arployees alone falling within the highest classification receiving SOp 
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per week nore than their counterparts at other nnmicipal airports. ( 43 ) 
Between 1970 and 1975, there was little industrial action at 
rmmicipal airports across the board against national settlerents . 
However, at Manchester Airport the manual workers continued to press 
for a canplete break with the national agreemmt and for the local 
detennination of pay and conditions of service. Be~ mid March and 
early April 1975, dissatisfaction again erupted. into widespread unrest. 
Airport hands, firemen, car park attendants, terrace wardens and 
unskilled. labourers took part in five stoppages of work, four of which 
extended beyond 24 hours and which took place over the peak Friday-
Saturday pericx:l. As this industrial action meant that the airport was 
closed for long pericx:ls, flights tended. to be diverted rather than 
delayed. In one day alone, 116 scheduled flights and 26 charter 
flights had been affected. All Manchester to IDndon flights had to be 
cancelled. along with the flights operated to the continent by foreign 
airlines. British Ai:rways flights to the continent 'Were transferred to 
castle Ibnnington and other flights were diverted to Blackpool and 
Gatwick. With cancellations and diversions, the authority incurred 
revenue losses of £42,300 against an estimated reduction of £15,300 in 
the wage bill. ( 44 ) 
On 10 March, after extensive negotiations, agreement had been 
reached by both sides of the Municipal Airports Panel regarding the 
1975 annual pay settlenent. The basic pay of airport workers was to be 
increased. by £8.50 per week, as cc.mpared. with an increase of £7.78 for 
other local authority manual workers. Shift payments were to be 
increased in line with recently negotiated. and accepted shift payrrETlts 
for all local authority manual workers. The effect of this agreement 
at Manchester Airport was to increase average earnings by over £13 per 
week, representing a 32% improvement on existing pay. However, the 
'IGWU representatives at the airport indicated that in addition to the 
£8.50 increase in basic rates, they wanted the basis of shift payrrETlts 
to be altered to 20% of the basic rate, thereby bringing shift payrrETlts 
into line with those paid to staff grades and improving the level of 
earnings by over 40%. 'Ib concede this claim would have added another 
£100,000 to the airport wage bill and rrore serious consequences were 
envisaged. in the creation of uncontrollable anarralies with other local 
authority workers. ( 45 ) At a nass meeting of the Manchester Airport 
Branch on 4 April, the District Secretary of the 'lGWU was instructed to 
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rrake a specific request for the Manchester Airport Joint Carmi. ttee to 
enter negotiations to establish a canprehensi ve local agreEment on 
wages and conditions. ( 46 ) The m:magarent produCErl statistical 
evidence, which is reproduced in Appendix 8.10, to show that local 
authority rates when calculated over local shift rosters were equal to 
those of the BAA and other public sector employees. ( 47) 
National Trade Union officials appealed to all members not to engage 
in industrial action and, as a result of this appeal, and in the light 
of overall increases granted, all municipal airports continued nomal 
working , with two exceptions. At Manchester and Newcastle airports, 
unofficial action was taken in sUPIX=>rt of the claim for shift rates to 
be revised. This action was strongly deprecated by national Trade 
union officials who advised that local authorities should on no account 
negotiate outside the terms of the mutually accepted national 
agreement. The Manchester men could not persuade members at other 
airports to sUPIX=>rt their action - the only undertaking which was 
secured was a refusal to handle aircraft diverted from Manchester. As 
the airlines operating out of Manchester began to withdraw air services 
and losses began to accrue to the Corporation, the response of the 
Airport Carrmi ttee was unequivocal. Unless the men were willing to 
return to nomal working, the Carrmi ttee themselves would close the 
airport. Faced with the employers' intransigence, a return to work was 
secured, although the employees made clear their intention to opt out 
of the national agreerrent and to continue to press for a local 
agreEment. ( 48 ) 
The 1970s generally ~ a period of rapid expansion at Manchester 
Airport with new types of larger aircraft caning into operation and 
changes in equipnent which affected particular work areas and further 
canplicated industrial relations. The Engineering Section, which 
canprised 64 skilled workers, 11 apprentices and 61 semi-skilled 
workers/groundsmen and was responsible for operational se:rviceability, 
design and maintenance of gas, water and electricity supplies, airfield 
lighting, motor transport, plant and equiprent including heating and 
ventilation, stand-by plant, electronics equiprent, refrigerators and 
escalators, maintenance of drainage sewage disposal, runways, taxiways 
and internal roads, was substantially effected by new developIBlts. As 
a result of £3.9 million additional investrrent in vehicles, equipIBlt 
and plant between 1974 and 1978, the maintenance function r~ a 
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familiarity with the nore m:xiem technology of hydraulics, control 
cirelli try and electronics, including canputers. Sate staff found it 
difficult to absorb the increased technical knowledge necessary and 
because of the lack of training at shop floor level, jobs took longer 
to canplete causing serious problems in the scheduling of work. ( 49 ) 
The intrcx:iuction of ccmplex electronics equipnent, in particular, 
created difficulties in staff recruitment and consequent difficulty in 
naintaining an effective service. A separate electronics section had 
been established in 1975 with the introduction of two posts of 
electronics engineer. In 1977, the establishrrEnt was increased by 
three posts of electronics technician but as nore canplex and advanced 
electronics equipnent like metal detectors, x-ray equipnent, micro 
processors, prograrnnable logic controllers, low level light cameras and 
explosive detection equipnent came into use, two of these posts 
remained vacant reflecting the inability to recruit suitable staff. 
(50) 
Whilst new electronics systems required. specialist skills, the 
difficulty of recruiting and retaining staff was reflected across the 
maintenance function. Trade Union representatives maintained that the 
situation was deteriorating daily. Men, especially young men who -were 
fitters, electricians and semi-skilled workers, VJere being lost at the 
rate of one a week. The root cause of this predicament was seen to be 
the relatively low earnings of craftsmen in local authorities. (51) As 
rates of pay were set nationally by the Standing Conference of 
Electricians and the JNC for IDeal Authorities I Services (Engineering 
Craftsmen) increased skills payments and bonus earnings VJere regardErl 
as the nost appropriate measures which could be used to reflect local 
circumstances. 
Initially, discussions took place between the Airport Authority and 
the EEI'PU for increases in skills payments made to electricians 
employed by the Airport Authority. Discussions culminatErl in a 
subnission to the NJC which agreErl to a two stage increase in skills 
payments in recognition of the requirement for electricians to undergo 
training in and undertake work on canplex electronics equipnent. 
Electricians accepted the first stage but rejected the second stage, so 
a \\1Orking party was set up under the JNC for IDeal Authorities' 
Services (Engineering Craftsmen) prinaril y to investigate the claim 
nade by the electricians, but also to judge whether there was 
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justification for similar skills payments to engineering craftSIlEI1 
generally. The tenns of reference of the working party were: 
"'lb examine and evaluate the carplexi ty of electrical/electronic 
work and mechanical work executed by the electricians and 
engineering craftsmen respectively at Manchester International 
AirpOrt and to consider the rate of pay in relation to those of 
their counterparts in other local authority depart::rrEnts." (52) 
'Ih.e working party concluded that extra skills were required of 
craftSIIEl1 EUq?loyed within the airport and that the nost satisfacto:ry 
basis of assessing the necessary skills was to relate job functions 
with training needs, thus providing a grading structure based on these 
two factors. The working party also expressed the view that there 
should be a carrm:>n basic grade for all craftsrren (that is the s~ for 
electricians, mechanics, fitters) EUq?loyed at the airport, and that 
this cOlllIDn rate should be in excess of the basic rate for other local 
authority craftsmen, bearing a direct relationship with the rates paid 
to craftsmen at airports other than those run by local authorities 
(that is Heathrow and. Gatwick). (53) .An agreement was drawn up between 
the Manchester International AirpOrt and the .AUEW, EE'rpu and NSMM 
representative of the craftsmen: 
"Where there can be identified an extra skills requirem:mt and 
training courses can be designed to relate the training needs to the 
job functions, a graded structure should be eval ved relating reward 
to competence." (54 ) 
Training nodules 'V.18re to be purpose designed around the advanced 
technology EUq?loyed at MIA and, although the job requirem:mts for 
mechanics and fitters - as opposed to electricians - were different, it 
was possible for a carm:m grading structure to be applied based on 
functions and training. The training of mechanics and fitters was to 
provide for greater diversification and versatility and enable nore 
flexibility between specialisms, whilst the electricians' training was 
to be geared nore towards academic ability. (55) The skills related 
payment scheme based on a canprehensi ve training prograrrme was thought 
to be of significant advantage to airport engineering management as a 
result of increased flexibility and greater expertise across the board. 
A nore "canplete" type of craftsman would eval ve, able to undertake 
'OOrk at the highest level of canpetence and flexibility. It was hoped 
that increased job satisfaction would provide a nore interesting career 
and assist with recruitment and retention of skilled craftSIIEl1. ( 56 ) 
As far as the bonus earnings of craftsnen at Manchester AirpOrt is 
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concerned, although a UMS system had been in operation for Sate years, 
bonus earnings had remllned constant at a level of about 30% and shop 
stewards of the EErPU, 'lGWU, Metal Mechanics and AEU requested an 
inquiry into the engineering departrrent' s managemant procedures. As a 
result of this inquiry, an agreem:mt was reached for changes in working 
practices which, when implanented, resulted in cost savings to those 
groups participating, and allowed self financing 
productivity/efficiency paym:mts to be rrade to all craftsrren anployai 
by MIM. Groundstaff, for example, had operated a stand-by system 
carprising four or six men when freezing conditions or snow was 
forecast. The appropriate stand-by creN would renain on the station 
covering a 14 hour period fram 18.00 hours to 08.00 hours the following 
noming. If ice and snow conditions did not prevail, the stand-by crew 
would not carry out other work. This restrictive practice had been in 
operation for aver 12 years. As part of the productivity deal, it was 
agreed that essential scheduled YJOrk, like litter picking and general 
cleanliness within the nanoeuvering area which was nore efficient if 
carried out in the quieter night time hours, would be undertaken by 
stand-by crews. The method of rraintaining the airfield lighting system 
had canprised of a system whereby an electrician and semi-skilled 
engineer carried out routine inspection and fitting changes, the semi-
skilled nan being present to provide an RT watch on! y . With increased 
flexibility, the semi-skilled nan could carry the portable RT set, 
execute the fitting change and inspection allowing the electrician to 
carry out other duties. Many services carried out on equiprent and 
plant at the airport had also been done with a skilled and semi -skilled 
nan working together. It was accepted by those concerned that this 
method of working was a fonn of restrictive practice and that a 
proportion of the YJOrk need only be carried out by a semi-skilled 
operator , usually working on his own. In general, the changes in 
working practices, as a result of the productivity deal, benefittErl 
managemant in a nmnber of ways. The introduction and use of new and 
more advanced equipnant and ma.chinery was achieved, first line 
servicing involving plant and equipnant could be carried out by semi-
skilled engineers, all engineering staff could be required to work 
single handed up to the limits of their capabilities, operating fran 
nobile work stations and other outstations to maximise actual YJOrking 
hours. Full interchangeability and flexibility of staff was introduced 
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so that mixed disciplines could operate within the basic job filllction 
of each specialism. Manpower savings of £82,025 per annum enabled much 
of the minor impravE!tBlts and developrent \IDrk at the airport to be 
carriErl out in-house with the advantage that the priority demmds at 
the airport could be met without relying on contractors and other 
contractual agencies; costs could be reduced by limiting travelling 
time to a minimum (contractors when employed averaged about two hours 
per day travelling tine); the use of airport staff to install equiprent 
established inmediate familiarisation thus rErlucing training needs and 
"down tine" on equipnent failure and job satisfaction improved. (57) 
Other \IDrk areas where new equiprEnt was introduced as a result of 
growth and developnent in the 1970s included the fire and portering 
sections. '!he Fire Brigade had, in fact, been required to adopt new 
equipnent and methcx:ls in the past as the constant growth of the airport 
had necessitated change to canpl y with aerodrane licensing provisions. 
In 1959, the introduction of two new fire appliances and a rescue 
tender had all~ for a reduction in establishment fram 35 to 26 
firerren. '!hese new machines had involved c~lex designs and had 
neErled constant skilled attention to maintain them at the required 
level of efficiency. A qualified Fire Section Engineer familiar with 
the design of the equipnent as well as chassis, engine and accessories, 
had been employed and the newly created post had been responsible for 
the training of pmnp operators to provide insurance against misuse. 
(58) With the increase in scheduled rroverrents of large type aircraft 
with all-up-weight of not less than 200,000 pounds in the mid 1960s, 
the airport required a category IX fire fighting capacity. Only the 
BAA airports at Prestwick and wndon operated to this standard at the 
tine and the nearest equivalent in the group of nrunicipall Y ownErl 
airports were the category VI airports at Binningham, Liverpool and 
Southend. 'lb bring the fire fighting media carriErl on vehicles up to 
the standaId required, it was necessary to provide an additional foam 
tender at Manchester Airport. Compliance with categorisation standards 
also required an increase in the establislnnent of the Fire Section fran 
41 to 59 and recruitment of an additional 17 firemen designatErl leading 
firenen., senior firemen or firemen and one section leader. (59 ) 
By the early 1970s, the equipnent maintainErl by the Fire Service at 
Manchester Airport had increased to include two General Motors Pyrene 
Pathfinder 6x6 Jumbo Foam Tenders; one Currmins Diesel/'!homeycroft 
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'IMA/300 6x6 Foam Tender; one Rolls Royce/'Ihomeycroft TFA B81 6x6 3, 000 
Foam Tender and a larger 6,000 version; one Mercedes Benz 4x4 Uninog 
EmergenCY Tender; one Bedford 4x4 Hose Layer; one Ccmnar 4x2 IWB; one 
Austin 4x2 Al59 Ambulance Control Unit and one Ford Transit Kanbi Apron 
Services vehicle SWB 22cwt. Prior to 1970, provision had been IPade for 
senior firemen on staff grades to be in charge of the larger 
appliances. However, in that year, the rank of senior fireman had been 
aOOlishe:l and the camplem:mt of 18 senior firemen rErluce:l to 15 leading 
firemen. In anticipation of increase:l air services, the purchase of 
two heavy duty Jmnbo fire vehicles had been authorise:l and these highly 
sophisticate:l appliances had to be operate:l by two leading firemen, one 
driver and one noni tor operator. Other equiprent was to be introduced 
to the service like breathing apparatus and headphones in the watch 
roan. Together with existing equiprent, the addition of these two 
vehicles gave Manchester Category X fire standards, the only other UK 
airport operating to this standard being Heathrow. Again, it was 
decide:l that leading firemen should be in charge of vehicles, so in 
1973 the canplem:mt of firemen was rErluce:l from 45 to 36 and leading 
firemen increase:l from 15 to 24. (60) 
Like the Fire Service, the portering section had in the past been 
required to operate additional plant, but again the introduction of new 
equiprent to handle Boeing 747 aircraft represented a fundamental 
departure from anything which had prece:le:l it in tenns of its technical 
operation. In 1971, a special lead rate of £9.50 had been introduced 
for airport hands operating this equiprent and in later years, a Hi-ill 
18 which was capable of operating B7 4 7 freight aircraft was introduced. 
(61) 
Given the technical sophistication of equiprent to cater for the 
larger jets in April 1977, the 'IGWU had requeste:l a review of local 
lead rates for driving and operating this new equiprent along with 
consideration of shift payments, the classification payment at 
Manchester Airport and the grades and rates of pay of all rranual graded 
staff. In view of the fact that the claim involved rrany issues which 
were subject to national agreement, a reference was IPade to the 
Municipal Airports Panel for the establishrrEnt of a working party to 
examine the duties of all IPanual workers at local authority airports 
including Manchester. ( 62) 
Discussions on detaile:l claims for increase:l leads continue:l at the 
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local level, but little agreement could be reached as mmage:rent did 
not consider that the claims for local payrrents met pay criteria and 
expressed the view that it 'WOuld be nore appropriate for the Union to 
seek an increase in the SOp classification allowance by establishing 
that in general, the 'WOrk discharged at Manchester was nore canplex 
than elsewhere. As part of the January 1978 pay deal, a nore 
carprehensi ve review of the wages structures at municipal airports, 
examining the relevance of job evaluation and the effects of new 
technology was agreed. 'Ihe working party was to collect infonnation 
rega:r:ding pay, jobs perfo:r:med, equipnen.t used, etc, fran all municipal 
airports and after visiting a selection of airports grades and pay 
structures were to be examined especially in the light of changes in 
aircraft using, or equipnen.t being operated at, each airport. This 
analysis would determine whether or not there were grounds for 
increasing the SOp classification payment at Manchester Airport. ( 63 ) 
As progress at national level continued to be slaw, the implications 
for Manchester Airport became rrore serious. Although discussions with 
representatives of the Fire Service regarding the introduction of new 
equipnent had been in progress since February 1977, in March 1978 
representatives of the firemen decided that they would not use Rapid 
Intervention Vehicles nor breathing apparatus without additional 
paymants. 'Ihe refusal to maintain the RIVs had potentially serious 
consequences if it meant that the vehicles were not available to attend 
an errergency. '!he CAA advised that unless at least one RIV - which was 
to replace an emergency tender nore than 20 years old - could be 
brought into use, the airport would be reduced to handling aircraft no 
larger than the BAC 1-11. 'Ihe firemen were supported in their action 
by the airport hands who refused to operate the Hi-La 18 until 
additional payments had been made to all m:mual workers. This was the 
only piece of equipnen.t awned by the airport authority capable of 
operating B7 4 7 freighters and as these aircraft could not be handled at 
the airport, potential income was being lost (one 747 freighter landing 
per week could prcxiuce an annual income of nore than £125,000). ( 64 ) 
In an attenpt to stabilise industrial relations and in view of the 
frequent and protracted negotiations with the 'IGWU at Manchester 
Airport in April 1978 a fornal Joint Consultative Ccmni.ttee was fomed. 
This was to provide a means of carmunication by which mutually 
acceptable solutions could be sought through a genuine exchange of 
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views and infonration. Six representatives of the employers and six 
representatives of the 'IGWU were to discuss local claims for increased 
pay and related issues like productivity scherres and manning levels. 
(65) In effect, the introduction of Rapid Inte:r::vention Vehicles to the 
Fire Service had implications not only for pay but for manning levels 
as well as staffing arrangerrents had to cater for firEmm training on 
these new vehicles. On 9 August 1978, the Fire Service undertook a 
lightning strike be~ 09.30 and 13.00 over the issue of manning 
levels. As a result of this action, 12 in-bound flights were diverted 
or delayed, affecting 800 passengers, four in-bound wndon flights were 
cancelled, seven flights were diverted to Liverpool and one to 
Binningham. Of the out-bound flights scheduled fram Manchester, four 
to wndon were cancelled; six were diverted for take-off fran 
Liverpool; a flight to Paris was cancelled with passengers being 
dispatched from Manchester on a later flight and a further six out-
bound flights were delayed. In all, scma 23 flights failed to operate 
out of Manchester and 2,300 passengers were affected involving a loss 
to the authority of £5,100. (66) 
In this instance, the Joint Consultative Ccmnittee proved to be a 
useful forum for achieving agreement between employee and. employer 
representatives and curtailing further industrial unrest. The 'IGWU had 
suggested that the issues in dispute could be settled if the authority 
agreed to the ilrmErliate implementation of a 17 lMIl rn.:ini.rrn.nn watch-
firemen would train on the RIVs whenever 17 men were on day duty on an 
agreed basis; the authority were also to agree to the i.rrIrediate 
recruitment of eight additional firEmm bringing them onto the watch as 
soon as possible, and finally a reccmnendation was to be made to the 
national Municipal Airports Panel that any additional payment made to 
firemen for training on RIVs would be backdated. As agreement had been 
reached in the Joint Consultative Committee, the employees' 
representatives agreed to put a strong recarmendation to the employees 
to accept these tenns and not to partake in further industrial action. 
(67) 
A nonth later, the national working party reported to the effect 
that duties at Manchester Airport involved greater responsibility than 
at other airports. However, agreement could not be reached at national 
level on the re-classification which should be adopted and the 
ccmni tment to the limit of 5% set by the goverrment' s pay policy was 
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another stumbling block in negotiations. The Trade Unions rejected a 
5% pay offer and suggested that the national arployers join then in an 
approach to Government for municipal airport arployees to be treated as 
a special case. However, the national arployers rejected this 
suggestion. (68) 
The employers' failure to agree at national level was discussed by 
the Joint Consultative Ccmnittee at Manchester Airport. In oider to 
overcare the inmadiate effects of the failure to agree at national 
level and. to achieve settlement at an early date, the Authority 
representatives decided that an approach should be made to the Unions 
locally to seek support for (a) a declaration that the Authority agrees 
that manual w:>rkers at the airport should, subject to guarantees on 
productivity , receive gross earnings approximately in line with the BAA. 
and British AiIways, (b) that no action \\1Ould be taken to breach pay 
policy, but officers should seek to get Manchester Airport treated as a 
"special casel! on the grounds of canparabili ty with the BAA and BA. and 
of the airport's designation as an international gateway airport, in 
o:r:der to secure pay increases in excess of the 5% made to employees 
concerned at national level, (c) that officers should be authorised to 
start inmadiate discussions with employees regarding the introduction 
of self financing productivity/efficiency measures. (69) In effect, 
the Authority was making an attempt to settle differences independently 
of the national bargaining machineI.y and employee representatives 
reiterated a request for a local agreement on pay and productivity 
giving arployees parity with BAA and BA gross earnings. It was agreed 
that because of the implications for the Rate Support Grant, any 
payments in addition to 5% would require Government approval and the 
employees were asked to refrain fram industrial action for a pericxi of 
four weeks to allow an approach to Government to be made and 
preparation of proposals for self financing producti vi ty measures. (70) 
However, following this meeting of the JCC employees decided that in 
view of the failure of national negotiations, a work to rule would be 
instituted in support of the claim for parity of earnings with BAA/BA. 
employees. An overtime ban with a refusal to work flexibly to cover 
key areas where staff were absent closed the airport for 24 hours on 
21/22 Januar.y 1979; for 12 hours on 23rd; 10 hours on 24th and 24 hours 
on 26th/27th. (71) 
In effect, this dispute was settlErl only temporarily by the 
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agrement at national level to refer claims to the Standing Carmission 
on Pay Canparability and by the ultimate agreem:mt by the 'IGWU leaders 
of 600 manual workers at Manchester AiIp::>rt to drop the work to rule, 
giving the AiIp::>rt Authority a m:mth' s grace to frame a "mini" local 
pay deal to achieve pay parity. By March 1979, ground staff anplayed 
at Manchester AiIp::>rt had voted by nore than ten to one to accept a 
self financing producti vi ty deal which would be subsurred into any award 
rrade by the Standing Carmission on Pay Canparabili ty. '!he producti vi ty 
deal involved reductions in manning levels which produced a saving of 
£750,000 resulting in additional pay:rrents of £14.40 per week in return 
for the lifting of many restrictive practices, including the operation 
of the Hi-ill 18 and other pieces of equipnent. (72) Whilst the 
agreerrent of the productivity deal secured the lifting of restrictive 
practices, it also eroded the differentials enjoyed by first line 
supervisors and as a result, a further producti vi ty deal was agreed 
with first and second line supervisors yielding an additional payment 
of £7.40; in addition, a North West Provincial Council guideline which 
stated that first line supervisors should be paid a guaranteed 12~% 
minimum differential over manual grades was invoked. (73 ) 
Whilst producti vi ty measures were accepted by the rna jority as an 
interim measure to achieve parity with the BAA, pending reccmnendations 
of the Clegg Ccmnission productivity measures were rejected by the Fire 
Service. Initially, the Joint Consultative Camnittee had agreed in 
March 1979 to recommend a resumption of nomal working and 
participation in the productivity deal covering all manual workers at 
the airport. In order to participate in the scherre , representatives of 
the firerren had agreed to accept a reduction in manning levels through 
natural wastage, of one post on each watch, that is four firerrEn. Fire 
Officers, ha.vever, intimated that they would not accept any reduction 
in manning levels at officer level to secure additional payment for 
their members , although they would co-operate fully in discussions 
:regarding productivity. On 1 April, a branch meeting fully rejected 
the proposed reductions in manning levels and resumed the work to rule 
until such times as the claims for additional responsibility payments 
for firerrEn and fire officers, already suhnitted, were resolved. The 
enployers ' position renained that claims for additional responsibility 
payments could on! Y be dealt with at national level and that, as per 
the national pay settlemant, rates of pay would be considered by the 
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standing Ccmnission on Pay Canparability. As a result of their refusal 
to \\Urk in accordance with contractual obligations, all 74 Fire Station 
personnel were suspended for three days. A rreeting of the Joint 
Consultative Ccmnittee was called in an effort to resume nomal working 
where errployee representatives suggested that a return to work could be 
secured if all suspended personnel were reinstated without loss of pay; 
all details regarding the dispute were rerroved fran individual 
personnel recon::ls; firemen remained outside the negotiated productivity 
scheme whilst meaningful discussions were held locally on the 
errployees' claim for additional responsibility paymants; nanning levels 
were not reduced and all vacancies against establishrrEnt ~re 
iImediatel y filled. '!he employers again refused to hold local 
negotiations on claims for additional paymants and the dispute 
escalated on 6 April when the men were sent home without pay. A 
resumption of nomal working was instituted the following day when the 
errployees concerned conceded to await the outcome of the canparability 
study. Inmediate action was taken to fill five vacancies against the 
Fire Section establishment agreed in August 1978; suspension notices 
were rescinded and details rerroved fran personnel files; further 
discussions were to take place on the phased repaymant of wages lost 
during the period of suspension and any disputes involving the Fire 
Section in the future were to be negotiated through the norrral JCC 
rrachinery and NJC or National Provincial Council. (74 ) 
At the end of the day, firemen errployed at Manchester Airport 
decided to opt out of the productivity package which would have gone 
sane way towards establishing parity with BAA airports and awaited the 
outcane of the Clegg Ccmnission investigations. In the rreantine, 
however, Fire Officers took issue over the guaranteed 12~% pay 
differential which had been awarded to other supervisors on condition 
that they participate in the producti vi ty arrangements. On 7 September 
1979, the 34 Fire Officers employed at the airport withdrew their 
labour in support of a claim to receive the same differential. For the 
enplayers, the poSition was clear: 
"Haw can we unilaterally concede the guarantee to the Fire Of~icers 
when they refused to make the concessions nade by other parties to 
the producti vi ty package?" (75) 
whilst the strikers were equally convinced. that their case was 
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legitilnate, 
"We don't want the IlOney paid out for productivity we want the 
guarantee on differentials because we have always ~ on the same 
grade as other supervisors before now." (76 ) 
As the dispute continued, airport closure rreant that losses of 
£70,000 per day were being incurred and within ten days, the possible 
lay-off of airport staff was being rrooted. By 21 September, losses 
incurred were approaching £1.6 million and a rreeting of nearly 1,000 
groundstaff at Manchester Airport criticised mmagem:mt and the 34 
striking officers as "stubborn. and pig-headed". ( 77) Under increasing 
pressure, the claim was referred to arbitration. ACrSS, representing 
the Fire Officers, argued that when staff grades for Fire Officers had 
been established in 1970 a differential had been created between all 
categories of errployees at the Airport Fire Station reflecting 
increased duties and responsibilities. Differentials had been 
maintained by Fire Officers always receiving the same treatment as 
other staff supervisors. The Fire Officers now requi.:r:ed the 12~% 
guaranteed differential in order to protect and preserve their status. 
The employers argued that to receive increases in pay aver and above 
nationally prescribed rates, manual and supervisory grades had agreed 
to a self financing producti vi ty scherre and that supervisors had 
accepted that participation in productivity measures had been a pre-
requisite to receiving the guaranteed :minimum differential. Whilst the 
Fire Officers had rejected productivity measures on the basis that the 
proposed reductions in manning levels could affect safety standards, 
the Authority maintained that even with reduced manning levels the fire 
cover provided would continue to be beyond that requi.:r:ed by the CAA's 
Licensing Regulations . In order to qualify for the guaranteed 
differential Fire Officers had to be subject to the same productivity 
and efficiency measures agreed with all other supervisors. Having 
weighed each case ACAS ruled that the guaranteed :minimum differential 
had to be paid to Fire Officers from 1 NOvember 1979. (78) 
The Standing Corrmission on Pay canparability which finally reported 
in March 1980, made recarmendations to achieve pay parity which have 
been presented in detail in Chapter Seven. As far as Manchester 
Airport is concerned, hCMeVer, the Standing Ccmnission failed to 
provide the long tenn solution to the problem of pay parity which had 
been the centre of industrial disputes for sane years. A fundanental 
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difficulty was that of how firerrEn who had rejected producti vi ty 
arrangements \\lOuld be treated. It should be emphasised that throughout 
the lengthy pericxi of industrial disruption, firerrEn had refused to use 
any new i terns of apiprent introduced into the service, whereas other 
sections had agreed the introduction of new equiprent as part of the 
productivity arrangements. If the Airport Authority refused 
inplementation of the Clegg award to firerrEn until such time as 
agreement was reached over the intrcxiuction of new equipnent, 
industrial relations could \\lOrsen. If on the other hand, revised rates 
were paid to firerrEn irrespective of their refusal to use new 
equipnent, repercussions could affect other manual workers who had 
agreed. that when prcxiuctivity payrrents ~ subsurred into the Clegg 
award, revised working practices would continue. Trade Union 
representatives had already suggested that unless similar arrangemmts 
were required of firemen at Manchester Airport as a condition of 
payment of the Clegg award, other manual workers would seek either 
rerroval of new working practices or payment of prexiucti vi ty nonies in 
addition to the Clegg award which would result in earnings being higher 
than comparators. (79) 
It was not within the Standing Commission's brief to address the 
significance of these local circmnstances in achieving pay parity, 
neither was it the Commission's function to determine the particular 
grade which should be applied to manual workers at individual airf:orts 
and the interpretation placed on the Clegg reccmnendations at other 
airf:orts created ananalies at Manchester. After prcmulgation of the 
Clegg award national job descriptions had been agreed and airf:orts had 
been asked to locally determine haw staff could be assimilated into the 
grading structure in accordance with agreed job descriptions. At many 
of the smaller nnmicipal airports agreemant had been reached on 
assimilation but staff at, for example, Sunderland, Staverton, 
BoumEmJuth and other airports with limited scheduled acti vi ty had 
placed staff in the highest grades, although the Clegg Commission had 
stated that "it is probable that Grade Four jobs will be confined to a 
few of the other larger airports." (80 ) 
'!he adoption of higher grades at smaller airf:orts meant that 
employees at Manchester Airport ~t fran being the highest paid 
employees in the National Agreement to being relatively law paid in 
C<ll1parison with staff at other nnmicipal airports. (81) 
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At this juncture, it is \'VOrth noting that the failure of the Clegg 
Carmission to address the root cause of industrial disputes at 
Manchester Airport, contributed towan:is a growing awareness on the p:rrt 
of airport nanagem:m.t of the inability of national negotiating 
structures to adequately reflect the p:rrticular CirClllUStances applying 
at Manchester Airport - which operated at a scale which was not 
encountered at other rmmicipal airports. Managemmt also became rrore 
conscious of the difficulties of integrating what had becarE prinarily 
a camercial trading organisation with the needs of a local authority 
in general. In assessing the position in respect of national 
negotiations, airport nanagemmt recognised that there were certain 
advantages accruing fran this arrangemmt. For example, national 
negotiations offered a degree of "protection" on certain natters which 
were the subject of national negotiation. Whilst Trade Unions accepted 
that certain elem:m.ts of pay and conditions of service were subject to 
national agreem:m.t and, therefore, could not be varied locally, the 
institution of a local agreement carried with it the danger that 
employees ' representatives \'VOuld consider all issues to be negotiable. 
Silnilarl y, nanagem:m.t also expressed an awareness that under a system 
of local pay negotiations employees ' representatives might seek only to 
achieve a greater distribution of Manchester International Airport 
Authority's profits to the work force and in countering this it was 
argued that there was a need to ensure that any pay increases beyond 
those negotiated nationally were justified by increased productivity, 
revised working practices, etc, rather than :rrErel y based upon profit 
share. It was appreciated that if a local pay agreement was concluded 
for any group of \'VOrkers, there could be repercussions in the form of 
requests for extension to any MIA employees excluded, to other local 
authority employees , especially those employed by the two parent 
authorities and to other nrunicipal airports. Finally, the airport 
YoUuld lose the services of the Froployers' Secretariat of the NJC which 
acted as a nanagem:m.t resource, providing infonnation relevant to the 
determination of pay levels in other sectors of the econOII¥, advice on 
conditions, facilities for the resolution of disputes, etc. (82) 
Whilst being aware of these disadvantages of negotiating locally, 
the general trend within the airport nanaganent was nevertheless to 
support fundamental rather than piecaneal change. Increasing 
dissatisfaction was expressed regarding Manchester' s relative position 
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within the MAP. The Panel was constituted on the basis of one voting 
representative fran each of the 19 rrnmicipal airports and Manchester 
had identical representation although it employed 50% of the total work 
force covered by the Panel ; five airports wi thin the Panel which 
individually employed less than 1% of MAP employees had equal voting 
rights. Apart fran employment, Manchester was also in the position of 
making substantial profits whilst IIDSt of the other airports wi thin the 
rrachinery operated at a loss; Manchester also fell into a unique 
category in tenns of its operational traffic, incare, expenditure and 
capital investment. Delays in pranulgating annual pay settlements had 
arisen, as srraller airports in pay negotiations often claimed that they 
could not afford pay increases; industrial action had taken place at 
Manchester Airport because of the delays in reaching national pay 
agreem:mts. (83) National agreements Vv1ere increasingly regarded as a 
straight jacket preventing the ability to use the vehicle of increased 
pay to achieve changes in working practices. Although local 
discussions in this respect could be initiated at any tilne, the cycle 
of annual pay awards tended to create opposition to securing changes 
locally . Given the improvement in industrial relations essential to 
future prosperity, it was argued that MIAA needed greater control aver 
the pay and conditions of employees in order to utilise manpower, 
maximise productivity and respond to manpower problems in a posi ti ve 
way. Whilst the Municipal Airports Panel was reluctant to nove away 
fran local authority conditions of service and to adopt conditions 
better suited to a commercial organisation employing large numbers of 
shift workers, the airport management at Manchester dem:mded a systan 
of shift payment which more nearly reflected the degree of 
unsociability of a particular shift, rather than the rotating systan 
which failed to differentiate between a Monday day shift, a Friday late 
shift and a Sunday night shift. (84) 
In terms of local authority labour structures, airport rnanagerrent 
increaSingly rejected a system of national conditions which was geared 
towards the majority of local authority employees who work on a Monday 
to Friday basis, and in terms of shift payments and siclmess 
allowances, did not meet the needs of an organisation where the 
majority of staff worked "around the clock". Although the Greater 
Manchester County and. the Manchester City Council, the two parent 
authorities fran 1974, were generally carrmitted to the principle of 
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national agreem:mts for I.oca.l Authority staffs, the need to improve 
industrial relations at the airport justified consideration of the 
possibility of local agreerrents. It was increaSingly felt that the 
difficulties arising at the airport largely originated fran the 
inability to reconcile the needs of a ccmnercial trading organisation, 
ccmnitta:l to growth and expansion with the needs of other local 
authority anployees. IDeal authority negotiators could not reconcile 
the process of expansion at Manchester Airport with the needs of the 
majority of local authorities faca:l with problems of manpower 
constraints and cash limits. ( 85 ) 
In general then airport managem:m.t came to increasingly support the 
notion of local pc1.y bargaining on the grounds that the authority could 
negotiate an agreerrent on pc1.y and conditions directly related to and 
nore relevant to its own needs allowing for the creation of locally 
detennina:l differential structures; the introduction of proca:lural 
agreements; changes to productivity schemes and vvorking arrangemmts 
and changes to sickness schemes and other conditions of service, which 
it was aJ.nost impossible to negotiate given the inflexibility inherent 
in the national bargaining arrangem:m.ts . Although a local pay 
agreement might involve increasa:l wage costs, it was argua:l that the 
benefits of such an arrangem:m.t vvould outweigh these costs. (86) 
Finally, in considering this survey of the course of industrial 
relations between anployers and manual vvorkers at Manchester Airport, 
it is clear that the dissatisfaction with national negotiating 
structures and the inability to cope with local issues is reflective of 
the inadequacies of such a system of industrial relations across the 
board. RichaI:dson has pointa:l out that the nain considerations in wage 
negotiations are the capc1.city of the industry to pc1.y, the relation 
betvam the wages of the workers concema:l and those pc1.id to other 
workers, including workers in other occupc1.tions and other industries 
and finally the workers' standard of living. (87) It appears that in 
respect of manual workers at Manchester Airport, the first two factors 
have been nost influential but negotiating structures have faila:l to be 
responsive to these criteria. 
Prilnarily, the centralisation of negotiating arrangemants seeks to 
detennine basic pc1.y and conditions wi th interpretative issues settla:l 
locally within the overall framework of the nain agrearents, thereby 
facilitating unifonnity of wage rates, novements and anploym:m.t 
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conditions across the board for similar jobs. This should provide the 
rreans of ensuring a stable relationship between the pay and. conditions 
of various groups of -workers thus minimising the likelihood of parity 
claims. (88) However, this has not been. the case at Manchester Airport 
because, as far as the work force is concerned, they have constantly 
regarded themselves as being a distinct group with needs which are not 
reflected anongst the rest of the work force covered by the MAP 
agreerent but are nore akin to groups of airport ~rkers elsewhere. 
'!he course of industrial relations has also reflected the problems 
inherent in the application of industry-wide agreerents to larger 
enterprises where it is nore difficult to acccmrodate the varied 
requiremants of differing technologies, product and labour markets. 
(89) As large canpanies tend to be innovators, they are often in 
special need of negotiating arrangements linking inproverrents in pay 
with improverrE11.ts in IrEthods of operation. Many nay be pacemakers in 
pay and the problems which arise from the gap bet.\\leen industry-wide 
rates and actual earnings are, therefore , especially acute for them. 
(90) In essence, the experience at Manchester reflects the adverse 
effect in industry wide agreements which arises from the fra;IUentl y 
wide variation in the prosperity of finns wi thin a single industry, 
where sare might be able to pay wages 20 - 50% higher than less 
efficient competitors. (91) 
Gill has pointed out that if a grievance or dispute is not settled 
at a particular level, it can escalate unnecessarily. By the tine the j 
grievance has reached the highest level of procedure, frustration and 
discontent will have festered as a result of delay and "buck passing" 
and this again certainly seems to have been the case at Manchester 
Airport. The slowness of national negotiations and the centralisation 
of decision naking with its accanpanying lack of consultation has also 
been a source of discontent. The experience at Manchester Airport 
reflects a dissatisfaction with a nachinery which has appeared 
bureaucratic and insensi ti ve to those it serves with the accountability 
of negotiators to constituents by necessity being severely limited. 
BaSically, the Union's rank and file has been increasingly dissatisfied 
with centralised l:argaining based on the perception that collective 
bargaining can on! y be satisfactorily attained if it is locally based. 
The whole concept of the national negotiation of conditions has been 
continually questioned by the ~rk force and dissatisfaction has been 
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heightened. by the inability of the IDC to keep abreast of local 
problems arising out of the variety of local, social and econanic 
conditions. 
Finally, industrial relations regarding MAP employees at Manchester 
Airport has ref lected. other fundamental weaknesses in national 
negotiations. Richardson has rraintained. that if employers and workers 
meet in conference only when differences have arisen between them, they 
always meet in an atnosphere of controversy or conflict. (92) With 
centralised. bargaining at Manchester Airport, it has been difficult to 
naintain effective lines of carmnmication at the local level and 
instead of developing positive industrial relations policies, there has 
developed. a tendency to rely alrrost entirely on expediency, reaction to 
union pressure, and the adoption of a defensive posture. 
Whilst it is clear that the course of industrial relations between 
employers and manual 1NOrkers at Manchester Airport may have been 
influenced. by the difficulties inherent in national negotiating and 
bargaining arrangem:mts, it is equally apparent that the situation has 
been exacerbated. by the nnmicipal ownership of a profitable carmercial 
trading undertaking. In contrast to other local authority 
establishments, the existence of a relatively large body of manual 
workers employed on a single site has been significant in the course of 
industrial relations at the Airport. Coupled with this has been the 
influence of srrall groups of strategic workers wielding substantial 
industrial muscle capable of halting airport operation altogether. 
Whilst manual 1NOrkers have generally regarded themselves as having 
nore in ccmron with airport 1NOrkers employed under different ownership 
structures, the initial response of the Corporation was to attempt to 
integrate this body of 1NOrkers lIDre finnl y with IDeal Governmant 
structures by the establishment of a dedicated national negotiating 
body, the Municipal Airports Panel. H~r, as Manchester Airport 
dnew closer towards its nnmicipal counterparts in the aviation field, 
the operational differences resulting fran the difference in scale of 
acti vi ty became even IlDre apparent. UI tinatel y, the link with the 
IDeal Governrra1t Service in general and the identity with other 
municipal airports was rejected by Unions and airport nanagem:mt alike, 
as it became clear that the operational needs of Manchester Airport 
could not be catered for under existing arrangem:mts. 
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8.3 <ILLl!CI'IVE B1\RGAI:N1N; AND srAF.F HnlIDYEES 
In Chapter Seven it was pointed out that since 1946, staff posts in 
the IDeal Goverrment Service have been conditioned to national 
agrearents which provide flexibility at the local level in tenns of 
detennining the grade for the job. Staff employed at Manchester 
Airport have generally been subsurre:i into these arrangE!IEIlts. At the 
outset, it should be noted that in contrast to the body of rranual 
workers, no evidence exists to suggest the incidence of industrial 
unrest arrong staff employees at the .Ai.rpJrt throughout its history. It 
nay be contended that this reflects the lack of industrial power 
wielded by this bcxiy of employees, a characteristic which cuts across 
the IDeal Government Service. In essence, industrial action on the 
part of, for example, social v,;orkers or teachers carmot directly impact 
upon the employer, it can only influence the erployer through a process 
of heightening public awareness and influencing public opinion. If 
such erployees are to directly affect the erployer, they require the 
support of other v,;orkers in unrelated fields of endeavour. For 
example, action on the part of erployees engaged in the collection of 
an authority's income fran local sources can potentially create havoc 
for the employing authority. 
In contrast, the employees of a municipal airport fo:rm an 
independent and cohesive group which tend to mirror the broad base of 
local authority service departments, rather than the restricted and 
very specialist nature of functional departments. Action on the part 
of erployees administering the process of developnent could cause that 
process to grind to a halt purely by refusing to issue contracts; 
errq;>loyees engaged in the collection of charges could have a direct 
impact on airport finances, etc. Thus it is suggested that the absence 
of industrial unrest has not been a reflection of a lack of bargaining 
IXJWer· 
In considering industrial relations between erplayers and staff 
graded employees at the airport, it is significant that in determining 
the grading of posts over time in order to recruit and retain staff 
sufficient to accarm:xiate growth and developnent, frequently the 
employing carmittee and the employee have often been in full agrearent 
as to the appropriateness of the grade. In contrast to the position 
between employer and manual worker, on the staff side ha:rrrony has 
existed between the inmediate arployer and the worker whilst conflict 
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has arisen between employing corrmittee and the EstablishnEnt Carmi ttee. 
As suggested in Chapter Seven, the role of the Establisl1nEnt Carmi ttee 
has generally been one of discharging the staffing function on behalf 
of the local authority as a whole weighing the c~ting darands of 
erploying deparbnents. An employing carmi ttee which is experiencing 
difficulty in recruiting and retaining E!rIplayees in staff grades nay 
conclude that the solution lies in the re-grading of posts and, 
therefore, may be detennined in its support of an individual E!rIplayee' s 
application for re-grading and in contesting the decisions of the 
Establishment Cam:nittee. 
In line with general local government practice, and in carmon with 
other E!rIploying cam:ni ttees, the establishnEnt of the Airport Carmi ttee 
of the Manchester Corporation has been subjected to periodic review 
(usually every three years). Between reviews , individual applications 
for re-grading have been considered along with claims en-bloc relating 
to particular groups of staff, especially junior supervisory posts in 
operational sections . Given that Manchester Airport has had to canpete 
for labour in a specialist market which extends beyond the bounds of 
IDeal Government practice and that the grading of posts is fundanental 
to the determination of rates of pay for staff, it will be useful to 
examine the criteria which the Airport Ccmnittee has applied in 
detennining the grading of posts under review and the extent to which 
such criteria have reflected an awareness of the rates of pay applying 
at other canparable airports. In considering these aspects, it is also 
important to address the extent to which the Establishrrent Ccmnittee of 
the Corporation has recognised the importance of recruiting and 
retaining staff to cater for the demands of the process of grcwt:h and 
developrent of the Airport envisaged by the Airport Ccmni ttee. 
One of the major criteria for detennining the grading of staff posts 
at the Airport has been the general criterion which applies across the 
board in the IDeal Govermnent Service, that of increased duties and 
responsibilities. However, evidence suggests that other factors such 
as the maintenance of internal relativities and an awareness of rates 
of pay applying at other airports have been significant, at least for 
the E!rIploying cam:ni ttee. Claims for recognition of increased duties 
and responsibilities have largely been based upon the inp3.ct of the 
process of growth and developnent on the nature of tasks in different 
areas of activity related to the airport's administration and 
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operation. One consequence of the process of growth and developrent 
has been the expansion of the volmne of \\Ork at different levels wi thin 
the organisation. This absolute expansion of ~rk has callerl forth the 
need to adjust existing systems and p:rocerlures and staff may be 
rewan:ied for their contribution in this respect. In the highest 
echelons reward may be based upon success in achieving broad 
objectives. However, a process of delegation of duties and 
responsibilities has similarly altered the funcianEntal characteristics 
of many activities perfonned. throughout the hierarchy, fran senior 
nanagerrent level to the lower ranks of administrative and supervisory 
posts. In Part II full and detailed consideration was given to the 
process of organisational change encompassing the expansion of 
functions, the re-organisation of departments and the emergence of new 
specialisms. Here it is intended. to highlight the way in which this 
process of growth and developnent has translated. into increased and 
rrore canplex duties and responsibilities for staff and claims for 
increased remuneration. Evidence will be cited. to suggest the positive 
way in which such claims have been viewed by elected. menbers 
responsible for policy making in respect of the Airport. 
In the late 1950s, the salary of the Airport Director was revi~ 
by the Chair and the Deputy of the Airport Carrmi ttee based on the 
effect of the accelerated. developnent of air traffic, services and 
runway ~rks on the ~rkload of the post. However, the review also 
sought to reward the Director for the change in the fortunes of the 
Airport since the appointment was made in the early 1950s. The Airport 
Carmittee recognised the need to improve the Airport Director's salary 
in recognition of the ~rk which had discovered weaknesses in the 
operational and administrative functions and had arrested. a continuing 
disparagerrent between expenditure and revenue, by the introduction of 
new fonns of revenue from advertising; by the revision of the tenns of 
various contracts with other organisations involved in the operation of 
the airport and by revising the charges applying for services 
discharged. by the Airport Carmi ttee. ( 93) 
As the Airport Director became rrore involved in matters of airport 
developnent in the 1950s and 1960s, so claims for re-grading the post 
of his Assistant were based. in part upon the delegation of m:magerial 
and financial responsibility. The process of growth and developrent 
and the increasing importance of Manchester within the UK airport 
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system resulted in a greater vohme of administrative YJOrk and 
responsibility for a much larger body of employees. In the 1950s, this 
increase in staff fran 178 in 1954 to 275 perrrBnent plus 70 temporary 
staff in 1959 figured as a fundamental argurren.t put fo:r:ward by the 
Airport Carmi. ttee to secure a re-grading of this post. Further it was 
argued that with the opening of the new tenninal building in 1962, the 
difficulties of administering the Airport had increased with the 
introduction of nore facilities and services. In particular much YJOrk 
was involved in the letting and operation of concessions and the 
provision of services to tenants in the building. lJhe expansion of 
operational facilities and the increase in traffic (especially the 
burgeoning developnent of freight traffic) had a similar effect in 
later years. (94) 
As the developnent of concessions and tenancies and the recrui trrent 
of additional staff increased the YJOrkload of administrative staffs in 
the lovver ranks new systems and new methods of administrative 
procedures were introduced again fanning the basis of re-grading clailns 
for senior staff in administration. (95) Within the accounting 
function, it was argued that the increasing importance of the 
concession areas in the new terminal building had introduced a new 
requirE:mmt for the detailed study of tenders and analysis of the 
volUllE of trade by concessionaires, in orner to assess their future 
prospects. lJhe increase in direct YJOrks on behalf of tenants and the 
expansion of capital YJOrks required nore detailed study of estimates 
and the keeping of nore canprehensi ve reco:r:ds rega:r:ding work and 
rraterials supplied. Similarly, with the increase in the number of 
vehicles and larger items of plant and equiprent purchased annually, 
nore effort was devoted to the process of quotation and tendering and 
as nore contracts for goods and services were rrade, a greater volUllE of 
correspondence had to be dealt with. (96 ) 
lDwer dONn the hierarchy the increase in acti vi ties, with nore 
aircraft IIOVaTalts, passengers and freight passing through the airp::>rt 
translated into claims for re-grading for those enployed in recovering 
incare based upon an expanding volume of YJOrk, although it was also 
considered that the canplexity of work had increased with the 
introduction of new and nore carplex scales of charges as new types of 
aircraft began to operate through the airp::>rt. (97) Increased 
expenditure on goods and services increased the workload of those 
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erplayed in raising orders and IPaking payrrents and the recnritrnent of 
additional staff resulted in a large volume of work records. Here 
again, the increased canplexi ty of work fornai a basis for re-grading; 
by 1961 those involved in the payrrent of wages had to work to nine 
different sets of conditions of service. (98) 
Staff in operational areas of activity have similarly been conscious 
of the .ilnpact of the process of growth and developnent on the nature of 
their work. For example, across the rraintenance function the constant 
growth of plant and the installation of additional equipnent in new 
buildings, the extension of technical facilities, the develop:rent of 
runways and taxiways, the use of rrore vehicles on site and the 
attendant increase in €!I'!Ployees to discharge the rraintenance function 
have been cited as justification for re-grading of staff posts 
throughout the period of the airport's developnent. (99 ) 
Although increased duties and responsibilities has fomed the 
fundamental criterion for detennining the grading of staff posts at 
Manchester Airport, the Airport Carrmi ttee has aver the years also 
argued for re-grading based on the maintenance of internal 
relativities . Basically, this criterion has tended to apply rrore to 
supervisory posts wi thin operational areas where large l::xxlies of manual 
or craft graded workers have been supervised. As the wages and working 
conditions of supervisory posts have been detennined by a different 
negotiating 1:xxiy to those which detennine the conditions and pay of 
manual employees and craftsmen, it has been necessary to consider 
ad justrnent of grading to take account of increases paid to manual and 
craft workers to ensure that anarralies are :mirri1nised. In essence, if 
sufficient differentials to give incentives for prarotion are not 
naintained, difficulties may be experienced in recnriting supervisory 
staff. In establishing and maintaining differentials, it has been 
necessary to take account of the fact that Miscellaneous Graded 
supervisory posts have not received the shift payrrents and other 
enhancements which have been paid to manual vvorkers supervised. ( 100) 
At this juncture, it should also be noted that although the maintenance 
of differentials has not been an explicit factor in detennining the 
grading of other staff posts, any adjust:m:mt of differentials for 
junior and senior supervisory posts may have the effect of ercxting 
differentials for administrative and accounting staffs as well as heads 
of depart.Irent so gradings at these levels may similarly be affected, 
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though in an indirect way. ( 101 ) 
prinaril y, the problem of the rraintenance of differentials has 
arisen :mainly in the portering/apron services area of activity which 
constitutes the largest concentration of manual workers in operational 
departments, as shawn in Appendix 8.15 , although evidence also suggests 
difficulties in respect of rraintenance, fire and IXJlice services. 
Largely, the increases in pay awarded to manual workers at Manchester 
Airport from 1957, arising out of the adoption of rates applicable at 
Ministry controlled airports were the origin of many ananalies arising 
fran that time. In 1958, porters and marshallers were conditioned to a 
44 hour week, but worked a 49 hour week with five hours rostered 
overtime. Average earnings per year in apron services after four years 
were £716 for porters, £744 for assistant chargehands and £761 for 
chargehands. At the senior superviso:ry level, one Senior Airport 
Forem:m received £795, one Airport Foreman received £724 and another 
two Airport Foremen received £678 for the same 49 hour week. Thus with 
the adoption of Ministry scales for manual workers an anarral y had 
inmediately arisen with airport foremen earning less than chargehands, 
assistant chargehands and marshallers and the Senior Foreman receiving 
only £34 per annum nore than chargehands. (102) By the early 1960s, 
the differential between the senior superviso:ry level, (by then 
deSignated Airport Duty Officers) and the manual workers supervised in 
the Apron Services section had been alnost ccxrpletel y wiped out. 
Porters were conditioned to a 42 hour week but worked a :minimum of 48 
hours with six hours rostered overtime. Their irrmadiate supervisors 
designated Marshaller Supervisors, Assistant Supervisors and Full 
Supervisors who were also employed on manual grades earned on average 
between £902 and £968 per annum after four years service. In 
carparison, Airport Duty Officers who were employed on Miscellaneous 
Grades and worked a 49~ hour rostered week received annual earnings of 
£944. (103) In both instances, it had been necessary to re-grade 
senior supervisory posts in order to maintain differentials. However, 
by 1968, the increases in pay awarded to manual workers had further 
eroded differentials between them and their supervisors significantly 
reducing the incentives for prcm:>tion and, as a result, the Airport 
Carmi ttee had to recarrmend the up-grading of posts by two grades to 
maintain differentials. (104) 
Similarly, in the maintenance section by the early 1960s, there was 
636 
practically no differential between earnings of three Assistant Station 
Engineers and the wages of senior subordinate staff, again giving 
little incentive to bear the heavy responsibility of controlling 
important sections of mechanical and electrical rraintenance work and 
co-o:rdinating the YJOrk of a large body of mmual workers. ( 105 ) At the 
same time differentials between Foreman Electricians and Foreran 
Fitters, (second tier supervisors employed on Miscellaneous Grades) and 
chargehands (who were first tier supervisors) ware being eroded lar:gely 
by the increases in lead payments made to chargehands. By January 1968 
differences in wages were as follows:-
Designation Gross Wage for a 44 Hour Week 
Forem:m Fitter/Electrician (Days) £24.13.0 
Chargehand Electrician (Days) £24.2.9 
Chargehand Fitter (Days) £24.0.2 
In this case, the real differential was reduced to only 2s 3d by the 
fact that forem:m received only their basic wage when on sick or arulUal 
leave and single tima for YJOrking on public holidays whereas 
chargehands received their nomal working week's wage and double tine 
for working on public holidays. (106) 
As a result of increases paid to firEmen with the adoption of 
Ministry rates from 1957 to 1963 the differentials between firemen and 
their section leaders, who had been conditioned to Miscellaneous Grades 
from 1961 had been eroded. Average earnings per annum for a 48 hour 
week stood at £1,028 for a Section leader, £980 for a leading Firem:m 
and £948 for a Senior Firem:m. In an effort to redress the balance 
Section leaders eventually sought premium payrrents for weekend working 
and duty on public holidays, but like their counterparts in apron 
services were recarmended for an increase of two grades in 1968. (107) 
In the Manchester Airport Constabulary similar ananalies arose when the 
senior post of Inspector was transferred to Miscellaneous Grades in the 
late 1950s whilst constables and sergeants rerrained on Civil Aviation 
Constabulary rates of pay. A salary review in the Civil Aviation 
Constabulary in 1960 resulted in the following rate~ of pay being 
applied to sergeants and constables in the Manchester Airport force:-
Sergeants - after two years service £900 per annum 
Sergeants - on promJtion £840 per annum 
Constables - after seven years service £725 per annum 
Constables - on entry to the service £550 per annum 
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Prior to this review, the basic pay of the Police Inspector had been 
£138 per year nore than that of a senior sergeant, however, after the 
review the basic pay of sergeants was £20 rrore than that of the Police 
Inspector. (108) The scope for ananalies was later reducerl by the 
transfer of sergeants to Miscellaneous Grades, but whilst Police 
Constables at Manchester Airport remained on Civil Aviation 
Constabulary rates intemal relativities rem:rined difficult to maintain 
and in 1968 it was necessary to re-grade sergeants by two grades to 
maintain diffenentials. (109) 
A number of fundamental points arise out of this consideration of 
re-gradings based on the rraintenance of internal differentials which 
highlight the reasoning behind the Corporation's desire to avoid any 
explicit link between the pay of manual "iNOrkers at Manchester Airport 
and those employed at Ministry IBM. controlled airports. In the earlier 
consideration of industrial relations between manual "iNOrkers and the 
employer it was pointed out that a significant contributory factor in 
the rejection of any parity with other airports had been the impact 
which might be felt in other areas of manual "iNOrk throughout the 
Corporation. However, it is clear fran the foregoing that the adoption 
of higher rates of pay applied to manual "iNOrkers at other airports 
outside IDeal Government control could have the effect of creating 
uncontrollable anarralies between manual and staff graded posts. The 
structure of nationally set pay scales with grades being detennined by 
local demand and supply conditions could thus have been undennined. 
The very flexibility inherent in the structure of detennining the rate 
for the job could have provided the mechanism for increasing labour 
costs across the board. at Manchester Airport. Ultinately, if in the 
long term airport workers had not been rrore finnl y integrated with the 
general body of IDeal Government "iNOrkers, the continued up-grading of 
posts at Manchester Airport to eliminate anaralies could have resulted 
in claims based upon the naintenance of internal relativities across 
the broadly based body of administrative staff perfonning s.ilnilar tasks 
within the authority. 
However, it is important to note that whilst the avoidance of 
ananalies may have been a prima:r:y consideration in certain specialist 
areas of acti vi ty where the scope for carp:rrison with other acti vi ties 
in the IDeal Govermnent Service was l.ilni ted and in other areas where 
functions which had previously been discharged by the Ministry ~ 
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taken aver by the Airport, there had been little alternative than to 
adopt Ministry practice. For exarrple, the Corporation had taken over 
the responsibility for airport policing fran the Ministry Constabulary 
in 1954 and in transferring employees, all ranks up to the highest 
level of Senior Constabulary Officer had been graded in accordance with 
scales agreed between the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and 
the Federal Council of Departmental Police Associations. Steps to 
assimilate these posts into the IDeal Government Service had proceeded 
with the initial transfer of the Senior Constabulary Officer to 
Corporation Miscellaneous scales. In the late 1960s, the transition 
was completed when sergeants and constables transferred to 
Miscellaneous scales. In 1967 the British Airports Authority adopted 
Civil Police rates and fran 1 October 1970 police constables and 
sergeants employed at Manchester Airport were similarly conditioned to 
national police rates. (110) On the face of it, this nay be 
interpreted as Manchester Airport falling into line with its BAA 
counterparts, but in reality, the BAA had fallen in line with the 
practice adopted by local forces under local authority control, giving 
the opportunity for general local govermnent practice to be adopted at 
Manchester Airport. 
A similar process of transition had applied in the provision of Fire 
Se:r::vices at the Airport. In the 1950s Section lBaders had been 
conditioned to National Scales for .Aerodrane Fire Se:r::vice Officers 
agreed between the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and the 
National Association of Fire Officers. When in 1956 the MICA Fire 
Se:r::vice had been awarded staff rates, Section lBaders at Manchester 
Airport were regraded on the appropriate MICA salary scales and 
condi tions . However, in conrrnon wi th the Manchester Airport 
Constabulary in the later 1950s and early 1960s, these posts were 
transferred to Miscellaneous scales and conditions of se:r::vice. (111) 
In essence then the trend towards the adoption of IDeal Govermrent 
scales and conditions of se:r::vice in respect of senior posts at 
Manchester Airport reflected a perceived need to avoid anc::m3.lies which 
might be created by the continued adoption of Ministry terms and 
conditions. Ha.\eVer, it also reflected the desire on the part of the 
Corporation to break the link with Ministry practice as a result of the 
Ministry's decision to adopt the reccmrendations of the NJCCAT in 
respect of manual ~rkers which \\Uuld have :i.nIrEdiatel y increased lalxmr 
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costs. Whilst the assimilation of manual grades had been seen to 
require the establishment of special negotiating arrangements for 
manual workers within the franework of the IDC for IDeal Authorities' 
Services (Manual Workers) staff posts could be readily absorbed into 
existing structures applying to Chief Officers and administrative , 
professional and technical staff. 
It is interesting to note that whilst the arployers generally sought 
to establish and rraintain continuity with the IDeal Governmant Service 
in general, evidence exists to support the notion that the AiIp::>rt 
Carmi ttee was aware of the fact that in seeking to recruit and retain 
staff, it was in canpetition with other airports in the general civil 
aviation network. When difficulties have been experienced in 
:r:ecruit:m:mt and retention of staff at grades detennined by the 
Establishment Carmittee, the arploying corrmi ttee has been quick to 
reference the rates of pay applying at other airports, ( especially in 
respect of senior posts), in defence of the re-grading of posts. In 
general, in this respect the fact that senior staff at Manchester 
AiIp::>rt have not benefitted frcm the support of a centrally based 
administrative machine has been arphasised. 
In 1953 the Airport Carmi. ttee considered the appoinbnent of an 
AiIp::>rt Manager and in detennining the reco.rrnended grade for the post, 
the AiIp::>rt Carmittee \\1ere mindful of their general objective at that 
time which was to develop the Ringway Airport into the second largest 
airport in the country. In attempting to attract candidates of the 
highest qualifications and abilities the rates of pay applying to 
Carmandants at the larger Ministry of Civil Aviation airports were 
examined. At the time, Ccmnandants received a salary of £1,950 at 
lDndon, £1,825 at Northolt, £1,650 at Prestwick and £1,475 at Nutts 
Comer . Given the Airport Carmi ttee' s objectives in tenns of airport 
developnent Northol t was deemed to be the appropriate canparator, thus 
the Airport Ccmnittee recc:mnended that Grade H (£1,650 - £1,900) of the 
JNC for Chief Officers scales should be adopted. Havever, the 
Establishment Ccmnittee of the Corporation maintained that JNC Grade F 
(£1,350 - £1,600) was cc:mnensurate with the duties and responsibilities 
of the post. ( 112) In all same 50 applications for employmant were 
received at this grade but although four candidates were short-listed, 
none were intervi~ as the Airport Ccmnittee were of the opinion that 
all of the candidates failed to fulfill the standard of experience and 
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qualifications required. Thus the post was ultimately filled at the 
originally recarrm:md.ed Grade H. ( 113 ) In a review of the Airport 
Director's salary in 1958, the Airport Ccm:nittee emphasised that all 
decisions taken by the Director regarding runways, aprons, airfield 
lighting, baggage and freight handling, Custc:ms, Air Traffic Control 
and Air Regulations, telecamrunications, aCcarm::x:iation, etc, were 
nonnall y covered by several departments of various Ministries at 
aerodrc::BlEs under MICA control. ( 114 ) Six years later, canparison was 
rrade with the :maximum salaries applying at Binningham and Liverpool 
Airports and it was stressed that these airports were not as advanced 
as Manchester; they ~re not operating on a 24 hour basis and they were 
supporting very heavy rate deficits in contrast to Manchester. (115) 
An increase in salary in 1972 was justified on the basis of canparison 
with GlasgCM Airport which constituted the nearest canparator to 
Manchester in tenns of scale of activity, although its traffic 
throughput was predaninantly domestic in nature. (116) 
In September 1951 the Chief Officer of the Manchester Fire Brigade 
advised that given the strength of the Ringway Airport Fire Brigade, 
the operational responsibility involved and the maintenance of 
discipline and effiCiency justified the appointment of an Airport Fire 
Officer continuously available at the airport. In determining the 
initial grade for the post at Miscellaneous IV/V, MCA standards had 
been applied. (117) However, no suitable candidate could be found out 
of 41 applications at this grade. By March 1952, no appointment had 
been made and Fire Officers at Grade II airports under Ministry of 
Civil Aviation control had received a Civil Service pay award of 10% on 
the first £500 and 5% thereafter so the post at Manchester was re-
graded to Miscellaneous v/VI (£455/£560) to reflect this. However, the 
Airport Carmi ttee contended that the post of Airport Fire Officer was 
at least equivalent to the post of Station Officer in the City Fire 
Brigade who received a salary of £590 - £640 equivalent to the NJC 
Scales Grade of .APr VA because the Fire Officer at Manchester was an 
autonarrous Fire Brigade Chief Officer unlike the Ministry officers who 
had recourse to a divisional or central headquarters for advice and 
assistance. Similarly, the post at Manchester was not subject to the 
general supervision or direction of these authorities. (118) Details 
of the Ministry of Aviation Fire Service Establishment which supporta:i 
staff at individual airports in 1963 are given in Appendix 8.12. 
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In the 1950s difficulties were also experienced in recruiting to the 
senior post of Maintenance Engineer. Four candidates out of a total of 
90 applicants were interviewed. but again all -were rejected. After 
subsequent interviews a candidate was selected but withdrew his 
acceptance. In this instance the Chair and Deputy of the Airport 
Carmittee argued that the salary applied to the post had not been high 
enough in view of the late duty requirem:m.ts and, therefore, 
recamended re-grading. (119) In order to retain staff in later years, 
on a number of occasions comparison with the organisation at the larger 
Ministry of Civil Aviation airports was made to secure salary 
mcreases. Emphasis was placed on the many fllllctions which were 
carried out by this senior post in the maintenance section at 
Manchester which tended to be allocated to several specialist officers 
at Ministry airports, again supported by a di visional/HQ staff. An 
additional responsibility applying to the senior post at Manchester was 
rotor transport - at Ministry airports a separate rrotor transport 
officer was employed. (120) 
In the specialist field of operations, the requirements of the post 
of Operations Officer created in the 1960s, which included the holding 
of a civil flying qualification, air Crf?M experience and administrative 
experience in the national and international regulations of civil 
aviation effectively restricted the field of potential recrui trrent to 
the ranks of Operations Officers employed by the Ministry, initially 
the post was graded on the basis of the Ministry's Operations Officer 
Grade I, but with the growth in air traffic experienced at Manchester a 
wider field of comparison was addressed. Salaries applying at that 
tine, at other airports were again taken as the yardstick: for grading 
and infonnation taken into accollllt is provided in .Appendix 8.13. 
The salary reccmnended for the senior post of Assistant Airport 
Director (Operations) at Manchester Airport was £2,345 - higher than 
the carrmencing salary of the Camandant at Prestwick which was deenerl 
to be the comparable post - to take accollllt of the greater volurre of 
traffic passing through Manchester. (121) 
Finally, evidence exists to support an awareness of salaries 
applying at the senior levels in the administrative as well as 
Operational fields. For example, in support of re-grading clailns which 
had been rejected by the Establishment Carmittee in 1958 in an attanpt 
to achieve increased salaries for various posts, the Airport Director 
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sul::mitted the info:rmation to the Establishm:m.t Cc:mnittee in 1960, as 
provided in Apendix 8.13. 
In assessing the way in which claims for re-grading have been vi~ 
by assessors, it may be concluded that, in general, the Airport 
Carmi ttee has accepted and indeed supported the recarrrendations of its 
senior officer, the Airport Manager or Director . H~, the 
Establishment Commi ttee viewing the staffing function fran an 
authority-wide perspective has not always been fully convinced. of the 
validity of the Airport Ccmnittee' s dem:mds on resources. A general 
survey of Establishment Ccmnittee minutes reveals that so far as claims 
for maintaining internal relati vi ties in the operational field of 
endeavour are concerned, the Establishnent Ccmni ttee has usually 
accepted the recommendations of the employing ccmnittee. (122) 
However, in the nore subjective area of claims based. on increased. 
duties and responsibilities evidence suggests that reccmnendations of 
the Airport Carmi ttee have been nodified. especially in respect of 
senior posts in the administrative field where claims for increases of 
rrore than one grade have been lcxiged.. Basically, in this respect, the 
Establishment Corrmittee has remained. unconvinced. that additional duties 
and responsibili ties warrant the grade proposed.. Fundamental 
difficulties emerge in attempting to identify the progress of 
individual posts through time as the process of growth and developrent 
had been accanpanied by constant re-organisation with new posts being 
added. to the airport structure and the nature of existing posts being 
rrodified. Similarly, the national scales and grading scheme itself has 
evolved with gradings being restructured and relativities being 
changed. However, it is possible to identify sane illuminating 
instances where Airport Carmittee recarmandations have been rejected. 
and ultimately claims have proceeded to the appeals machinery. 
In 1959, the Airport Ccmnittee reccmnended. the re-grading of the 
p::>st of Assistant Airport Director from JNC Grade A to JNC D. The 
Establishment Ccmni ttee recarrmended. no change in the existing grade so 
the case proceeded to appeal in April 1961 when the post was up-graded. 
to JNC B. In a subsequent review of the Airport Carrmi ttee' s 
establishment in 1963, a re-grading to JNC E was reccmnended. by the 
Airport Carmi ttee and, on this occasion, the Establislurent Carrmi ttee 
awarded JNC c. This claim was also taken to appeal a year later when 
JNC D was awarded. The Grade of JNC E recarmended in the 1963 review 
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was finally awarded in a revievv of establishnent in 1965, but it is 
significant that in effect, it had taken five years to achieve the 
grading originally recamended by the Airport Carmittee in 1959. ( 123 ) 
The post of Chief Administrative Assistant was likewise reccmrended 
for a re-grading fran .API' III to APr IV in 1959, but the EstablishrrEnt 
Carmittee recarnended no change. A year later, the Airport Carmi ttee 
re-sul:mitted this claim to the Establishnent Carmi ttee but revised the 
proposed grading to that of APr V. Under continued pressure fran the 
Airport Ccmnittee the post was re-graded to the originally proposed APr 
IV. 'lWo years later, the grade of APr V claimed in 1960 was also 
awarded, but again in the subsequent revievv of establishrrEnt in 1963, a 
claim for re-grading fran APr V to JNC C and re-designation to Airport 
Chief Administrative and Planning Officer was revised to JNC A and a 
re-designation to Airport Administrative Officer. On appeal the ruling 
of the Establishment Ccmnittee was confinned. Similar delays have 
occurred in relation to junior posts. In 1959 it was proposed that two 
posts of Junior Administrative Assistant be re-graded fran API' I to APr 
II, this proposal being rejected in March 1960, the claim was revised 
to APr III and a redesignation of post to .Administrative Assistant. 
However, no change was again recorrmended and the re-grading originally 
reccmnended in 1959 did not came to fruition until the subsequent 
revievv of establishment in 1963. (124) In the accounting sphere a 
similar trend nay be identified. A recorrmended re-grading of the post 
of Chief Accounting Assistant to APr IV was rejected by the 
Establishment Ccmnittee in 1959, although under pressure it was awarded 
a year later. A subsequent claim for re-grading to JNC C and re-
designation to Airport Finance Officer was modified by the 
Establishment Ccmnittee to JNC A. H~r, on appeal, this officer, 
unlike his counterpart in administration, was awarded JNC A. 
Similarly, the junior posts in the accounting field had received 
different treatment fran their counterparts in administration. A claim 
for re-grading of two posts of Accounting Assistant fran API' I to API' 
II was considered by the Establishment Ccmnittee in 1959 and a re-
grading to Clerical III was awarded which was subsequently confil::mad in 
an appeal heard on 27 April 1964. H~r, follCMing re-su1:Inission of 
the claim to the Establishment Ccmnittee in June 1961, the grade of API' 
II was accepted. ( 125 ) 
Clearly, the nachinery governing the detennination of grades in the 
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Manchester Corporation was used extensively in order to achieve 
equitable rewards in the administrative and accounting dc:mllns and 
evidence supports a similar use of the appeals ma.chinery in respect of 
senior posts in the operational areas of Maintenance, Fire Services, 
portering, etc. Claims lodged by senior IIEmbers of the ma.intenance 
section in 1963 requested re-grading of one Assistant Station Engineer 
(Electrical) fran Miscellaneous X to XI; re-grading of another 
Assistant to Miscellaneous XII and re-designation to Assistant Airport 
Engineer and re-grading of an Assistant Station Engineer (Mechanical) 
to Miscellaneous XI. The Establishment Carmi ttee allCMed only the re-
grading and re-d.esignation of the one post in Electrical and awarded 
Miscellaneous XI in lieu of XII. However, on appeal in :Novenber 1964, 
all these re-gradings were allowed. (126) In the Fire Service, a claim 
for re-grading the Chief Fire Officer from API' III to API' IV was 
initially rejected by the Establishment Carmittee, but was awarded in 
1960 under continued pressure from the Airport Carmittee. A claim for 
re-grading from APT IV to JNC C in 1963 was reduced to API' V and a 
subsequent claim for the same proposed grading was reduced to JNC B in 
1965. 
These examples serve to support the contention that in exercising a 
responsibility to recruit and retain staff of a particular calibre and 
expertise, the Airport Carmi ttee had not been constrained by the 
Establishment Carmi ttee. In this sense, the employing carmi ttee and 
individual employees have addressed a carrm:m interest in prarroting 
growth and developnent against the priori ties of a carmi ttee which must 
weigh these demands in the context of the responsibilities falling to 
the authority as a whole. The Airport Carrmittee supported by the 
Airport Director , continually rrounted a substantial defence of the 
claims of employees in this respect. In the light of the foregoing, it 
is apparent that the late 1950s represented a period when the 
Establishment Ccmnittee were generally unwilling to yield to what they 
may have regarded as excessive demands. Havever, the inmadiate 
anployers willingly registered their dissatisfaction with the status 
quo . Ostensibly, the objective of the review of the authority's 
establishment in the late 1950s had been to address the difficulties of 
retaining and recruiting staff equipped by ability and experience to 
asStnne greater responsibilities as int.itmted in the EstablishnEnt 
Carmittee Circular 927 of 13 May 1958. It had been suggested that 
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special consideration \\1Ould be given to those posts carrying the 
greater responsibility. However, the All:port Ccmnittee rraintaina:i that 
the EstablishrrEnt Carmi ttee had faila:i in this respect and that whilst 
the reccmnendations regarding junior staff had tenda:i to be accepta:i, 
those relating to senior posts had been rejected. (127) By the turn 
of the decade, the All:port Carmi ttee argua:i that the resignation of the 
Accounting Assistant from the All:port in favour of a IIDre highly grada:i 
post in the Surveyor's Department was a consequence of the lack of 
action on the part of the Establishment Ccmnittee and that for the same 
reason there was a possibility of losing the Chief Administrative 
Assistant to a nore highly graded post in the Surveyor's Department of 
the City of Bradford. In general in support of re-gradings it was 
argua:i that the state of the airport's finances derived fran having a 
small but canpetent staff and if the Carmittee was unable to retain 
staff, the progress of the planning of the new tenninal building, 
essential to the airport's developnent, would be retarda:i. The All:port 
Director contended that in the short space of time since the 
EstablishrrEnt Ccmni ttee review the \\Urkload of the Depart:nEnt had 
expanda:i, 
". . . Indeed it is still expanding at such a rate that it will be 
quite impossible to keep a pace with the urgent extra work and 
problems which are nav arising, unless the gradings are adequate to 
retain existing staff and recruit sui tabl y qualifia:i replacarent and. 
additional staff." (128) 
Much emphasis was placed on the way in which the recClIlIEIldations of 
the EstablishrrEnt Carmi ttee had served to erode differentials at the 
senior level creating anomalies in the grading structure. Prior to the 
1959 review, the differential bebNeen. the Assistant All:port Director 
and his senior officers had been £300 or 29.27%. As a consequence of 
the review, this differential had been reduced to £15 or 1.09%. The 
subsequent award of JNC B had increasa:i the differential to £110 or 
8.0% whereas the original reccmnendation of the Airport Canmi ttee of 
JNC D \\Uuld have maintained a differential of £380 or 27.64%. (129) 
In the 1960s, expansion of the airport similarly calla:i for the 
fOnnulation of developnent plans bearing heavily on senior officers and 
section heads and this developnent of poliCY could not be delegata:i nor 
the derrands created by it solved by the recruitment of IIDre staff. The 
need to retain existing staff was therefore regarded as crucial to the 
airport's future. The Airport Carmi ttee thus increasingly placed 
646 
emphasis on the need to view re-gradings against the background of the 
airport being a successful trading undertaking rraking substantial 
contributions to the Rate and of the extensive capital scherres which 
needed to be canpleted within a few years. It was argued that if 
senior staff sought employmant with other airport authorities the 
consequences at Manchester in the crucial stage of developrent would be 
serious. Gi veIl the specialist nature of duties in civil aviation it 
~uld be difficult to obtain suitably qualified staff to take aver fran 
any senior officers going elsewhere. (130) 
The crucial point regarding the employee under this regine is that 
whilst they may feel aggrievai at having reccmrendations for re-
gradings rejected in many instances this has been tempered by the award 
of sc:ne additional payment in the fonn of IIDVEm3Ilt to the next highest 
grade. This in itself has acted as a stop-gap. UI timatel y, the 
appeals machinery has offered the prospect of achieving what enplayees 
nay regard as a just reward for their individual labours, although just 
recognition may be delayed by the operation of the bureaucratic 
nachine. 
8.4 cncrnsICtiS 
The course of industrial relations with manual workers at Manchester 
Airport has been influenced by the existence of a relatively large bcxiy 
of manual v"urkers employed on a single site, in contrast to the 
poSition at other local authority establishments where manual workers 
tend to be employed in smaller numbers. Coupled with this has been the 
influence of small groups of strategic workers, especially fi.rE!l'En, who 
hold substantial industrial power, capable of closing the airport at 
any tine. 
In ccmron with the civil air transport industry as a whole, the 
fornation of the NJCCAT was fundamental to the future course of 
industrial relations at Manchester Airport. As manual workers 
continually pressed for parity with workers embraced by this body, the 
response of the Corporation was to attempt to ce:nent the body of 
airport workers to IDeal GovernIrEnt structures. However, in tenns of 
the structure of the Municipal Airports Panel, fran the outset it was 
difficult to integrate Manchester Airport with other nrunicipal airports 
which had not undergone a similar process of growth and developnant. 
The application of special conditions to Manchester Airport was always 
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a source of potential conflict. Thus, whilst conflict initially arose 
fran the perception on the part of airport workers of being a 
specialist group of labour within the IDeal Govern:rrent service 
requiring special treatment, integration with other municiJ;a1 airport 
workers served only to emphasise the differences in treatnent of 
airport workers employed under different ownership structures. 
Whilst there has been a general desire to keep the J;ay levels of 
airport nanual workers in line with IDeal Govern:rrent, both at national 
and local level, under the pressure of industrial unrest there has been 
a gradual trend towards ~ity with BAA airport workers. However, in 
the face of the strict interpretation of incanes policy by national 
employers, the employers at Manchester Airport increasingly rejecte:i 
the general philosophy of the ruc and by the 1970s supporte:i the notion 
of the local agreement of conditions of service to cater for the 
airports ~icular circumstances. 
The national agreements applying to IDeal Authority manual workers 
have failed to respond to the needs of Manchester Airport. With little 
emphasis on local negotiation, employees' and employers' 
representatives always met in a situation of potential conflict. As 
nany issues could only be settled at national level there was little 
opportunity to avoid the escalation of disputes. Although the 
employees at Manchester Airport increasingly saw the introduction of 
local productivity bargaining as a means of increasing J;ay levels to 
IIDre nearly reflect the scale of operation, the constraints of national 
negotiations on nany fundamental issues remained a constant source of 
conflict. 
The course of industrial relations in respect of staff grade:i posts 
at Manchester Airport stands in stark contrast to that of rnanual 
workers. The absence of conflict reflects that which has applie:i 
throughout the IDeal Government service, as a result of the inherent 
flexibility provided by the grading schere which can recognise the 
llnportance of local circumstances. '!he tradition of professionalism 
within the service as a whole has been reflected at Manchester Airport 
in the sense that the employing carrmi ttee has willingly accepted the 
prinCiple of canparison with other airports to recruit and retain this 
specialist body of staff. The nature of the local staffing filllction 
within the Corporation has engendered rrore of a co-operati ve atnosphere 
in the relations between employees and the anploying carmi ttee. In the 
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face of mmp::JWer constraints imposed by the Establishnent Carmi ttee 
across the broad spectrum of the authority, the anploying carmi ttee has 
constantly backed employees claims for increased pay and displayed a 
willingness to recognise the contribution made by staff to the 
development of a facility which has constituted a profitable 
undertaking contributing to the local rate. 
Another significant factor in the stability of industrial relations 
with staff employees has been the appeals machinery. In effect, each 
individual employee has been able to look to the prospect of achieving 
what they regard as an equitable return for their labours. Whereas 
manual workers claims have been made en-bloc, the cohesive identity 
anongst staff has been broken dawn by the process of the individual 
grading of posts, thus there has been little opportunity for the 
emargence of a collective sense of grievance. 
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Table 8.1 
YEAR SALARIES £ WAGES £ 
1945/6 623 8,112 
1946/7 1,289 8,891 
1947/8 16,186 *1 
1948/9 5,425*2 19,400*3 
1949/50 8,373 31,368 
1950/1 8,348 31,850 
1951/2 9,847 43,284 
1952/3 12,868 57,489 
1953/4 13,856 66,128 
1954/5 15,914 73,123 
1955/6 17,777 84,887 
1956/7 22,839 97,077 
1957/8 26,779 117,320 
1958/9 32,827 151,275 
1959/60 36,083 163,606 
1960/1 42,561 182,362 
1961/2 50,293 256,777 
1962/3 57,301 291,933 
1963/4 67,175 320,555 
1964/5 73,718 332,241 
1965/6 77,569 388,987 
1966/7 114,235 422,038 
1967/8 126,352 471,778 
1968/9 141,575 525,051 
1969/70 163,388 563,563 
1970/1 134,659 670,030 
1971/2 178,914 801,185 
1972/3 205,305 1,199,933 
1973/4 197,747 1,498,147 
*1 Canbined. figure from salaries and wages 
*2 From 1948/9 Administrative, Professional and Technical Grades 
only 
*3 Manual Workers and "Others" 
Source: Manchester City Council Abstract of Accounts 
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Table 8.2 
~ MANUAL ADMINISTRATIVE '!OrAL 
PERMANEN!' TEMPORARY 
1953/4 125 27 152 
1954/5 151 20 27 198 
1955/6 154 29 28 211 
1956/7 155 30 34 219 
1957/8 162 36 42 240 
1958/9 195 52 47 294 
1959/60 217 58 50 325 
1960/1 223 51 52 326 
1961/2 273 105 60 438 
1962/3 305 105 70 480 
Source: Manchester Airport, Merrorandmn by the Chair and Deputy Chair of 
the Airport Conmittee, 9 March 1964, Appendix C - Staff 
Establishment 
Table 8.3 
ADMIN FINANCE POLICE FIRE POR~E 
1970 40 51 (10) 30 49 222 (80) 107 
1971 39 56 (20) 32 64 238 (90) 96 
1972 49 64 (20) 51 69 290 (100) 107 
1973 53 75 (20) 59 73 327 (60) 111 
1974 63 81 (20) 75 67 356 (55) 104 
1975 62 87 66 58 350 117 
() Average numbers of tertp:)rary staff employed each year in car 
parks (Finance) and Portering 
Source: Extracted fran Airport Carmittee and MIAA Manpower Budgets 
Table 8.4 
KXJ.iENDITURE (XiI EMPIDYEES 
MAINT PORTERS MAINT FIRE POLICE CAR PARK TRA.INDG SECURITY INFO OiliER 
PillS El'C (+Mr) SERVICE ATI"S OOARD DESK EXP 
ADMIN LEVY 
1957/8 28,399 73,727 23,011 15,665 8,895 
1958/9 35,132 101,951 26,741 17,909 10,903 
1959/60 38,388 113,373 28,660 17,562 12,015 
1960/1 45,208 128,341 32,472 19,560 13,107 
1961/2 54,269 189,350 40,898 23,334 20,268 
1962/3 61,525 20,894 51,614 28,030 21,307 
1963/4 72,571 219,246 68,774 34,140 26,567 
1964/5 79,550 219,448 74,344 31,945 29,245 ~ 
1965/6 98,940 250,301 80,105 43,528 28,455 
U"I ..... 
1966/7 123,429 284,522 83,619 45,239 27,970 10,209 
1967/8 137,095 307,546 100,195 52,648 30,524 12,700 
1968/9 154,101 343,309 103,042 58,147 35,049 15,629 3,680 
1969/70 102,797 376,888 137,942 93,213 46,003 23,687 3,474 
1970/1 126,717 469,897 164,452 118,514 61,633 31,383 1,990 
1971/2 162,133 578,619 188,720 138,961 84,674 45,350 2,385 
1972/3 201,179 741,518 225,714 160,950 134,980 60,099 100 
1973/4 243,627 882,339 265,771 187,584 186,056 82,319 
1974/5 323,873 1,079,418 382,393 225,775 238,909 112,543 10,207 
1975/6 470,667 1,399,124 574,945 296,317 37,891 148,350 
1976/7 541,737 1,585,455 652,571 333,657 144,906 181,026 251,845 
1977/8 580,586 1,795,660 761,109 369,763 195,059 765,738 
1978/9 500,101 2,172,409 838,777 438,666 231,322 946,791 102,860 62,712 
1979/80 645,520 2,805,956 1,015,243 561,425 295,475 1,363,856 139,735 21,980 
1980/1 874,735 4,003,389 1,460,879 826,723 392,973 1,756,196 209,700 30,912 
1981/2 1,123,152 4,874,201 1,884,218 923,875 473,313 2,080,737 245,887 35,054 
1982/3 1,849,163 5,757,119 2,116,650 983,054 505,964 1,943,951 258,181 24,720 
Source: Manchester City Council, Abstract of Accounts and MIAA ManpcM9I' Budgets 
Appendix 8.1 
RATE OF PAY APPLICABLE '10 FIREMEN EMPIOYED AT ~ .AND BARIm AIRPCRrS :MSID CE '.IHE 
PREV.AIL1N; RATES OF PAY AND aIIDITICES OPERATED BY 'mE MINISJRY OF CIVIL AVIATICE WI'.IHIN 
-nm MISCELIANEXXJS 'IRADES JOINr axJNCIL Em QJVERNMENT INDUSIRIAL ESrABLISHMENrS 
w.e.f 8.11.48 
DESIGNATION GRADE UPON "M" RATE LEAD OR SHIFl' IDrAL RATE EXIsrThG 
WHICH BASED ALlOWANCE PAYMENT FOR 44 HOUR RATE 
WEEK --
Fireman Airport Hand 
Chargehand Crash Crew 4.15.0 
Under 10 (1) 5.15.3 
Employees 4.15.0 14/- & 5/- 4/- 5.18.0 (2) 5.14.10 
Supervised 
Over 10 (1) 5.15.4 
Employees 4.15.0 14/- & 8/- 4/- 6.1.0 (2) 5.14.10 
Supervised 
Fireman 4.15.0 14/- 4/- 5.13.0 (1) 5.9.9 
(2) 5.7.4 
( 1) = Qualified Driver 
( 2) = Recognised First Aid Certificates 
Source: Town Clerk's Report to the Establishment Ccmni ttee, Manual Staffs at Ringway and Barton Airports, 













RATES OF PAY APPLICABLE 'ID INOOS'lRIAL (MANUAL) STAFFS AT RJ}{;WAY AND 
BARTON AIRPORTS w.e.f. 8.11.48 
GRADE "M" RATE LEAD OR BASIC FOR REMARKS 
.E ~E 44 HOUR 
WEEK £ 
Labourer 4.15.0 4.15.0 
(unskilled) 
Labourer 4.15.0 3/- 4.18.0 
(Semi-skilled) 
Semi-Skilled 4.15.0 5/- to 8/- 5.0.0 to read at local 
(using tools) 5.3.0 discretion 
Messenger 4.15.0 3/- 4.18.0 
Airport 4.15.0 12/- 5.7.0 
Foreran's 
Assistant 
Airtnrt Hand 4.15.0 4/- 4.19.0 General duties, 
Grade II baggage handling 
Airport Hand 4.15.0 8/- 5.3.0 Ta.rnac mll'shalling; 
Grade I floodlights on rrotor transport 
vehicles; laying & 
lighting paraffin 
flares; recording 
aircraft arrivals & 
departures i baggage 
handling, if 
required. read 




Leading 4.15.0 15/- 5.10.0 
Storemcm 
Storemcm 4.15.0 10/- 5.5.0 
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~ 8.2 Continued 
RATES OF PAY APPLICABLE 'ID INIXJS'lRIAL (MANUAL) s:rAFFS AT R1N.;'WAY .AND 
BARIrn .AIRl.U1TS w. e. f. 8.11.48 Ccm:tiIDEd 
GRADE "M" RATE LEAD OR BASIC FOR REMARKS 
f l\LI.Gll\NCE 44 HOUR 
WEEK £ 
Packer 4.15.0 6- to 9/- 5.1.0 to 
5.4.0 ) At 
) IDeal 
) Discretion 
Assistant 4.15.0 3/- to 5/- 4.18.0 to ) 
Packer 5.0.0 ) 
Stoker 4.15.0 13/- 5.8.0 
(IDw Pressure) 





Class "A" 4.15.0 8/6 5.3.6 * 
Class "B" 4.15.0 9/6 5.4.6 * 
Class "C" 4.15.0 11/6 5.6.6 * 
Class "D" 4.15.0 15/6 5.10.6 * 
Class "E" 4.15.0 19/6 5.14.6 * 
* Type of Desiqnation 
Class 
Vehicle of Driver 
Motor Cycle Driver 
Motor Cycle "A" 
passenger MT Driver "A" 
Cars (Passenger) 
Up to & MTDriver "B" 
inc 2 tons (light) 
(exc "A") 
Source: ToNn Clerk's Report to the Establishment Comnittee, 
Manual Staffs at Ringway and Barton Airports, 
8 April 1949 
Appendix 8.3 




















NEW RATE PROPOSED BY 
CORPORATION 







MIN OF TRANSPORT & CIVIL 
AVIATION RATES 





9.13.0 x 5/- to 10.8.0 
Efficiency increments of 
5/- to 10.18.0 
10.15.6 x 5/- to 11.5.6 
Efficiency increments of 
5/- to 11.15.6 
Source: Airport Carmittee, Special Meeting, 26 February 1958, Wages and Working 
Conditions of Manual Employees 
*4 YEAR PERIOD COUID BE 
WAIVED AT MANAGEMENr 
DISCRErION 
Proposed new rates to be 
augmanted in the nmmer 
prescribed by the North 
Western Whitley Council 
for IDeal Authority Non-
Trading Services in 
respect of shift 
working, overtime, 






NJC F(R UX!AL AUlHJUTIES' SERVICES (MANUAL lO<KERS) EH?IDYEES AT 
MUNICIPAL.AI:RRRrS, TERMS AND CllIDITIOOS OF ~









RATES OF PAY 
II 
IV 







DESIGNATION CLASS I CLASS II CLASS III CLASS IV 
Airport Hand 9.18.10 9.15.2 9.11.6 None at this 
Classification to to to 
10.6.2 9.18.10 9.15.2 





to \\1Orkers solely on this acti vi ty 
10.9.10 
10.9.10 10.6.2 9.18.10 9.15.2 
to to to 
10.13.6 10.9.10 10.2.6 
to 
9.18.10 
10.9.2 No employees solely on these 






Source: Correspondence, NJC for IDeal Authorities' Services (Manual 




LEAD RATES OF SUPERVI&RY GRADES 1962 
DESIGNATION/ 
SECTION 








12/ - per week 
8/- per week 
8/- per week 
Leading Fireman 23/6 or 24/-
per week 
Senior Fireman 
According to length 
of service 
8/- per week 
21/ - per week (6d/hour) 
14/ - per week (4d/hour) 
14/ - per week 
24/6 per week (7d/hour) 
14/- per week 
Maintenance * read payments revised to bring in line with above 
Foreman 6~d per hour 
3 1/act per hour 
7d per hour 
4d per hour 




CITY OF MAKlIESTER, .AIRRRr DEPARIMENr ~ SECI'lCE 
~ FCR mE GRADnG OF IAlU1RmS AND Wl'.IHIN '!HE 
J.i'RAMEKE{ OF mE SCHEDlLE OF WN;ES AND ~ ClHHTICRi OF '!HE NJe 
FCR ~ AIJrfDUirIES' SERVICES (:MANUAL lOU<mS) lWDIESI'ER AmRRr 
10.12.62 
GRADE BASIC PER QUALIFICATIONS 
,as for semi -skilled 
engineering employees) 
WEEK 
1 10.1.3 L:imi ted experience 
2 10.3.5 Sane practical experience 
3 10.13.6 Special duties or 
considerable experience 
4 11.0.6 Exceptional ability 
Source: Manchester Corporation, Establishment Ccmnittee, 8 January 1963 
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}\qleUiix 8. 7 





























PERIOD SECTIONS INVOLVED STATUS 
21.00-22.00 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
09.00-11.15 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
15.00-15.25 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
21.15-22.30 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
09.15-10.30 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
24.00-01.00 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
15.00-16.00 Airport hands and Airport open, 
su:pervisors baggage not handled 
14.55-16.10 Strike meeting - Airport open, 
maintenance, fire baggage not handled, 
and apron services fire on call 
21.00-22.15 ) ) 
01.00-02.00 ) ) 
09.15-10.30 ) Maintenance, fire ) Airport 
11.30-13.30 ) and apron services ) Closed 
20.45-23.45 ) ) 
08.30-09.50 ) ) 
14.15-16.15 ) ) 
21.00-21.30 ) ) 
12.30-13.30 Maintenance Airport open 
21.15-22.15 ) ) 
20.25-01.15 ) ) 
08.00-12.00 ) Maintenance, fire ) Airport 
12.00-15.15 ) and apron services ) Closed 
00.01-02.00 ) ) 
21.00-23.15 ) ) 
15.00-16.00 Maintenance and Airport open 
apron services 
Airport closed 16.15-18.15 Maintenance, apron 
and fire services 
12.00-13.30 Maintenance only Airport open 
Manchester Airport, Schedule of Strikes and Losses since 1968,. 




NATICI'lAL JOINr <lXHTI.. Em. lOCAL N1IHJUTIES' SERVICES (MANUAL 
llRt.<E1<S) MUNICIPAL AIRPCRrS PANEL l'OO.POOMS Em. RE-crA'lSIFICATICE OF 
MARllESTER .AIRRRr AND RATES OF PAY OF J.lCRI'ERllG SrAFF AND ~
1 RE-CLASSIFICATION 
In recognition of the Eoard of Trades' categorisation (Grade IX) and 
the scale of operations including the volurre of international and 
domestic passenger and freight traffic, to revise the scheme of 
classification of airports for pay purposes as an interim measure to 
increase rates by 5~ per hour, to be taken into account in the 
pending 1968 general pay settlement. 
2 FIREMANSHIP 
In recognition of the certification by the Airport Carmandant of 
canpetence in firem:mship of a standard equivalent to Boal:d of Trade 
Firem:mship Course at Stansted, to pay a qualification "plus rate" 
of 2d an hour subject to this being merged in any increased rate 
which the employee concerned nay subsequently enjoy on being 
prorroted to leading hand or other supervisory appointment and not 
applying to any employee who is at present in leading hand or other 
supervisory grade. 
3 ENHANCED.ALI.CMANCES - SHIFr mRK - NIGHT mRK 
Pending canpletion of the 1968 reviev.;r to increase the following 
enhanced allowances: 
Shift Work - Rotating shift - fran 5 3/4d. to 7~ per hour 
Alternating shift - fran 4 3/4d. to 5 3/4d. per hour 
Night Work - From time + ~ to time + 1/3 
4 PRODUCTIVITY 
In consideration of co-operation in a work study review of 
operations at the airport and of agreanent <;>n. measure~ set out ~low 
regarding increasing efficiency and productlvlty of auport servlceS 
to pay on account of the benefits which have ~ccrued and are to 
accrue for nore productive and efficient working, a sum of lOs a . 
week to be absorbed in any final productivity payment or bonus which 
nay result fran such study or studies. 
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~ 8.8 Qntinued 
NATIc&L JOINl' ancn.. F(R IOCAL AIJIHRITIES' SERVICES (MANUAL 
~) MUNICIPAL AI:RRRrS PANEL PROroSALS F<R RE-crA'iSIFICATICI'l OF 
.AIRRRl' AND RATES OF PAY OF :J.lCRI.'ElUl'G STAFF AND FIREmN 
nntinued 
(a) Overtime 
(i) A reasonable arrount to meet airport operating 
requiremants. 
(ii) Nornal shift to be extended by ~our to provide 
shift overlap. 
(iii) Stay-back overtime - guarantee of 1~ hours per 
~ at the :request of m:magenent. 
(i v) Co-operation in all "callout" arrangerrents. 
(b) Efficiency and Productivity 
Co-operation in efforts to secure the efficient and 
econanical operation of the airport including: 
the use of work study and other managemant services 
changes in working practices 
versatility and flexibility of staff 
continuing review of nanning requirenents 
5 MATrERS FOR lOCAL CONSIDERATION 
The parties to consider in the light of this agreement: 
(a) 
(b) 
ux:al lead rates and rate of rrarshallers. 
~lications of proposals in relation to other ground 
staff wi thin the limits of the national agreement and 
current arrangerents as to pay. 
6 DATE OF OPERATION 
Proposals to came into effect, if adopted, on 1 July 1968. 
Source: Manchester Corporation, Special Meeting of the Airport Ccmnittee, 16 July 1968, Airport Dispute, Rates of pay of 
portering Staff and Firerren, corres:fX?ndence fran the NJC 
Froployers' Side, subnitted as Appendix A, AttachIrent. 
Appendix B _ 9 
DRrAILS OF EF.FECI'S OF PRORJSALS BY JOmr SErnE.I2\RIES OF IDe RR IDCAL AImDUTIES' SERVICE'S 
(:MANUAL VDRKERS) Em REVISDG PAY .AND (lH)ITIOOS OF RRI'mnG .AND FIRE STAFFS AT 
~.AlRRRI' 
(1) Wage Award: 2 d per hour; shift rates: alternating 1d, rotating 1 3/4d per hour, qualified fireman 2d per hour 
(2) Airport Classification: 3d per hour; productivity paymant lOs per week 
GRADE EXISTll'G WAGE PROPOSED INrnEASES IDrAL INCREASE 
Airport Hand 
1st year basic 
Average 45 hour week 
After 4yrs Service: 
Basic 
45 hour week 
Fireman - Qualified 
1st year basic 
Average 44 hour week 
After all Service 
IncrE!llE:m.ts : 
Basic 









* - After three years' service 
** - After six year's service 

























Source: Manchester Corporation, Airport Ccmnittee, Special Meeting, 16 July 1968 
Airport Dispute, Rates of Pay of Portering Staff and Firenen 
REVISED WAGE WAGE OF Fl)UIVALENT 











MAP 1975 ANNUAL PAY ~ EFFECr (E EARNIN:iS AT MAtI:lIESTER 
~r (DWARED wrm: BAA 
MAP AGREEMENl' BAA. .AGREEMENr 
NWrt Hand ( lowest grade) 
Basic Pay 34.39 27.51 
read-in 1.00 ) ) 
Weekend premimn 7.56 ) 11.26 ) 8.22 
Night pay 1.42 ) ) 
Shift pay 2.28 ) ) 
PAY FOR 40 HOURS 46.65 45.73 
Rostered overtirrE 6.77 7.38 
Night pay 0.15 ) 0.46 
Shift pay 0.31 ) 
'IDI'AL FOR 45~ HOUR WEEK 53.88 53.11 
Firanan ( lowest grade) 
Basic pay 34.22 31.85 
lead-in 1.00 
weekend premimn 7.70 ) 11.86 ) 10.83 
Shift pay 4.16 ) ) 
PAY FOR 40 HOURS 47.08 
42.68 
Rostered overtirrE 5.13 
4.78 
Shift pay 0.42 
'ICTAL FOR 44 HOUR WEEK 52.63 
47.46 
Source: Manchester Airport, Management Infonration Bulletin 
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AppE!ldix 8.11 
MAIDIES.I'ER .AIRP(Rl' STAFF, JUNE 1968 (0PERATItB\L DEPAR'Dmfi'S) 
ESTABLISHMENT 
Maintenance 
paid on Administrative Grades 
Airport Engineer 
Senior Assistant Airport Engineer 





Chargehand Fitter (Days) 
Chargehand Electrician (Days) 









Labourers (Shifts) Grade 2 
Foreman Groundsman 
Chargehand Groundsman 














































[geldix 8.11 Ccnt.imBi 




Paid on .Administrative Grades 
Senior Airport Duty Officer 
Airport Duty Officer 
Apron Se:rvices Supe:rvisor 
Other Grades 
Supervisors & Assistant Supe:rvisors 





Airport hands (Temp 5 rronths) 
Road Guards 
Wcmen Cleaner Supe:rvisors 
Wcmen Cleaners 
Terraces and Left Luggage 
Paid on .Administrative Grades 
Terrace Wardens 
Other Grades 
Temp Assistant Terrace Wardens 
- for 7 months - 4 ) 
- for 6 months - 2 ) 


































l\JlpeOOix 8.11 ContinuOO 
:MAIDIESrER .AIRKRr STAFF, JUNE 1968 (0PERATIcmr. 
DEPARIMENrS) ContinuOO 
Car Parks 
paid on Administrative Grades 
Car Park Manager 
Car Park Supervisor 
Other Grades 





Paid on Administrative Grades 
Airport Fire Officer 







Paid on Administrative Grades 









































Source: File, Manchester Airport Archive, Strike, May - July 1968, 
Manchester Airport Establishment, 1968 
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l\gBrlix 8.12 
MINIsmY OF AVIATICB FIRE SERVICE ESrABLISBMENr, 1963 
Chief Fire Officer 
Deputy Chief FSO 
DeputyFSO 
Deputy FSO 
Airport Fire Officer 
Grade One 
Airport Fire Officer 
Grade One 
Airport Fire Officer 
Grade One 





Airport Fire Officer 
Grade One 
Airport Fire Officer 
Grade 'Thvo 
2 x Section leader 
RESPONSIBILITIES SALARY 
Policy and overall 
organisation £3,200 
Assisting above £2,200 
Operational matters £1,700 
Executive matters £1,700 
Training matters £1,475 
Fire Prevention matters £1,475 
Personnel matters £1,475 
ROF and research and 
development £1,475 
Filing and clerical £1,000 








Source: Manchester Airport, Ministry of Aviation Fire Service . 
Establishment (.Additional to Airport Fire Staff) at 29 Aprll 
1963, Headquarters staffs. 
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~8.13 












2,925 - 3,350 
2,305 - 2,875 
1,732 - 2,148 
1,243 - 1,810 
Operations Officer Grade I 
Operations Officer Grade II 
Corrm:mdant 2,150 - 2,475 
Plus responsibility allowance 
Operations Officer Grade I 1,732 - 2,148 
Ccmnandant 2,150 - 2,475 
Carrmandant 2,470 - 2,785 
Corrmandant 2,015 - 2,345 
Commandant 2,240 - 2,565 
Assistant Comnandant 1,860 - 2,120 
Source: Manchester Corporation Establishment Corrmittee, 10 April 1962, 
Appoinbnent of Assistance Airport Director (Operations) 
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.Ag?endix 8.14 
GRADItb OF SENICR ~S'ffiATIVE ros:rs AT MINISlRY ~'S, 1960 
Post Present Recomnended Cgnparable Salary 
Grade Grade Grade at 
Ministry Airports 
Assistant AirpJrt JNCA JNCD Chief Executive £2,200 
Director £1,420 £1,520-£1,755 Officer 
Chief 
Administrative APr III APr V Senior Executive £1,800 
Assistant £880/£1,005 £1220/£1375 Officer 
Administrative APr I APr III Higher Executive £1,375 
Assistant £610-£765 £880/£1,065 Officer 
Chief Accounting APr III APr V Senior Executive £1,800 
Assistant £880/£1,005 £1,220/£1,375 Officer 
Source: Manchester Corporation, Establishment Committee, 18 March 1960, 
AirpJrt Corrmi ttee, Review of Departmental Establishment. 
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In this thesis I have sought to investl-gate th e process of growth and 
development at Manchester Airport and the impll-catl"ons of municipal 
ownership. Whilst the major focus has been the nature of municipal 
enterprise, this, of necessity, has therefore been viewed within 
the overall framework of institutional arrangements governing the 
civil air transport industry. This ~ail~~~ across more 
than half a century during which the role of Manchester in civil air 
transport has been transformed from essentially a snaIl-scale limited 
activity to a najor operation implied by international "Gateway" 
status. This transition has taken place under continued local 
authority ownership and control. Whilst the key issues addressed have 
included the llnpact of municipal ownership on capital and labour 
structures and the evolution of internal organisation structures with 
increasing scale, emphasis has also been placed upon the extent to 
which other forces and agencies have detennined the process of change. 
In Chapter One it was suggested that the air transport system 
canprises a number of carrp:>nents including the airport itself; the 
airlines and their custaners; the local cormnmity and the forces of 
government. It was emphasised that given the canplexity of the 
institutional framework, airport developnent rrrust be the outcare of the 
interaction of nmnerous institutions which are seemingly independent 
but are, in practice, interdependent because of the effects of 
decisions on the other components of the air transport system. Each 
institution nay set an agenda for developuent independently of other 
forces, but in reality interdependence nay affect the achievenent of 
set goals . Essentially then, whilst the primary aim has been to 
investigate the nature of municipal enterprise , objectives for this 
study have reflected this fundamental condition. The rrain core of the 
thesis has constituted a discussion of the impact of municipal 
ownership structures on the developuent of an enterprise operating in 
an international, carrmercial environment. However, whilst seeking to 
ascertain the extent to which the m:x:le of ownership has affected 
developnent through poliCY fonnulation, the setting of specific goals 
and the provision of an organisatioml fraJll(SWOrk which rrrust be 
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evolutionary in order to accormodate the needs of a growing and rapidly 
changing industry, such factors have not been dealt within isolation. 
The underlying significance of these factors can only be objectively 
assessed within a wider context which encanpasses the influence of the 
local ccmnunity and central government on the nature and direction of 
civil air transport . Similarly, in the consideration of the ilnpact of 
municipal CMIlership structures on industrial relations and collective 
bargaining arrangements, the study has justifiably extended beyond the 
bounds of nnmicipal arrangements to encanpass the civil air transport 
industry as a whole. It is suggested that a nore limited approach 
would have failed to recognise the fundaIrental condition that a 
municipal airport exists as two entities - on the one hand, a IDeal 
Government service, and, on the other, a canponent of the civil air 
transport industry. 
I have argued that the pattern of grCMth and developrent at 
Manchester Airport has differed considerably frcm experience elsewhere 
in the provinces and have tried to show that despite the potential 
constraints of the municipal ownership regime, it has proven to be a 
positive factor in prorroting a process of change in the absence of 
growth prorroting forces in both the local and national arenas. I have 
argued that municipal enterprise supporting the injection of local 
drive, knCM'ledge, initiative and enthusiasm has been an appropriate 
organisational fonn, maximising gain> in an industry subject to rapid 
technological change and spurts of growth. 
Chapter Two addressed the way in which, during the post war period 
Manchester Airport increased its share of the UK passenger and freight 
rrarkets. Of overriding significance was the way in which an initial 
dependence upon the Irish market gave way to the establishnent of a 
wider range of continental and trans-Atlantic air services. It was 
suggested that such developrent began to set Manchester Airport apart 
from other nnmicipal airports wi thin the UK provinces and that during 
the 1960s the Airport's dominant position was consolidated by the 
establishment of a finn foothold in the IT market based upon a process 
of concentration of regional acti vi ty at the Airport. It was 
recognised that in achieving a leading position within the regions, the 
Airport had benefitted fran a naturally large catchrrent area. However, 
emphasis was placed upon the necessity to trans late latent demand into 
effective dem:md in order to increase the scale of activity. The early 
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attempts to acquire the Alexandra Park site for a rrnmicipal aercx:irarE 
and the City's detennination to acquire an alternative site following 
the failure of the Barton Aerodrome have been cite:i as nanifestations 
of the conviction on the part of the local authority of the nee1 for an 
airport to satisfy potential demand. It has been argue:i that whilst 
~lcaning the prospect of ma.terial prosperity, local politicians were 
in a nore advantageous position than their national counterparts to 
envisage the effects of airport proposals and identify appropriate 
rrOOifications. The application of superior knowle:ige adde:i ~ight to 
the aspirations set at the local level. 
It has been contended that an essential factor in extending the 
Airport's natural catchment area, which in turn contribute:i towards the 
intensification of air services, was the provision of airport 
facilities ahead of dem:md which addressed one of the fundanental 
principles involved in airport developnent. In effect I the invest:m:mt 
decisions taken by the City of Manchester impacted upon the operation 
of other airports with the potential to service a camon, overlapping 
catchment area. In differentiating the airport by operating upon 
supply-side factors, the airport owner realised the full potential of 
the ma.rket in attracting the lion's share of traffic. 
In Chapter One the canplexi ties of investment of airports as opposed 
to other enterprises were highlighted. Reference was ma.de to the need 
to nobilise capital first and cOIJlplete a projectbefore benefits accrue; 
to accept an unrermmerative period whilst traffic builds up; to embark 
upon a prograrrme of continuing investment and. capital outlay to keep 
up-to-date and to make decisions on "all or nothing" propositions 
involving "1lllT!Ps " of investment. It was suggested that these 
characteristics create difficulties in rraking cc.mrErcial judgemants 
regarding the economics of potential new projects. I have tried to 
show how, given these fundamental characteristics, the potential 
constraints of the regime of rrnmicipal ownership have rranifested 
thansel ves at various stages in the developnant process at Manchester. 
For example, it has been argued that the selection of the Barton site 
in the late 1920s in itself reflected an overriding concern to minimise 
capital expenditure in order to reduce the burden of developrvant 
carried by the rate. Moreover, it has been argued that the position 
taken up by the Finance Ccmnittee in the early stages of developrvant of 
the Ringway site reflected the "duality" of IDeal GovernIrent investnent 
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and finance and an increasing concern regarding the fX)ssibili ty of 
deficit operation given the limitations of central governmant control 
of the level and direction of local authority investment. H~, the 
decision to proceed with the Ringway schema in 1934 following the 
failure of Barton, has been interpreted as suggesting a fundamantal 
recognition of the need to give site selection priority, based upon the 
advice of aeronautical specialists , irrespective of the need to ccmnit 
large sums of investment to land acquisitions. As far as the long tenn 
developnent or the Ringway site is concerned, I have naintained that 
the local authority has consistently pursued corrmercial objectives. 
In Chapter Three it has been argued that rather than reflecting the 
potential constraints of "duality", the pursuit of non-ccmnercial ends 
and the control of central government in local investment, usually 
attributed to the municipal ownership regime, the progressive policies 
pursued regarding airport developrEIlt have in themselves implied an 
acceptance of corcmarcial risk with the objectives of the spending 
carmittee consistently taking precedence over the counsel of the 
"treasury carmittee". 1his has been coupled with a policy of revenue 
rrmdmisation by capturing IIDre lucrative n:erket in the long run. 
Furthenrore, it has been argued that with the accrual of surpluses, 
financial arrangements were m:xlified to ensure that the future pursuit 
of purely political objectives would not impinge upon airport 
developnent. In this way the profits of airport operation Wl9re 
ploughed back rather than being dispersed to the General Rate Fund to 
subsidise other local authority services. I have also tried to show 
how increasingly financial autonomy was accompanied by greater 
managerial freedom and the adaptation of internal organisational 
structures to changes in the type and scale of airport operation. 
Essentially, the organisational changes highlighted in Chapter Three 
nay be viewed in the context of the tradition of "professionalism" 
wi thin the IDeal Govermnent Service and the consideration in Chapter 
Eight of its significance in detennining the grading of posts at 
Manchester Airport. It may be concluded that the tradition of 
"professionalism" assisted in the acquisition of specialist skills to 
cater for the needs of airport developnent. 
di . f the Whilst the thrust of Chapter 'Ihree has been the SCUSS1.on 0 
implications of the municipal ownership regime for investment, 
subsequent chapters have sought to detennine the extent to which other 
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forces at 1NOrk within the ; .... ~t1't t' nal f ~J.O U 10 rartE'WOrk of the civil air 
transp:>rt industry have contributed towards the process of growth and 
developnant. In Chapter One it was emphasised that in addition to the 
three rna jor components comprising the civil air transp:>rt industry, the 
surrounding camrunity has a particularly strong relatiOnship wIth airports 
given the externali ties involved in their operation. It was stated 
that any objectives set by the authority in which ownership was vested, 
could be influenced by the objectives of other local institutions whose 
assessrrEIlt of externalities would be coloured by their perceptions 
regarding urbanisation effects. Basically if the goal of planning 
institutions is to slow down the expansion of an already highly 
urbanised region, the construction or expansion of an airport nay run 
counter to that goal. It is clear from the consideration of the 
influence of local institutions which forms Chapter Four that this has 
indeed been the general case at Manchester Airport and it has been 
argued that the siting of the airport outside the boundary of the local 
authority in which ownership was vested proved to heighten the negative 
perceptions regarding airport developnent by the linking of this issue 
with the general question of the spread of large matropolitan areas 
into the surrounding countryside. Basically, the rural camnmity 
around Manchester regarded airport development as an additional 
intrusion into their area which was already being transforrrai by 
Manchester's housing over-spill. Ha.vever, it is argued that ownership 
by a large municipal authority claiming to represent the interests of 
an extensive industrial and ccmnercial camnmity was decisive in 
defeating the opp:>si tion of individuals and institutions alike who 
perceived themselves as bearing the costs of the development in tenns of 
disameni ty . Furthermore, the eventual institution of fornal 
consultative arrangerents in the 1960s has been regarded purely as a 
palliative designed to quell opposition, which at the same tine ensured 
that the influence of the local carmnmity, when faced with the econanic 
lobby of the airlines backed by the administrative nachine of a large 
local authority, would rem3.in minimal. Ul tinatel y , it has been argued 
that the drive and enthusiasm applied by the local authority to a 
developnent process from which it could gain substantially, both in 
terms of prestige and profit, was ove:r::whelroing to the point of 
effectively disenfranchising the surrounding carmnmity. 
Similarly, in consideration of the characteristics of airport 
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operation, it was emphasised that because of the posi ti ve extemali ties 
which may arise from develop1'EIlt coupled with the relatively high level 
of capital investment involved, airports and. the air seIVices which 
operate fran than are frequently regarded as public assets and 
therefore subject to an element of control by central govemrrent. 
However, it has been argued that whilst airports may act as growth 
points and governments may exercise control so as to prarote airport 
developre1t as an instrument of redistribution of prosperity between 
one region and another, this again has not been the case with regard to 
Manchester Airport given the tendency in the UK towards the laissez-
faire approach to planning. Moreover, it has been argued that in 
resisting central government plans for requisitioning during the Second 
World War and for nationalisation in the post-war era, the special 
arrangements agreed for the ownership, management and control of 
Manchester Airport involving local management supported by an element 
of central funding, reinforced the precianinance of the local agenda set 
by a municipal authority pursuing its own financial objectives. In 
this sense, it has been argued that the conferment of Category "A" 
Gateway status on Manchester Airport in 1978 was not the culmination of 
a policy of pronotion of grCMth on the part of central governrrent, but 
was purely the recognition of a status achieved in the past, by the 
forces of municipal enterprise. Similarly, it has been argued that in 
respect of the role of national agency in regulating the developrent of 
air services, the pursuit of national objectives, particularly the 
prarotion of the interests of national airlines, has not proved to be a 
positive factor contributing towards the growth and developrent of 
Manchester Airport. The principal a.rgum:mt arerging fran the 
consideration of the regulato:ry fraIll8VOOrk and ownership and canpeti tion 
policy in the UK airline industry in Chapter Six, is that the key to 
attracting the interests of the State Corporations at Manchester 
Airport was the dem:mstration effect given by the activities of foreign 
and independent operators alike who, backed by the encouragem:mt of the 
municipal owners of the Airport, recognised the . full potential of the 
market for air services existing in the City of Manchester and its 
environs. 
It is therefore apparent that in addressing the origins of the 
process of growth and developnent at Manchester Airport in this thesis, 
the primary arguIIEIlt is that municipal ownership provOO to be the 
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decisive factor in the absence of growth promoting forces elsewhere. 
In other words, the forces of municipal enterprise driven by "municipal 
pride" engendered a fundamentally commercial approach to the question 
of airport development which balanced the negative influence of other 
institutions prsuingtheir own independent local and national objectives. 
It is argued that this factor is of overriding significance in accounting 
for the pattern of growth and development at Manchester Airport. This 
differed significantly from its municipal counterparts which were subjected 
to central government requisition in war-time, nationalisation in the 
post-war period, and were handed back to local authority control in the 
1960s as deficit operations. 
In terms of capital it has been suggested that municipal ownership 
was the driving force contributing towards a scale of activity more akin 
to the larger state-controlled airports, however it has been noted that 
the application of procedures for the conduct of industrial relations in 
Local Government has created difficulties especially in relation to manual 
workers, given the existence of variable patterns of ownership within the 
civil air transport industry. Generally it has been argued that the origins 
of industrial unrest have lay in the fact that a relatively large number of 
manual workers have been employed on one site, a condition not usually 
encountered in local authority establishments. Given the specialist 
nature of the activities involved in airport operation, and the tendency 
towards large scale operation not encountered at other municipal airports, 
the body of manual workers at Manchester developed a firmer identity with 
other airport workers based at state-controlled airports than the 
collective body of municipal employees. An increasing rejection of local 
authority standards and principles in determining the terms and conditions 
of employment on the part of manual workers was countered by an attempt by 
the local authority employers to more firmly integrate the workforce with 
the local authority establishment, whilst at the same time providing limited 
f · t "at1·on However, it is recognition of the specialist nature 0 a1rpor ope~ . 
argued that this process of integration served only to highlight the 
operational differences between Manchester Airport and its municipal 
counterparts. 
1 t a gradual trend towards Under the pressure of industria unres , 
parity with the larger airports operated by the British Airport 
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Authority may be discerned. A strict interpretation of incomes 
policy in national collective bargaining which reflected the 
influence of central governemtn control of the level and direction 
of local authority funding culminated in the wholesale rejection 
by local management of a machinery which proved inflexible in 
accommodating the special needs of Manchester Airport. Thus it is 
argued in Chapter Eight that the constraints of the municipal 
ownership regime when dealing with labour, especially manual workers 
were of considerable significance. 
Finally, in concluding this thesis, it should be noted that the municipal 
ownership regime has been regarded as a positive factor in promoting 
airport development because it provided a framework for the evolution of 
alternative organisational structures capable of adapting to the 
changing requirements of the development process. It has been argued 
that in this sense, flexibility of municipal ownership in itself 
contributed towards distancing of airport operation away from the 
potential constraints of the local authority regime as the need arose. 
Since 1986, as a result of central government policy, the municipal 
owners of the airport have been grouped together to form a public 
limited company and, in this sense, the Manchestesr Airport may be 
regarded as having been partially privatised. However, it is clear 
from the arguments put forward in this thesis that a process of 
partial privatisation: was implied by the tendency towards "arms 
length" administration which was the fundamental response to the 
specialist needs of the development process. In this way, the 
municipal ownership regime served a crucial historical purpose. 
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GLOSSARY 
Any area of land or water designed, equipped, 
set, ~~rt or commonly used for affording 
facllltles for the landing and departure of 
aircraft and includes any area or space, whether 
on the ground, on the roof of a building or 
elsewhere, which is designed, equipped or set 
apart for affording facilities for the landing 
and d?~ure of, aircraft capable of descending 
or Climblllg vertlcall y, but does not include any 
area the use of which for affording facilities 
for the landing and departure of aircraft has 
been abandoned and has not be resUIIEd. 
Advance Booking Charters Charter flights operated under Class 2 
licences between the UK and designated. 
territories overseas in respect of which an 
operator has sold blocks of seats to one or nore 
licensed travel organisers for resale to 
passengers. 
Aircraft Movement An aircraft take-off or landing at an airport, 
For airport traffic puIIXJses one arrival and one 
departure are counted as two m:wements. Runway 
capacities are expressed in terms of the number 
of arrivals and departures that can be 
accamrrodated on that runway with a specified 
period. 
Air Transport Movements Various definitions exist. The description 
used in CAA Airport Statistics covers landings 
and take-offs of aircraft engaged in the 
transport of passengers or cargo on carmarcial 
tenns. All scheduled service rrovements, whether 
loaded, empty or positioning, charter rrovenents 
transporting passengers or cargo and air taxi 
:rrovements are included. 
Apron 
A defined area on a land aerocirare, intended to 
accommodate aircraft for the purposes of loading 
or unloading passengers or cargo, refuelling, 
parking or maintenance. 
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Cargo (Airport Activity) The weight of cargo (including accanpanied 
~cles) picked up and set dCMIl by aircraft on 
cur t:r:ansport flights. Cm:go in transit through 
the al.:q:x::>rt on the same aircraft is excluded as 
is mail, company stores, excess baggage and 
dip~~~ic bags picked up and set down (See also 
deflllltlon below when used in airline statistics 
. . . where mail and excess baggage are included). 
cargo (Airlllle Operatlons) Any property carried on an aircraft. In 
airline statistics it includes the weight of 
vehicles carried, excess baggage, mail and 
diplanatic bags (see also definition abJve for 
air cargo statistics where mail , excess baggage, 








are those transporting passengers or cargo for 
hire or reward fran one point to another, other 
than scheduled services. 
A rectangular area at the end of the take-off 
run available and under the control of the 
ae:roc:lrorre licensee, selected or prepared as a 
suitable area over which an aircraft may nake a 
portion of its initial climb to a specified 
height. 
are services flown entirely within Great 
Britain, Isle of Man, Channel Islands and 
Northern Ireland. 
In terms of airport categorisation - an airport 
with a wide range and frequency of international 
services, (including intercontinental services) 
and of dcxnestic services. The tenn is also used 
in the context of bilateral air services 
agreements to identify the points of last 
departure and first arrival of international 
scheduled services. 
are separate fare charters where the cost. to the 
passenger includes the cost of accamodatlon. 
A passenger is said to be interlining if he or 
she arrives at an airport with the sole purpose 
of changing airlines and departing for another 
point. The term is sometim~s used for 
passengers connecting between fllghts of the 
same airline although such passengers are often 
te:r:med "intraliners" or "on-line connectors". 
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International Services . are services flCMIl between the UnitErl 
Kingdan (including Great Britain, Isle of Man, 








'!hat part of the manoeuvering area primarily 
intended for the landing or take-off of 
aircraft. 
The speed at which an aeroplane can alight 
without undue shock. 
The percentage of the total seats on an aircraft 
occupied by passengers. Nonnall y only revenue 
passengers are included. and the average seat 
factor is calculated. by dividing total revenue 
passenger miles by total available seat miles. 
Covers only that handled by postal 
administrations and includes troop mail. 
The nmway IIDSt used. for take-off and landing. 
'!hat part of an aerodrome provided. for the take-
off and landing of aircraft and for the novement 
of aircraft on the surface, excluding the apron 
and any part of the aerodrome provided. for the 
maintenance of aircraft. 





than scheduled. services. 
Any object or feature whether natural or nrul-
nade, which by reason of its elevation. or 
position nay affect the safety or regularl.ty 
with which an aerodrome can be used. 
'!hat part of the useful load being of carnercial 
value and providing a source of revenue. 
are flights for purely private purposes by 
private owners or other pr~vate aircraft 
operators, excluding aero-club fllghts. 
are those perfonned according to a published. 












thereto, and open. to use by rranbers of the 
public. 
An area adjacent to the edge of a paved surface 
so prepared as to provide a transition between 
the paverrent and the ad jacent surface for 
aircraft running off the paverrent. 
The OpPOrtunity for an airline to carry foreign 
trafflc between foreign territories on either 
side of its harre country. A canbination of 
third and fourth freedans. 
An airport slot is the time allocated for an 
aircraft to occupy a runway during take-off or 
landing. 
That speed at which an aeroplane or glider just 
maintains level flight with its wings at their 
stalling or critical angle. 
A defined rectangular area at the end of the 
take-off run available, prepared. and designated 
as sui table area in which an aircraft can be 
stopped in the case of a discontinued take-off. 
An area of specified dimensions enclosing a 
runway to provide for the safety of aircraft 
operations. 
A defined path, on a land aerc:x:irare, selected or 
prepared. for use of taxying aircraft. 
is a passenger joining or leaving the aircraft 
flight at the reporting airport. A passenger 
travelling between tv.u reporting airports is 
counted twice, once at each airport. 
The beginning of that portion of the runway 
usable for landing. 
is a passenger who arrive at and departs fran a 
reporting airport on the sane airc~ft which is 
transi tting the airport. Each transl t passenger 
is counted once only and not once on arrival and 
once on departure. 
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Usability The percentage of occasions on which the 
crosswind canponent is below a specified value. 
The usability may be determined for any 
canbination of take-off and landing. 
Whole-plane Charters Flights on which the whole capacity of the 
aircraft is available for resale to the public 




(a) Manchester Airport 
1 Correspondence, notes, mem:>randa, minutes of conferences, 
miscellaneous reports, etc, extracted from Manchester 
Corporation Town Clerk's Department; Ci ty Treasurer's 
Department; Airport Department files and Manchester 
International Airport Authority depart::rrEntal files 
2 Reports suhnitted to the Manchester City Council and Manchester 
District Council fran the Aerodrane Special Carmi ttee and 
Finance Conmittee, 1929-1955; fram the AiIport Carmittee, 
including observations of the Finance Committee, 1956-1973. 
3 Reports suhnitted to the Manchester AiIport Joint Carmittee and 
Manchester International AiIport Authority fran the AiIport 
Director / Chief Executive; the Joint Treasurers; Routine 
Treasurer; Personnel Officer; Joint Honorary Secretaries; 1973-
1984. 
4 Reports suhnitted to the Aerodrane Special Coomittee/AiIport 
Conmittee fran the Airport Manager/AiIport Director; Town 
Clerk; City Surveyor ; City Treasurer (including joint reports), 
1929-1973. 
5 Reports fran the City Treasurer to the Finance Carmi ttee of the 
Manchester Corporation, 1963-1969 and to the Finance Carmittee 
of the Manchester International AiIport Authority, 1981. 
6 Minutes of the Manchester Corporation Airport Special 
Committee, 1929-1955 and the AiIport Committee, 1956-1973. 
7 Minutes of the Manchester AiIport Joint Committee, 1974 and the 
Manchester International AiIport Authority, 1976-1981. 
8 Minutes of the Manchester District Policy Committee, 1973. 
9 Minutes of the Greater Manchester County Council Policy 
Conmittee, 1973. 
10 Minutes of the Manchester Corporation Parliarrentary Sub-
Conmittee, 1928. 
11 Minutes of the Special Sub-Carmittee of the AiIport Committee, 



















Minutes of the Manchester International AiIport Authority 
Staffing Sub-Carnmittee, 1981-1982. 
Minutes of the Manchester AiIport Joint Consultative Carmittee 
1979-1980. ' 
Minutes of the Manchester AiIport Consultative Carmittee 1972-
1979. ' 
Manchester AiIport, Technical Report, c1962 and Annual Reports 
of the Manchester International AiIport, 1969-1982/3. 
Chart~ I~stitute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Costs 
and StatiStlCS of IDeal Authority AiIports, 1977/78· Accounts 
and Statistics of Local Authority AiIports, 1978/79-1985/86. 
Greater Manchester County, Abstract of Accounts, years ending 
31 March 1975 to 31 March 1978; Annual Report and Accounts, 
1979-1980. 
Manchester Town. Hall 
Reports of the Aerodrome Special Ccmni ttee/Airport Carmi ttee and 
the Town. Clerk to the Establishment Committee 1923-1972. 
Minutes of the Establishment Committee 1923-1972 and the 
Appeals Sub-Cammittee, 1961-1964. 
Minutes and Reports to the Council of the Officials Conditions 
of Service Committee, 1907-1922. 
Minutes of the Workmens' Special Committee, 1924-1932. 
Epitome of Council Proceedings, 1965/6-1973/4. 
City of Manchester, Abstract of Accounts, 1928/9-1973/4 and 
Estimates, 1965/6-1973/4. 
Other Archives 
Arralganated Engineering Union, National Cammittee, 1~43-1~55 
and Arralganated Union of Engineering Workers. (Engm~rmg 
Section) National Ccmnittee, 1975-1977, Executl.ve Camu.ttee 
Reports. 
Clerical and .Administrative Workers Union, North Western Area 
Council, Reports on the Trade MQverneIlts and r::regotiations, ~954 
_ April 1972 and Association of Professl.onal, Executl.ve, 
Clerical and Computer Staffs, Reports, May 1972-1979. 
CCl1MAND PAPERS 
1931, Crnnd 3909, Royal Commission on the Civil Service. 
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1934, Qnnd 4654, Merrorandum on the Report of the Ccmnittee on 
the Control of Private Flying and other Civil Aviation 
Questions, together with the Report of the Ccmni ttee and 
appendices thereto. 
1937, Qnnd 5351, Report of the Ccmnittee to consider the 
Developnent of Civil Aviation in the United Kingdan. 
1938, Qnnd 5685, Report of the Ccmnittee of Inquiry into Civil 
Aviation and observations of liM GoveD1ItEl1t thereon. 
1945, Qnnd 6605, British Air Transport 
1945, Qnnd 6712, British Air Services 
1955, Omnd 9613, Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1953-
1955. 
1963, Qnnd 2162, lDca.l Authority Borrowing 
1966, Cmnd 3034, National Board for Prices and Ineanes, The Pay 
of Industrial Civil Servants, Report No18. 
1967, Qnnd 3230, National Board for Prices and Ineanes, The Pay 
and Conditions of Manual Workers in IDeal Authori ties, the 
National Health Service, Gas and Water Supply, Report Na29. 
1967 , Cmnd 3311, National 13oa.I:d for Prices and Ineanes, 
Producti vi ty Agreements, Report No36. 
1968 , Crnnd 3623, Royal Carrmission on Trade Unions and 
Employers' Associations, 1965-1968. 
1969, c::rrnd 4018, British Air Transport in the Seventies, Report 
of the Carmittee of Inquiry into Civil Air Transport. 
1969, c::rrnd 4213, Civil Aviation Policy. 
1978, Cmnd 7084, Airports Policy. 
1980, Standing Carmission on Pay Ccmparabi I ity , Report Na6, 
Municipal Airports, Manual Workers. 
1984, Cmnd 9366, Airline Competition Policy. 
1985, c::rrnd 9542, Airports Policy. 
III OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
1927, Air Ministry, '!be Progress of British Civil Aviation. 
1935, Parliamentary debates, House of ccmocms, Vol 298, No53 
(Col 2134-2136). 
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1938, Depart:mant of Civil Aviation, Air Ministry The Civil 
Aviation Statistical and Technical Review 1937. ' 
1939, Air Transport Licensing Authority, Applications of 
Railway Air Se:r:vices Limited to operate between wndon and 
Glasgow with inte:rmediate landings. Proof of evidence of Mr HA 
Baerlein, Manchester Chamber of Ccmnerce. 
1939, Minister of Health and IDeal Government, Financial 
Statistics, England and Wales 1936-37, Part II, IDeal 
Authorities in wndon and County Boroughs. 
1948, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Civil Aviation Report, 1946 
and 1947. 
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ended 31 March 1963, HC297, Session 1962-3. 
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IDeal Gove:r:nment (Redcliffe-Maud Report) . 
1970, Departm:mt of Trade and Industry, passeng:rs ~t Airports 
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8 June - 4 October. 
1971, Civil Aviation Act. 
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1974, IDeal Government Training Ibard Report. 
1975, Civil Aviation Authority, CAP 372 '!he Develnrm.ont of th 
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1975, Civil Aviation Authority, CAP 375, Annual Statistics, 
1973. 
1975, Civil Aviation Authority, CAP 373, Airport Developrent in 
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19?6,. Department of ~ans!X>rt, Airport Strategy for Great 
Br1 tain, Part 2 The Reg10nal Airports: A Consultative Docl.mEnt. 
1976, Civil Aviation Authority, CAP 394, Passengers at Major 
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1976/7. 
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